Robert Jensen, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1084

Robert Jensen, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Carl Rindelaub, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed April 26, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-18-3180

Thomas R. Haugrud, Thomas C. Atmore, Leonard, O’Brien, Spencer, Gale & Sayre, Ltd.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Peter Frank, Mark E. Duea, GDO Law, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
This appeal follows a court trial involving a dispute over an easement for lakeshore
access. Appellants argue that the district c ourt (1) erred by concluding that the easement
is appurtenant, (2) abused its discretion by barring expert testimony regarding the meaning
of the easement language, and (3) erred by excluding evidence of the easement’s historical

2
use. Appellants also challenge the district court’s denial of their motion for a new trial on
those grounds. Because we conclude that th e district court did not err by concluding that
the easement was appurtenant an d properly excluded the expert testimony, we affirm in
part. But because we conclude that the dist rict court erred by ex cluding evidence of the
easement’s historical use, we reverse in part and remand for a new trial limited to
determining the scope of the easement.
FACTS
This case involves an easement that prov ides “ingress and egress” to White Bear
Lake. The 15-foot wide easement runs from Dellwood Avenue to White Bear Lake through
lakeshore property where appellants Jane a nd Robert Jensen resi de (hereinafter the
lakeshore property). The easem ent provides lake access to the Jensens’ neighbors,
respondents Carl and Darcy Rindelaub, who live across the street on a parcel of land that
does not border the lake (hereinafter the non-lakeshore property). The current dispute arose
after the Jensens became con cerned that the Rindelaubs planned to build a boardwalk
across the easement and use motorized vehicles such as a golf cart or all-terrain vehicle on
the easement.
The easement was created in 1941, long before the parties to this action owned their
respective parcels. Prior to that time, a co mpany owned all of the land that would later
become the lakeshore and non-lakeshore proper ties. In August 1941, the company sold
the non-lakeshore property to a married couple, Thomas and Elizabeth Wann. The deed to
the Wanns included the easement in the legal description of the Wanns’ property. In
October 1941, the Wanns deeded just the easeme nt back to the company. And four days

3
later, the company reconveyed the easement to th e Wanns via a quitclaim deed dated
October 21, 1941. The purpose of this transaction remains unclear.
The quitclaim deed identified Thomas and Elizabeth Wann as the grantees of the
easement and provided the following description, in relevant part:
[T]he said party of the first part . . . does hereby Grant, Bargain,
Quit-claim, and Convey unto the said parties of the second part
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, their assigns,
the survivor of said parties, and the heirs and assigns of the
survivor, Forever, all the tract or parcel of land lying and being
in the County of Washington and State of Minnesota, described
as follows, to-wit:

A perpetual easement for ingress and egress across a
strip of land 15 ft. wide[.] . . . This easement shall also include
the right to maintain the usua l dock facilities on said fifteen
foot strip on the shore of White Bear Lake.

(Emphasis added.) The company later sold the lakeshore property to a third party, and both
the lakeshore and non-lakeshore properties ch anged hands over the ye ars. The Jensens
purchased the lakeshore property in 1978.
1 The deed conveying the property to the Jensens
describes the easement, and the Jensens’ certificate of title refers to the easement. In 2014,
the Rindelaubs purchased the non-lakeshore property that previously belonged to the Wann
family.
On August 15, 2018, the Jens ens filed a petition in a proceeding subsequent to initial
registration of land under Minn. Stat. § 508.71 (2020). 2 The Jensens’ petition contained

1 In 2003, the Jensens conveyed the lakeshore property to themselves as trustees of a
revocable trust. The trust now owns the lakeshore property for the Jensens’ benefit.
2 Under Minn. Stat. § 508.71, an owner of registered property or other person in interest
may petition the district court for amendment of a certificate of title or issuance of a new

