State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1066

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kong Meng Xiong,
Appellant.

Filed June 28, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-19-1600, 27-CR-19-10869

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree controlled-substance crime and unlawful
possession of a firearm. In this direct appeal, appellant challenges the validity of his guilty
pleas and argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his pleas because they are not

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accurate. Because we conclude that the record from the pl ea hearing establishes that
appellant’s guilty pleas are accurate, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2019, respondent State of Minneso ta charged appellant Kong Meng Xiong by
two complaints with seven cr iminal offenses. The compla ints contained the following
allegations.
In January 2019, following a police inves tigation of Xiong, police executed a search
warrant at a home in New Hope. Officers found Xiong lying on a bed in the basement of
the home. In another area of the basement, two young children were lying in two twin-sized
beds. An adult woman was in the basement bathroom. The polic e found two additional
adults elsewhere in the home.
During a search of the basement bedroom area, officers found mailings in Xiong’s
name on the nightstand near where Xiong was found. Officers also found a pair of pants
containing a wallet and Xiong’s identification. A black jacket was lying next to the pants.
The jacket contained 116 grams of methamphe tamine in one pocket and 4 grams in the
other, as well as multiple packages of small plastic baggies and $1,509 in cash. The police
also found a key ring in the jacket, which held keys to the home, Xiong’s vehicle, and a
locked safe. The locked safe was located in a backpack that police found in the basement
bedroom where Xiong was located when they executed the warrant. The police unlocked
the safe with its key and found 228.6 gram s of methamphetamine and $50,000 in cash
inside. After searching the rest of the base ment, the police also found more cash, plastic
baggies, and drug paraphernalia, as well as additional quantities of methamphetamine and

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marijuana. The police then searched Xiong’s vehicle, which was in the garage of the home.
The car contained latex gloves, packaging materials, and a scale. A dresser in the garage
also held packaging materials consistent with narcotics distribution.
Based on the items found in the search, the state charged Xiong with four
controlled-substance crimes, including one co unt of first-degree controlled-substance
crime (sale of methamphetamine) under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2018). The
state also charged Xiong with gross misdemeanor child endangerment. The state filed the
complaint a few days after executing the search warrant.
In May 2019, approximately four months after the state filed the January 2019
complaint, law enforcement stopped a car regist ered to Xiong. Xiong was arrested, and
the police searched the car. In the trunk of the car, police allegedly found a .22-caliber
revolver, a .45-caliber automatic handgun, a ma gazine for a .40-caliber handgun, and ten
9-mm bullets. Under the backseat of the car, the police found another .45-caliber handgun,
56.13 grams of methamphetamine, and $1,000 in cash. Based on this search, the police
charged Xiong with two a dditional offenses, including another first-degree
controlled-substance crime (possession of me thamphetamine) and one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018).
In March 2020, Xiong pleaded guilty to two charges: first-degree
controlled-substance crime (sale of methamphe tamine), as charged in January 2019, and
unlawful possession of a firearm, as charged in May 2019. In exchange, the state agreed
to dismiss the remaining charges in both comp laints and to not ch arge Xiong with two
additional offenses. Consistent with the pl ea agreement, the district court imposed an

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executed sentence of 107 months for the firs t-degree controlled-s ubstance crime and a
concurrent 60-month sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm.
Xiong appeals.
DECISION
Xiong challenges the validity of his guilty pleas. The valid ity of a guilty plea is a
question of law, which this court reviews de novo. State v. Boecker, 893 N.W.2d 348, 350
(Minn. 2017). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, Xiong challenges only the accuracy of his pleas. For a guilty plea to be
accurate, a proper factual basis must be estab lished for each element of the offense.
State v. Jones, 921 N.W.2d 774, 77 9 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27,
2019). But “[e]ven if an elemen t to an offense is not verba lized by the defendant [at the
plea hearing], a district court may nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted to
by the defendant.” Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. App. 2021) (emphasis
omitted) (citing Nelson v. State , 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016)). “A district court
should not accept a guilty plea unless the record supports the conclusion that the defendant
actually committed an offense at least as se rious as the crime to which he is pleading
guilty.” Boecker, 893 N.W.2d at 350 (quotation omitted).
Xiong argues that both of his guilty pleas are inaccurate because the factual bases
for his pleas fail to establish elements of each offense. Xiong a dditionally contests the
manner by which the factual bases for his pleas were established. We address the factual

