Nathan Mead, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1101

Nathan Mead,
Appellant,

Amy Mead,
Plaintiff,

vs.

BNSF Railway Company,
Respondent,

Ture Lee,
Respondent on related appeal,

and

BNSF Railway Company,
Respondent

vs.

Jerry Lee,
Respondent on related appeal.

Filed May 10, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-10789

William Kvas, Richard L. Carlson, Hunegs, LeNeave & Kvas, P.A., Wayzata, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Stephen M. Warner, Sally J. Ferguson, Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering,
Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent BNSF Railway Company)

2

Robert H. Tennant, III, Stringer & Rohleder, Ltd., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents on
related appeal Ture Lee and Jerry Lee)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Wo rke, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant-plaintiff Nathan Mead was involved in a car accident while working for
respondent-defendant BNSF Railway Company. Mead brought this lawsuit against BNSF,
prepared to introduce expert testimony that BNSF was negligent for failing to maintain the
driver’s seat recliner mech anism—which, according to the expert, failed during the
accident and caused Mead to propel into the truck’s rear window.
The district court granted summary judgment to BNSF three times. Mead appealed
the district court’s decision each time (this being the third appeal). In each of the first two
appeals, we reversed the district court’ s grant of summary judgment and remanded for
further proceedings. Mead v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. A17-0480, 2018 WL 414318 (Minn. App.
Jan. 16, 2018) (Mead I); Mead v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. A18-1965, 2019 WL 4745138 (Minn.
App. Sept. 30, 2019) ( Mead II). In this appeal, Mead seeks review of the district court’s
grant of summary judgment premised on its deci sion to exclude an expert from testifying
to his opinions about the cause of the seat re clining, BNSF’s failure to properly maintain
the seat, and whether the company that BNSF uses to repair its trucks should have known
about the defective mechanism that purportedly caused the seat to recline.

3
We conclude that the district court erred by excluding expert testimony on one
opinion, but acted within its discretion in excl uding the others. As a result, the district
court did not err in granting summary judgme nt because without th e properly excluded
opinions, no material disputed facts remained on the essential element of breach of duty.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
To explain the relevant facts of this case, we first describe the accident at issue and
then turn to the litigation history.
The Accident
Mead worked as a carman for BNSF, where his dutie s included maintaining and
repairing rail cars.1 On August 12, 2012, Mead’s supervisor directed him to drive a specific
BNSF truck from Fridley to a j ob site in Saint Paul. Me ad inspected the truck and
complained about several issues to his supervisor (none of which were related to the
driver’s seat recliner mechanism), but the supervisor insisted that Mead take the truck.
On Interstate 94, on his way to Saint Paul , Mead was rear-ended by an intoxicated
driver—Jerry Lee. According to Mead’s de position testimony, his tr uck’s driver’s seat
reclined backwards upon impact. The reclined seat acted as a ramp, sending Mead’s body
backwards and resulting in his head crashing into the truck’s rear window. Mead suffered
significant injuries in the accident.

1 We have discussed the facts of this case in more detail in our previous opinions, but to
provide context, we briefly describe the incident at issue and the procedural posture of the
case leading to this third appeal.

4
After the accident, Bona Brothers Auto and Truck Services—the company that
serviced all BNSF’s trucks—inspected and re paired the truck. Bona Brothers had
experience with this truck and had done over $80,000 worth of maintenance and repairs in
the past. The driver’s seat was reclined when the truck was brought to Bona Brothers. But
Bona Brothers determined, af ter inspecting the truck, that the recliner mechanism was
intact and functioning properly.
The Litigation History
Mead sued BNSF, alleging negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
45 U.S.C. § 51 (2020).2 He alleged that the driver-seat recliner mechanism failed, causing
his injuries. He asserted that BNSF was ne gligent because it failed to properly maintain
the mechanism.
To prove that BNSF was neg ligent, Mead retained the se rvices of several expert
witnesses, including Dr. Scott Benson and William Muzzy III. Mead expected Dr. Benson
to testify about medical causation and his op inion that hitting the rear window was what
caused Mead’s injuries. Muzzy was to testify to several opinions regarding the cause of
the seat reclining in the accident, including th at (1) the seat reclined because the recliner
mechanism failed; (2) the caus e of the mechanism’s failure was improper or inadequate
maintenance; and (3) Bona Brothers knew or should have known that the mechanism was
prone to failure due to poor maintenance.

