Danna Rochelle Back, petitioner, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1098

Danna Rochelle Back, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Appellant.

Filed June 7, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-07-005374

Joseph A. Gangi, Farrish Johnson Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
In determining a petitioner’s eligibility for compensation based on exoneration
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 590. 11 (2020), a district court may deny eligibility pursuant to
the discretion required by subdivision 7, and ot her provisions of the statute, even if the
petitioner has been exonerated from her crimin al conviction on grounds consistent with
innocence pursuant to subdivision 1 of the statute.

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OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota appeals th e district court’s determination that
respondent Danna Rochelle Back is eligible for compensation based on exoneration. The
state argues that the district court erred in concluding that Back was exonerated as
contemplated by Minn. Stat. § 590.11. The di strict court properly determined that Back
was exonerated as defined in subdivision 1, properly applied subdivision 3 by concluding
the crime was not committed by Back, and pr operly determined that Back satisfied the
elements of subdivision 5 of the statute. However, because the district court failed to
exercise its discretion to determine Back’s eligibility for co mpensation as an exonerated
person as required by subdivi sion 7, we reverse and rema nd for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
This case has a significant history before al l three levels of the judicial branch and
has resulted in a revamping of Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (eligibility for compensation based on
exoneration), by the legislature. The district court’s conclusion that Back is eligible for
compensation pursuant to the amended exoneration statute, of which the state seeks review,
comes before our court as Back V.
In 2007, Back and N.S., at Back’s insist ence, went to the home of Back’s former
boyfriend. State v. Back , No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 7,
2009) (Back I). At the home, N.S. fatally shot Back’s former boyfriend with a firearm. Id.
Though Back did not possess or use the firearm, a jury found Back guilty of second-degree

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manslaughter with culpable negligence. Id. The district court entered judgment of
conviction and sentenced Back to an executed prison sentence, which our court affirmed.
Id. at *7.
The supreme court reversed the convic tion, concluding th at the evidence was
insufficient to establish that Back was culpably negligent because she owed no legal duty
to N.S. or the victim. State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 872 (Minn. 2009) (Back II). By the
time of the supreme court’s decision, Back had spent 32 months in prison and four months
on supervised release.
Back next petitioned for eligibility fo r compensation pursuan t to Minnesota’s
exoneration-compensation statute, which the district court denied. Our court reversed this
decision and determined that Back qualified as an exonerated pers on within the meaning
of subdivision 1 and remanded the case fo r consideration of the other eligibility
requirements. Back v. State, 883 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. App. 2016) (Back III). The supreme
court determined that a portion of the stat ute which provided Back with a remedy was
unconstitutional and reversed the court of appeals decision. Back v. State, 902 N.W.2d 23
(Minn. 2017) (Back IV).
Following legislative amendments to subdi vision 1 of the statute, which redefined
what it means to be “exonerated,” Back ag ain petitioned the district court for a
determination of eligibility. Fo llowing a hearing, the district court concluded that Back
was eligible to seek compensation based on exoneration. The state appeals.

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ISSUE
Did the district court fail to exercise its discretion as required by Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, subd. 7, to determine whether Back was eligible to seek exoneration
compensation?
ANALYSIS
The state argues the district court abus ed its discretion by concluding Back was
eligible to seek ex oneration compensation. We firs t outline the steps the exoneration-
compensation statutes provide for a determination of eligibility and receipt of exoneration
compensation. Next, we consider those steps and the facts of this case to address whether
the district court abused its discretion.
A.
In 2014, the Minnesota legislature enact ed an exoneration-compensation statute,
Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-.368 (2014), which provide s an avenue for exon erated persons to
petition to seek compensation from the state th rough Minn. Stat. § 59 0.11. In 2019, the
legislature amended subdivision 1 of secti on 590.11, which defines “exonerated.”
Following a successful comple tion of the four steps requi red by section 590.11, four
additional steps pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-.368 must occu r before a petitioner
may receive compensation for exoneration.
Section 590.11 prescribes a four-step process for the di strict court to determine
eligibility based upon exoneration. Minn. Stat. § 590.11. The burden of proof rests on the
petitioner to demonstrate the facts alleged in the petition by a pr eponderance of the
evidence. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2020).

