In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Marcus Mable.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1061

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Marcus Mable.

Filed February 8, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-PR-11-2016

Jennifer L. Thon, Steven D. Winkler, Warren J. Maas, Jones Law Office, Mankato,
Minnesota (for appellant Marcus Mable)

Michael K. Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Anna E. Gusaas, Assistant County Attorney,
Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the district court’s order authorizing the involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medications, appellan t raises the following four challenges
to the order: (1) the district court discounted evidence of medication compliance in
determining that he refused treatment; (2) the district court applied an incorrect standard
of proof in determining incapacity; (3) the district court clearly erred in making the factual

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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findings underlying its determination of incapacity; and (4) the district court’s ord er lacks
validity because it did not include sufficiently specific terms. We affirm the district court’s
order authorizing the administration of neuroleptic medications for the following reasons:
(1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that appellant refused
to consent to treatment; (2) the district court properly applied the preponderance -of-the-
evidence standard of proof to the element of incapacity; (3) the district court did not clearly
err in making its factual findings; and (4) the district court satisfied the specificity
requirements and issued a valid order.
FACTS
Civil commitment patient and appellant Marcus Mable is diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. On August 6, 2012, Mabl e was civilly committed
as a person who has a mental illness and is dangerous to the public. The fo llowing year,
he was indeterminately committed . He has been under Jarvis orders1 for the involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medication for several years.
In summer 2019, Mable’s mental-health symptoms improved and he was transferred
to a lower-security facility. But in March of 2020, staff became concerned with Mable’s
symptoms. Mable’s treating psychiatric provider attempted to meet with him regarding an
adjustment in medication, but Mable refused to consider any medication adjustments.
Soon after, Mable refused to meet with his provider and was transferred back to a higher -
security facility. Then , on May 7, 2020, he met with his provider and again refused hi s

1 A Jarvis order authorizes providers to involuntarily administer neuroleptic medications
to a patient.

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neuroleptic medications. To prevent a lapse in medications, his provider filed a Jarvis
petition requesting authorization to administer neuroleptic medication. In the petition, the
provider requested court authorization of the following neuroleptic medications:
Risperidone, Olanzapine, Aripiprazole, Quetiapine, Haloperidol, Fluphenazi ne, and
Perphenazine. For Perphenazine, she requested 12 milligrams (mg) in the morning and 16
mg at bedtime. The treatment plan indicated daily interaction with the nursing staff and
regular meetings with the psychiatric practitioner to monitor and adju st medications as
needed for symptoms.
The district court held a Jarvis hearing and received testimony from Mable, Mable’s
treating psychiatric provider , a court-appointed psychiatric expert, and a court-appointed
forensic psychologist. Mable’s provider, who filed the Jarvis petition, testified as an expert
witness. She testified that she filed the petition because Mable was displaying “increased
paranoia,” “increased perseveration significant mood liability, threatening behaviors,” and
delusional beliefs including that the treatment staff is plotting against him. She explained
that Mable has “long ingrained delusions” that he has fathered over 13 children with female
correctional officers and “other notorious individuals.” She also described his delusio ns
regarding several lawsuits that he believes he has won and that he believes the staff is
plotting against him out of retaliation for grievances that he has filed. She determined that
an increase in medication, which was within the existing Jarvis order, was warranted to
treat these symptoms. She further testified that a combination of neuroleptic medication
had been helping Mable to the point that he could “fully engage in treatment, [was]
accepting of feedback, [and] work[ed] with his treatment providers.” In her testimony, she