2 The parties brought several other claims that are not pertinent to this appeal. Mead sued
Ture Lee (who owned the vehicle that Jerr y Lee was driving) for negligence. BNSF
brought a third-party complaint against Jerry Lee and asserted cross- claims against Ture
Lee, alleging that the Lees were liable to it, to the extent that BNSF was liable to Mead.

5
Mead also relied, in part, on another BN SF employee’s statement. The employee
wrote in a statement that “both before and af ter [Mead’s] accident, the [driver’s] seat [of
the truck at issue] would recline to rear without touching the adjustment mechanism.” But
at a subsequent deposition, the employee qualified that statement, testifying that he noticed
an issue “one time, and only on e time” in which he leaned ba ck on the seat and the seat
was “loose, like it didn’t catch.” He got back out of the truck, “jarred the seat,” and the
seat “caught.” The admissibility of Muzzy’s testimony is the central focus of this appeal,
but a discussion of the prev ious summary judgment pro ceedings provides necessary
context for our decision.
Early in the case, BNSF made two motions. First, BNSF moved for summary
judgment. Separately, BNSF moved to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Benson and
Muzzy, and the testimony of other witnesses. Without addressing BNSF’s motion to
exclude expert testimony, the district cour t granted summary judgme nt to BNSF on the
grounds that there was no evidence to suppor t that BNSF had notic e that the mechanism
might fail or that the mechanism’s malfunction was foreseeable to BNSF.3
Mead then filed his first appeal, challenging summary judgment. Mead I, 2018 WL
414318. We reversed, concluding, among othe r things, that there ex isted genuine issues
of material fact regarding whether BNSF had notice of issues with the seat and whether it
was foreseeable that the mechanism would fail. Id. at *4-6. In reac hing our conclusion,
we relied, in part, on Muzzy’s report and opinions. We did not expressly indicate that

3 The district court referenced Muzzy’s expe rt report in its analysis without indicating
whether the testimony regarding the report was admissible.

6
Muzzy’s opinion was admissible, and did not discuss the admi ssibility of any evidence.
We remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
On remand, BNSF renewed its motion to excl ude expert testimony. The district
court granted BNSF’s motion to exclude both Dr. Benson’s and Muzzy’s testimony.
After the district court excluded the e xpert testimony, BNSF again moved for
summary judgment—based solely on the exclusion of Dr. Benson’s testimony and the lack
of evidence regarding medical causation of Mead’s injuries. The district court granted the
motion and Mead again appealed. In Mead II, we examined the district court’s decision to
exclude Dr. Benson’s testimony. 2019 WL 47451 38, at *3-4. We concluded that the
district court abused its discretion by excl uding the testimony, and therefore, that the
district court erred by granting summary judg ment based solely on the lack of testimony
regarding medical causation. We declined to address Me ad’s arguments regarding the
admissibility of Muzzy’s tes timony because, as Mead co nceded, resolving whether
Muzzy’s testimony was admissible was not necessary to reso lve the appeal. Id. at *2-3.
We again remanded for further proceedings.
On remand once again, BNSF moved for summary judgment a third time—this time
based on the exclusion of Mu zzy’s testimony. BNSF argued, and Mead conceded, that
Muzzy’s testimony was essential to Mead’s ca se and that his negligence claim against
BNSF failed without it. Mead asked that the district court reconsider its order excluding

7
Muzzy’s testimony. The district court denied Mead’s request to re consider and granted
summary judgment in BNSF’s favor.4 This appeal follows.
DECISION
Mead challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment predicated
on its ruling that Muzzy’s expert opinion tes timony was inadmissible. Thus, the focus of
our review is whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding Muzzy’s expert
opinion testimony.
Before addressing Mead’s specific argumen ts, we briefly discuss the nature of
Mead’s claims under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Then we turn to the
admissibility of Muzzy’s testimony—first addr essing whether the district court erred by
failing to adhere to the law-of-the-case doctrine before turning to whether the district court
abused its discretion by excluding Muzzy’s opinion testimony for lack of foundational
reliability.
We begin by reviewing the Federal Empl oyers’ Liability Act, which underpins
Mead’s claim. Under this Act, common ca rriers like BNSF are liable to their employees
for injury resulting “in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents,
or employees” of the carrier or “by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence in its cars, engines . . . or other equipment.” 45 U.S.C. § 51. The specific claim
at issue here is that BN SF was negligent in its failure to properly maintain the truck’s
recliner mechanism which resulted in him being injured in the accident.

