State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1102

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Luis Enrique Leal,
Appellant.

Filed August 16, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-20-25

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matthew Haugen, Chippewa Co unty Attorney, Christopher Reisdorfer, Assistant County
Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Christine W. Chambers, Special Assistant Pu blic Defender, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering,
Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Luis Enrique Leal appeals his conviction for first-degree drug possession,
arguing that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence that
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police found in his home while executing a sear ch warrant. He contends that the search
violated his constitutional rights because the s earch-warrant application did not support a
finding of probable cause for the search. Because the search-warrant application
established a fair probability that Leal’s home would contain evidence of criminal activity,
there was no constitutional violation. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 7, 2020, a detective with the Pine to Prairie Drug Task Force arrested
an individual for possessing a controlled substa nce. The individual agreed to cooperate
with the detective by revealing the source of the drugs, thereby be coming a “cooperating
defendant” (CD). The CD identified the source as Luis Leal, whose nickname is “Leo.”
The CD also provided Leal’s home address. According to the CD, on January 5, 2020, the
CD entered Leal’s home and saw a large quantity of heroin there. In addition to supplying
this information, the CD showed the detective a text message exchange on the CD’s phone
between the CD and a number that the CD said was Leal’s. During the exchange, the CD
discussed sending money to Leal through Western Union. The CD told the detective that
the money discussed in the texts was owed to Leal for drugs.
The detective confirmed through department of motor vehicles (DMV) records that
the address provided by the CD was Leal’s home address. He also matched Leal’s photo
from DMV records with pho tos of Leal that th e CD provided, which were stored on the
CD’s phone and social media. The detective then contacted another drug task force, the
CEE-VI Drug Task Force, to pass on the information from the CD.
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A second detective, a member of the CEE- VI Drug Task force, verified that the
cellphone number in the CD’s text messages wa s registered to Leal. He also discovered
that Leal had a 2015 conviction for a first- degree controlled substance offense. On
January 8, 2020, the second de tective drafted a search-warrant application containing the
CD’s allegations, the independ ent investigation performed, a nd a statement that, in his
experience, it was “common for drug dealers to receive payments for controlled substances
through Western Union money grams.” A judge reviewed the search-warrant application
and issued a search warrant for Leal’s residence.
On January 9, 2020, the CEE-VI Drug Ta sk Force executed the search warrant at
Leal’s home. They found over 23 grams of cocaine, 25.6 grams of marijuana, 400.5 grams
of heroin, about $1,300 in cash, torn money-gram receipts in a garbage ca n, a notebook
with a ledger that listed names and contact information, and a variety of drug paraphernalia.
Leal was present in the home at the time of the search and subsequently arrested. Based
on the items found, respondent State of Minne sota charged Leal with one count of first-
degree sale of a controlled substance (heroi n), Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(3) (2018),
and one count of first-degree possession of a controlled su bstance (heroin), Minn. Stat.
§ 152.021, subd. 2(a)(3) (2018). The state also gave notice of its intent to seek an
aggravated sentence.
Leal moved to suppress the evidence seiz ed from his residence. He argued to the
district court that the search-warrant applica tion failed to establish probable cause for the
search of his home and, therefore, the search violated his constitutional rights. Leal asked
4
the district court to exclude all of the ev idence found as a remedy for the constitutional
violation. In a written order, the district court denied Leal’s motion to suppress.1
Leal waived his right to a jury trial, and the state agreed to dismiss the first-degree-
sale charge and withdraw its request for an aggravated sentence. To preserve his
constitutional challenge to the search warrant fo r appeal, Leal had a stipulated facts court
trial under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. The district court
found Leal guilty of first-degree possession of a controlled substance and sentenced him to
126 months in prison.
Leal appeals.
DECISION
In this appeal, Leal asks us to revers e the district court’s order denying his motion
to suppress the state’s evidence. He argues that the district court erred by concluding that
the search-warrant application established probable cause for the search of his home. Leal
contends that the request for a search warrant was primarily based on the claims of an
unreliable informant—the CD, who had a motive to fabricate the truth. Additionally, he
asserts that his 2015 drug conv iction was too remote to salv age the otherwise inadequate
search-warrant application.