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also opined that Mable “has decompensated to a point where his mood has been greatly
affected and he has not been willing to try other neuroleptic medications.”
Regarding the discussion to alter the medications, the provider te stified that Mable
refused to meet with his providers and refused his non-neuroleptic medications for several
days. The provider testified that Mable “does not think that he needs neu roleptic
medications,” instead he “believes that he needs treatment for post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD).” The provider stated that Mable is aware he is in a hospital , under a
Jarvis order, and can be forced to take the medication. While Mable understood the Jarvis
consequences of refusing the medication, the provider testified that Mable did not
understand the psychiatric risks to himself of refusing to take it.
The provider also testified about Mable’s treatment plan. She testified that Mable
is prescribed Perthenazine, otherwise known as Trilafon, and has previously been
prescribed Abilify. Based on Mable’s history, the provider asked the district court to add
other medications including Risperidone at a maximum dosage of 16 mg, and Olanzapine
at a maximum dosage of 40 mg. She testified that she would start at an e ntry dose and,
based on Mable’s response, determine if an adjustment needed to be made. She also
testified that based on Mable’s past compliance and resistance to medication adjustments,
she would be concerned about Mable’s treatment without a Jarvis order. She testified that
Mable’s condition will become worse without a medication adjustment, and that increasing
medications will improve his condition.
A court-appointed expert examined Mable, prepared a report for the hearing , and
testified. This expert diagnosed Mable with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and

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opined that Mable has “delusional ideation” and paranoia about state employees. She
testified that Mable “understands the purpose of the [neuroleptic] medication” but “does
not believe that he needs that medication.” Instead, Mable believes it is to “keep him quiet”
about the stat e’s assaults and maltreatment. This expert opined that Mable’s capacity to
consent is “questionable based on his level of insight and awareness and his
circumstances.” She believed that Mable had the insight into the risks and benefits of the
medication, but did not understand why the medication was required for him personally.
Ultimately, this expert did not support the Jarvis petition because Mable was currently
compliant, making the petition premature.
A second court-appointed expert also testified. This psychologist also examined
Mable and prepared a report. She also diagnosed Mable with schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar type. The second expert also describe d how Mable disagrees with this diagnosis
and believes he should instead be diagnosed with PTSD. She further testified that Mable
is “not competent to make decisions about medication” because “he doesn’t see that he has
any symptoms of his mental illness,” “ [h]e denies having symptoms,” and “ [h]e’s
extremely paranoid and distrustful of medical personnel.” While Mable was willing to
discuss medication with her, he indicated that he does not feel he needs it but that “it did
help him feel calm.” When asked if Mable made a “clear choice” about his treatment, the
second expert responded that it was “hard to have a rational discussion” with Mable
because he is “so paranoid about why he’s there and how people are against him.” The
second expert supported the Jarvis petition.

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Mable also testified. He stated that he would continue taking his medications that
he was currently prescribed, at the current dosage, if the Jarvis petition was not granted.
Mable also testified that he disagreed with his diagnosis and that he should have less
medication and get more therapy to address trauma that he experienced while incarcerated.
He testified that he settled multiple lawsuits through an agreement with the Governor of
Minnesota. Mable also confirmed that if he were not hospitalized, he would take his
medication daily and would seek therapy.
In a written order, the district co urt determined that Mable refused to consent to
treatment and concluded that the Jarvis petition was not premature. In reaching this
determination, the district court considered that Mable is currently “compliant” with his
neuroleptic medication prescription regimen. The district court, however, also considered
evidence that Mable refused to meet with his provider to discuss a change in medication,
Mable “threatened staff” if they increased his medications, and Mable refused to take his
other, non-neuroleptic medications for his seizures and diabetes, which placed “his health
at significant risk.” Balancing this evidence, the district court concluded that Mable
refused treatment, despite his periodic compliance.
Regarding incapacity, the district court fo und that Mable is aware of his situation
and reasons for hospitalization, but does not have insight into the consequences of refusing
neuroleptic medications and does not believe he suffers from mental health symptoms.
Instead, the district court noted that Mable disagrees with his diagnosis of schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar subtype, and believes that he suffers from PTSD that can be treated
through therapy alone. The district court also found that Mable understands the risks and

