A20-1038 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed January 11, 2021

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1038

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

L. J. and T. L., Parents.

Filed January 11, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-JV-19-707

Bill L. Thompson, Law Office of Bill L. Th ompson, Duluth, Minneso ta (for appellant
father T.L.)

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Benjamin M. Stromber g, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis C ounty Public Health and Human
Services)

Matthew Miller, Cloquet, Minnesota (for respondent mother L.J.)

Alexandra Perron, Duluth, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant father challenges the transfer of his child’s custody to the maternal
grandmother. Because the district court sufficiently addressed the child’s best interests—

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which does not require a balancing of inte rests—and appropriately concluded that a
transfer of custody was necessary, we affirm.
FACTS
When M.L. (the child) was born in March 2019, L.J. (mother) tested positive for
methamphetamine. Mother admitted to recently using the drug. St. Louis County Public
Health and Human Services (t he county), responding to a child protection report,
developed a safety plan that required both mother and child to stay at the child’s maternal
grandmother’s house following th e birth. But the next week mother and appellant T.L.
(father) left grandmother’s house with the child without permission.1 When they returned,
both parents appeared to be under the influence of drugs. The county filed a child in need
of protection or services (CHIPS) petition due to the parent’s ongoing drug use. After an
emergency protective care hearing, the district court awarded temporary legal and physical
custody of the child to the county. The child continued to live in the care of grandmother.
In July 2019, the district court adjudicated the CHIPS petition and adopted case plans for
reunification for both parents.
In September 2019, the county filed a petiti on to transfer the child’s custody to
grandmother. Two months late r, father filed a competing petition to transfer custody to
himself. Shortly thereafter, mother voluntarily agreed to a transfer of custody.2

1 T.L. was adjudicated father of the child in November 2019.
2 At a pretrial hearing in February 2020, moth er testified via letter that the transfer of
custody was in the child’s be st interests. She did no t take a position on whether
grandmother or father should have custody.

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In June and July 2020, a two-day trial took place to consider the competing petitions
to transfer permanent physical and legal cu stody of the child. Father, grandmother, the
social worker, the guardian ad litem, and ch aracter witnesses for father, including his
ex-wife and adult daughter, all testified.
With regard to his petition, father testif ied about his previous success as a parent, 3
and noted his care and commitment to the child through his supervised visits with her. The
county social worker commende d father’s ability to visit th e child, noted that he “cares
about her a lot,” and that they have a good relationship. But the social worker said father
was one of the most difficult clients she has wo rked with due to his resistance to changes
in his lifestyle. The bulk of the social worker’s testimony detailed how father did not fulfill
his case plan, including completing only six of the 20 required urinalysis tests (UAs) to
prove maintained sobriety. 4 The social worker also tes tified to father’s refusal to
participate in a domestic abuse intervention program despite a misdemeanor conviction for
domestic abuse in 2005, a conviction of di sorderly conduct in 2013, and exhibiting
aggressive and inappropr iate behavior toward the social worker. Ultimately, the social
worker said she could not recommend father for custody of the child due to his

3 Father’s 19-year-old daughter testified that he was a “g reat dad” who has “always been
there” for her. She also noted that she had ne ver seen him use drugs and that there were
no concerns about his treatment of others in the household.
4 Of the six tests father did submit, one tested positive for methamphetamine and THC,
while another was rejected because the urine was much colder than body temperature,
suggesting it was tampered with. Because the district court views missed tests as positive,
the court deemed father to have tested positive more than 78% of the time.

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unwillingness to follow his case plan and “show that he’s actually made changes in his life
and show sobriety.”
As for grandmother’s fitness to parent, th e social worker highlighted the bond and
attachment between grandmother and the ch ild. She also emphasized grandmother’s
efforts to work through the child’s medical conditions, including routine doctor visits and
finding a pediatric specialist. Grandmother, in her own testimony, did admit to a series of
shoplifting offenses in the prio r decade, but noted this was her only criminal history and
that it was during a diffi cult time in her life. She also de scribed her efforts to maintain a
healthy home for the child, including contacting child protection services before her birth.
While she stated she was “not a big fan” of father,5 grandmother reiterated that she wanted
both parents to maintain contact with the child and would work with them toward that goal,
but expressed a need for safety and sobriety.
Witnesses agreed that the child was doing well. The gua rdian ad litem testified to
the child’s health and positive in teractions with both grandmother and father. But father,
over the 15 months, had been unable to move beyond supervised visits. And the guardian
ad litem expressed concern with a transfer to father’s custody due in part to the fact that he
has never had full-time custody.
After hearing the testimony, the district court ordered transfer of legal and physical
custody of the child to grandmother, subject to continued regular contact (via the current

5 An order for protection (OFP) against father on behalf of grandmother, granted because
father sent grandmother sexually explicit vide os of her daughter (mother), lapsed prior to
the trial.

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supervised visitation schedule) with father. In reaching this conclusion, the district court
explained that father had the ability to comply with reunification efforts set out in his case
plan, but chose not to, noting his resistance to both the plan and his own delayed efforts to
establish paternity. The district court furthe r expressed concern with father’s periods of
incarceration and extensive probation violati ons which, it stated, do not “bode well for
[father’s] ability to provide stability for his child.” In addressing the child’s best interests,
the district court stated that father’s “unaddressed chemical dependency, mental health, and
domestic violence issues make it impossible to conclude that it would be in the best
interests of the child to be placed in the care of her father.”
With regard to grandmother, however, the district court stated that an analysis of the
best interests factors supported a transfer of custody. The district court noted:
[The child’s] medical and developmental needs are being met.
She is fully integrated into [grandmother’s] home and is
strongly bonded with her grandmother. Disrupting that
connection and removing the child from the only home she has
ever known would not be in her best interests.

