Theresa M. Anderson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1056

Theresa M. Anderson,
Appellant,

vs.

MidFirst Bank,
Respondent,

Collection Resource LLC, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed June 1, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-18-10763

Theresa M. Anderson, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Melissa L.B. Porter, Gary J. Evers, Davi d R. Mortensen, Shapiro & Zielke, LLP,
Burnsville, Minnesota (for respondent MidFirst Bank)

Jack E. Pierce, Bernick Lifson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Collection
Resource LLC and Kent Rossman)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant brought two claims: one to vaca te the foreclosure of her home by her
creditor, and the other against the other two respondents who hold an interest in her former
home. Appellant claims the district court improperly dismissed both claims. Because we
conclude no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the creditor properly
foreclosed on appellant’s property and that a ppellant lacks standing to bring suit against
the other two respondents, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, respondent MidFirst Bank (the bank) became the assignee of a mortgage
granted by appellant-mortgagor Theresa M. Anderson in co nnection with the purchase of
a home, properly registered in Hennepin County, in 2008.
Due to Anderson’s failure to make monthl y mortgage payments since July 2012, the
bank foreclosed and purchased the property at a sheriff’s sa le on January 2, 2018. After
the statutory six month redemption period
1 expired without Anderson redeeming the
property, respondent Collection Resource 2 redeemed the property from the bank.
Collection Resource then conveyed the property to the third respondent, Kent Rossman.

1 “When lands have been sold in conformity w ith the preceding sections of this chapter,
the mortgagor, the mortgagor’s personal representatives or assigns, within six months after
such sale . . . may redeem such lands.” Minn. Stat. § 580.23, subd. 1(a) (2020).
2 Collection Resource held a right of redemption as a junior lien holder pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 580.24(a) (2020), which states that “[i]f no redemption is made by the mortgagor
. . . the most senior creditor having a legal or equitable lien upon the mortgaged premises
. . . and each subsequent creditor having a lien may redeem, in the order of priority of their

3
Anderson, proceeding pro se , filed an amended complaint 3 against the bank
contesting the foreclosure and against Coll ection Resource and Ro ssman contesting the
redemption of the property fo llowing the foreclosure. The bank moved for summary
judgment, which the district court granted. The district court later granted Collection
Resource and Rossman’s rule 12 motion to dismiss. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court properly granted the bank summary judgment.
The district court granted the bank summary judgment on all of Anderson’s claims.4
The district court determined Anderson had received proper notice of the bank’s
foreclosure and that the bank’s delinquent payment demand was proper. Anderson argues
this was an error because genuine issues of material fact exist as to two issues: whether the
bank properly served her w ith notice of the default a nd whether the bank improperly
demanded payment of “previously-excused” monthly payments.
Appellate courts review a district court’s ruling on motions for summary judgment
de novo. See Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc. , 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017).
Granting summary judgment is appropriate wher e there are no genuine issues of material

respective liens, within seven days after th e time allowed the prior lienholder by paying
the amount required under this section.”
3 The original complaint named the bank as the sole defendant.
4 Anderson alleged negligence, fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, wrongful foreclosure, improper accounting, and quiet title against the bank. The
district court, in granting the bank summary judgment on all claims, determined that “there
is no genuine issue on the validity of the foreclosure proceeding initiated by the bank and
the resulting sheriff’s sale” and therefore “d ismiss[ed] all claims” against the bank.
Anderson seeks only review of the district court’s foreclosure decision.

4
fact and the district court correctly applied the law. Id. The nonmoving party cannot rely
on averments or denials set forth in its pleadi ngs, and instead must offer particular facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69-71
(Minn. 1997) (stating that nonmoving part y must produce “substantial evidence” to
establish genuine issue of material fact). There is no genuine issue of material fact “when
the nonmoving party presents evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a
factual issue and which is not sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case to permit reasonable persons to dr aw different conclusions.”
Id. at 71.
A. Notice
Minnesota Statutes section 580.032, subdivision. 4 (2020), states that in foreclosure-
by-advertisement proceedings, “[m]ailed notice is deemed given upon deposit in the United
States mail first class, postage prepaid, and addressed to the person requesting notice.”
(Emphasis added.) The mortgage Anderson signed includes a similar requirement, stating
“any notice that must be given to Borrower under this Note will be given by delivering it
or by mailing it by first class mail to Borrower.”
The record reflects that the bank sent Anderson a letter by certified mail in August
2017, stating that Anderson was “presently in default due to [her] failure to make required
monthly mortgage payments,” and that she must pay “past due monthly mortgage payments
from [April 2017] through [August 2017], late charges, and allowable fees” to cure the
default. It also stated that if this am ount was not paid by Sept ember 13, 2017, “[the]
property will be sold at a foreclosure sale and you may be required to vacate the premises.”