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three prayers for relief. Two pr ayers for relief concerned the scope of the easement,
meaning the easement’s permissi ble uses. Specifically, the Jensens requested that the
district court declare that the easement term s prohibit construction of a boardwalk or any
improvements within the easement area that would interfere with the Jensens’ use of their
property. The Jensens also requested that the district court declare that the easement by its
terms is limited to pedestrian traffic only and that motorized-vehicle use is prohibited as a
means of ingress or egress. The third pray er for relief concerned the nature, or the
classification, of the easement. There, the Jensens requested that the district court declare
that the easement is “in gross” rather than “appurtenant,” such that the Rindelaubs have no
rights in the easement. The Rindelaubs filed an answer requesting that the court deny all
relief requested by the Jensens and affirm the Rindelaubs’ ownership rights in the
easement.
The parties then prepared for a bench trial. Prior to trial, the district court heard
motions in limine from the parties. Relevant to this appeal, the district court granted the
Rindelaubs’ motion to exclude testimony abou t the use of the easement prior to the
Rindelaubs’ ownership of th e non-lakeshore property. The court also granted the
Rindelaubs’ request to exclude expert testimony concerning whether the easement was in
gross or appurtenant. The district court then held a bench trial.
The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for
judgment, in which it denied all of the Jensen s’ requests for declaratory relief. The court

certificate upon several grounds, and the district court may order those changes to be made.
Minn. Stat. § 508.71, subd. 2.

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concluded that (1) the easement was appurtenant to the non-lakeshore property because the
language of the easement “unambiguously” indicated that the parties intended to create an
appurtenant easement and, furt hermore, the Jensens were barred by res judicata and
collateral estoppel from arguing that the easement was in gro ss; (2) the Jensens failed to
meet their burden to show that the Ri ndelaubs were prohibited from constructing
improvements on the easement; and (3) the Jensens failed to meet their burden to show that
the easement is limited to pedestrian traffic. Although the Rindelaubs had requested at trial
that the court issue an order expressly recogn izing their right to build improvements and
operate motor vehicles on the easement, the di strict court declined to grant that relief
because the Rindelaubs failed to properly notice that request in their answer. The district
court then affirmed that the Rindelaubs are th e holders of the easement rights set forth in
the 1941 quitclaim deed.
The Jensens subsequently moved the district court for a new trial or, alternatively,
to amend its findings of fact a nd conclusions of law. They ar gued that the district court
erred by concluding that the easement is unambiguously appurtenant, abused its discretion
by barring expert testimony as to the nature of the easement, and abused its discretion by
excluding evidence of the easement’s historical use. Following oral argument, the district
court issued an order denying the Jensens’ motion in its entirety.
The Jensens appeal.
DECISION
On appeal, the Jensens raise similar issues to those raised in their posttrial motion.
They contend that the district court (1) erre d as a matter of law by concluding that the

6
easement is appurtenant, (2) abused its disc retion by barring expert testimony regarding
the meaning of the easement language, and (3) erred as a matter of law by excluding
evidence of the easement’s historical use. We address these arguments in turn below.
I. The district court did not err by conclu ding that the easement is appurtenant.
The Jensens argue that the district court erred by concluding that the easement is
appurtenant to the Rindelaub property and denying their motion for a new trial on that
ground. They contend that the district cour t improperly determined that the language in
the 1941 quitclaim deed unambiguously created an appurtenant easement and also erred by
applying res judicata and collateral estoppel to preclude their argument that the easement
is in gross. We agree with the district court that the 1941 quitclaim deed unambiguously
created an appurtenant easement. We th erefore do not reach the Jensens’ argument
regarding the district court’s application of the preclusion doctrines.
“An easement appurtenant is one that is granted for the benefit of the grantee’s
land.” Block v. Sexton, 577 N.W.2d 521, 525 (Minn. App. 1998). It involves “two distinct
tenements”—“the dominant, to which the right belongs, and the servient, upon which the
burden or obliga tion rests.” Winston v. Johnson , 45 N.W. 958, 959 (Minn. 1890). An
easement appurtenant “runs with the land” and therefore passe s to subsequent owners of
the land. See Alvin v. Johnson, 63 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1954) (“An easement appurtenant
to another lot, when created by conveyance, attaches to the possession of that other lot and
follows it into whosesoever hands it may come .” (quotation omitted)). In contrast, “[a]n
easement in gross is the right to use another’ s property that is personal and revocable.”
Block, 577 N.W.2d at 525. “[W]hether an easement is appurtenant or in gross is determined

