Jodi D. Campbell, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1068

Jodi D. Campbell,
Respondent,

vs.

John J. Larson,
Appellant.

Filed May 3, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-19-1188

Rodd Tschida, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mark A. Olson, Olson Law Office, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
This appeal arises from an award of a ttorney fees in a partition action between
siblings. Appellant John Larson asserts that Minnesota Statutes section 558.10 (2020), the
statute governing costs in partition proceedi ngs, is unconstitutional as applied by the
district court. Larson also ar gues that the district court erre d in awarding partial attorney
fees to respondent Jodi Campbell. Because the statute was not unconstitutional as applied

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to Larson and because the distri ct court did not abuse its disc retion in awarding attorney
fees, we affirm.
FACTS
Larson and Campbell are brother and sister. In May 2018, they received title to
their childhood home, a property in St. Paul, as tenants in common pursuant to a decree of
summary assignment in their fa ther’s probate proceeding. The siblings’ tenancy in
common was contentious, and Larson actively denied Campbell access to the property for
about two years.1
In February 2019, Campbell filed a comp laint against Larson seeking partition by
sale of the property. After process servers were unable to serve Larson with the summons
and complaint and Larson subsequently failed to answer a published summons, Campbell
filed a motion for default judgment. The district court scheduled a default hearing for July
2019. At the scheduled hearing, Larson app eared without counsel, and he indicated that
he may want to purchase the property.
The district court ultimately determined that Campbell was entitled to partition by
sale of the property, and it issued a written order requiring the property to be sold and the
net proceeds of the sale to be deposited with the court, with distribution of the proceeds to
be determined at trial. Additionally, the district court ordered that Larson provide
Campbell a key and unlimited access to the property, that the parties obtain and exchange

1 The district court found that Larson denied Campbell access to the property from
November 2017 to November 2019 by changi ng locks, barricading doors, blocking the
driveway, and placing metal spikes in the yard.

3
competitive market analyses of the property’s fair market value, and that the parties
complete mediation by September 11, 2019. The district court’s order further noted that
Campbell would be entitled to pe tition the court for all costs of partition in the action,
including reasonable attorney fees expended for the common benefit of the parties.
On September 11, 2019—the deadline for completing mediation—Larson, now
represented by counsel, filed an answer and counterclaim in the district court, alleging that
Campbell had stolen money from their deceased father’s estate. The parties appeared for
a hearing several days later. Larson had not provided Cam pbell a key to the property,
obtained a market analysis of the property’s value, or participated in mediation. His
counsel represented, though, that Larson woul d cooperate with the court’s instructions
moving forward. Following the hearing, th e district court issued another order, and
corresponding judgment, instructing the parties to sign a listing agreement for the property
and to forward any purchase agreement at or above 95% of the listing price to the district
court for approval.
Shortly thereafter, Larson moved to vacate the district court’s July and September
orders and judgment for a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied Larson’s
motion to vacate, finding that Larson had waived any defenses relating to insufficient
service of process or lack of personal jurisd iction, and that the purpose of his motion was
to delay the proceedings.2

2 The district court found the motion particularly disingenuous given that Larson’s counsel
seemed to accept the summons and complaint on the record at the September 16 hearing.

4
On February 5, 2020, the parties appeared for a court trial regarding how proceeds
should be distributed once the property sold. Campbell notified the district court that a
prospective buyer had offered to buy the property for $220, 000. Larson stated that he
wished to buy the property and that he was prepared to offe r more than the third-party
prospective buyer. The district court ordered Larson to provide the court with a bank letter
the next day showing that Lars on was approved for a loan for the amount of his offer.
When the parties reconvened the following day to continue the trial, Larson offered a letter
from a credit union, which the di strict court admitted as eviden ce of Larson’s intent to
move forward with the purchase of the property.
After the trial, the district court issued an order on February 10 that allowed Larson
to submit his own purchase agr eement, which would compete with that of the third-party
prospective buyer. On February 12, after th e district court received purchase agreements
from the third-party prospective buyer and from Larson, the district court issued another
order that provided Larson the opportunity to buy the property, contingent on his deposit
of half the purchase price plus earnest money with the court within 24 hours. Larson failed
to deposit the money. Instead, on the day the money was due, Larson petitioned this court
for a writ of prohibition preventing the district court from enforcing the February 10 and
February 12 orders based on jurisdictional a nd statutory defects. We denied Larson’s
petition for a writ of prohibition.
On February 14, after Larson did not deposit the money by the deadline, the district
court determined that it was in the best interest of the parties to sell the property to the next