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benefits of the medica tion and how it may apply to other people, but that he does not
understand the risks and benefits for his own care. The district court further found that
while Mable “has some insight into the fact he suffers from mental illness, and some
willingness to take some prescribed medication, he does not demonstrate a clear choice
that is reasoned and not based on delusion.” Based on a preponderance of the evidence,
the district court found that respondent met its burden to prove incapacity.
Ultimately, the dis trict court granted the Jarvis petition and authorized the
involuntary administration of neuroleptic medications. In its findings of fact, the district
court summarized the specific medication treatment: the provider sought “authorization as
set f orth in the petition to possibly administer Risperidone; Olanz apine; Aripiprazole;
Quetiapine; Halopridol; Flupheanazine; and Perphenazine (Trilafon).” The district court
further found that Mable’s provider “was not seeking authority to administer all of these
medications at once; nor in their maximum doses immediately. Rather, she is seeking to
increase the Trilafon, add the aripiprazole (Abilify); and possibly to then substitute either
or both of those medications.” The district court granted the petition, and authorized “the
use of the neuroleptic medications specifically identified and requested in the Jarvis
Petition.” Mable appeals.
DECISION
I. Consideration of Evidence Regarding Refusal to Consent to Treatment
Mable argues that the district court erred in concluding that he refused neuroleptic
medication because the totality of the circumstances included periods of time during which
he voluntarily took his medications . Because the district court adequately considered

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Mable’s periodic compliance when it wei ghed all of the evidence regarding the
circumstances in this case—including evidence of refusal to take medications and evidence
of recent noncompliance with other aspects of his treatment —we conclude that it did not
abuse its discretion when it determined that Mable refused to consent to treatment with
neuroleptic medication.
Minnesota S tatutes Section 253B (2018) governs the rights and treatment of
civilly committed persons. If a patient is mentally ill and no suitable alternative to
judicial commitment exists, the court “shall commit the patient to the least restrictive
treatment program or alternative programs which can meet the patient ’s treatment
needs.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a). W hen a patient either lacks capacity or
refuses to consent to treatment—such as with neuroleptic medication—court approval is
necessary before medical staff may administer neuroleptic medication involuntarily.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd s. 5, 8. To determine if a patient “refuses to consent” to
treatment, the dis trict court considers the “totality of the recent circumstances
surrounding a patient’s compliance with treatment involving a neuroleptic medication
regimen.” In re Civil Commitment of Breault, 942 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Minn. App. 2020).
Although Mable argue s that we should apply a clearly erroneous standard of
review, Mable does not contest the factual findings made by the district court. Instead,
Mable argues that when the district court considered the totality of the recent
circumstances, the district court did not give sufficient weight to Mable ’s ultimate
willingness to take medications. Because this argument relates to the district court’s
legal conclusion that Mable’s conduct constituted refusal and not to any specific factual

9
finding, we review the dec ision for an abuse of discretion. Compare In re Civil
Commitment of Raboin, 704 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. App. 2005) (noting that we review
the record “ in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision” and affirm “the
district court’s findings un less they are clearly erroneous ”), with In re Welfare of
Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 900-01 (Minn. App. 2011) (noting that an argument
concerning a conclusion drawn from a finding of fact in volves a mixed question of law
and fact , with factual determinations subject to clear error and conclusions of law
reviewed for an abuse of discretion), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Here, the district court made the following uncontested factual findings: Mable
was committed as mentally ill and dangero us in 2012; Mable has been subject to Jarvis
orders on several occasions ; based on three expert opinions, Mable is diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar subtype ; Mable has not accepted this diagnosis and
instead believes that he suffers from PTSD; Mable does not recognize or accept that he
has benefitted from these medications in the past, or that they could help him going
forward; because Mable exhibited recent escalations in his symptoms, his medical
provider prescribed an increased dosage in his neuroleptic medications; when presented
with a potential change in medication, Mable threatened his provider, refused to take the
prescribed neuroleptic medication, and refused other, non-neuroleptic medications and
medical care for several days, placing his health and life at risk; and Mable did eventually
accept the appropriate medical care. These findings are supported by the record.
Mable contests the district court’s conclusion that he refused to consent to treatment.
Mable argues that although he refused to take neuroleptic medications at one point in time,

