Jomari E Alexander, Sr., Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1055

Jomari E Alexander, Sr.,
Appellant,

Majestic Dreams Holding Co., Plaintiff,

vs.

Laurie Ball, Respondent.

Filed June 1, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-19-17264

Jomari E. Alexander, Sr., Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Jeffrey M. Markowitz, William J. McNulty, Bradley L. Idelkope, Arthur Chapman,
Kettering, Smetak and Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment and
dismiss his defamation claim. We conclude th at because the statements are substantially
true, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.

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FACTS
In August 2019, respondent Laurie Ball hired appellant Jomari Alexander and his
company, Majestic Dreams Holding Co., to perform wo rk on a townhome she had
purchased. Alexander offered Ball certain di scounts and agreed to paint the ceilings,
laundry room, and bathroom, as well as make other improvements, such as replacing light
fixtures. Alexander began pa inting, and Ball purchased a ba throom light for $100 which
Alexander installed for $250. Shortly after, a dispute arose between the parties. Ball was
unhappy with the quality of Alexander’s work, and Alexander felt Ball was being
unreasonable in her behavior and demands. Alexander sent Ball an invoice but Ball refused
to pay. Alexander then informed Ball that he would revoke the offered discounts and
enforce the contract in court if Ball continued to refuse to pay. Ball sent Alexander photos
of the areas that were either not painted or painted incorrectly, and the parties continued to
discuss the possibility of going to court. Al exander eventually ag reed to repaint and
address Ball’s concerns, but warned Ball that if she was disrespectful to him, he would
revoke her discounts for “creating a hostile work environment.” Alexander repainted and
remedied the areas of concern, and Ball paid him for the work he completed.
Ball then posted the following online review:1
We hired Painting Simplified. I was contacted immediately
and they started immediately th e following week to paint our
new townhome that we just pur chased. Seemed very nice
couple [sic]. From start to finish it took almost a month to
complete. The owner was sick so it took longer than planned.
The team included [Alexander (the owner), his wife], and their
son. They were hired to pa int my popcorn ceilings and my

1 Majestic Dreams Holding Co. sometimes does business as Painting Simplified.

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laundry room. I also was going to hire them to repaint my
garage but now have decide d we will do it ourselves. Along
with that I had them replace a bathroom light (which cost me
$350 to do and I even bought the light) , replace a toilet and
replace the inside fixture of anot her toilet, replace six electric
cans with new ones ($360), and a few minor repairs. The
following week I returned to our townhome where my ceilings
were very spotty and streaked where they had painted. They
said their son was just learning and would fix it up to make it
right. After they left I was cleaning my cupboards and saw so
many spots that were either not pa inted or as they said didn’t
cover because they were trouble spots because of the normal
wear and tear of cooking in a kitc hen. In short it took at least
two more times to get it right but it was almost through going
to court. They said I was a hostile person because I refused to
pay them the remainder of the bill even though the ceilings as
pictured showed they were not done correctly. They also
threatened to charge me more fo r work that they promised to
do in the first place saying they had to come back to make it
right. I told them it should have been done right from the first
time. One of the things they did when they touched up is used
two different whites. That was not my problem that was their
mistake. However it became my problem and I was being
hostile because I refused them to pay them until it was done
correctly. I never ever raised my voice but told them that I was
very frustrated with the work manship and quality of work.
Also my laundry room was done so poorly. No effort by their
son to even stretch his arms to try to get behind anything such
as a furnace or water softener where there were at least six
inches behind to reach it. [A lexander] did come back and fix
my ceilings and repainted the areas in my laundry room. That’s
after the fact he threaten to [sic] take me to court and I said I
would be happy to show the judge the workmanship of the
painting. He did come back and I paid the bill and happy to be
done with them.

(Emphasis added.)