5
available buyer. The district court authorized Campbell to sign any document relating to
the sale of the property on behalf of Larson.
The property was sold the next month to a third party, and the net sale proceeds
were deposited with the district court. On April 10, Campbell moved for attorney fees and
costs under Minnesota Statutes section 558.10, requesting that her attorney fees be paid by
the parties in equal shares from the sale proceeds. Also on April 10, the district court issued
a distribution order, directing that $100,934.82 of the net proceeds from the sale be
distributed to Campbell and that $40,000 be distributed to Larson. The distribution order
directed that the rest of Larson’s distribution, $55,761.31, remain on deposit with the court
until determination of Campbell’s motion for attorney fees and costs. The district court
ordered Larson to file a res ponsive memorandum regarding th e attorney-fees request by
April 27, 2020.
Larson filed a responsive memorandum on th e day of the April 27 deadline. In it,
he challenged, for the first time, the constitu tionality of section 558. 10 as applied to his
case. On April 28, he filed a notice of constitutional challenge addressed to the Minnesota
Attorney General’s Office, along with an affidavit of service by mail, both dated April 27,
2020.
In June 2020, the district court grante d Campbell’s motion for attorney fees and
costs. The district court concluded that Campbell’s attorney fees, costs, and disbursements
should be paid by the parties in equal shares out of the sale proceeds. It determined that
the outstanding amount owed to Campbe ll’s counsel, $43,245.50, was reasonable
compensation for the services rendered. Th e district court also amended its earlier

6
distribution order to clarify that the actual amount of net sale proceeds was $196,286.44
and to direct that $79,857.23 of the proceeds be distributed to Campbell, $43,245.50 be
distributed to Campbell’s couns el, and $73,183.71 be distributed to Larson. The district
court declined to consider Larson’s constitutional challenge to the attorney-fees award, as
it determined Larson had waived this issue by filing the attorn ey-general notice after the
briefing deadline and without seeking leave from the court.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not apply Minnesota Statutes section 558.10 in violation
of Larson’s constitutional rights.

We first consider Larson’s claim that the district court’s application of section
558.10 to allow attorney fees in this partition action violated Larson’s constitutional rights.
The district court declined to consider Larson’s constitutional challenge, as it found
Larson’s notice of constitutional challenge was filed late. While we disagree with the
district court’s rationale for declining to address Larson’s constitutional challenge to
section 558.10, we nonetheless hold that the constitutional challenge fails.
If a party files a pleading, motion, or other document that “draw[s] into question the
constitutionality” of a state statute, and neither the state nor any of its agencies, officers, or
employees are party to the underlying lawsuit, Minnesota law requires the party to “file a
notice of constitutional questio n stating the question and identifying the document that
raises it.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 5A. The pa rty must serve the notic e and document on the
Minnesota Attorney General “by U.S. mail to afford the Attorney General an opportunity

