Jose Santoya Juarez, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1103

Jose Santoya Juarez, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 4, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-10-594

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Richard A. Dahl, Dahl Law Firm PA, Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorn ey, Julianna F. Passe, Assistant County
Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of postconv iction relief, arguing that the district
court erred by denying his claim of newly discovered evidence as untimely and denying an
2
evidentiary hearing. Because the district court did not abuse its discre tion by denying
appellant’s postconviction petition, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2010, appellant Jose Santoya Ju arez began speaking with a woman, the
victim, in a bar. Appellant touched the victim’s thighs and breasts multiple times, and she
told him not to touch her. The bartender asked appellant to leave the bar. The victim left
the bar later that evening to smoke a cigarette. As she stood outside, appellant “came from
behind” her and dragged her into an alley. Appellant tried to pull the victim’s pants off,
called her a “whore,” a “skank,” and a “b-tch,” and stated he “kn[e]w [she] want[ed] it.”
Appellant pulled off the victim’s tank top and grabbed her breasts and vagina.
The victim called for help and told appella nt to leave her alone. The victim took
her cell phone from her pocket and redialed the last number she called. Appellant grabbed
her phone and threw it against the cement wa ll. While the victim was unable to say
anything into the phone, the person she called heard a voicemail of the victim screaming.
Appellant then threw the victim against the cement ground and pushed her head against the
cement two or three times, causing her to “black[] out.” The victim did not know how long
she was unconscious. But the victim recalled that appellant pulled his pants down and held
her down with his knees. Appellant put his pe nis by the victim’s mouth and told her to
suck it. The victim screamed and told appellant no. While appellant was trying to put his
penis in the victim’s mouth, the victim’s friends found her and threw appellant off her. The
victim testified she “thought [she] was going to die” in the alley when appellant was
banging her head against the cement.
3
The state charged appellant with attempte d first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
kidnapping with intent to commit great bodily harm, two counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, and third-degree assault. Following a bench trial in August 2011, the
district court found appellant guilty of a ttempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, kidnappi ng, and assault. The district court
sentenced appellant to life imprisonment with out the possibility of release for second-
degree criminal sexual conduct. We affi rmed appellant’s conviction on appeal. State v.
Juarez, No. A11-2189, 2012 WL 5476119, at *1 (Minn. App. Nov. 13, 2012), aff’d, 837
N.W.2d 473 (Minn. 2013). The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted further review and
affirmed the conviction in 2013. State v. Juarez, 837 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. 2013).
Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota. In March 2016, a federal magi strate recommended that the
U.S. District Court deny the habeas petition, dismiss the action with prejudice, and deny a
certificate of appealability. In April 2016, a U.S. District Court Judge accepted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the petition.
In November 2019, appellant petitioned for postconviction relief. The district court
denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.
DECISION
We review a denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State,
925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). We revi ew the “postconviction court’s legal
determinations de novo, and its fa ctual findings for clear error.” Brown v. State , 895
N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017). “A postconvic tion court abuses its discretion when its
4
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record, or exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Crow v. State, 923
N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
I. The postconviction petition is untimely and no exception applies.
A. The petition is untimely.
A person convicted of a crime who clai ms a violation of his rights under the
Constitution or laws of the United States or Minnesota may petition for postconviction
relief unless direct appellate relief is availabl e. Minn. Stat. § 590. 01, subd. 1 (2018). A
petition “filed outside the statute of limitations may be summarily denied, unless a statutory
exception applies.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 423 (Minn. 2018).
A postconviction petition must be filed within two years of either “the entry of
judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed,” or “an appellate court’s
disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal,” whichever is la ter. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(a) (2018). Here, appellant appealed his co nviction to this court, and we affirmed the
conviction in November 2012. Juarez, No. A11-2189, 2012 WL 5476119, at *1. The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in October 2013. Juarez, 837 N.W.2d
at 478. Appellant filed his postconviction petition in November 2019, long after the two-
year statutory deadline. 1 Thus, appellant’s petition for postconviction relief is untimely
under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a).

1 Appellant claims the two-year time period runs from the filing of his 2016 habeas petition.
This argument is unsupported. See Wayne v. State , 866 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Minn. 2015)
(noting that a postconviction petition is a “creature of state statute, . . . governed by its own
5
B. The newly-discovered-evidence exception does not apply.
We next consider whether an exception ap plies. A district court may consider a
petition filed beyond the two-year time limit if the petitioner establis hes any one of five
enumerated exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(1)-(5) (2018). The presentation
of newly discovered evidence is one of the five enumerated exceptions. Id., subd. 4(b)(2).
Such evidence must, on its face, prove the petitioner’s innocence by a clear and convincing
standard. Id. A petition invoking this exception, however, is subject to another limitations
period—which provides that th e petition “must be filed within two years of the date the
claim [for the exception] arises.” Id., subd. 4(c) (2018). As a result, “[a] postconviction
petitioner is not entitled to relief or an eviden tiary hearing on an untimely petition unless
he can demonstrate that he satisfies one of the [statutory] exceptions . . . and that application
of the exception is not time-barred.” Roberts v. State, 856 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn. App.
2014) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015). When a petitioner seeks
relief more than two years af ter the claim arose, a distri ct court “does not abuse its
discretion when it summarily denies the petition.” Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 787
(Minn. 2016).
i. The petition was filed more than two years after the claim arose.
Appellant claims the newly-discovered-evidence exception applies. We determine,
first, that appellant’s attempt to invoke this exception to the two-year statute of limitations
under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), is itself untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01,