4 Based on the judgment in BNSF’s favor, th e district court also dismissed BNSF’s
third-party claims and cross-claims against the Lees.

8
The elements of a negligence claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act are
the same as those in an ordinary negligence action, including duty, breach, and causation.
See Fulk v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 22 F.3d 120, 124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Smith v. Soo Line
R.R. Co. , 617 N.W.2d 437, 439 (M inn. App. 2000) (citing id.), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 21, 2000). But the plaintiff’s burden of proof under the Act is less than in a
common-law negligence case. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride , 564 U.S. 685, 692,
131 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (2011) (Act calls for a “relaxed standard of causation” (quoting
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall , 512 U.S. 532, 543, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2404 (1994).); see
also Smith, 617 N.W.2d at 439.
At its core, Mead’s argument in this appeal is an evidentiary one. While the Act is
a federal law, when it comes to the issue here—that of expert testimony admissibility—
state court procedures apply. Alby v. BNSF Ry. Co., 934 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2019).
Thus, the state rules of evidence, including our rules regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony, govern. Mead intended to introdu ce Muzzy’s expert testimony to prove that
BNSF owed him a duty to remedy a fores eeable hazard—the allegedly improperly
maintained mechanism—and that the failure to properly ma intain the mechanism was a
breach of duty that caused Mead’s injuries. When the district court excluded Muzzy’s
testimony, Mead conceded that he could not satisfy his burden of proof that BNSF was
negligent. Thus, Mead’s arguments on appeal attack the district court’s conclusion that
Muzzy’s testimony was inadmissible.

9
I. Mead I did not establish, as law of the case, that Muzzy’s expert opinion
testimony was admissible under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702.

Mead first argues that because we purportedly decided that Muzzy’s testimony was
admissible under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 in Mead I, the law-of-the-case doctrine
applies to that issue and that the district court erred in excluding Muzzy’s testimony. We
review de novo whether the law-of-the-cas e doctrine applies to an issue on remand. See,
e.g., Sigurdson v. Isanti County , 448 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. 1989) (reviewing the
application of the doctrine de novo); Mattson v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London ,
414 N.W.2d 717, 720-21 (Minn. 1987) (same); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Cent. Ins.
Co., 503 N.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Minn. App. 1993) (Sylvester II) (same).
The law-of-the-case doctrine is intended to “effectuate the finality of appellate
decisions.” Loo v. Loo , 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994); see also Sylvester II,
503 N.W.2d at 795 (observing that the doctrine is “based on a policy requiring issues once
fully litigated to be set at rest”). The doctrine provides that “when a court decides upon a
rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages
in the same case.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990) (emphasis
omitted) (quotation omitted). Thus, the law-of-the-case doctrine applies when an appellate
court has “ruled on a legal issue” and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Sylvester II, 503 N.W.2d at 795. On remand, any issue not decided in the appeal may be
litigated, but the issues decided in the appeal may not be re litigated in district court or
reconsidered in a second appeal. Id.

10
Here, to discern whether we decided Muzzy’s testimony was admissible, we address
two issues. First, does the law of the case doctrine apply to implicit decisions?5 Second,
if so, did we actually decide the admissibility question? We address each question in turn.
The answer to the first question is simple —the doctrine is generally understood to
apply to issues that ar e implicitly decided. See 18B Charles Alan Wright et al, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 632 (3d ed. 2019) (collecting cases that support that the
doctrine applies to issues deci ded by necessary implication ). The parties do not dispute
this general understanding.
But while the doctrine may apply to an implicitly decided issue, that issue must be
“decided” or “ruled on.” Sylvester II, 505 N.W.2d at 795. The law-of-the-case doctrine,
therefore, applies only to i ssues that we re litigated. Sigurdson, 448 N.W.2d at 66.
Similarly, the doctrine does not apply to an issue raised in a previous appeal but not
decided. Id. at 63; see also Cayse v. Foley, 110 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Minn. 1961). Thus, the
determinative factor in whether an issue has become law of the case is whether the issue
was raised and actually decided by the appell ate court—either expressly or by necessary
implication.
To determine what an appellate court has actually decided, we logically turn to what
the opinion says. The effect of an appellate opinion reversing a di strict court order or
judgment depends on the ground for reversal, “as expressed in the decision reversing it.”