7
to intervene.” Id. “Generally, appellate courts have required strict compliance with these
notice requirements.” State v. Jorgenson , 934 N.W.2d 362, 367 n. 2 (Minn. App. 2019)
(citing Charboneau v. Am. Family Ins. Co. , 481 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1992)). But we have
interpreted the attorney -general notice requirement to apply to challenges to the facial
validity of a statute, and not to challenges to the constitutionality of a statute as applied.
See Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571, 576 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17,
1987) (interpreting Minn. R. Ci v. App. P. 144, the appellate counterpart of rule 5A);
Markert v. Behm, 394 N.W.2d 239, 243 (Minn. App. 1986) (reasoning that “because there
was no such notice [to the attorney general’s office] in this case, only the constitutionality
of the statute as applied need be addressed”).
In his April 27 responsive briefing on the request for attorney fees, Larson raised a
separation-of-powers argument. Specifically, he argued that if the district court were to
interpret section 558.10 as allowing attorney fees in partition actions, the court would
“read[] into § 558.10 a right that is not there,” and thereby afford a remedy the legislature
had not authorized. Providing this remedy, he reasoned, “would be an as-applied violation”
of the Minnesota Constitution’s separation-of-powers doctrine. As noted, Larson did not
file a notice of constitutional challenge until April 28, which was one day after the deadline
that the district court imposed for his responsive memorandum on the request for attorney
fees.
Larson’s constitutional challenge is, as he asserts, an as-applied challenge. A facial
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is one in which “the challenger bears the heavy
burden of proving that the legislation is unconstitutional in all applications.” McCaughtry

8
v. City of Red Wing, 831 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2013). Larson does not argue that section
558.10 is unconstitutional in all applications; instead, he asserts that it is unconstitutional
when applied to award attorney fees in a partition action. Larson contends that, although
section 558.10 provides that “costs, charges, and disb ursements of partition shall be paid
by the parties respectively en titled to share in the land” in amounts determined by the
district court, this language should not be read to allow attorney fees.3 He does not seek to
invalidate the statute, but instead contends th at an erroneous judicial interpretation of
“costs” infringes on the legislature’s authority.
Accordingly, Larson was not required under rule 5A to notify the Minnesota
Attorney General’s Office of his as-applied challenge in order to have it considered by the
district court. We turn next to whether we should consider his challenge in the absence of
a district court decision.
This court does not normally address cons titutional issues for the first time on
appeal, as matters not considered by the di strict court are generally not amenable to
appellate review. See In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981); Elwell
v. Hennepin County, 221 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn. 1974). Exceptions apply, though, and
we have considered constitutiona l issues when required in th e interest of justice, when
parties have had adequate briefing time, and when issues were implied in the district court.
See Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 1982). Appellate courts have
also considered questions not properly presented in the interest of judicial efficiency. See,

3 As explained in detail below, though, Minne sota courts have interpreted section 558.10
as permitting attorney fees in partition actions.

9
e.g., Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 612 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Minn. 2000) (addressing the
propriety of a direct attack on a prior ju dgment to avoid the “exercise in judicial
inefficiency” that would result if the supreme court remanded the case to allow the parties
to present the same question in the proper procedural posture).
On appeal, Larson raises both a due-proce ss and a separation-of-powers challenge
to the district court’s order providing for attorney fees. Larson never raised his due-process
challenge in the district court. Accordingly, he forfeited consideration of that issue, and
we decline to consider it. See State v. Beaulieu , 859 N.W.2d 275, 278 n.3 (Minn. 2015)
(explaining that forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right). However,
because Larson did provide some briefing on his separation-of-powers challenge in the
district court, we will consider the merits of this challenge in the interest of judicial
efficiency.
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Rew
v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 77 6 (Minn. 2014) (citing Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr. ,
811 N.W.2d 643, 653 (Minn. 2012)). We presume that Minnesota statutes are
constitutional. Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 298-99 (Minn.
2000). Further, “[t]he party challenging a statute has the burden of demonstrating beyond
a reasonable doubt a violati on of some provision of th e Minnesota Constitution.” In re
Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989).
The concept of separation of powers co mes from article III, section 1, of the
Minnesota Constitution, which divides the powe rs of the government into legislative,
executive, and judicial departments, and pr ovides that no person from one department