Father appeals.

DECISION
Father argues that the record is insuffi cient to support—by clear and convincing
evidence—that a transfer of custody is in the child’s best interests. To support this, he first
points to the district court’s lack of bala ncing the best interests factors required by
Minnesota Statutes section 260C .301, subdivision 7 (2018). We review this question of
statutory interpretation de novo. Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019).
Second, father asserts that the evidence overall (particularly in light of the grandmother’s

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testimony about him) belies the district court’ s best interests analysis. We review the
district court’s decision to transfer custody for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of
C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Minn. App. 201 8). We observe that in making these
arguments, father does not assert that any of the district court’s factual findings are clearly
erroneous.
To frame our review, we begin by highli ghting the paramount consideration in all
juvenile protection proceedings: “the health, safety, and best interests of the child.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2018) (emphasi s added). And when making the difficult
decision about a child’s permanent placement, the legislature has expressed a preference
for relatives where the child cannot remain with a parent. Minn. Stat. § 259.57, subd. 2(c)
(2018). As a result, the district court “may order permanent legal and physical custody to
a fit and willing relative in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4
(2018). In such a permanent custody order, the district court must address:
(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social services
agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the
parent . . . where reasonable efforts are required;
(3) the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to use services to
correct the conditions whic h led to the out-of-home
placement; and
(4) that the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement
have not been correct ed so that the child can safely return
home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a) (2018). Each of th e four statutory criteria must be proved by
“clear and convincing evidence.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). With this
standard in mind, we turn to father’s arguments.

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I. An explicit balancing of best interests is not required to support a transfer of
legal custody.

Father challenges only the first of the four requirements of section 260C.517(a)—
asserting that the district court did not adeq uately address how the child’s best interests
were served by the transfer of custody. Father does not challenge the individual findings,
but instead asserts that the district court’s decision is erroneous for failing to include the
“required” balancing of factors, including the child’s interest in preserving her relationship
with her father and father’s interest in preserving his relationship with his child.
But the explicit balancing of interests a pproach father refers to applies to a
termination of parental rights petition, not a tr ansfer of custody petiti on. Father cites to
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdi vision 7 and Minnesota Rules of Juvenile
Protection Procedure 58.04(c)(2)(ii ), but all of this language is limited to termination of
parental rights. Here, we note the district court explicitly did not find a termination of
father’s parental rights to be in the child’s best interests. Instead, the district court said that
it was in the child’s best interests to maintain a relationship with father through continued
visitation.
Because the termination-centered analysis does not apply to th is transfer-of-legal-
custody proceeding, the district court did not err by failing to use it.6

6 Cf. In re Paternity of B.J.H., 573 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 1998) (noting that the best
interests factors of Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1 (1996) used to address
custody disputes between “p arents” and were not dispositive in resolving conflicting
presumptions of parentage).

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in transferring legal and physical
custody to grandmother.

Father further argues that the district court’s findings do not adequately support the
conclusion that a transfer of cu stody was in the child’s best in terests, and that this court
should remand for more fact finding. He asserts that remand is particularly necessary given
testimony from grandmother. To be adequate, the district court’s best-interests findings
must provide insight into which facts or opin ions were most persuasive for the district
court’s ultimate decision and demonstrate the district court’s comprehensive consideration
of the statutory criteria. In re Welfare of M.M., 452 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990).
Here, the district court’s best-interests determination is supported by evidence in the
record. This includes: that grandmother has been caring for the child in out-of-home
placement for effectively child’s entire life, and that they share a strong bond; that father’s
chemical dependency issues , including his admitted failure to comply with the UAs, 7
would be liable to “interfere with his parenting ability”; and that due to his extensive history
of probation violations, it does not “bode well for [father’s] ability to provide stability for
his child.” Additionally, the district cour t concluded that the unaddressed issues of
domestic abuse in the home of father may adve rsely affect the child’s safety, well-being,
and development. Ultimately, the district court found that as the conditions that led to the
need for the child’s placement had not been corrected, and further that father, after 15
months, was unable to move past supervised visitation, it was not in the best interests of

7 The district court also noted that the UAs were father’s o pportunity to demonstrate that
“illegal drug use was not an impediment to him caring for his child.”

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the child to transfer custody to father. This determination, with its underlying findings, is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 260C.517(a).
Still, father argues that grandmother’s testimony should have raised “huge
concerns” over what is in the child’s best interests, due to her admitting that she was “not
a big fan” of father, and that she had not contacted him with updates on the child. But, not
only was there a two-year OFP that prevented father and grandmother from communicating
until shortly before the hearing, grandmother agreed that he should still be able to see the
child. The district court, in a careful order considering the child’s best interests, explicitly
retained jurisdiction in order to ensure that the child continued to have contact with her
father through visitations that would be at least as frequent as the schedule currently in
place.
In sum, the district court’s transfer of legal and physical custody to grandmother,
while maintaining visitation with father, is within the district court’s wide discretion and a
proper application of the law.
Affirmed.