10
he also ultimately displayed a willingness to do so. Mable relies on Breault to assert that
his periodic compliance—including while under previous Jarvis orders—outweighs the
“limited duration” of his refusal to increase his medication dosage. We disagree for two
reasons. First, we do not reweigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo. E.g., In re
Civil Commitment of Kropp , 895 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. App. 2017), review denie d
(Minn. June 20, 2017); In re Salkin, 430 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 23, 1988). Here, the district court balanced the evidence of Mabel’s periodic
willingness to take medications against the evidence of Mabel’s refusal to do so and
resistance to treatment. We defer to the district court’s weighing of evidence.
Second, Mable misstates Breault. Mable argues that Breault requires a court to
consider a person’s recent willingness to take medication. But this argument overlooks
Breault’s focus on the consistency or inconsistency of a person’s willingness to take
medication, not just on a person’s current or ultimate willingness to do so. 942 N.W.2d at
376. Breault also focuses on treatment more broadly, not on merely taking medications.
Id. Thus, contrary to Mable’s characterization, Breault requires consideration of recent
circumstances surrounding the consistency of a person’s compliance with a treatment
regimen: “This definition of treatment is broader than a patient’s decision to accept or
refuse medication at a singular point in time. . . . [A] patient’s inconsistent compliance
with a medication regimen provides the district court with a ba sis to conclude that he or
she ‘refuses to consent to treatment wi th neuroleptic medications. ’” Id. (quoting Minn.
Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 8(a)).

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Here, the district court concluded that despite Mable’s periodic willingness to take
medications, the balance of the evidence established the legal element of refusal based on
facts showing Mable’s inconsistent behavior and his consistent resistance to treatment of
his mental illness. Based on the record and the uncontested factual findings, we conclude
that the district court’s conclusion is not an abuse of discretion.
II. Standard of Proof Required Regarding Incapacity to Refuse Treatment
Mable contends that the district court erred when it used the statutory
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof as opposed to the clear-and-convincing
standard. Because Minn esota Statutes section 253B.092, subd ivision 6(d), mandates
application of the preponderance -of-the-evidence standard, we conclude that the district
court applied the correct standard of proof.
If a person who is civilly committed as mentally ill and dangerous r efuses to take
neuroleptic medications, the neuroleptic medications may not be adm inistered without a
court order. Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 8(a). If a patient refuses, the district court must
hold a hearing to determine whether the patient has the c apacity to decide whether to take
the medication and whether the administration of the medication is appropriate. Id., subd.
8. Section 253B.092, subdivision 5, guides the district court in determining whether a
patient lacks capacity to make a decision regarding neuroleptic medication. “A patient is
presumed to have capacity to make decisions regarding administration of neuroleptic
medication.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 5(a). Mable argues that the district court
applied the wrong standard of proof to the issue of incapacity. Which standard of proof

12
applies is a legal question subject to de novo review. E.g., C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343,
352 (Minn. 2008).
The statute states unequivocally: “ the petitioner has the burden of proving
incapacity by a preponderance of the evidence .” Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 6(d)
(emphasis added). Mable’s argument that this court should disregard the legislature’s clear
pronouncement rests on opinions applying the clear-and-convincing standard of proof. See
In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Minn. App. 2003) ( “The record provides clear and
convincing evidence to support the district court’s finding that appellant lacked the capacity
to make determinations concerning neuroleptic medications.”); In re Peterson, 446 N.W.2d
669, 672 (Minn. App. 1989) (“[T]he legislature intended that persons seeking to administer
neuroleptic medications must prove by clear and convincing evidence that such medication
is necessary.” (emphasis omitted)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989).
We conclude that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies. While
Peterson applied the clear -and-convincing standard , that decision predates the 1997
statutory provision in subdivision 6 setting forth the preponderance burden for proof of
incapacity. 1997 Minn. Laws ch. 217, art. 1, § 60, at 2159 -60. When this court decided
Peterson, “the legislature required court approval to administer neuroleptic medications in
certain instances, but did not indicate whether the [standard] of proof should be clear and
convincing or another standard.” Peterson, 446 N.W.2d at 672 (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.09, subd. 1 (1988) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that a proposed patient
is mentally ill, developmentally disable d, or chemically dependent ) and Minn. Stat.