7
not by contiguity but by whether the easement was intended to benefit the grantee’s land.”
Id.
When an easement is created by an expre ss grant, as it was in this case, its terms
constitute a contract. Lindberg v. Fasching , 667 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Minn. App. 2003),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003). “The primary goal of contract interpretation is to
determine and enforce the in tent of the parties.” Staffing Specifix, In c. v. TempWorks
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 913 N.W.2d 68 7, 692 (Minn. 2018) (quo tation omitted). “When the
language is clear and unambiguous, we enforc e the agreement of the parties as expressed
in the language of the contract.” Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776
(Minn. 2016). If, however, an agreement is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, it is ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence may be consid ered to interpret its
meaning. Staffing Specifix, Inc. , 913 N.W.2d at 692. Whethe r an ambiguity exists is a
question of law, which we review de novo. Storms, Inc., 883 N.W.2d at 776; see also
Scherger v. N. Nat. Gas Co. , 575 N.W.2d 578, 580-81 (Mi nn. 1998) (reviewing de novo
whether an easement agreement was ambiguous).
Here, to determine whether the easement at issue is appurtenant or in gross, the
district court examined the language of the easement as granted in the 1941 quitclaim deed.
The district court emphasized certain clau ses and terms in the easement language,
reasoning:
The parties to the 1941 Qu it Claim Deed conveying the
[e]asement . . . expressly indi cated that the [e]asement was
meant to be “A perpetual easement for ingress and egress . . . .”
(emphasis added). The 1941 Quit Claim Deed further clarifies
the parties’ intent to grant th e [e]asement to the Wanns and

8
“their assigns, the survivor of said parties, and the heirs and
assigns of the survivor . . . Forever . . . .” (emphasis added).

The district court reasoned that “had the parties intended the [e]asement to be in gross—
and therefore revocable—there would be no re ason to expressly state that the [e]asement
is ‘perpetual’ or would last ‘forever’ or to grant the [e]asement to the grantee[s’] ‘assigns,’
their ‘survivor,’ and the ‘heirs and assigns of the survivor.’” The district court concluded
that “[t]hese clauses indicate unambiguously that the parties intended the [e]asement to
survive the Wanns and run with the [non-lakeshore] property—not that it would be subject
to revocation by the owners of the [lakeshore] property.” (Emphasis added.) We agree
with the district court.
Based on our review of the language in the 1941 quitclaim deed, we conclude that
the easement is unambiguously appurtenant to the non-lakeshore property. The company
granted a “perpetual” easement to the Wanns and “their assigns, the survivor of said parties,
and the heirs and assigns of the survivor, Forever.” Although words of inheritance are not
dispositive, the use of those terms sugg est that an easement is appurtenant. See
Lidgerding v. Zignego, 80 N.W. 360, 361 (Minn. 1899) (discussing that the omission of
words of inheritance supports a “very slight” inference that the ease ment is in gross).
Moreover, the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms “perpetu al” and “[f]orever”
compels the conclusion that th e original parties to the easement intended the easement to
benefit the non-lakeshore property and run with that land, rather than to grant a right to an
easement that is personal and revocable.

