In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: Y. F., Parent.
The holding in the court’s own words
We conclude that the district court’s determination that Y.F.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- In Re the Children of T.A.A. 702 N.W.2d 703
- 744 N.W.2d 381 not in our corpus
- In Re the Welfare of L.A.F. 554 N.W.2d 393
- In Re the Welfare of J.K. 374 N.W.2d 463
- In Re the Welfare of J.L.L. 396 N.W.2d 647
- In re the Welfare of the Child of J.K.T. 814 N.W.2d 76
- In re the Welfare of the Children of K.S.F. 823 N.W.2d 656
- In Re the Termination of the Parental Rights of Tanghe 672 N.W.2d 623
- In Re the Marriage of Schmidt 436 N.W.2d 99
- In Re the Welfare of the Child of D.L.D. 771 N.W.2d 538
- 943 N.W.2d 661 not in our corpus
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1065
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: Y. F., Parent.
Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed in part and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge
Martin County District Court
File No. 46-JV-19-137
Ryan A. Gustafson, Frundt, Lundquist & Gustafson, Ltd., Blue Earth, Minnesota (for
appellant Y.F.)
Terry Viesselman, Martin County Attorney, Amanda Heinrichs-Milburn, Assistant County
Attorney, Fairmont, Minnesota (for respondent Human Services of Faribault & Martin
Counties)
Allison Hennager, Fairmont, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)
Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the district
court erred by finding that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the
children’s out-of-home placement and that termination was in the best interests of the
children. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that reasonable efforts failed to correct
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the conditions, but because the district court did not make adequate findings regarding the
children’s best interests, we remand that issue to the district court for additional findings.
FACTS
In February 2019, the three c hildren of appellant-mother Y.F. were adjudicated in
need of protection or services within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8)
(2018), and were removed from Y.F.’s care. The county petitioned for termination of
parental rights (TPR) in December 2019 pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2),
(4), (5), (8) (2018). The children had remained in court -ordered out-of-home placement
since their initial removal in February 2019.
In July 2020, t he district court held an adjudicatory hearing on the TPR petition.
The county presented testimony from the case manager, the psychologist who conducted a
psychological evaluation and parenting assessment of Y.F., the guardian ad litem, a family-
based services provider , the visitation supervisor, and the social worker who authored
Y.F.’s community support plan. Y.F. and her mother and sister also testified at the hearing.
Neither side presented testimony from Y.F.’s children.
The county’s case manager testified that the county had concerns regarding Y.F.’s
ability to provide a safe and stable living environment for the children. The county set
goals for Y.F. to “complete specific par enting curricul [a], demonstrate the learned
parenting skills during parenting time, obtain and maintain stable housing, maintain a clean
environment . . . , and ensure [Y.F.] could meet the [c]hildren’s basic needs.” The county
developed case plans signed by Y.F. As part of those plans, the county referred Y.F. to
several services to assist her with such things as homemaking skills, budgeting, shopping,
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food safety, life skills , and parenting education. She was also referred to vocational
rehabilitation services to help her find employment. Y.F. completed one parenting
curriculum but the services provider testified that, based on the provider’s observations,
Y.F. did not implement the techniques. Y.F. c ompleted none of t he other programming
even though the county offered transportation assistance. She only attended a few sessions
at most with the various providers.
The case manager also testified about Y.F.’s failure to follow the plans for visitation
and care of the children. From June 2019 to March 2020, Y.F. missed 21 visits with the
children, including three visits in the month preceding the adjudicatory hearing on the TPR
petition. She also failed to attend most of the children’s school conferen ces and medical
appointments, despite attendance being part of the rehabilitation plan.
The county presented testimony that , when Y.F. did attend visitations, she seemed
to have little control or authority over the children and the oldest child, age 12 a t the time
of the hearing, often assumed a parental role with th e two younger children, ages six and
four. County witnesses testified about instances where Y.F. failed to take away dangerous
items from the younger children or to prevent situations where they could be injured, such
as stopping one of the children from running into the street . The visitation supervisor
testified with regard to the latter incident that, even though Y.F. was observing the child’s
actions, Y.F. did not seem to appreciate the d anger presented and someone else had to
intercede to prevent the child from running into the street.