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First, a petitioner must prove, and the distri ct court must find, as a threshold issue
that the petitioner was exonerated. Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1; Back II, 883 N.W.2d at
619. The question of whethe r a petitioner meets the statutor y definition of “exonerated”
presents a question of statutory interp retation that appellate courts review de novo. Back
IV, 902 N.W.2d at 27. In prio r appellate cases, no hearing oc curred because the district
court determined whether th e petitioner was exonerated “o n grounds consistent with
innocence” and that was the appellate issue. See, e.g. , Back III , 883 N.W.2d at 616;
Freeman v. State, 944 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn. App. 2020); Kingbird v. State, 949 N.W.2d
744, 750 (Minn. App. 2020), review granted (Minn. Nov. 17, 2020).
The Minnesota legislature amended the e xoneration-compensation statute in 2019
to define “exonerated” as ha ving a “vacated, reversed, or set aside [] judgment of
conviction on grounds consistent with innocence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i)
(Supp. 2019) (emphasis added). The legisl ature defined “on grou nds consistent with
innocence” as a showing of “any evidence of factual innocence” by the petitioner. Id.,
subd. 1(c) (Supp. 2019). Unlike the previous cases to come before our court for review of
a petition pursuant to section 590.11, this ma tter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing,
which requires us, for the firs t time, to review an orde r that addresses additional
subdivisions of the statute beyond subdivision 1.
Second, the district court must “determine if an individual who is exonerated is
eligible for compensation based on the establishment of innocence.” Id., subd. 3(b) (Supp.

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2019) (emphasis added). This requires the petitioner to establish “that a crime was not
committed or that the crime was not committed by the petitioner.” Id.1
Third, the district court must determine whether the exonerated petitioner meets the
elements described in subdivision 5. This subdivision states that:
A claim for compensation arises if a person is eligible
for compensation under subdivision 3 and:

(1) the person was convicted of a felony and served any part
of the imposed sentence;

(2) in cases where the pers on was convicted of multiple
charges arising out of the same behavioral incident, the person
was exonerated for all of those charges;

(3) the person did not commit or induce another person to
commit perjury or fabricate evid ence to cause or bring about
the conviction; and

(4) the person was not serving a term of incarceration for
another crime at the same time . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 5. We note that steps two and three of the analysis will typically
be combined for the district court to consider during the he aring and based on both the
record and the facts presented.
Fourth, subdivision 7 requires the district court to exercise its discretion to
determine whether the exonerated petitioner is eligible for compensation: “If, after
considering all the files and records admitted and any evidence admitted at a hearing held

1 Subdivision 3(a), not here applicable, direct s the district court to issue an order of
eligibility if the prosecutor “joins the petition and indicates that it is likely that the original
complaint or indictment would not have been filed or sought or would have been dismissed
with the knowledge of all of the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 3(a).

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pursuant to subdivision 4 , the court determines that the petitioner is eligible for
compensation, the court sha ll issue an order containing its findings . . . .” Id., subd. 7
(emphasis added). Subdivision 4—which informs the district court’s analysis of steps two,
three, and four—describes the evidence which may be considered in determining
eligibility:
Court records related to the conviction and the
exoneration are admissible in a proceeding under this
section . . . . Both the petitione r and the prosecutor have the
right to present additional evid ence. The court may consider
acts by the petitioner that may ha ve contributed to bringing
about the conviction and any other offenses that may have been
committed by the petitioner in the same behavioral incident,
except for those acts contained in subdivision 5, paragraph (c).
The victim of the offense has a right to submit an oral or written
statement before the court issues its order. The statement may
summarize the harm suffered by the victim as a result of the
crime and give the victim’s re commendation on whether the
petition should be granted or denied.

Id., subd. 4 (emphasis added).
If a petitioner succeeds in obtaining a dist rict court order concluding eligibility for
compensation, the petitioner may bring a clai m for an award based on exoneration.
Because the facts and procedural history of this case implicate only the above section
590.11 process, we do not address the process which w ill next occur pursuant to Minn.
Stat. §§ 611.362-.368, in our analysis.
2

2 The remaining process would entail (1) bringing a claim for an award pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 611.362 and appointmen t of a compensation panel by the chief justice of the
supreme court, (2) the panel holding an evid entiary hearing to determine the amount of
damages pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 611.364-365, (3) judicial review, if sought by a party,
of the damages decision pursuant to Minn. Stat . § 611.366, and (4) the panel forwarding
the decision to the commissioner of manage ment and budget, who then submits “the

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B.
We now apply this statutory framework to the facts of this case. For reasons
described below, the district court properly concluded that the first three steps of the statute
were met but the district court failed to exercise its discretion required by step four.
Definition
The state argues the district court erred by concluding Back is an exonerated
individual, claiming the defin ition of “exonerated” in subd ivision 1 is ambiguous.
Applying the rules of statutory construction and legislative history, the state argues, leads
to a conclusion that Back is not exonerated. We disagree.
Our court in Freeman addressed the meaning of “factual innocence” by determining
that, “[b]y its plain terms, the phrase ‘any evidence of factual innocence’ means any
evidence that shows some fact establishing the absence of the petitioner’s guilt.” 944
N.W.2d at 491. We agree with the district court’s interpretation of the statute and discern
no error in the court’s conclusi on that, based on the reversal of Back’s conviction by the
supreme court in Back II, Back was exonerated as defined by subdivision 1.
Alternatively, the state contends that the supreme court’s decision in Back II did not
exonerate Back but was, instead, a “clarification of the law” and, therefore, not based on
Back’s factual innocence. The state cites Kingbird for this proposition. Again, we are not
persuaded.

amount of the award to the legislature for consideration as an appropriation.” Minn. Stat.
§ 611.367.