9
We are not persuaded otherwise by the Jens ens’ arguments that “[t]he language used
in the [e]asement is, at best, ambiguous.” First, they contend th at the easement is
ambiguous because the quitclaim deed does not describe a benefitted parcel or include
certain phrases, such as “appurtenant” or “r uns with the land.” Bu t no Minnesota case
requires the use of these particular terms or phrases to create an appurtenant easement.
And this argument ignores that the easement expressly states that it is “perpetual” and lasts
“[f]orever.” The Jensens’ argument is theref ore unsupported by case law and contrary to
the parties’ clear intent.
The Jensens also argue that the easeme nt cannot be appurtenant because the
language of the easement indicates a grant “to a finite group of people.” They base this
argument on the language granting the easemen t to “Thomas L. Wann, Jr., and Elizabeth
B.C. Wann . . . their assigns, the survivor of said parties, and the he irs and assigns of the
survivor.” The Jensens appear to contend th at this language does not contain words of
inheritance but rather conveys an intent to limit easement rights to a finite group of
grantees—i.e., “the Wanns, and limited heirs, successors and assigns” of the Wanns. The
Jensens argue that if the original parties had intended the easem ent to run with the
non-lakeshore property, the quitclaim deed wo uld have simply granted the easement to
“Thomas L. Wann, Jr. and Elizabeth B.C. Wann, and their heirs and assigns.” (Emphasis
added.) We are not persuaded. We can di scern no meaningful distinction between the
words of inheritance that the Je nsens insist must be included in a grant of an appurtenant
easement and the language contained in the 1941 quitclaim de ed. The language granting
the easement to the Wanns and “their assigns, the survivor of said parties, and the heirs and

10
assigns of the survivor” does not limit the grante es to a finite group of people, but rather
conveys the easement to the survivors, heirs, and assigns of the Wanns. Such language is
consistent with a grant of an appurtenant easement. If the original parties to the easement
had intended the easement to be in gross, an d thus only personal to a limited group of
people, it would be nonsensical to identify the grantees of the easement to include “assigns”
and “heirs.” Similarly, it would be illogical to describe an in gross easement as “perpetual”
and continuing “[f]orever” because such an easement is personal and revocable, and
therefore by definition not “perpetual” or continuing “forever.”
The Jensens disagree that the terms “perpe tual” and “forever” support the district
court’s conclusion that the easement is ap purtenant. They contend that “the term
‘perpetual’ . . . was often employed for both in gross and appurtenant easements” and “the
term ‘Forever’ . . . was a standard, formulaic part of a Quit Claim Deed.” But the Jensens
cite no authority to support either of those assertions. They therefore have not provided
any compelling reason for us to conclude that the use of the terms “perpetual” and “forever”
indicate anything other than the parties’ clear intent to create an appurtenant easement that
runs with the land.
Lastly, the Jensens contend that fact s surrounding the eas ement’s creation and
subsequent events show that the easement was intended to be in gross. For instance, they
contend that the Wanns’ convey ance of the easement to the original grantor company in
October 1941 and the company’s immediate tran sfer of the easement back to the Wanns
shows that the original parties intended to separate the easement from the Wanns’ land and
create an easement in gross. But, as explained above, we do not consider extrinsic evidence

11
of the parties’ intent if the easement language expresses that intent in unambiguous terms.
See Staffing Specifix, Inc., 913 N.W.2d at 692 (explaining that extrinsic evidence of intent
may be admitted only if contract language is ambiguous). The Jens ens’ arguments are
unavailing.
Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the easement language, we conclude
that the 1941 quitclaim deed unambiguously created an appurtenant easement, which runs
with the non-lakeshore property. Accordingly, the district court did not err by ruling in
favor of the Rindelaubs and denying the Jensens’ motion for a new trial on that ground.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by excluding expert testimony
concerning whether the easement is appurtenant or in gross.

The Jensens also argue that the district court erred by exclud ing expert testimony
that they asserted would assist the court in determining whether the language of the
easement was intended to create an appurtenant easement or an easement in gross and by
denying the Jensens a new trial so that such testimony could be presented. We disagree.
“The admission of evidence rests within th e broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be distur bed unless it is based on an e rroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42,
45-46 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). “En titlement to a new trial on the grounds of
improper evidentiary rulings re sts upon the compla ining party’s ability to demonstrate
prejudicial error.” Id. at 46 (quotation omitted).
Prior to trial, the Jensens provided notice that they intended to offer testimony from
an expert who would explain “what constitutes an easement in gross and what constitutes