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basis for each of Xiong’s pleas individua lly before turning to Xiong’s remaining
arguments.
First-Degree Controlled-Substance Crime
A person is guilty of first-degree contro lled-substance crime if “on one or more
occasions within a 90-day period the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures of a
total weight of 17 grams or more contai ning cocaine or methamphetamine.” Minn.
Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1). The definition of “sell” as used in this statute includes
possessing methamphetamine with intent to sell. Minn. Stat . § 152.01, subd. 15a (2018).
Xiong contends that the factual basis for his plea did not establish that he (1) possessed 17
or more grams of methamphetamine or (2) intended to sell 17 or more grams of
methamphetamine. We disagree. We conclude that the factual basis for Xiong’s plea was
sufficient to establish both possession and intent to sell.
Possession
Possession can be proved by evidence of actual possession or constructive
possession. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Constructive possession
exists “where the inference is strong that the defendant at one tim e physically possessed
the substance and did not abandon his possesso ry interest in the substance but rather
continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to the time of the arrest.”
State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975 ). Constructive possession requires a
showing either that the polic e found the substance in a place under the defendant’s
exclusive control to which others did not usua lly have access or that , if others did have
access, there is a strong probability, inferable from other evidence, that the defendant was

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at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over the substance. Id. at 611; see
also State v. Hunter, 857 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Minn. App. 2014) (explaining that constructive
possession requires a suspect’s exercise of dom inion and control over the substance, not
over the place where it is found). Although not dispositive, the defendant’s proximity to
an item is an important factor in establishing constructive possession. State v. Sam ,
859 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. App. 2015). In addition, “[a] defendant may possess an item
jointly with another person.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
At the plea hearing, Xiong answered “Y es” when asked by hi s attorney whether
police found “more than a hundred grams of methamphetamine” in the home “[b]etween a
jacket and a safe.” Xiong also answered “Y es” when his attorney asked, “[E]ven though
you’re possessing it , the statute is entitled first-degree sale?” (Emphasis added.) And
Xiong answered “Yes” to the question, “And it’s presumed, that if you have that type of
quantity, that you’re selling it?” Following these questions by his attorney, the prosecutor
asked Xiong some additional questions about the methamphetamine that was found in the
home. Xiong answered “Yes” when aske d: whether the polic e found a bag of
methamphetamine in some clothing near the area where he was sleeping; whether that
clothing was near where his identification and wallet were found; and whether the bag
contained “approximately 116 grams” of methamphetamine. And Xiong further answered
“Yes” when asked whether “about 225 grams” of methamphetamine was found in a safe
in the basement.
From this testimony, it can be inferred that Xiong was exercising dominion and
control over a quantity of methamphetamine much greater than the statutory minimum of

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17 grams. See, e.g., State v. Cusick, 387 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn. 1986) (holding evidence
was sufficient to establish constructive possession by defendant where cocaine was found
next to defendant’s wallet in front seat of car). Xiong’s admissions at the plea hearing are
sufficient to establish constructive possession of this quantity even if there were other
persons in the home, because constructive possession may be joint among two or more
people. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 604. Xiong contends that the factual basis for his plea
is insufficient because he did not admit that any specific quantity of methamphetamine was
his. But Xiong’s factual admissions at the plea hearing support a reasonable inference of
constructive possession of far more than 17 grams of methamphetamine. The factual basis
was sufficient to establish the possession elemen t of the first-degree controlled-substance
offense.
Intent to Sell
The factual basis was also su fficient to establish Xiong’s intent to sell. Possession
of a “large quantity of drugs” tends to show an intent to sell or distribute. State v. Hanson,
800 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Moreover, possession of a large
amount of cash, along with a large quantity of drugs, supports an inference of intent to sell.
See State v. Marshall, 411 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App. 1987) (evidence of large amounts
of cash supported findings that defendan t was in “drug distribution hierarchy”), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 1987).
Here, Xiong answered “Yes” when asked whet her he had intended to sell or transfer
“some” of the methamphetamine. He also answered “Yes” when asked whether there is a
presumption, based on the quantity of metham phetamine found, that he was “selling it.”

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While Xiong correctly notes that these admiss ions alone likely do not indicate that he
possessed or planned to sell any particul ar quantity of methamphetamine, Xiong’s
additional admissions at the plea hearing, di scussed above, establish that he possessed a
total of 341 grams of methamphetamine. The amount of methamphetamine Xiong
admitted that he possessed cert ainly constitutes a large quantity of drugs indicative of an
intent to sell. See Hanson, 800 N.W.2d at 623; see also State v. Heath, 685 N.W.2d 48, 63
(Minn. App. 2004) (stating that “ten or mo re grams of methamphetamine” constitutes “a
substantial amount that is often greater than for personal use”), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 16, 2004). Furthermore, Xiong admitted at the plea hearing that the safe found in the
basement which contained methamphetamine also contained approximately $48,000 in
cash. The large quantity of drugs and cash that Xiong posse ssed, in addition to Xiong’s
admissions that he intended to sell at least “some” of the methamphetamine, supports a
reasonable inference that Xiong intended to sell 17 or more grams of methamphetamine.
Xiong’s guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance crime was supported by a sufficient
factual basis and is therefore accurate.
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm
We next address whether the factual ba sis for Xiong’s guilty plea to unlawful
possession of a firearm was sufficient. Under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), “a person
who has been convicted of . . . a crime of violence” is not “entitled to possess ammunition
or a pistol or . . . any other firearm.” Like possession of a controlled substance, possession
of a firearm may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession. Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 601. To convict a defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the