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Kingbird, who had been convicted of posse ssing a firearm, had his conviction and
sentence overturned based on a clarification by the supreme court as to what constitutes a
“firearm.” In contrast, in Back II, the supreme court overturn ed Back’s c onviction and
sentence based on an applic ation of existing law. Back II, 775 N.W.2d at 869-72. The
decision in Back II was based on the holdings of State v. Cantrell , 18 N.W.2d 681, 686
(Minn. 1945) (determining th at culpable negligence requires the existence of a duty),
Larson v. Larson, 373 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. 1985) (stating that whether a person owes
a duty of care “is an issue for the court to determine as a ma tter of law”), and Lubbers v.
Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995) (explaining that th e existence of a duty is
an essential element of a negligence claim).
Based on our de novo review of the district court’ s conclusion, the district court
properly concluded that Back meets the definition of “any evidence of factual innocence”
and is exonerated.
Interests of Justice
As the district court concluded, Back established that “the crime was not committed
by [Back]” as defined by subdivision 3(b), and “that a crime was not committed or that the
crime was not committed by [Back].” (emphasis added). The supreme court’s decision in
Back II demonstrates that Back did not commit “the crime,” Back II, 775 N.W.2d at 872
(holding that Back “was not culpably negligent” and re versing Back’s conviction of
second-degree manslaughter), and the state presented no evidence during the hearing that
Back committed another crime. We therefor e discern no error in the district court’s

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conclusion that Back established innocence. Resolution of this step in the process leads to
our review of step three.
Elements
The state does not dispute that Back’s pe tition satisfies the relevant elements of
subdivision 5, which are that:
(1) the person was convicted of a felony and served any part
of the imposed sentence;
. . . .

(3) the person did not commit or induce another person to
commit perjury or fabricate evid ence to cause or bring about
the conviction; and

(4) the person was not serving a term of incarceration for
another crime at the same time . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 5. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that these
elements are satisfied, and we discern no erro r in the conclusion that Back satisfied this
step in the process.
Order
The district court conducted the evidentiary hearing pursuant to subdivision 4 and
was presented with evidence, which included statements fro m the victim’s family and
testimony from Back about Back’s involvement in the events that led to the victim’s death.
The district court mistakenly believed that, despite making factual findings that would
suggest Back was not eligible, it was compelled by the language of the exoneration statute
to conclude Back is eligible . It is, we believe, this mi sapprehension which leads to the
district court’s failure to exercise its discretion required by subdivision 7.

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The district court issued findings which recognized Back’s significant role in
victim’s death. The district court found that, by insisting that she go to the victim’s home
with the assailant, Back was “the linchpin th at made the murder po ssible” and that Back
“does not have clean hands in this case.” However, the district court found that “[the
exoneration-compensation statute] does not explain what to do if the petitioner shows she
did not personally commit a crime, but . . . played a significant part in the crime that was
committed.”
The district court found that subdivisions 3 and 4 are “at odds in this case.” The
district court continued: “I am making a sp ecific finding that if this Court is meant to
balance Petitioner’s acts and the other considerations in subdivision 4 against Petitioner’s
‘any showing of factual innocence’ [Back] would not be entitled to compensation for any
period before the conviction was reversed,” but “[a]pplying the actual wording of the
statute . . . requires an order finding [B ack] is eligible fo r compensation under
subdivision 3. [Back] was exonerated and did not personally commit the crime for which
she was incarcerated.” The district court also explained that if “the factors of subdivision 4
do not matter, [Back] would be entitled to compensation back to the date of the verdict.”
We empathize with the district court’s struggle to discern the legislature’s direction
caused by its design of the exoneration statute. However, we conclude that the legislature
unambiguously granted the district court discre tion to consider the evidence as described
in subdivisions 4 to conclude, pursuant to subdivision 7, whether an exonerated petitioner
is eligible for compensation.

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By determining that the statute “required” a finding of eligibility based solely on
Back’s exoneration status, the district court therefore failed to ex ercise discretion to
determine Back’s eligibility. This failure by the district court to exercise discretion
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See State v. DeLaCruz, 884 N.W.2d 878, 888 (Minn.
App. 2016) (holding that a district court’s failu re to exercise its disc retion is an abuse of
discretion). We therefore remand to the district court to exercise the discretion afforded it
pursuant to subdivision 7 and make a determin ation of Back’s elig ibility for exoneration
compensation. We do not express an opinion as to the result upon remand.3
DECISION
Because the district court failed to exercise its discretion to determine whether Back,
whom the district court properly concluded is exonerated, is eligible for compensation, we
reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opini on. On remand and in its
discretion, the district court shall determine whether the record and evidence supports a
conclusion of eligibility for exoneration compensation and whether an additional hearing
is necessary to make such a determination.
Reversed and remanded.

3 Because we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion, we do not
address Back’s cross appeal.