12
an appurtenant easement” and “i ssue an opinion as to whether the easement which is the
subject of this action is an easement in gross or an appurtenant easement.” The Rindelaubs
filed a motion in limine, requesting that the di strict court “exclude any expert testimony
which infringes upon the [c]ourt’s sole authority to decide legal questions concerning the
application of the law.” The Rindelaubs also disclosed their own expert witness who would
counter the testimony of the Jensens’ expert.
Before the district court ruled on the motions in limine, the Jensens’ proposed expert
witness died. The Jensens made an informal request for a continuance to find a replacement
expert, but the court denied the request. The district court then he ld a hearing on the
motions in limine. At the hearing, the court noted that the Jensens’ now-deceased proposed
expert never submitted an expert report to the court. The Jensens’ counsel stated that he
had not been able to find a replacement expert witness. Following the parties’ arguments,
the district court ruled on the record that it was excluding the testim ony of both parties’
proposed experts. The court explained:
As to the category of expert legal opinions about what
constitutes an easement in gross or an
easement . . . appurtenant; t hose ultimate legal questions
before the Court, the Court’s fi nding that expert testimony is
not appropriate on those topics. [The Jensens’ expert] is not
available, never rendered an op inion. The Jensens have not
found a replacement that they ca n even talk about in terms of
what the opinion would be, or how that would be appropriate.
And [the Rindelaubs’ expert] essentially was a reaction . . . to
get somebody to respond[.] . . . I’m not going to hear from
those kinds of experts.

13
Accordingly, the district court excluded th e Jensens’ proposed expert testimony, both
because the testimony would concern the “ultimate legal questions” in the case and because
the Jensens had failed to find a replacement expert.
Following the court’s judgment in the proceeding subsequent, the Jensens moved
for a new trial, arguing that “[e]xpert test imony giving the Court information about the
historical use of [the easement] language and what it likely meant to the drafters at the time
would be helpful to the Court.” In its order denying the motion, the district court reiterated
its conclusion that “[t]he testimony the Jensens offer is essentially a legal opinion ordinarily
reserved for legal counsel to argue.” The court determined that excluding the expert
testimony did not deprive the Jens ens of a fair trial because th e analysis of the nature of
the easement was “straightforward” and “[t]estimony tantamount to a legal argument does
not assist the Court in interpreting the ease ment any more than counsel’s written trial
submissions.”
The Jensens now argue that the district c ourt abused its discretion by excluding the
expert’s testimony and denying their motion for a new trial. They contend that an expert
“is allowed to testify as to the ultimate issues in the case” and that their expert could have
offered “specialized knowledge” regardin g “the law and language at the time the
[e]asement was drafted” in order to “conden se the issues for the Court.” We are not
persuaded.
Two alternative grounds suppo rt excluding the Jensens’ proposed expert testimony.
We first note that expert testimony regarding the nature of the easement would constitute
extrinsic evidence of the intent of the original parties to the easement. As such, it was

14
properly excluded in light of our conclusion that the ease ment language unambiguously
creates an appurtenant easement. See Staffing Specifix, Inc., 913 N.W.2d at 692 (explaining
that extrinsic evidence of intent may be admitted only if contract language is ambiguous).
Second, the Jensens’ argument fails on its merits. Expert testimony is admissible
only where it would “assist the trier of fact to understand the eviden ce or to determine a
fact in issue.” Minn. R. Evid. 702. “Tes timony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable beca use it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact.” Minn. R. Evid. 704. However: “A distinction should be made
between opinions as to factual matters, and op inions involving a legal analysis or mixed
questions of law and fact. Opinions of the latter nature are not deemed to be of any use to
the trier of fact.” Conover v. N. States Power Co. , 313 N.W.2d 397, 403 (Minn. 1981)
(quotation omitted). Here, the Jensens’ proposed expert te stimony would have
undoubtedly involved legal analysis or mixed questions of law and fact because the expert
intended to testify to the legal meaning of the terms in the 1941 quitclaim deed. In its order
denying the Jensens’ motion for a new trial, th e district court reasoned that this proposed
testimony would “complicate an ot herwise straightforward anal ysis.” Accordingly, the
court’s view was that such testimony would not have aided the court in deciding the legal
issue before it. The district court’s decision to exclude the expert testimony on this basis
was neither an erroneous view of the law nor an abuse of the court’s discretion.
Because the Jensens’ proposed expert te stimony would constitute extrinsic evidence
of the original parties’ intent and would also include opinions involving legal analysis, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony.