10
“shall exercise any of the powers properly belo nging to either of th e others except in the
instances expressly provided in this constitution.” Separation-of-powers violations can
result if the judiciary improperly exercises a “legislative function” or the legislature
improperly exercises a “judicial function.” See Sanchez v. State , 816 N.W.2d 550, 563
(Minn. 2012) (holding that the legislature did not unconstitutionally usurp a judicial
function when it added time limits to postconviction relief statute); Lee v. Delmont , 36
N.W.2d 530, 538 (Minn. 1949 ) (explaining that the legislature “cannot delegate purely
legislative power to any other body, person, board, or commi ssion”). Courts “have the
power to determine what is judicial and what is legislative.” Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 563.
In his separation-of-powers challenge, Lars on argues that by interpreting section
558.10 as allowing attorney fees, the district court provided a remedy that was not in the
statute and thus usurped the legislature’s power to decide when attorney fees are
permissible. We disagree.
Statutory interpretation is undoubtedly a judicial function, and Larson cites no case
in which a court’s erroneous interpretation of a statute resulted in a separation-of-powers
violation. Moreover, the district court’s interpretation was based on controlling Minnesota
Supreme Court precedent. Larson bears th e burden of showing error on appeal, and
ultimately, he has no t done so here. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn , 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65
(Minn. 1944); see also Luthen v. Luthen , 596 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn. App. 1999). We
accordingly conclude that the district court’s application of section 588.10 to award partial
attorney fees to Campbell was not unconstitutional.

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II. The district court did not err in awarding partial attorney fees to Campbell.
Larson next argues that the district court e rred in awarding attorney fees to Campbell
because the court did not have authority to do so in this partition action and because the
fees were not necessary and reasonable. We disagree.
A. Minnesota Statutes section 558.10 auth orizes attorney fees in partition
actions.

Attorney fees generally “are not recovera ble in litigation unless there is a specific
contract permitting or a statute authorizing such recovery.” Dunn v. Nat’l Beverage Corp.,
745 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Minn. 2008). In pa rtition actions, section 558.10 provides that
“[t]he costs, charges, and disbursements of partition shall be paid by the parties respectively
entitled to share in the land, and the amounts to be paid by each shall be determined by the
court, and specified in the final judgment.” Interpreting this statute in Kuller v. Kuller, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that attorney fees are allowed under the statute in some
circumstances. 109 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 1961). Specifically, the court stated:
[W]here the final result is of bene fit to all parties a trial court
in its discretion may award attorn ey’s fees to plaintiffs, but
that, where the action is advers ary and where it can be fairly
established that the results th ereof were of no substantial
benefit to defendants therein, su ch attorney’s fe es should be
denied.

Id.; accord Hanson v. Ingwaldson, 87 N.W. 915, 915 (Minn. 1901) (explaining that “where
a partition of real property is the principa l object of the action, and the final judgment

12
results in benefit to all the parties concerne d, the court may, in its discretion, make a
reasonable allowance to plaintiffs for necessary attorney’s fees”).4
Larson suggests but fails to show that Kuller and Hanson have been overruled. In
support of his assertion, La rson cites two later Minnesota Supreme Court cases holding
that attorney fees are not recoverable unless a statute explicitly authorizes such recovery.
See Anderson v. Medtronic, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn. 1985); Bar/Nelson, Inc. v.
Tonto’s, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Minn. 1983). He emphasizes that section 558.10 does
not explicitly provide for attorney fees. However, other than citing cases that stand for the
proposition that attorney fees generally must be statutor ily authorized, Larson does not
provide a persuasive rati onale for departing from Kuller, where the Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted section 558.10 to allow atto rney fees in partition actions. Accordingly,
we follow Kuller and recognize that attorney fees are authorized under section 558.10.5

4 We note that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 558.10 as allowing
attorney fees under prescribed circumstances is pertinent de spite the fact that, as Larson
notes, neither partition action at issue in Kuller and Hanson resulted in an award of attorney
fees. See Kuller, 109 N.W.2d at 564; Hanson, 87 N.W. at 915.