5 At oral argument, Mead argued that we expressly decided that Muzzy’s testimony was
admissible in Mead I . We reject that assertion. Our opinion in Mead I contains no
discussion of the admissibility of evidence.

11
Mattson, 414 N.W.2d at 720 (quotation omitted). The scope of finality of an appellate
opinion “depends on what the court intends to be final.” Id. And we determine what the
appellate court intended to be final by examining what the court’s decision says. Id.
Applying these principles here , we examine our decision in Mead I. In that case,
we observed that Muzzy’s report raised a fa ct issue regarding whether it was foreseeable
that the recliner mechanism was defective, stating that
Muzzy, Mead’s expert, explained in his report that it would
have been prudent for Bona Brothers to just replace the entire
seat structure, and that they either knew or should have known
that the driver’s seat recliner was worn and defective. This
report on its own raises a fact i ssue for the jury on whether it
was foreseeable that the recliner mechanism was defective.

Mead I, 2018 WL 414318, at *5. Thus, because there was so me evidence to establish
foreseeability, we concluded th at the district court erred by granting summary judgment
based on a lack of evidence of foreseeability. Id. But we did not discuss the admissibility
of Muzzy’s opinion—we instead considered th e same evidence that the district court
considered and concluded that that evidence established a genuine issue of material fact
regarding foreseeability. Nothing in Mead I supports the conclusion that we intended to
rule on the admissibility of Mu zzy’s testimony. Rather, we assumed the admissibility of
the testimony.6

6 We recognize that it is well-establishe d that only admissible evidence should be
considered in determining whether su mmary judgment is appropriate. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 56.03(b) (“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot
be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”); Hopkins v. Empire Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. , 474 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn. App. 1991) (observing that “[e]vidence
offered to support or defeat a motion for su mmary judgment must be such evidence as

12
The procedural posture of the case, in addition to the langua ge of the opinion,
supports our conclusion. At the time that Mead I was decided, the district court had not
yet addressed BNSF’s motion to exclude Muzzy’s testimony. 7 Because we generally do
not decide issues that the district court has not “passed on,” it would have been unorthodox
for us to address the admissibility of Muzzy’s testimony when the district court had not yet
ruled on the issue, even though BNSF raised the issue in its appellate brief. Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
In short, the admissibility of Muzzy’s testimony was an issue that was raised but not
decided in Mead I. Sigurdson, 448 N.W.2d at 63; Cayse, 110 N.W.2d at 205. Our decision
cannot be read to have implicitly decided th at Muzzy’s testimony was admissible. Thus,
the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply.
II. The district court abused its discretion by excluding testimony regarding one
of Muzzy’s opinions, but acted within its discretion in excluding testimony
about the other two opinions.

Mead alternatively argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
Muzzy’s expert testimony based on a lack of foundational reliability. See Minn. R.
Evid. 702. We review the district court’s ruling on the admissibilit y of expert testimony
for an abuse of discretion. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150,
164 (Minn. 2012); see also Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 88, 93 (Minn. 1983) (stating
that exclusion of expert testim ony “lies within the sound disc retion of the trial court, and

would be admissible at trial”). But here, there is no indication in our opinion that we even
considered the issue.
7 The district court, in fact, noted Muzzy’s expert report in its summary judgment order
without addressing the admissibility of his testimony.

13
its ruling will not be reversed unless it is based on an errone ous view of the law or it
constitutes an abuse of discretion”).
We begin our analysis of th e district court’s decision to exclude Muzzy’s expert
opinion testimony with an examination of the law governing the admission of such
testimony. Expert opin ion testimony is admissible if it “will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Minn. R. Evid. 702. The expert
witness must be qualified to render the opinion, and his or her opinion must have
“foundational reliability.” Id. Thus, to present expert opinion testimony, the proponent
must show that the testimony passes a four-par t test: “(1) The witness must qualify as an
expert; (2) the expert’s opinion must have foundational reliability; (3) the expert testimony
must be helpful to the trier of fact; and (4 ) if the testimony invol ves a novel scientific
theory, it must satisfy the Frye-Mack standard.” Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 164.
Here, the district court excluded Muzzy’s expert opinion testimony based on a lack
of foundational reliability. We focus our analysis on that factor.
An expert’s opinion testimony has foundational reliability if the opinion is based on
a reliable theory and methodology and if the opinion has a factual foundation supported by
the record. Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines , 933 N.W.2d 45, 56 (Minn. 2019). To
determine whether an expert’s opinion tes timony has foundational reliability, the district
court must consider the reliability of the expe rt’s theory, “as well as the reliability of the
evidence in the particular case, with a vi ew toward the purpose for which the expert
testimony is offered.” Id. (quotation omitted).

