OTI, Inc., Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1099

OTI, Inc.,
Relator,

vs.

Ramsey County,
Respondent.

Filed March 29, 2021
Appeal dismissed
Frisch, Judge

Ramsey County Finance

Rory C. Mattson, Messerli & Kramer P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Robert B. Roche, Lindsey Millard, Assistant
County Attorneys, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
This certiorari appeal follows a final determination by the county that it did not
violate prevailing-wage laws in the procurement or award of public contracts involving
yard-waste management and hauling. The county moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Because Minnesota law unambiguously provides for original

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jurisdiction over such an action in the district court, we grant the county’s motion and
dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
FACTS
This case arises from a dispute between re lator OTI, Inc. and respondent Ramsey
County regarding the county’s application of a prevailing-wage ordinance to two contracts.
In March 2019, the county issued a request for bid s (RFB) for a contract to manage yard
waste collected at its Midway and Summ it Hill collection sites. The RFB specified that
“[b]ids are being taken for a per ton rate for combined transportation and disposal of yard
waste and a per hour rate for site work (pushing up piles, etc.).” In relevant part, the RFB
required all contrac tors and subcontractors to conform to Ramsey County’ s
prevailing-wage ordinance. See Ramsey County, Minn., Prevailing Wage Ordinance
2013-329 §§ 1-3 (Dec. 3, 2013) (PWO or prevailing-wage ordinance).
OTI and a competitor , Utmost Compost , LLC, bid on the contract. The county
awarded the contract to Utmost. Utmost then subcontracted with Augie’s Trucking for
trucking services.
In October 2019, the county issued another RFB to manage yard waste at five
collection sites not covered by the first contract. This RFB was essentially identical to the
previous RFB. OTI bid again, but the county awarded the contract to Augie’s Trucking.
After OTI lost the second bid, it began corresponding with the county, arguing that
the county misapplied the prevailing-wage ordinance. It also argued that the county failed
to enforce the prevailing-wage ordinance against Utmost and Augie’s, allowing them to
pay less than the prevailing wage and to avoid submitting mandatory reports.

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The county denied that it misapplied the prevailing-wage ordinance, explaining that
the ordinance applied to the labor associated with the loading and transportation of yard
waste off-site, not to the site work, and that the contracts required the contractors to pay
the state prevailing wage for the transportation work. The county also indicated that reports
from Utmost had been submitted and were up to date and that it was looking into OTI’s
concerns regarding rental reports.
The county nevertheless undertook a formal bid protest review process to respond
to OTI’s concerns. At the end of this process, the county determined that “the County’s
solicitation process was completed accurately and consistent with laws, rules, policies and
procedures” and that it correctly applied the state and county prevailing-wage laws.
OTI appealed the determination to the county’s chief financial officer (CFO),
arguing that (1) the county improperly awarded the contracts to Utmost and Augie’ s, who
underbid OTI by failing to incorporate the prevailing wage into their bids, and (2) the
county failed to enforce the prevailing -wage ordinance against Utmost and Augie’s. OTI
asked the CFO to rescind the two contracts and enforce the ordinance. The CFO reviewed
the record and law and affirmed the county’s original determination in his final decision.
OTI petitioned this court for certiorari review. The county moved to dismiss the
appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
DECISION
“Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of the court to hear the type of dispute
at issue and to grant the type of relief sought.” County of Washington v. City of Oak Park
Heights, 818 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 2012) . “Minnesota courts have consistently

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recognized that statutory requirements limiting a court’s jurisdiction are threshold
requirements that must be complied with before a court can exercise jurisdiction.” Irwin
v. Goodno , 686 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Minn. App. 2004). “When a party challenges the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, the court must examine whether it has the authority
to hear the type of dispute and to grant the type of relief sought.” Williams v. Smith, 820
N.W.2d 807, 812-13 (Minn. 2012). “Without subject-matter jurisdiction, we must dismiss
the claim.” Id. at 813.
The parties dispute whether the Minnesota Uniform Municipal Contracting Law
(the UMCL), Minn. Stat. § 471.345 (2020), applies here . Pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 471.345, subd. 21(a), “Original jurisdiction is granted to the district court over any action
seeking legal, equitable, or declaratory relief arising under or based upon the alleged
violation of any law or ordinance governing public procurement requirements, public
procurement procedures, or the award of any public contract.”
The county argues that, pursuant to the UMCL, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction
over this dispute because OTI’s claim hinges on the county’s application of the
prevailing-wage ordinance to the yard-waste contracts , meaning it is a dispute “arising
under or based upon” the county’s alleged violation o f an ordinance governing public
procurement requirements. OTI responds that the ordinance is “a law for the protection of
workers, to be applied an y time workers are deprived of fair wages —regardless of the
context,” not a law governing public procurement requirements or procedures. OTI further
argues in this appeal that its claim focuses on the county’s failure to equally apply and
enforce its prevailing-wage ordinance, not the county’s procurement process or award of

