In re the Marriage of: Andrew John Stevens, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1082

In re the Marriage of:
Andrew John Stevens, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Kyla Anne Stevens,
Respondent.

Filed May 10, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Halbrooks, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-12-1384

Michael D. Dittberner, Linder, Dittberner & Winter, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

Sean P. Stokes, Law Offices of Sean Stokes, PLLC, Stillwater, Minnesota; and

Kevin S. Sandstrom, Mitchell S. Sell, Eckberg Lammers, P.C., Stillwater, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Ju dge; Bryan, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motions to (1) compel his
minor child’s attendance at Eagan High School and (2) modify the parenting-time schedule
so that the child spends the majority of time with him during the school year. Because we
conclude that the district court did not e rr by determining that the dissolution judgment
grants respondent authority to select the mi nor child’s school, we affirm in part. But
because we conclude that the district cour t abused its discretion by denying appellant’s
parenting-time motion without gi ving it separate independent consideration, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Appellant Andrew Stevens (father) petitioned to dissolve his marriage to respondent
Kyla Stevens n/k/a Kyla Sessing (mother) in 2012 . At that time, the parties’ minor child
was six years old. Both parties agreed that they would share joint legal custody of their
minor child, but were initially unable to agree on the school their child would attend. They
participated in early neutral evaluation, which produced an understanding that they would
share joint legal and physical custody but would employ a parenting consultant “to address
the issue of child’s school enrollment.” This understanding was memorialized in an order
from the district court. But the order also noted that the parties could amend their
understanding by mutual agreement.
The district court subsequently issued an order for judgment and decree in
September 2012, dissolving the parties’ marriage pursuant to stipulation. The dissolution

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judgment awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of th eir minor child. The
parties stipulated to define joint legal custody as follows:
The award of “joint legal cust ody” means that both parents
have equal rights and responsibilities in major decisions
determining their child’s up bringing including education,
health care, and religious training. Neither parent’s rights are
superior to those of the other pa rent. Parties have agreed that
[mother] shall have the right to decide the minor child’s school
location.

The dissolution judgment also set forth a parenting-time schedule that presumed their child
would stay primarily with mother during the school year, giving father overnights from
Thursday through Saturday wi th an additional weekly overn ight in the summer. The
parties operated in accordance w ith the judgment for severa l years, with their child
attending public school in Stillwater.
In February 2020, father moved the district court on two matters. First, he sought
to compel their child’s attendance at Eagan High School beginning with the 2020-21 school
year. Father asserted that attending Eagan High School would be in their child’s best
interests because the school district wa s high-performing and provided greater
opportunities and academic support for their child, who had been di agnosed as being on
the autism spectrum. Mother opposed the motion. Although she acknowledged that their
child had struggled in Stillwater public scho ols, she attributed the child’s academic
struggles to the social environment of the larg er, more “chaotic” public schools. For that
reason, mother chose New Heights School, a private charter school in Stillwater, for their
child to attend during the high school years.

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Second, father also moved to modify the parenting-time schedule so that their child
would primarily live with him in Eagan during the school year. He asserted that this change
would be in their child’s best interests be cause his home provided a quieter environment
that was more conducive to completing school work and more amenab le to their child’s
needs. Father also asserted that their child’s relative academic improvement over the most
recent school year was due to his being able to exercise his Thursday night parenting time
to help their child with sch oolwork. Mother opposed this motion as well, although she
acknowledged that father’s increased interest in their child’s schoolw ork “ha[d] helped a
lot” in terms of the child’s academic achievement.
The district court issued its findings of fact and order in August 2020, denying both
motions. It concluded that the 2012 disso lution judgment “gives [mother] sole legal
custody over [the child’s] school location.” And because father’s motion on school choice
was therefore a de facto motion to modify custody concerning school location, the district
court determined that the enda ngerment standard should apply to father’s motion. The
district court noted that the child’s academic difficulties were largely social and that the
child’s education would not be endangered by attending Ne w Heights School instead of
Eagan High School. And because the district court determined that father’s motion to
modify parenting time was contingent upon it granting his motion on school choice, the
district court did not separately address fath er’s motion to modify parenting time. This
appeal follows.

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DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s de terminations that the dissolution judgment
grants mother sole authority over the school their child a ttends and that his motion to
modify parenting time was contingent on his motion on school choice. We address each
issue in turn.
I. The dissolution judgment grants mother sole authority over the child’s school
location.

Father asserts the district court’s determ ination that the dissolution judgment awards
mother sole authority to ch oose the child’s school is erroneous because it is both
incompatible with joint legal cu stody and leads to an absurd re sult. But, as the district
court noted, father agreed to the stipulated language in the dissolution judgment. “Whether
a provision in a dissolution judgment and decree is clear or ambiguous is a legal question.”
Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 339 (Minn. App. 2014). And when “the same judge who
entered the judgment and decree” is “the judge who determined” a provision’s meaning in
a subsequent proceeding—as is the case here—its “reading of the provision is entitled to
great weight.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Stipulated judgments are treated the same as binding contracts and are construed
according to the “ordinary rules of contract interpretation.” Ertl v. Ertl, 871 N.W.2d 410,
415 (Minn. App. 2015). If contractual language is unambi guous, it must be construed
“according to its plain meaning.” Id. Contractual language is ambiguous only if
“reasonably subject to more than one interpretation.” Id.