1 In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the allegations in the search-warrant
application, Leal moved for a Franks hearing. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56,
98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978) (permitting challenges to th e validity of a search-warrant
affidavit in a pretrial hearing when a defend ant alleges and can offe r proof of deliberate
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in the affidavit). The district court determined
that Leal failed to make a su fficient showing to warrant a Franks hearing. Leal does not
challenge that decision on appeal.
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“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts]
may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district
court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris , 590
N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). In a challenge to the validity of a search warrant, an appellate
court gives “great deference” to the determ ination of the issuing judge that there was
probable cause for the search. State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001). The
precise question before the reviewing court is “whether the issuing judge had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. When considering this question, a
court should not review the individual compone nts of the search-warrant application in a
hyper-technical fashion, but should consider whet her the totality of the allegations
established probable cause. See State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985). Our
review is limited to the “four corners of th e document”; we do not consider information
outside of the search-warrant application in determining whether there was probable cause.
See State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 539-40 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 22, 2006).
Before we apply our standard of review to address the search warrant here, we
briefly outline the law concerning search warrants. The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that “no Warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Our st ate constitution likewise requires
probable cause for a search warrant. Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The probable-cause
requirement is intended to safeguard citizens from rash and unfounded invasions of privacy
6
and from unsubstantiated criminal charges. Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 176,
69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949).
The Fourth Amendment spec ifically protects the sanc tity of the home—“physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.” Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 58 5-86, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1379-80 (1980)
(quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125,
2134 (1972)). The right to be secure in one’s own home is a fundamental right. See Payton,
445 U.S. at 589-90, 100 S. Ct. at 1381-82.
Given the significance of this right, the pr ivacy of the home should only be invaded
if the police have a warrant issued by a neutral judge upon a finding of probable cause. See
State v. Nolting, 254 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Minn. 1977). The task of a judge considering a
search-warrant application is “to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983); see also Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 (applying this
precept from Gates). The issuing judge should examine the “totality of the circumstances”
to determine if there is probab le cause to believe it is more likely than not that the items
sought will be found in the place to be searched. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at
2332; see generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.2(e) (4th ed.). “Elements
bearing on this probability include information linking the crime to the place to be searched
and the freshness of the information.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998).
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In deciding whether there is probable caus e to authorize a search, the issuing judge
can consider information provided by informants. See State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833,
840 (Minn. App. 2008). But the judge cannot presume an informant’s reliability. State v.
Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Minn. 1978). Instead, the search-warrant application
must supply information that allows the judge to independ ently assess th e informant’s
credibility. Id. The judge reviewing this information should consider both the informant’s
basis of knowledge and veracity. See Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750. Courts have delineated
several principles bearing on the reliability of information provided by confidential
informants—informants whose identity has been withheld. State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67,
71 (Minn. App. 1998). A “first-time citizen in formant” can be presumed reliable so long
as the search-warrant applica tion avers that this informant has no criminal history. Id.
When an informant has provided verified in formation in the past , the informant is
considered more reliable. Id. An informant’s reliability ca n be established if the police
can corroborate the information provided. Id. (citing Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269).
Informants who voluntarily co me forward are presumably mo re reliable than informants
whose cooperation is compelled. Id. (citing State v. Gabbert, 411 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Minn.
App. 1987)). And an informant is considered slightly more reliable if the informant makes
a statement against the informant’s interests. Id. (citing State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d
700, 704 (Minn. 1990)).
Other circumstances can also enhance the reliability of an informant’s allegations.
For example, an informant’ s “personal, first-hand basi s of knowledge” may enhance
8
credibility. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d at 840. And an informant’s information is more reliable
if it is based on recent observation. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269.
Against this legal backdrop, we consider Leal’s arguments regarding the sufficiency
of the allegations in the search-warrant application in his case.
A. The district court did not err in concluding that the search-warrant
application established the CD’s reliability.