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On October 11, 2019, Alexander filed a complaint against Ball alleging that the
online review amounted to defamation per se.2 Both parties moved for summary judgment.
In relevant part, the district court considered three statements from the review.3 The district
court determined that the statement “[a]long with that I had them replace a bathroom light
(which cost me $350 to do and I even bought th e light)” is substantially true because the
entire job cost $350 and Ball di d buy the light. The district court determined that the
statement “[t]hey said I was a hostile person” is substantially similar to stating that Ball
“created a hostile work environment,” which Alexander acknowledged saying. The district
court also determined that the statement “[t]hey also threatened to charge me more for work
that they promised to do in the first place saying they had to come back to make it right” is
substantially true because Alex ander did threaten to revoke discounts. The district court

2 Alexander later amended his complaint to include Majestic Dreams Holding Co. as a
plaintiff. On appeal, Alexander attempts to appear pro se on behalf of himself and Majestic
Dreams. But Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 143.06 requires that all briefs,
motions, notices, and petitions filed with this court be signed by a li censed attorney with
the exception that self-represented litigants may sign only for themselves. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 143 advisory comm. cmt. (2016). Additionally, “[i]t is well settled under
Minnesota common law that a co rporation must be represente d by an attorney in legal
proceedings.” Save Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park , 699 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn.
2005). Because Alexander is not a licensed atto rney, we limit this appeal to Alexander’s
personal claims.
3 The district court considered seven statements from the review, but Alexander’s principal
brief concerns only three of t hose statements. We need not address the other statements.
Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda , 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010) (discussing the
principle that issues not raised or argued in an appellant’s principal brief cannot be raised
in a reply brief); Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 654 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn.
App. 2002) (“If an argument is raised in a reply brief but not raised in an appellant’s main
brief, and it exceeds the scope of the respondent’s brief, it is not properly before this court
and may be stricken from the reply brief.”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).

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concluded that no question of fact remained regarding the truth of any of the three
statements and granted summary judgment in Ball’s favor.
Alexander then moved for reconsideration and the district court granted the request.
In its following order, the district court ex plained that, under the substantial truth test,
statements are incapable of carrying a defamatory meaning if any reasonable person could
find the alleged defamatory statements to be supportable interpre tations of what was
actually stated. The district court applied the substantial truth test and declined to change
its decision. Alexander appeals.
DECISION
Alexander argues that the district court erred when it determin ed that the three
statements in question are tr ue. Because the statements in questions are reasonable
interpretations of undisputed facts, we agree with the district court that the statements are
substantially true and incapable of carrying a defamatory meaning.
Among other elements, a plaintiff pursuing a defamation claim must prove that the
defendant made “a false and defamato ry statement about the plaintiff.” Maethner v.
Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2019); see also McKee v. Laurion, 825
N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. 2013) (“The plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity in order to
establish a successful defamation claim.”). “T ruth is a complete defense to a defamation
action and true statements, however disparaging, are not actionable.” McKee, 825 N.W.2d
at 730 (quotation omitted). “If the statement is true in substance, minor inaccuracies of
expression or detail are immaterial,” and “do not amount to falsity so long as the substance,
the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge is justified.” Id. (citations omitted). We apply the

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“substantial truth test” to determine whether a statement is true in a defamation action. See
id.; Bebo v. Delander, 632 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Oct.
16, 2001). Under that test, a statement that has multiple interpretations is not defamatory,
if one reasonable interpretation of the statement is substantially true:
A commentator who advocates one of several feasible
interpretations of some event is not liable in defamation simply
because other interpretations exist. Consequently, remarks on
a subject lending itself to multiple interpretations cannot be the
basis of a successful defamation action because as a matter of
law no threshold showing of “f alsity” is possible in such
circumstances. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S.
485, 512-13, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1966, (1984) (allegedly
defamatory criticism of speaker system in consumer magazine
not actionable because criticis m was “‘one of a number of
possible rational interpretations’ of an event ‘that bristled with
ambiguities’ and descriptive challenges for the writer”)
(quoting Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290, 91 S. Ct. 633,
639, 28 (1971)); Washington [v. Smith, 893 F. Supp. [60,] 64
[(D.D.C. 1995)] (allegedly defa matory assessment in sports
preview magazine of plaintiff’s coaching ability inactionable
because “[r]easonable minds can interpret the statistics
[interpreted by commentator] differently”).

Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. June
19, 1996). “[T]he substantial truth test is broad: if any reasonabl e person could find the
statements to be supportable interpretations of their subjects, the statements are incapable
of carrying a defamatory meaning, even if a reasonable jury could find that the statements
were mischaracterizations.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
“[S]ummary judgment is mandatory against a party who fails to establish an essential

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element of the claim, if that party has the burden of proof, be cause this failure renders all
other facts immaterial.” Bebo, 632 N.W.2d at 737. We review the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo “to determine whethe r genuine issues of material fact exist
and whether the district court correctly applied the law.” McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 729. In
addition, “the question of whether a statement is substantially accurate is one of law for the
court.” Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. , 390 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. App.
1986).
In this case, Alexander argues that the district court erred because he believes that a
question of fact exists regarding whether each of the three statements is true or false. We
are not convinced. Alexander’s argument does not recognize the substantial truth test, and
contrary to his argument, we cannot apply a different test. Moreover, we discern no
genuine issues of material fact in applying the substantial truth te st; each of the three
challenged statements is substantially true. We address each statement in turn.
In her review, Ball commented that “[a]long with that I had them replace a bathroom
light (which cost me $350 to do and I even bought the light).” Alexander does not dispute
that Ball paid him $250 to install a light and that the light cost her an additional $100 to
purchase. Instead, Alexander argues that the statement is defamatory because one possible
interpretation of the true statement is fals e. Specifically, Alexander argues that the
statement could be interpreted to mean that Ball paid Alexander $350 to install the light in
addition to the cost of the lig ht, which would be fa lse. Applying the proper test, the
statement is substantially true because a reasonable person could conclude that Ball spent
$350 to replace the light. In other words, because a “reasonable person could find [Ball’s]

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statements to be supportable interpretations of their subjects, the statements are incapable
of carrying a defamatory meaning.” Hunter, 545 N.W.2d at 707 (quotations omitted).4
Ball also made the statement that Alexander “said I was a hostile person because I
refused to pay them the remainder of the bill even though the ceilings as pictured showed
they were not done correctly.” Alexander claims this statement is false because he did not
call her “a hostile person,” but instead told he r that she created a hostile environment. 5
Again, we disagree. The distinction betwee n calling someone a particular kind of person
and saying that that person creates that particular kind of environment is a minor difference.
See Jadwin, 390 N.W.2d at 441 (“If the statement is true in substance, inaccuracies of
expression or detail are immaterial.”). The tw o statements are substantially similar such
that a reasonable person could interpret a claim that Alexander called Ball a hostile person
as consistent with a claim that Alexander told Ball that she created a hostile environment.
Last, Ball commented that “[t]hey also threatened to charge me more for work that
they promised to do in the fi rst place saying they had to come back to make it right.”

4 While the substantial truth test is dispositive, we also note that this statement is not
defamatory. “In order for a statement to be defamatory, it must tend to harm the plaintiff’s
reputation and lower him in the estimation of the community.” McKee, 825 N.W.2d at
731. “Whether a defamatory meaning is conveyed depends upon how an ordinary person
understands the language used in the light of surrounding circumstances.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “The question of whether a st atement’s language r easonably conveys a
defamatory meaning is one of law.” Id. Alexander stated that charging $350 to install the
light was very reasonable by industry standards. Charging someone a reasonable price
does not harm Alexander’s reputation or lower him in the estimation of the community.
5 Ball argues that because she interpreted Al exander’s statement as calling her a hostile
person, her statement is pure opinion protected by the First Amendment. See Hunter, 545
N.W.2d at 707. We need not decide whether calling some one hostile is a statement of
opinion because saying that someone called another person hostile is a statement of fact.

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Alexander asserts that this statement is false because he says he only threatened to revoke
a previously promised discount; he did not threaten to increase the cost of his work. The
distinction made by Alexander is not sufficient to raise a question of fact regarding the
truth of Ball’s statement. Revoking a discoun t is one way that Alexander could increase
the charged amount for his work. Because Ball’s statement is a supportable interpretation
of the undisputed fact, it does not substantially deviate from the truth.
The district court properly applied the law, and we affirm its decision to grant Ball’s
motion for summary judgment of Alexander’s defamation claims.
Affirmed.