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Father contends that the dissolution-j udgment language is ambiguous for two
reasons. First, he argues that placing the ph rase “[p]arties have agreed” before “[mother]
shall have the right to decide the minor child’s school location” renders the district court’s
statement to be a mere recitation of the partie s’ respective positions at the time, and not a
binding conclusion of law. Father cites Dean v. Pelton , 437 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. App.
1989), for the proposition that when a district court prefaces a statement in an order with
“claims,” “according to,” or “a sserts,” the statement is nothing more than a recitation of
the parties’ claims and cannot be interpreted as binding. Id. at 764. He urges us to conclude
that the phrase “parties have agr eed” carries this same effect in the district court order at
issue here.
We disagree. The issue in Dean was whether or not the district court’s findings
were sufficient to support an increase in child support. Id. at 765. In several of its findings
the district court stated, “petitioner claims,” “according to petitioner’s application,” and
“respondent asserts.” Id. at 764. This court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Id. at 765. In doing so, we stated, in part: “Reciting the parties’ claims may be helpful in
understanding what the trial court considered in making its findings; however, the findings
themselves must be affirmatively stated as findings of the trial court.” Id. at 764.
Here, the district court made conclusions of law based on the parties’ stipulation.
The verbs “agree” or “agreed” me an to “be in accord,” to “c oncur,” or to “come to an
understanding.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 34 (5th ed. 2018).
The phrase “parties have agreed” evidences that the parties concurred about how to choose
a school location and must be interpreted as indicative of a binding agreement.

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Second, father argues that construing the stipulation language as creating an
exception from joint legal cust ody is absurd because he ne ver explicitly waived the
presumption of joint legal custody and such an exception cannot be reconciled with the
preceding language granting the pa rties an equal right to deci de matters of their child’s
education. But the statutory definition of “joint legal cust ody” as used in chapter 518
contemplates that parties may modify the term by mutual agreement. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518.003, subd. 3 (2020) (pro viding definitions of “custo dy” that apply “[u]nless
otherwise agreed by the parties”); see also Wolf v. Oestreich, 956 N.W.2d 248, 255 (Minn.
App. 2021) (contemplating that “a district c ourt order” may change “the meaning of the
relevant terms” such as “joint lega l custody” upon request of the parties), pet. for review
filed (Minn. Mar. 18, 2021). In this instance, the parties modified “joint legal custody” by
defining it to allow mother to decide where their child attends school. Concluding that the
parties proposed a definition of “joint legal custody” that allowed mother to decide where
the child would attend school and that the district court adopted the parties’ stipulation on
this point is consistent with the statute and is not an absurd interpretation.
We also note that the district cour t’s interpretation prop erly harmonizes the
judgment’s clauses and is not incompatible with joint decision-making on matters of
education. Courts must construe contra ctual language “as a whole and attempt to
harmonize all of [the] clauses.” Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776
(Minn. 2016). Father contends it is impossi ble to harmonize a grant of equal rights to
determine a child’s upbringing, including their education, with a grant of sole authority to
one parent on an education-rela ted issue. But as noted, the statutory definition of joint

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legal custody specifically contemplates that parties may mutually decide to attribute a
different meaning to the term. Minn. Stat . § 518.003, subd. 3. Further, there are
conceivably additional major decisions related to a child’s education beyond where their
child will attend school. For example, ther e may be decisions re garding appropriate
elective courses, preferred teachers, specia lized academic programs, or extracurricular
activities. The district court’s interpretation of the school-choice sentence does not exclude
father from these decisions. Based on our de novo review, we conclude that the dissolution
judgment unambiguously grants mother sole legal custody to decide where their child
attends school.
II. The district court abused its dis cretion by summarily denying father’s
parenting-time motion.

Father contends that the district court a bused its discretion by denying his parenting-
time motion because the district court regard ed the motion as con tingent on his school-
choice motion. We review a district court’s determination of a parenting-time issue for an
abuse of discretion. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App. 2017). A district
court abuses its discretion if it misapplies th e law or relies on findings of fact that are
unsupported by the record. Id.
The district court’s determination th at father’s parenting-time motion was
contingent on the school-choice motion is unsu pported by the record. At no point in
father’s motion or supporting documentation does he tie the two motions together. To the
contrary, father raised two issues in his February 2020 motion: (1) “that the parties’ minor
child . . . attend high school at Eagan High School during the 2020-2021 school year and

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until [the child] graduates” and (2) to modify “the parenting[-]time schedule in the parties’
divorce decree to allow the parties’ minor child to reside primarily with [father] during the
school year.” In his supporting affidavit, father proposed “that the regular parenting[-]time
schedule should be modified such that [child ] is with [father] during most of the school
week,” so that he can “even be tter assist [child] with . . . school work while giving both
parents parenting time during the weekends.” He further delineated between the two
motions in the supporting memoranda that he submitted to the district court.
On this record, there is no support for the district court’ s determination that father
made his motion to modify parenting time c ontingent on the success of his motion on
school choice.1 Instead, the record su ggests that the motions were separate. Although
father’s increased parenting time might arguably be more convenient if their child attended
high school in Eagan—the community in which father lives—father’s second motion was
not dependent on that arrangement. Because we conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by not treating the second motion as separate and distinct from the first, we
reverse the district court’s denial of father’s motion to modify parenting time and remand
for separate consideration of that motion. On remand, the district court has the discretion
to reopen the record if doing so would assist in its consideration.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

1 Mother asserts that father made this connection at the motion hearing. However, there is
no transcript from this hearing in the record.