To assist Y.F. with maintaining a clean home, the county provided Y.F. with a
laminated cleaning chart to help Y.F. remember and track cleaning tasks. S he was also
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provided with a vacuum cleaner, broom, dustpan, mop , and dish soap. The case manager
testified that, despite these efforts, the home was not clean and the county assisted in
cleaning and taking out overflowing garbage bags on several occasions. Additional
testimony was presented to the effect that Y.F. failed to achieve her goals of maintaining
an adequate amount of food in the home and being able to handle and store food in a
hygienic manner.
The county introduced evidence of the children’s histories, showing that at the start
of the out-of-home placement, the children had significant dental issues (one child had to
have six teeth pulled), were behind on immunizations, and all had significant psychological
issues. The younger children had behavioral issues, often kicking and hitting others. The
six-year-old child was behind educationally, requiring him to repeat kindergarten. The
case manager shared her observations that, during their placement in foster care, the
children’s behavior and health improved significantly.
Due to the ongoing concerns regarding Y.F.’s parenting abilities and lack of a clean
and safe living environment, the case manager testified that it was her belief that Y.F.
would be unable to properly care for the children i n the foreseeable future and that
termination of Y.F.’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
The psychologist who conducted a psychological evaluation and parenting
assessment of Y.F. agreed, at the hearing, that termination of Y.F.’s par ental rights was
necessary due to Y.F.’s inability to provide care for the children. The psychologist further
noted that testing showed that Y.F. is in the extremely low range of intellectual functioning,
cannot understand simple questions, and has difficulty with memory.
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The other county witnesses, including the guardian ad l item, all agreed that
terminating Y.F.’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests due to “safety needs,
as well as the physical, mental and emotional health of the [c]hildren.”
Y.F., Y.F.’s mother, and her sister testified that Y.F. was a very loving parent and
has tried very hard to be the best parent possible. All three asserted that Y.F. had improved
and was working hard to keep her apartment clean and fresh food available.
The district court granted the TPR petition pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5), finding that the county had made reasonable efforts at rehabilitation and that,
despite these efforts, Y.F. failed to correct the conditions that caused the out -of-home
placement. The district court further concluded that termination was in the best interests
of the children. Y.F. now appeals.
DECISION
On this appeal, Y. F. claims that the district court’s findings are not supported by
sufficient evidence.
We review a n order terminating parental rights “to deter mine whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether those findings are suppor ted by
substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d
703, 708 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted) . An appellate court will affirm “ the district
court’s termination of parental rights when at least one statutory gro und for termination is
supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the best interests of the
child, provided that the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted). An
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appellate court is to grant “[c]onsiderable deference . . . to the district court’s decision
because a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In
re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
I. The district court did not err in finding that Y.F. failed to correct the conditions
leading to the out-of-home placement.
We first consider whether the district court erred by finding that reasonable efforts
were made b ut that Y.F. failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement of her children under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). That section
provides, in relevant part, that parental rights may be terminated if the court finds:
(5) that following the child’s placement out of the home,
reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed
to correct the conditions leading to the child’ s placement. It is
presumed that reasonable efforts under this clause have failed
upon a showing that:
(i) a child has resided out of the parental home under
court order for a cumulative period of 12 months within the
preceding 22 months. . . . ;
(ii) the court has approved the out -of-home placement
plan . . . ;
(iii) conditions leading to the out -of-home placement
have not been corrected. It is presumed that conditions leading
to a child’ s out -of-home placement have not been corrected
upon a showing that the parent or parents have not substantially
complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan; and
(iv) reasonable efforts have been made by the social
services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
Y.F.’s main argument is that the evidence is not sufficient to support the district
court’s findings that she failed to c orrect the conditions leading to the out -of-home
placement and would not be able to provide appropriately for the children in the future. In
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particular, Y.F. argues that the county’s witnesses had not observed Y.F.’s home recently
and she had made improvements in her housekeeping . She also argues that the
psychologist’s assessment had been completed more than a year before the trial, and that
the psychologist had not seen Y.F. since April 2019. We are not persuaded.
Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), it is presumed that reasonable efforts
have failed to correct the conditions leading to out -of-home placement if the four factors
quoted above are present. Here, all four have been established by the evidence put forward
by the county. The first factor is satisfied because the children were in out -of-home
placement for almost 17 months. The second factor is also satisfied by the county’s
evidence that there were court-approved rehabilitation plans.