5 Larson also argues that the district court erred by equating “costs” with “attorney fees” in
its July 2019 order following the first hearing. In this order, the district court stated
Campbell could petition the court for costs of partition, including a ttorney fees. Larson
contends that because the word “costs” in section 558.10 refers to “costs of partition,” the
district court erroneously allowed Campbell to recover attorney fees by equating “attorney
fees” to “costs of partition.” However, as discussed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
construed Minnesota Statutes section 558.10—governing the “costs” of partition actions—
as allowing recovery of attorney fees under prescribed circumstances. Kuller, 109 N.W.2d
at 563. And as detailed below, the partition action here falls within those prescribed
circumstances, meaning the district court wa s within its discretion to award costs and
attorney fees to Campbell. Thus, the district court did not erroneously equate “costs” with
“attorney fees.”

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B. The district court was within its discretion to award attorney fees.
Larson next contends that the district court misapplied the Kuller holding to this
partition action and thus did not have discretion to award attorney fees. We disagree.
Appellate courts review a district court’s assessment of fees and costs in a partition
action for an abuse of discretion. Kuller, 109 N.W.2d at 564. A district court abuses its
discretion when its “ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law” or when “its decision
is against the fact s in the record.” City of N. Oaks v. Sarpal , 797 N.W.2d 18, 24 (Minn.
2011).
As stated, the Kuller court held that a district cour t may, in its discretion, award
attorney fees to the pl aintiff when the final partition of th e property benefits all parties.
Kuller, 109 N.W.2d at 563. Conversely, a dist rict court should deny attorney fees in a
good-faith adversarial partition action when th e defendant derives no substantial benefit
from the sale. Id. The Hanson decision, cited by the Kuller court, identified adversarial
partitions as those where “the real contes t is as to the title to the property.” Hanson, 87
N.W. at 915.
In awarding attorney fees to Campbell, the district court found that both Larson and
Campbell benefitted from the partition sale because it resolved their “contentious,
untenable joint ownership” of the property a nd because both siblings received their share
of the fair-market sale proceeds. The distri ct court further noted that the partition sale
benefitted them by providing full payment of delinquent real estate taxes for the property.
And the district court found that the partition action was not adversarial because there was

14
no contest to title6 and because Larson adopted a litigatio n strategy intended to delay the
sale so that he could maintain control of the property without buying it or paying the
delinquent real estate taxes.
Larson argues that he did not, in fact, benefit from the final partition because he
wished to purchase the prop erty—to which he had a sentimental attachment—but was
unable to do so. While Larson may not have gotten the result he was seeking in the partition
action, he cites no authority suggesting that a defendant does not receive a substantial
benefit from a partition sale wh en the defendant wishes to buy the property, but instead
collects a share of the sale proceeds. Nor does he refute the district court’s findings that
ending an untenable joint ownership, receivi ng a share of the sale proceeds, and paying
delinquent real estate taxes were benefits that both he and Campbell received as a result of
the sale. Accordingly, we de termine that Larson has not sh own that the district court
abused its discretion in finding that this partition benefited both parties.
Larson also challenges the district court’ s determination that this partition action
was not adversarial. He points to the fact that this was a contentious case in which he and

6 Larson argues that the district court erroneously conflated Kuller and Hanson when it
stated that the proceeding in Kuller was adversarial because the parties in that case
contested title. It appears that the district court did erroneously state that there was a title
contest in Kuller. The Kuller court did not discuss whether the parties were contesting title
to the property at issue. Rather, the 1901 Hanson case stated that the partition at issue in
that case was an “adversary one, and the real contest [was] as to the title of the property,”
meaning attorney fees were properly denied. Hanson, 87 N.W. at 915. However, the
district court’s error here did not affect the court’s ultimate conclusion because, as
discussed above, the record supports a determination that the partition action here was not
adversarial. See In re Estate of Sullivan , 868 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. App. 2015)
(explaining that under the abuse of discretion standard, we accord discretion to the district
court’s ultimate conclusions).