15
III. The district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the historical
use of the easement.

Lastly, the Jensens argue that the district court erred as a matter of law by excluding
evidence of the historical use of the easement and by denying their motion for a new trial
on that ground. They contend that case law es tablishes that the dist rict court abused its
discretion by failing to admit this evidence, whic h is relevant to the scope (as opposed to
the nature) of the easement. In this regard, we agree.
“The admission of evidence rests within th e broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be distur bed unless it is based on an e rroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Kroning, 567 N.W.2d at 45-46 (quotation omitted).
“Entitlement to a new trial on the grounds of improper evidentiary rulings rests upon the
complaining party’s ability to demonstrate prejudicial error.” Id. at 46 (quotation omitted).
The Jensens intended to offer testimony at trial about the use and maintenance of
the easement by prior owners of the non-lake shore property to support their position that
the use of the easement was intended to be limited to an unimproved footpath. The
proposed testimony concerned use of the ease ment by a married couple who had owned
the non-lakeshore property prior to the Rind elaubs. The wife was the daughter of the
Wanns, and she inherited the non-lakeshore property in 1957 following Elizabeth Wann’s
death. She and her husband owned the prope rty until her death, and then her husband
owned the property until 2014 when the Ri ndelaubs purchased the pr operty. In district
court filings, the Jensens indicated that they were prepared to testify to their observation of
the married couple’s use and maintenance of the easement from 1978, when the Jensens

16
moved onto the lakeshore property, until the non-lakeshore property was sold in 2014. And
the Jensens disclosed at least three additiona l witnesses who could have testified to the
historical use of the easement. One of their proposed witnesses had owned a neighboring
property from 1965 to 1980. The Jensens a sserted that their proposed testimony would
show that the easement area “was never paved or improved in any manner.”
Following the Rindelaubs’ mo tion in limine, the dist rict court excluded all
historical-use evidence of th e easement prior to 2014, determ ining that such evidence is
not “relevant to the type of easement that it is.” The district cour t further explained its
reasoning for excluding the ev idence in its order denying the Jensens’ motion for a new
trial. There, the court determined that it had not erred by excluding evidence of the
easement’s use and maintenance by owners who were not original parties to the easement
because
the easement’s scope is determined by its drafters. Historical
use may be useful extrinsic ev idence where it indicates what
the drafters intended the easement’s scope to be—but the
Jensens seem to propose that the Court should consider all
historical use, even by non-parties to the easement, when it was
originally granted. . . . [A]ny historical use evidence the
Jensens offer in this case must have a demonstrable nexus to
the easement’s original parties . . . . [T]he Jensens offer no
such evidence . . . .

(Emphasis added.)
To determine whether the di strict court erred by excl uding the Jensens’ proposed
historical-use evidence, we must first examine whether the easement language is
ambiguous as to improvements and motor vehicle use. See Staffing Specifix, Inc. ,
913 N.W.2d at 692 (pr oviding that extrinsic evidence of intent may be admitted only if

17
contract language is ambiguous ). Whether an ambiguity ex ists is a question of law,
reviewed de novo. Storms, Inc., 883 N.W.2d at 776; see also Scherger , 575 N.W.2d at
580-81 (reviewing de novo whether an easement agreement was ambiguous).
Based on our review of case law and the 1941 quitclaim deed, we conclude that the
easement language is ambiguous regardi ng whether the easement owner may make
improvements or use motor vehicles on the land. In Farnes v. Lane , the supreme court
provided a general rule for interpreting the scope of an easement:
If the easement is granted in terms which clearly and
specifically allow or deny [the] use [at issue], the language of
the instrument creating the right will control. Where, as here,
the easement for a way is granted in general terms . . . the
uncertainty must be resolved by applying the general principles
of law relating to the construction of ambiguous writings.