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the contracts. OTI finally argues that the contracts at issue are not “contracts” within the
meaning of the UMCL, so the statutory jurisdictional provision does not apply.
We disagree first with OTI’s interpretation of the prevailing -wage ordinance as
unrelated to public procurement requirements . The unambiguous language of the
ordinance provides for its application to the county’s “solicitations for bids on contracts
for the purchase of labor and materials” and requires that “the hourly wages paid to workers
on Projects and for Services . . . not be less than the prevailing hourly wage rates
established by [Minnesota law].” PWO § 1.B(1), (3). Furthermore, the “Ordinance applies
to all contracts with Covered Persons in which the Count y is a contracting party. ” PWO
§ 3.A. Covered persons include only entities “contracting directly with the County . . . or
subcontracting to perform all or part of the work.” PWO § 2.A(5). Contrary to OTI’s
argument that the ordinance protects all workers, the unambiguous language in the
ordinance provides for its application only to wages paid to workers under the county’s
contracts for projects and services. The ordinance requires that workers under those public
contracts be paid the prevailing wage, so it is an “ordinance governing public procurement
requirements.” Minn. Stat. § 471.345, subd. 21(a).
The ordinance also provides that the “requirements and obligations contained in this
Ordinance are . . . incorporated into the bid specifications and requests for bids . . . and are
material and binding terms and conditions of all contracts and subcontracts for Projects and
Services.” PWO § 3.A(7). By its express and unambiguous terms, the ordinance requires
that the county incorporate the requirements of the prevailing-wage ordinance in its RFBs.

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Stated differently, the ordinance unambiguously sets forth requirements in the public
procurement procedures.
We are also not persuaded by OTI’s argument that this action does not arise from
the procurement process. OTI essentially argues that its real complaint is that the county
is not enforcing the prevailing-wage ordinance in the performance of the contracts, not that
it failed to follow the ordinance in the procurement process, and that its complaints about
the performance of the contracts are not subject to the jurisdictional limitations set forth in
the UMCL.
The manner in which OTI casts its claim is irrelevant to the question of
subject-matter jurisdiction. “The characterization of a claim in a complaint does not
change the jurisdictional analysis.” Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 763
N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. App. 2009). We determine whether jurisdiction lies by examining
the factual substance of the claims to understand how the aggrieved party claims to have
been harme d and the relief sought . See generally Willis v. C ounty of Sherburne , 555
N.W.2d 277, 280-82 (Minn. 1996).
Here, the essence of OTI’s action relates to the procurement process. OTI alleges
that the county is failing to equally enforce the prevailing -wage ordinance. That claim
arises from OTI’s original arguments to the county that it awarded the contracts to Utmost
and Augie’s without requiring them to submit bids incorporating the prevailing wage as
required by the ordinance . OTI argues that this failure to enforce the ordinance in the
bidding process caused OTI to lose those bids . OTI’s own filings underscore the essence
of its claim. In its statement of the case to this court , OTI states that “ [t]he County’s

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unequal application of prevailing wage requirements enabled Utmost to successfully
underbid OTI and is the proximate cause of OTI’s damages from losing the
Midway/Summit contract that it previously held. ” (Emphasis added.) OTI further states
that “[b]y letter dated April 3, 2020, the County denied OTI’s protests to the County’s
procurement process . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Not surprisingly, the county’s review of OTI’s complaint and its ultimate decision
focused on whether the county properly applied the ordinance in the bidding process , and
the county concluded that it did comply with the ordinance. That is the decision from
which OTI now seeks certiorari review. OTI’s original complaints, the county’s decision,
and OTI’s petition for certiorari review of that decision all show that this dispute is based
on allegations that the county violated the prevailing-wage ordinance in the public
procurement process. In other words, this is a dispute “arising under or based upon the
alleged violation of . . . [an] ordinance governing public procurement requirements [and]
public procurement procedures.” Minn. Stat. § 471.345, subd. 21(a). Original jurisdiction
over such a dispute lies in the district court. Id.
Finally, we disagree with OTI’s argument that the contracts are not “contracts”
within the meaning of the UMCL. “A ‘contract’ means an agreement entered into by a
municipality for the sale or purchase of supplies, materials, equipment or the rental thereof,
or the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of real or personal property.” Minn.
Stat. § 471.345, subd. 2. OTI argues that the ya rd-waste contracts are for operational
services to help the county carry on the business of the sites (collecting and repurposing or
disposing of customers’ yard waste), not for the repair or maintenance of those sites. OTI’s

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argument fails on the face of the RFBs, which both described the site work as including
“the hourly loader work assigned to keep[] the sites maintained and operating efficiently.”
(Emphasis added.) This maintenance included “1. As assigned, push up piles of materials
including leave s/grass, brush, finished compost, and wood mulch . . . . 2. Stockpile and
haul finished compost . . . . 3. Form windrows to specification from incoming leaves . . . .
[and] 4. Repair site surfaces (potholes, etc.) with loader.” (Emphasis added.) These
contracts include the repair and maintenance of t he yard -waste sites, the county’s real
property, so they meet the definition of “contract” within the UMCL.
This dispute is governed by Mi nn. Stat. § 471.345, subd. 21(a), which confers
jurisdiction in the district court . We grant the county’s motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Because we lack subject-matter jurisdiction, we do not address
the substantive claims set forth in the petition.
Appeal dismissed.