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state must prove in relevant part that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. Id.
Xiong contends that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient because he did not admit
at the plea hearing that “he knew that [the guns ] were in the car before he was arrested.”
We are not persuaded.
At the plea hearing, Xiong answered “Yes” when asked whether he was “in
possession” of a gun found in the trunk of the car he was driving. He also answered “Yes”
when asked whether he was “aware that there were handguns in the vehicle with [him] that
day.” He further answered “Yes” when asked whether one of the guns was “operational.”
Xiong’s affirmative responses to those questions establish that Xiong knowingly possessed
a firearm.
Xiong contends that the factual basis fo r his plea was insufficient because he “did
not know what model or caliber of weapons were found in his car,” “did not admit to ever
owning or handling a gun, or to putting them into the car, or to kn owing how they got
there,” and did not say at the plea hearing “when on that day he became aware of the guns,
or whether he became aware before he drove the car.” But Xiong cites no legal authority
to support his argument that any of these admi ssions are required to support a guilty plea
to unlawful possession of a firearm. Section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), requires knowing
possession; it does not require ownership, pr oof of how the person came to possess the
firearm, or knowledge about the caliber of the firearm in question. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d
at 601 (explaining that an unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm conviction requires a showing
that the defendant “ knowingly possessed the firearm”). Because Xiong admitted at the
plea hearing to knowingly possessing a firearm on the day of his arrest, Xiong’s guilty plea

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to unlawful possession of a firearm was suppo rted by a sufficient factual basis and is
therefore accurate.
Xiong’s Remaining Arguments
Xiong further suggests that both of his guilty pleas were ina ccurate because the
attorneys and the district court primarily as ked him leading questi ons to establish the
factual bases for his pleas. This argument is unpersuasive. The supreme court has “long
discouraged” the practice of establishing a factual basis for a guilty plea by asking leading
questions. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Minn. 2 010). The preferred method for
establishing a factual basis i nvolves asking the defendant “to express in his own words
what happened.” Id. (quotation omitted). Nonetheless, the use of leading questions “does
not by itself invalidate a guilty plea.” Barnslater v. State, 805 N.W.2d 91 0, 914 (Minn.
App. 2011) (citing State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Minn. 1994)); see also Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 95. “Ultimatel y, the accuracy requirement ensures that a defendant does
not plead guilty to a crime more serious than that of which he could be convicted if he
elected to go to trial.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 95. If the attorneys and district court
establish a factual basis that meets this standard by asking leading questions, the
defendant’s plea will be accurate and valid “despite its disfavored format.” Id. at 96.
Here, although the attorney s and district court primarily asked leading questions at
the plea hearing, Xiong’s answers satisfied th e objective of the accuracy requirement.
Xiong’s answers established that he (1) possessed 17 or more grams of methamphetamine
with intent to sell and (2) knowingly possessed a firearm. Xiong’s challenge based on the
format of the questioning is unavailing.

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In his reply brief, Xiong also argues that this court’s recent decision in Rosendahl
requires a reversal of his convictions. He contends that, under Rosendahl, “[i]n the context
of a guilty plea, a reasonable inference of guilt is not enough, because the defendant must
actually admit the elements of the offense.” Xiong’s reliance on Rosendahl is misplaced.
In Rosendahl, we expressly acknowledged that “[e]ven if an element to an offense is not
verbalized by the defendant, a dist rict court may nevertheless draw inferences from the
facts admitted to by the defend ant.” 955 N.W.2d at 300 (citing Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at
861) (emphasis added). There, we concluded that the factual basis for Rosendahl’s guilty
plea to second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon was insufficient because Rosendahl
did not admit at the plea hearing that he inte nded to cause the victim fear of immediate
bodily harm or death, nor did he make any statements from which one could infer that he
intended to cause such fear in the victim. Id. at 299-300. In contrast to the facts of
Rosendahl, Xiong admitted facts at the plea heari ng from which the di strict court could
reasonably infer that the elements of each of the offenses were satisfied.
In sum, the record estab lishes that Xiong’s guilty pleas are accurate and therefore
valid.
Affirmed.