161 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Minn. 19 68) (emphasis added). Applying this rule to the present
case, the easement plainly grants a right of way in general terms—it provides for “ingress
and egress” across the lakeshore property, an d it does not specifically allow or deny the
use of motor vehicles. Furthermore, apar t from specifically permitting “the right to
maintain the usual dock facilities,” the language is silent as to the right to improve the land.
The Rindelaubs urge us to conclude that the easement’s silence as to improvements
and motor vehicle use unambiguously permits the Rindelaubs to engage in those activities
and that all extrinsic evidence was therefore properly excluded. They cite two cases to
support their position that the easement language is unambig uous as to the easement’s
scope. But their reliance on these cases is mi splaced. First, the Rindelaubs rely on
Bruns v. Willems, 172 N.W. 772 (Minn. 1919). In Bruns, the plaintiff complained that the

18
defendant easement holder’s grading of a roadway easement in terfered with his ability to
drive machinery on the road. 172 N.W. at 774. The supreme court held that the easement
holder had not violated the plaintiff’s rights. Id. In its analysis, the court noted that “one
possessed of a right of way easement may put it in proper condition for use and keep it in
repair.” Id. The Rindelaubs contend that Bruns “held that silent right-of-way easements
generally allow the building of improvements.” But the Bruns court considered extrinsic
evidence in reaching its c onclusion that the defenda nt’s improvements did not
unnecessarily injure the plaintiff. See id. at 774-75 (“The court found expressly that
defendant and his grantors and predecessors in interest have maintained and repaired the
cartway in such a manner as to cause no unnecessary injury or damage to plaintiff or his
land.”). Moreover, Bruns predates Farnes by almost 50 years. Bruns is not controlling in
this case.
The Rindelaubs also cite Giles v. Luker , 9 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 1943), to support
their contention that “[i]n general, a right-of-way easement that does not explicitly exclude
motor vehicles allows motor vehicles.” In Giles, the supreme court held that the use of the
word “wagon” in an easement grant was broa d enough to permit the use of trucks on the
land. 9 N.W.2d at 717-18. Contra ry to the Rindelaubs’ contention, the Giles court’s
interpretation of the easement was based on a term actually present in the conveyance
document; the court did not inte rpret silence in the easeme nt language to unambiguously
permit motor vehicle traffic. The Rindelaubs’ arguments are unavailing. Because the 1941
quitclaim deed conveyed the easement in ge neral terms, the easement language is
ambiguous regarding the scope of the easement.

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Having concluded that the easement langu age is ambiguous as to its scope, the
remaining question is whether the district c ourt abused its discretion by excluding the
Jensens’ proposed testimony about the historic al use of the easement. When interpreting
an ambiguous easement, admi ssible extrinsic evidence includes the “practical
construction,” or historical use, of the easement. Farnes, 161 N.W.2d at 301.
Here, the district court determined th at evidence of the easement’s use and
maintenance by the Wanns’ daughter and her family was properly excluded because it is
not relevant to determining the intent of the original partie s to the easement. The court
reasoned that “any historical use evidence th e Jensens offer in this case must have a
demonstrable nexus to the easement’s original parties” and noted that the Jensens had failed
to offer any such evidence. We conclude that the district court’s decision to exclude the
historical-use evidence was an abuse of discretion.
As the Jensens contend, Minnesota case la w provides that the use of an easement
by successors to the original parties is releva nt to determining the scope of an ambiguous
easement. For instance, in Farnes, the supreme court provided the following principle for
interpreting ambiguous easement language:
In addition to the rules which ap ply generally as aids in the
ascertainment of intent in the use of words, extrinsic evidence
may be considered relating to the facts peculiar to the particular
easement involved on the assumption that the grantor intended
to permit a use of the easement which was reasonable under
the circumstances and the grantee expected to enjoy the use to
the fullest extent consistent with its purpose.