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Campbell were not friendly litigants. Larson also notes that like the defendants in Kuller,
which involved an adversarial partition, he was a one-half ow ner in a joint tenancy who
wanted to buy the property. See Kuller, 109 N.W.2d at 562.
As noted by the district court, the defendants in Kuller were obligated to fight
vigorously to bring up the prope rty’s sale price at the partiti on sale, which required them
to repeatedly seek correcti ons in the proceeding, have numerous conferences and
consultations about values and procedures, a nd obtain funds to bid up the property to a
price reasonably close to its fair market value. Id. at 564. The district court found that
here, in contrast, Larson was not contesting the partition action in good faith or to increase
the value of the property.
The district court determined that, whereas Campbell brought the partition action in
good faith after being denied access to use and enjoyment of the property for about two
years, Larson engaged in conduct intended to delay the sale so that he could maintain his
unreasonable control over the property. The re cord supports the district court’s finding
that Larson engaged in a series of unrea sonable delay tactics: Larson brought a
counterclaim to recover estate-related claims from a completed probate action, pursued a
motion to vacate the district court’s order to sell the property based on lack of personal
jurisdiction after having waived this defense, failed to comply with court orders, failed to
cooperate with Campbell’s efforts to sell the property, and misrepresented his own
financing when he attempted to purchase the property.
While the partition proceeding indeed may have been contenti ous, we agree with
the district court that Lars on’s bad-faith delay tactics as an unfriendly litigant did not

16
convert this proceeding into an adversarial partition acti on. Because the partition action
resulted in benefits to both Campbell and Larson, we hold that the district court was within
its discretion to award Campbell attorney fees.
C. The district court did not clearly err in determining that the fees paid to
Campbell’s attorney were reasonabl e, necessary, and furthered the
partition to the benefit of both parties.

Finally, Larson challenges the necessity and reasonableness of Campbell’s attorney
fees, arguing that his conduct did not unre asonably delay the pr oceedings and that
Campbell’s fees were not incurred for his benef it. As discussed, th e assessment of fees
and costs in an action for partition lies within the discretion of the district court. Kuller,
109 N.W.2d at 563. The dist rict court’s determination of reasonable fees and costs is a
finding of fact that will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Amerman v. Lakeland
Dev. Corp., 203 N.W.2d 400, 400-01 (Minn. 1973).
The district court determined that Campbe ll’s requested $43,732.50 in attorney fees
and $1,013 in costs and disbursements were necessary because La rson prolonged the
litigation by engaging in delay tactics that increased the time, cost, and resources Campbell
was required to expend to resolve the partition. As noted, the record supports the district
court’s findings that Larson engaged in unrea sonable delay tactics, and, based on that
record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Campbell’s
attorney fees were necessary.
The district court also determined th at Campbell’s fees were reasonable and
furthered the partition to the benefit of both parties. Larson challenges this finding on the

17
ground that the district cour t did not identify which of Campbell’s fees furthered the
partition to his benefit and suggests that the awarded fees were therefore unreasonable.
The district court did not provide detail in its order about the specific charges in
Campbell’s award of attorney fees. But the di strict court noted that it had reviewed an
affidavit and exhibits submitted by Campbell’s attorney, which documented the hours that
the attorney expended in the litigation and the billing rate for the services. The attorney’s
affidavit stated that the wo rk was performed for Campbell’ s benefit, and the exhibits
included itemized billing statements summarizing the fees and costs Campbell was billed
throughout the partition proceeding.
The district court had opport unity to review these itemize d invoices, stated that it
did indeed review them, and then determin ed that Campbell and Larson should pay
Campbell’s attorney fees in equal shares. We conclude that Larson has not demonstrated
that the district court clearly erred in apportioning the attorney fees.
Accordingly, because Larson has not shown th at the district court clearly erred in
finding the fees necessary, reasonable, and of benefit to both parties, we conclude that the
district court did not err in ordering that Campbell’s attorney fees be paid by the parties in
equal shares out of the sale proceeds.
In sum, we hold that the district court co rrectly determined that it had discretion to
award attorney fees under section 588.10 in this partition action and that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering Larson to pay half of Campbell’s attorney fees.
Affirmed.