14
An “essential element” of foundational reliability is the expert’s familiarity with the
facts of the case, and whether the facts sup porting the expert’s opinion are supported by
the evidence—otherwise known as the “factu al foundation” for the expert’s opinion
testimony. Id. (quotation omitted). The showing required to establish an adequate factual
foundation supporting expert opinion testimony is not high. An expert’s opinion testimony
lacks foundational reliability due to an inade quate factual foundation if (1) the expert’s
opinion does not include the facts or data that the expert relied on in rendering the opinion,
(2) the expert does not explain the basis for hi s or her opinion, or (3) the facts that the
expert assumed or relied on in forming the opinion are not supported by the evidence. Id.
Alleged deficiencies in a fact ual foundation generally speak to the weight of the expert’s
opinion, not its admissibility. Id. at 60. These alleged deficiencies are usually best tested
by cross-examination and arguments to the jury, not a foundational-reliability
determination. Id.
Turning to the district court’s ruling here, we observe that the district court properly
considered the foundational reliability of Mu zzy’s proposed testim ony in light of the
purposes for which it was offered. The district court identified that Mead offered Muzzy’s
testimony to prove that (1) the recliner mechanism failed, (2) it failed due to ineffective or
defective maintenance, and (3) Bona Brot hers knew or should have known that the
mechanism was worn and defective. Because the admissibility of the testimony should be
considered in light of its purpo ses, we take the same approa ch in reviewing the district
court’s decision.

15
A. The district court abused its discre tion by excluding Muzzy’s opinion
testimony that the recliner mechanism failed.

The district court first addressed whet her Muzzy’s opinion that the recliner
mechanism failed had foundational reliability. The district court noted that Muzzy’s
opinion was based on Mead’s de position testimony that the seat reclined in the accident,
the employee’s pre-deposition statement that he had issues with the seat spontaneously
reclining, and photographs showing the drive r’s seat reclined afte r the accident. The
district court commented on the credibility and weight of this evidence8 and then observed
that there was also evidence th at Bona Brothers had inspected the seat after the accident
and determined that the reclin er mechanism was intact and functioning. Based on these
issues with the evidence, the district court concluded that Muzzy’s opinion that the recliner
mechanism failed lacked foundational reliability.
The district court abused its discretion in this analysis for two reasons. First, the
district court did not take into account another factual basis for Muzzy’s opinion—that the
accident caused a positive change in velocity in the truck of between 11.2 and 13.4 miles
per hour. Second, the district court strayed into the weight and credibility of the evidence
supporting Muzzy’s opinion—which should instead be tested by cross-examination at trial.
Id. Muzzy’s opinion that the recliner mechanism failed had an adequate factual foundation
because (1) he identified the facts in the record that he relied upon in forming his opinion
(Mead’s deposition testimony and the physics of the accident), (2) he explained the basis

8 Specifically, the district court observed that Mead did not claim that the seat had reclined
in the accident until the litigation began, suggesting that the testimony may not be credible.

16
for his opinion (that Mead’s testimony that the seat spontaneously reclined and the change
in velocity in the accident demonstrate that the mechanism failed ), and (3) the record
supports the facts he relied upon in forming his opinion. Id. at 56.
This reliability does not evaporate becau se Muzzy did not personally inspect the
truck. An expert need not personally conduct tests or gather data to render an opinion. See
Minn. R. Evid. 703(a) (noting that “the facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be perceived or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing” (emphasis added)). Nor does the ex istence of evidence contradicting
Muzzy’s opinion remove its foundation. Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 56 (observing that
alleged deficiencies in the expert’s factua l foundation speak to the weight, not the
admissibility, of the expert’s opinion testimony).
But while we conclude that the district court abused its di scretion in excluding
Muzzy’s testimony as to whether the recliner mechanism failed, we reach a different
conclusion regarding the district court’s decision to exclude Muzzy’s other opinions.
B. The district court did not abuse it s discretion by excluding Muzzy’s
testimony regarding the cause of th e mechanism’s failure and whether
Bona Brothers knew or should ha ve known that the mechanism might
fail.