Id. at 300 (emphasis added). The Farnes court then provided a long list of questions that
may be used to resolve the ambiguity of easement language. Id. at 300-01. These questions

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included the following: “What was the practical construction given to the easement by the
parties affected? . . . . Has there been a variation or abandonment of such initial uses
during the intervening years?” Id. at 301. The Farnes court did not limit a district court’s
inquiry to the original parties’ use of the easement but rather endorsed a broader
examination of the easement’s historical us e to determine whether the easement holder’s
proposed use of the easement is “r easonable under the circumstances.” See id. at 300.
Other cases support the proposition that ad missible historical-use evidence includes
evidence of the conduct of successo rs-in-interest to the easement. See Kretz v. Fireproof
Storage Co., 149 N.W. 648, 651 (Minn. 1914) (considering both the conduct of the original
parties to an easement and the conduct of successors-in-interest and stating, “The conduct
of later owners, including plaintiff, shows a practical construction of these instruments, and
leaves no doubt as to their own vi ew of the rights of defendant.”); Bruns, 172 N.W. at
774-75 (“The court found expre ssly that defendant and his grantors and predecessors in
interest have maintained and repaired the cartway in such a manner as to cause no
unnecessary injury or damage to plaintiff or his land. We cannot hol d that the finding is
without support in the record.”).
The historical-use evidence that the Jensen s proposed to admit fits squarely within
the inquiries that the Farnes court directed district courts to conduct. Moreover, because
the Jensens’ proposed testimony related to the use and maintenance of the easement by the
daughter of the original easement grantees, the evidence also meets the district court’s own
criteria for admission because it has a “demonstrable nexus to the easement’s original
parties.” Contrary to the Rindelaubs’ argument, the testimony that the Jensens intended to

21
offer is relevant to determining the intent of the original parties regarding the scope of the
easement. The Jensens contend that the tes timony would have shown that the use of the
easement after 1978 was “limited to pedestrian use and no improvements had ever been
constructed on the easement.” Under the Farnes standard, such testimony concerning the
use of the easement over time would shed light on what uses of the easement are
“reasonable under the circumstances.” See 161 N.W.2d at 300 (providing that an
easement’s grantor is assume d to intend uses that are “reasonable under the
circumstances”). Moreover, whether the daught er of the original easement grantees
constructed improvements or drove motor vehi cles on the easement may reflect whether
the original parties to the easement intended those uses to occur.3
The district court abused its discretion by concluding that the historical-use evidence
was irrelevant. And because the district court expressly based its decision not to grant the
Jensens’ requests for declaratory relief regard ing the use of the easement on the lack of
evidence in the record demonstrating the original parties’ intent in that regard, we conclude
that the exclusion of the evid ence prejudiced the Jensens. 4 We therefore remand for the

3 We note that although eviden ce of the prior owners’ use of the easement is relevant to
determining the easement’s scope , it is not necessarily dispositive of the intent of the
original parties. On remand, it will be the district court’s role, as fact-finder, to weigh the
historical-use evidence. See Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines , 933 N.W.2d 45, 60-61
(Minn. 2019) (distinguishing between the we ight and the admissib ility of evidence and
explaining that the role of weighing the evidence belongs to the fact-finder).
4 The Rindelaubs also contend that evidence of the easement ’s historical use should be
excluded because its admission would unfairly prejudice them. See Minn. R. Evid. 403
(“Although relevant, evidence may be exclude d if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”). The Rindelaubs’ argument does not
persuade us that the district court properly excluded all historical-use evidence. First, the
district court did not exclude the evidence on this basis. Because the district court did not

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district court to conduct a new trial limited to determining the scope of the appurtenant
easement.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

address the question of potential unfair prejudice, the issue is not properly before us. See
Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (explaining that an appellate court
“must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and
considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it” (quotation omitted)). On
remand, the Rindelaubs may raise an argument under rule 403 to challenge the admission
of specific historical-use evidence. But, it appe ars that the risk of any unfair prejudice is
minimal, at best, and unlikely to substantia lly outweigh the probative value of relevant
historical-use evidence because this case involves a court trial, as opposed to a jury trial.