5
A notice of delivery was left at Anderson ’s home and the certifie d letter, which was
unclaimed, was returned to sender approximately one month following the delivery.
The district court concluded that the “t he United States Postal Service attempted
delivery of the August 7, 20 17 default notice to the Pr operty, but when the intended
recipient could not be found, it left a notice regarding the mail. The mail went unclaimed
for approximately a month before it was sent back to the sender.” The record supports this
conclusion. The district court determined that Anderson’s “mere assertion that she did not
receive” the notice was not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. In support,
the district court cited Nemo v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. and Hotel and Restaurant Emp. Local
No. 556, 35 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn. 1948), which states that “[i]n the absence of proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that mail properly addressed and posted, with postage prepaid,
is duly received by the addressee.” We agree with this analysis.
Anderson acknowledged in her affidavit that notice of the letter was delivered to her
home and that this letter was a foreclosure notice from the bank, an d that the mail went
unclaimed by her. Her admission establishes that the statutory notice obligation was
satisfied by the bank. Therefore, Anderson, as the party resisting summary judgment, did
not meet her burden of producing “substantial evidence” of a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the notice requirements were satisfied. See DLH, 566 N.W.2d at 70. Mere
allegations that the certified mailing did not satisfy the “first class” mailing requirement of
the statute is not sufficient to create an is sue of material fact to overcome a motion for
summary judgment. See id. at 69-71.

6
B. Payment Demand
Anderson also asserts that the bank’s foreclosure was improper because the bank
demanded previously “excused” payments. The record reveals no evidence of “excused”
payments nor a demand for such payments, if indeed any had been “excused.”
Anderson admits that she made no mont hly payments on the mortgage since 2012
and lived on the property until 2017. After two unsuccessful attempts to foreclose in 2013
and 2016, the bank began its third attempt at foreclosure in 2017 by notifying Anderson by
letter that she “must” begin making monthl y payments on the mortgage from April 2017
to prevent default:
Please accept this lette r as notification that you must
begin making monthly payments on the referenced loan,
including the payment due for April 1, 2017, to prevent a
default under the note and mortgage.

(emphasis added). The bank then sent Anderson monthly mortgage statements from April
2017 through July 2017, identifying the monthly mortgage amount and previously unpaid
amounts following April 2017, which equaled the total amount due.
The mortgage agreement stat es that, if the borrower “d efaults by failing to pay in
full any monthly payment, then [the bank] may, except as limited by regulations of the
Secretary in the case of payment defaults, require immediate payment in full of the
principal balance remaining due and all accrued interest.” By requesting monthly
payments from April 2017, the bank complied with the terms of the mortgage.

7
In summary, because th ere exist no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
bank properly foreclosed the property, the district court’ s decision to grant the bank
summary judgment on all claims is affirmed.
II. The district court properly determined that Anderson did not have standing to
pursue claims against Collection Resource and Rossman.

Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), the district court dismissed Anderson’s
claims5 against Collection Resource and Rossma n on the ground that Anderson lacked
standing. “Standing is a lega l requirement that a party ha ve a sufficient stake in a
justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.” Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326,
329 (Minn. 2007). Whether a party has st anding is a question of law we review de novo.
Builders Ass'n of Minn. v. City of St. Paul, 819 N.W.2d 172, 176 (Minn. App. 2012).
“When real property is sold pursuant to a foreclosure, the mortgagor may redeem
the property within a certain time period after the sale, by paying the amount for which the
property was sold and certain other expenses.” Riverview Muir Duran, LLC v. JADT Dev.
Group, LLC, 776 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Minn. App. 200 9). The relevant time period is six
months, subject to exceptions not here applicable. Minn. Stat. § 580.23 (2020). “When so
recorded, upon expiration of the time for redemption, the [sale] certificate shall operate as
a conveyance to the purchaser or the purchaser’s assignee of all the right, title, and interest
of the mortgagor in and to the premises named therein at the date of such mortgage, without
any other conveyance.” Minn. Stat. § 580.12 (2020).

5 Anderson alleged fraud, ju dgment procured by fraud, sl ander of title, and quiet title
against Collection Resource and Rossman, which relate to the transfer of the property after
foreclosure.

8
Following the expiration of Anderson’s six month rede mption period on July 2,
2018, and her failure to redeem the property, the bank recorded the sheriff’s sale certificate
reflecting its ownership of Anderson’s property, followed by Collection Resource’s
redemption of the property fro m the bank as a junior creditor. Collection Resource then
conveyed the property to Rossman. Because Anderson was divested of her interest in the
title to the property du e to the lapse of the redemption period, and the recording of the
sheriff’s sale certificate conf irmed ownership in the bank, Anderson lacks standing to
pursue claims against Collection Resource or Rossman. The district court properly
dismissed these claims.
Affirmed.