13
§ 253B.18, subd. 1 (1988) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that a proposed patient
is mentally ill and dangerous)).
Following Peterson, the legislature adopted subdivision 6(d), expressly providing
that for purposes of administration of neuroleptic medications, a mere preponderance was
needed to prove the element of incapacity, partially abrogating Peterson. 1997 Minn. Laws
ch. 217, art. 1, § 60, at 2159 -60. The legislature did not change the s tandard of proof
required under section 253B.09, subdivision 1 , or section 253B.18, subdivision 1. 1997
Minn. Laws ch. 217, art. 1, §§ 55, at 2158; 86, at 2173 . Both subdivisions still require
clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.09, subd. 1 (2018), 253B.18, subd. 1
(2018). In addition, the holding in Peterson applied more generally, requiring clear and
convincing proof “that such medication is necessary.” 446 N.W.2d at 672. Peterson did
not address the incapacity element singled out by the legislature when it enacted section
253B.092, subdivision 6(d). Id. Finally, the evidence in Peterson was sufficient to
establish incapacity by clear -and-convincing proof, so the evidence also necessarily
satisfied the preponderance standard. Id.; see also, Thulin, 660 N.W.2d at 145 (concluding
that clear and convincing evidence supported determination of incapacity).
Absent precedent that expressly invalidates the standard of proof set forth in
subdivision 6(d), we conclude that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to
the finding of incapacity.

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III. Factual Findings Underlying Determination of Incapacity
Mable also challenges the district court’s findings of fact underlying its conclusion
that he lacked capacity to refuse treatment .2 Specifically, Mable argues that he has
sufficient awareness of the nature of his illness and the consequences of refusing treatment.
He also argues that he understands the benefits and risks of taking neuroleptic medications
and that his resistance to taking neuroleptic medications is not the product of delusional
reasoning. Because the evidence presented supports the district court’s factual fi ndings,
we conclude that the district court did not clearly err.
To determine incapacity, the district court must consider three factors:
(1) whether the person demonstrates an awareness of the nature
of the person’s situation, including the reasons for
hospitalization, and the possible consequences of refusing
treatment with neuroleptic medications;
(2) whether the person dem onstrates an understanding of
treatment with neuroleptic medications and the risks, benefits,
and alternatives; and
(3) whether the person communicates verbally or nonverbally
a clear choice regarding treatment with neuroleptic
medications that is a reasoned one not based on delusion, even
though it may not be in the person’s best interests.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 5(b). We review “the record in the light most favorable to
the district court’s decision” and “affirm the district court’s findings unless they are
clearly erroneous.” Raboin, 704 N.W.2d at 769.

2 Mable does not challenge the district court’s application of section 253B.092, subdivision
7(c), which requires that, after a determination of incapacity, the district court dete rmine
what a reasonable person would do in the shoes of the incapacitated person, taking into
consideration a non -exhaustive list of factors. Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 7(c) .
Accordingly, our analysis is confined to the disputed facts underlying the determination of
incapacity.