With respect to the third factor —failure to correct the conditions —it is presumed
that conditions have not been corrected “upon a showing that the parent . . . [has] not
substantially complied with the cour t’s orders and a reasonable case plan.” Id.,
subd. 1(b)(5)(iii). Here, the county provided, as found by the district court, a plethora of
evidence demonstrating Y.F.’s failure to comply with the plans. Specifically, as noted by
the district court, Y.F. failed to complete all but one of the service programs , missed 21
visitations with her children, including three in the month before the hearing, and she
missed most of the children’s medical and educational appointments.
The final factor, whether the co unty made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the
parent and reunite the family, is not contested by Y.F. on appeal. And, regardless, there is
ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings on this factor. Thus,
8
all the elements are established and the statutory presumption provided in Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), is applicable.
Y.F. attempts to rebut the presumption by arguing that the county’s evidence was
stale and that she had recently improved . Even if she was improv ing with regard to
maintaining a cleaner home in recent months, that is just one of a number of the goals
contained in the rehabilitation plan and is not adequate to overcome the statutory
presumption or to prove that she is currently able to parent three children. In re Welfare of
J.K., 374 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that improvements immediately
before the termination hearing were insufficient to overcome the whole of a parent’s
negative history), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985) ; see also In re Welfare of J.L.L. ,
396 N.W.2d 647, 651 -52 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that termination was proper when
parent was unable to care for children appropriately, even when parent took recent steps to
improve and had desire to improve). And, as noted above, Y.F. failed to appear for three
visits with her children in the month preceding the hearing.
With regard to Y.F.’s claim of stale evidence, while the psychologist had not
observed Y.F. with her children for over a year prior to the hearing , t he fo cus of the
psychologist’s testimony was on clinical testing and observations of Y.F.’s cognitive
abilities to parent the children. The county presented testimony from its case manager and
the visitation supervisor concerning Y.F.’s more recent interactions with the children.1
1 The visits would all have been supervised because Y.F. never progressed far enough in
her plan to have unsupervised visits with her children.
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Here, t he county’s witnesses provided undisputed testimony that Y.F. failed to
comply with the case plans. They also shared their opinion that it was not likely that Y.F.
would be able to care for her children in the foreseeable fu ture. The district court was
within its discretion to accept this testimony as credible. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. ,
814 N.W.2d 76, 90 (Minn. App. 2012). We conclude that the district court’s determination
that Y.F. failed to correct the condition s leading to the out -of-home placement despite
reasonable efforts is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
II. The district court did not issue sufficient findings on the children’s best
interests.
Y.F. next argues that the district court did not properly consider and make findings
on the best interests of the children. She argues that the findings the district court did make
(1) lacked the children’s preferences or an explanation of why their opinions were not
included, (2) did not analyze the three best -interests factors, and (3) consisted only of
limited conclusory statements regarding the best interests of the children.
When making a decision on a TPR matter, the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile
Protection Procedure require that
[b]efore ordering termination of parental rights, the court shall
make a specific finding that termination is in the best interests
of the child and shall analyze: 1. the child’s interests in
preserving the parent -child relations hip; 2. the parent’s
interests in preserving the parent-child relationship; and 3. any
competing interests of the child.
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of Children
of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). When an appellate
10
court reviews the best -interests determination, it should not comb through the record to
determine the children’s best interests because it involves credibility determinations. In re
Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing Schmidt v. Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d
99, 105 (Minn. 1989)); see also In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 771 N.W.2d 538, 546
(Minn. App. 2009).
Here, the district court’s best-interests findings were conclusory and did not explain
its rationale sufficiently to allow appellate review. Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d at 626 (“[T]he
district court, in a termination proceeding, must consider a child’s best interests and explain
its rationale in its findings and conclusions.”). In particular, t he district court failed to
make any findings on the children’s interests in preserving the parent -child relationship.
In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R. , 943 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Minn. App. 2020) (holding the
district court’s best-interests analysis was inadequate because, among other reasons, it did
not specifically address the child’s interest in preserving the relationship) ; D.L.D., 771
N.W.2d at 547 (affirming the district court’s finding of the parents’ palpable unfitness but
remanding for failure to make findings on the best interests of the child). We thus remand
for additional findings on the children’s best interests.
In light of our decision to remand, we need not address Y.F.’s contention that the
district court erred by not obtaining the preferences of any of the children with regard to
termination. On remand, however, the district court may, at its discretion, reopen the
record to allow additional evidence with respect to consideration of the children’ s best
interests.
Affirmed in part and remanded.