Leal first attacks the relia bility of the CD—the informant who supplied police with
much of the information in the search-warrant application. He argues that the CD was not
sufficiently trustworthy to establish probable cause for the search. Leal contends that the
CD’s own criminal charges provided a signifi cant motive to falsely incriminate others,
making the CD inherently unreliable. He also points out that most of the CD’s information
was available to the public and easily accessible, undercutting its reliability. According to
Leal, the CD’s allegations were therefore too unreliable to supp ort a probable-cause
finding.
We initially address the CD’s status as an individual charged with a crime. During
oral argument, Leal’s counsel focused on the informant’s status as a cooperating criminal
defendant, arguing that this factor made the CD much more likely to lie than a garden-
variety informant. The law recognizes that a citizen in formant or an informant who
voluntarily approaches police may be mo re reliable than other informants. State v. Ross,
676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (M inn. App. 2004); Ward, 580 N.W.2d at 71. But the fact that an
informant has been charged is not a per se basis for finding the CD unreliable. See
McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 703-04. A judge presen ted with a search-warrant application
9
may consider all circumstances bearing on an informant’s credibility. Id. The CD’s status
as a criminal defendant was certainly a factor in the equation. But the issuing judge also
was entitled to consider any other facts relevant to the CD’s reliability.
The district court’s suppression order identified two such facts—the CD made a
statement against interest and the police corroborated much of the CD’s information. Leal
maintains, however, that neither of these were sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of
the CD’s allegations.
First, Leal challenges the district court’ s determination that the CD’s statement to
the police was a statement against interest. He notes that when the CD admitted to
purchasing drugs from Leal, the CD had already been arrested for drug possession. Thus,
he argues, the CD’s admission to buying drugs was not truly a statement against interest.
The CD’s statement may not have been par ticularly valuable to police given other
evidence implicating the CD. But the statement was nonetheless an implicit admission of
guilt, which made it a statement against the CD’s interest. A nd “[t]he mere fact that the
statement was in some way against the informant’s interest is of some minimal relevance
in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of probable cause.” McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at
704. Thus, the district court did not err in considering the CD’s admission as a fact bearing
on the CD’s reliability.
Second, Leal contends that the dist rict court improperly relied on police
corroboration of the CD’s info rmation to find the CD reliable. According to Leal, the
information that corroborated th e CD’s allegations was in pu blic records and could have
10
been easily obtained by anyone without special knowledge. Therefore, he argues, the
corroborating information was not probative of the CD’s reliability.
Leal cites our decision in State v. Albrecht, in support of this argument. 465 N.W.2d
107 (Minn. App. 1991). In Albrecht, we affirmed the district court’s determination that a
search-warrant application failed to estab lish probable cause because the only evidence
corroborating the anonymous informant’s tip was the suspect’s address and ownership of
a vehicle parked in the driveway of that address. Id. at 108-09. We concluded that “such
corroboration without more, is not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.”
Holiday, 749 N.W.2d at 841 (quotation omitted) (explaining the holding in Albrecht).
Leal is correct that polic e corroborated some of the CD’s allegations with
information from public sources. But corroboration of even minor details can enhance the
reliability of an informant’s information. Id. And contrary to Leal’s assertions, the search-
warrant application described additional corro borating evidence that was not publicly
available. A detective reviewed text messa ges on the CD’s phone between the CD and a
number confirmed to be Leal’s phone. Those messages discussed money that the CD owed
to Leal, which Leal wanted to receive via Western Union, a common method of paying for
drug transactions. See State v. Wiberg , 296 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Minn. 1980) (“An
informant’s reliability on a particular occasion can also be established if the statements of
the informant can be at least partially corroborated independently.”). And the CD produced
photos on the CD’s phone of an individual matching Leal’s DMV photo. Unlike Albrecht,
the corroboration here was significant and specific to the drug-sale activity alleged by the
CD.
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Other circumstances also bolstered the CD ’s reliability. As noted by the district
court, all of the CD’s information was based on the CD’s own personal observations. See
Holiday, 749 N.W.2d at 840. Furthermore, th e CD’s information was fresh—the CD
reported seeing heroin in Leal’s home just two days before speaking to the detective. See
Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269.
Given the facts in the search-warrant application, the issuing judge could reasonably
find that the CD’s information was sufficiently reliable to be included in the probable-cause
determination. Likewise, the district court di d not err in relying on the CD’s information
to conclude that there was probable cause for the search warrant.
B. The district court did not err in co nsidering Leal’s 2015 drug conviction
in its probable-cause determination.

Leal also argues that the district cour t erred by considering his 2015 drug-sale
conviction to determine that the search-warrant application established probable cause. He
contends that the five-year-old conviction was too stale to support a finding of probable
cause.
“A person’s criminal record is among th e circumstances a judge may consider when
determining whether probable cause exists for a search warrant.” State v. Carter , 697
N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 2005). But criminal records are “best used as corroborative
information” and not as a basi s for a probable cause finding. Id. (quotation omitted).
Moreover, the older the conviction, the less reliable it is in establishing probable cause. Id.
In support of his argument that his prior conviction was stale, Leal cites State v.
Blacksten, where the supreme court addressed a de fendant’s seven-year-old aggravated-
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robbery conviction. 507 N.W. 2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1993). Blacksten did not involve a
search warrant, however. Rather, the supr eme court considered whether police had
probable cause to arrest the defe ndant for an aggravated robbery.2 Id. Given the facts in
Blacksten, where the only other evid ence of the defendant’s involvement in the robbery
was his association with another individual arrested for the robbery, the supreme court held
that the prior conviction was insufficient to provide probable cause for the arrest. Id. The
supreme court noted that the conviction was not recent. Id. And the court also observed
that the incident underlying the conviction was not sufficiently similar to the robbery under
investigation. Id.
Blacksten does not help Leal’s argument. Leal’s prior conviction was not the only
information suggesting that Leal was selling drugs. The search-warrant application
provided additional facts suggesting that Le al’s home would contain evidence of drug
sales, including the CD’s cl aim that Leal was the CD’s source for drugs, the CD’s
statements about observing hero in in the home just two da ys earlier, and text messages
from Leal requesting that money owed be pa id via Western Union. And although the
district court mentioned the 2015 convicti on as a circumstance supporting the probable-
cause determination, the conviction was not the focus of the di strict court’s order. It was
just one fact that the district court considered in conjunction with the other information in

2 Probable cause for a search and probable cause to arrest involve different inquiries. “The
test of probable cause to arrest is whethe r the objective facts are such that under the
circumstances, a person of ordinary care and prudence would entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that a crime has been committed.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695
(Minn. 1997).
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the search-warrant application. We accordi ngly reject Leal’s argument that, pursuant to
Blacksten, the district court erred in consider ing the 2015 convicti on because it was too
old. Furthermore, we agree with the district court that the conviction had some probative
value in the probable-cause determination.
C. The search warrant established prob able cause for a search of Leal’s
home.

Finally, viewing the issuing judge’s decision to authorize a search with the required
deference, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances alleged in the search-warrant
application provided a substantial basis to find probable cause for a search of Leal’s home.
See Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d at 804. Those circumstances established a fair probability that
police would find evidence of a crime in the home. See Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268.
Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Leal’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Affirmed.