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The evidence presented shows that Mable suffers from delusions, grandiosity,
persecutory beliefs, and impulsivity. Al l three experts testified that Mable’s diag nosis is
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type and that he suffers from delusions. The district court
admitted expert testimony that Mable believes staff is plotting against him and retaliating
against him for filing past grievances. In addition, the expert testimony uniformly showed
that Mable denies any need for neuroleptic medications and the benefits they might produce
for himself. The expert testimony described Mable as experiencing extreme paranoia and
distrust of medical personnel that prevented Mable from having a rational discussion about
his treatment. Moreover, Mable’s own testimony corroborated the expert testimony and
demonstrates Mable’s delusional thoughts regarding the administration of these
medications. Mable continuously state d that he is misdiagnosed with schizoaffective
disorder and maintains that he suffers from PTSD. Mable testified that he disagrees with
his medication, believing therapy to be sufficient. Mable also denied any legitimate basis
for treatment using medications and testified that he believes the medications have been
recommended based on prejudices.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision, we
conclude that the record supports the district court ’s findings that Mable does not
demonstrate an understanding of the consequences of refusing the medication or an
understanding of the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed treatment. In addition,
the testimony presented supports the district court’s finding that Mable did not articulate a
clear, reasoned preference, free from delusion. Given the evidence presented, the district
court did not clearly err.

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IV. Validity of the Order
Mable next argues that the district court’s order authorizing the involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medication is invalid because the order failed to outline a
sufficiently specific course of treatment, including the medication names, dosage amounts,
and treatment duration. We are not persuaded because Mable’s argument mischaracterizes
the district court’s order and misstates the law.
“[A] district court’s order authorizing the involuntary administration of neuroleptic
medication must identify ‘the limits on the hospitals ’ authority to adm inister a course of
treatment.’” Raboin, 704 N.W.2d at 770 (quoting In re Steen, 437 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Minn.
App. 1989)). In this context, “course of treatment” means “a reasonably specific time
period during which a physician may attempt to treat a patient with a reasonably specific
dosage of a particular neuroleptic medication, or an equivalent dosage of another or several
other types of neuroleptic medication.” Steen, 437 N.W.2d at 104. “[O]rders authorizing
the administration of neuroleptic medication must be tailored to the circumstances of the
individual situation . . . some orders will require more specificity on the authorized course
of treatment, wh ile others will require less.” Raboin, 704 N.W.2d at 770 ( quotation
omitted). We review de novo this challenge to the validity of the district court’s order. See
Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc. , 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003) ( “No deference is
given to a lower court on questions of law.”).
First, we conclude that Mable’s argument mischaracterizes the district court’s
findings. Contrary to the argument, the district court specifically listed the requested
medications in its findings of fact . While the order section of the order refers to “the

17
neuroleptic medications specifically identified and requested in the Jarvis Petition,” the
findings listing the medications are sufficiently specific to satisfy the requirements of
Raboin.
Second, we conclude that Mable’s argument misstates the applicable legal
requirements. Mable cites to no authority requiring reversal of an order that is silent
regarding dosage amount. Subdivision 8(h) permits a district court to specify a maximum
dosage, but does not require district courts to do so: “The [district] court may limit the
maximum dosage of neuroleptic medication that may be administered.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.092, subd. 8(h) (emphasis added ). As we stated in Raboin, “ This language is
permissive, not mandatory. . . . [T]he fact that the district court’s order does not identify a
maximum dosage authorized for Raboin’s treatment is not fatal to the order’s validity.”
704 N.W.2d at 770-71 (citation omitted). We see no reason to overrule Raboin.
Likewise, Mable cites to no authority requiring reversal of an order that does not
specify a length of treatment. The district court’s order expires after two years, pursuant
to statute. Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 8(g) (“[T]he [district] court may authorize
treatment of neuroleptic medication for not more than two years, subject to the patient ’s
right to petition the court for review of the order .”). Th is same statutory duration was
sufficient in Raboin, 704 N.W.2d at 770 , and without authority to the contrary, we reach
the same conclusion. See also Steen, 437 N.W.2d at 105 (noting that “[s]ome orders will
require more specificity on the authorized cour se of treatment, whi le others will require
less”).

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We conclude that the district court’s order is valid because it does not lack
specificity regarding the medications authorized, the dosage amounts, or the duration of
Mable’s treatment.
Affirmed.