The district court also excluded Muzzy’ s expert opinion te stimony that the
mechanism failed due to inadequate maintenance and his opinion that Bona Brothers knew
or should have known that th e mechanism was worn and def ective. Mead again argues
that the district court abused its discretion because these opinions also carried foundational
reliability.

17
For these opinions, the district court identified a different reason for concluding that
Muzzy’s opinions lacked foundational reliability—that Muzzy did not cite to any evidence
linking the wear to the seat cu shion or to the vehicle as a w hole to wear of the recliner
mechanism. The court therefore concluded that Muzzy’s testimony to these opinions was
speculative. We agree.
The inadequacy in Muzzy’s factual foundation for these opinions does not arise
from contradictory evidence in the record—rather, it arises from his failure to explain how
the facts he identifies support his conclusions. Muzzy’s opinion that improper maintenance
caused the mechanism to fail a ppears to be based solely on the circumstances of the
accident. Muzzy concluded that “[s]eat back failure/collapse in a collision of this severity
is due purely to ineffective and defective maintenance.” But Muzzy offers no explanation
for why he reached that conclusion. And while he discusses earlier in his report evidence
that (1) the vehicle was heavily used, (2) the vehicle had be en subject to a significant
amount of repairs in the past, and (3) the drive r’s seat cushions had to be replaced due to
extensive wear, Muzzy did not link the general use and wear to the vehicle to wear on the
mechanism.9 Nor does Muzzy identify what pr oper maintenance would entail, and
therefore why the mechanism was improperly ma intained here. Instead, Muzzy merely
suggests that it would have been “prudent” to rebuild or replace the entire seat when Bona
Brothers replaced the seat cushions. Muzz y’s opinion lacks foundational reliability
because he fails to explain the basis for his opinion. Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 56.

9 We also observe that Muzzy does not e xplain in his report how the mechanism might
have failed.

18
For essentially the same reasons, Muzzy’ s opinion that Bona Brothers knew or
should have known th at the mechanism would fail lacks foundational reliability. Muzzy
opined that Bona Brothers knew or should have known that the mechanism was worn and
defective based on the truck’s heavy use and previous repairs. But again, Muzzy does not
explain how the heavy use and previous repairs would also cause the specific component
at issue here, the recliner mechanism, to b ecome worn and defectiv e. Muzzy does not
explain what maintenance or inspection procedures BNSF, or Bona Brothers, should have
followed, and why those procedures would ha ve revealed to Bona Brothers that the
mechanism was purportedly worn and defectiv e. And the only inspection conducted on
the vehicle—which occurred after the accident— led Bona Brothers to conclude that the
mechanism was intact and functional. We therefore conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that Muzz y’s opinion that Bona Brothers knew or
should have known that the mechanism was worn and defec tive also lacked foundational
reliability because Muzzy failed to explain the basis for his opinion. Id.10

10 Our conclusions regarding the admissibility of Muzzy’s expert opinion testimony
necessarily leads us to conclude that the district court did not err by granting summary
judgment based on the exclusion of that te stimony. We review the grant of summary
judgment de novo to determine “whether ther e are genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright
Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
In his appellate brief, Mead acknowledges that Muzzy’s testimony is necessary to
establish BNSF’s breach of duty . Mead asserts that the brea ch of duty is established by
Muzzy’s opinion that th e recliner mechanism failed due to ineffective maintenance. But
the district court acted within its discretion in excluding that Muzzy’s testimony regarding
that opinion. Because the district court co rrectly concluded that no genuine issues of
material fact remained regarding BNSF’s alleged breach of duty, the district court did not
err by granting summary judgment. See Jane Doe 43C v. Diocese of New Ulm, 787 N.W.2d

19
In sum, the district court abused its discretion by excluding Muzzy’s testimony that
the recliner mechanism failed during the accident, but did not abuse its discretion by
excluding Muzzy’s other opinions based on a lack of foundational reliability. Because the
properly excluded opinions are the evidence that Mead relies upon to establish breach of
duty, the district court did not err in granti ng summary judgment de spite its error in its
evidentiary ruling.11
Affirmed.

680, 686 (Minn. App. 2010) (observing that summary judgment is appropriate when the
plaintiff fails to establish an essential element of her claim).
11 BNSF filed a cross-appeal, arguing that if we were to reverse and remand, its third-party
claims and cross-claims against the Lees should be reinstated. Because we affirm, we do
not reach these arguments.