statutory time bar”). We reject appellant’s attempt to avoid the statutory time bar by relying
on the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations.
6
subd. 4(c). A claim arises when the petitioner “knew or s hould have known” the claim
existed. Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Minn. 2012).
After the federal court denied appellant’s habeas petition in 2016, appellant’s sister
contacted a private investigator to interview some witnesses. The investigator interviewed
L.S., M.O., and R.O. These in terviews were completed by October 2017. According to
appellant, the investigator discovered that (1) the victim “had a reputation for going to bars,
dressing provocatively and encouraging guys to buy her drinks”; (2) one of the victim’s
friends thought the victim had a drinking problem; and (3) one of the victim’s friends stated
the victim told her the sexual contact was consensual and she falsely accused appellant of
assault when he stopped buying her drinks.
Appellant’s petition could have been brought within two years of the “discovery”
of this evidence. The inves tigator completed all the inte rviews by October 2017, which
was more than two years befo re appellant filed his postcon viction petition in November
2019. The district court reasoned that appe llant “knew or should have known about the
content of the statements . . . on the dates the statements were taken.” We discern no abuse
of discretion in this determination.
ii. The petition fails on the merits.
We also determine the petition fails on the merits. A court may consider an untimely
petition under the newly- discovered-evidence exception if: (1) the petitioner alleges the
existence of newly discovered evidence; (2) the evidence could not have been discovered
through the due diligence of the petitioner or his attorney within the two-year time limit;
(3) the evidence is not cumulative; (4) the evidence is not for impeachment purposes; and
7
(5) the evidence establishes th e petitioner’s innocence by clea r and convincing evidence.
Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 290; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2).
Here, clear and convincing ev idence does not establish that appellant is actually
innocent of the crime under the fifth prong of the test. Appellant argues that he is entitled
to postconviction relief because the victim recanted her statement. To obtain a
postconviction evidentiary hearing because of false testimony, we apply the Larrison test
and consider whether: (1) the court is reason ably well satisfied the testimony given by a
material witness is false; (2) the jury might have reached a different conclusion without the
testimony; and (3) the party s eeking a new trial was taken by surprise when the false
testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the
trial. Reed, 925 N.W.2d at 26-27 (citing State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 584-85 (Minn.
1982); Larrison v. United States , 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928)). “To obtain a
postconviction evidentiary hearing, [a petitioner is] not required to satisfy the Larrison test.
Instead, he [is] simply required to present competent material evidence that, if found to be
true following an evidentiary hearing, could satisfy the Larrison test.” Martin v. State, 825
N.W.2d 734, 743 (Minn. 2013).
The district court reviewed the victim’s trial testimony and the investigator’s report
and determined that the purported recantation was not genuine. Witness R.O. claimed the
victim recanted her testimony and that another witness, M.O., also heard her recant. Yet,
M.O. denied that the victim recanted. The district court determined that R.O.’s statement
“does not prove the innocence of [appellant] in any way.” The district court also
determined the statements co nstituted inadmissible hearsay. “[H]earsay evidence is
8
[never] sufficient to warrant a ne w trial under the first prong of Larrison.” Campbell v.
State, 916 N.W.2d 502, 507 (Minn. 2018). A district court does not abuse its discretion by
denying a claim of newly discovered evidence of false testimony when the appellant fails
to “present any admissible evid ence of . . . recantation.” Dobbins v. State , 845 N.W.2d
148, 155 (Minn. 2013). The district court determined the statements from R.O., M.O., and
L.S. were “hearsay, and at best [had] only impeachment value against the testimony of [the
victim].” Appellant argues that the statemen ts are not hearsay but fails to support his
argument with citation to any relevant legal authority. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding it was not reasonably well satisfied that the victim’s testimony was
false.2
We conclude that appellant failed to pres ent “competent material evidence that, if
found to be true following an evidentiary hearing, could satisfy the Larrison test.” Martin,
825 N.W.2d at 743. Without this showing, appellant cannot satisfy the five-part test of the
newly-discovered-evidence exception. See Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 290 (“[a]ll five criteria
must be satisfied to obtain relief”); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5). In sum,
we determine that the district court did no t abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
postconviction petition.

2 While we need not consider the other f actors, we also determine that the third Larrison
factor is not met because appellant was not “taken by surprise” by the victim’s testimony.
Appellant was represented by counsel at tr ial and defense counsel thoroughly cross-
examined the victim at trial. Appellant wa s not surprised by the victim’s testimony or
otherwise unable to meet her testimony, failing the third Larrison prong. And we reject as
baseless and belied by the record counsel’s assertion on appeal that appellant was convicted
with no evidence of injuries to corroborate the victim’s account of the attack.
9
II. Appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant argues he was entitled to an ev identiary hearing on his postconviction
petition. But a district court need not hold a hearing if “the petition and the files and records
of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2018); see also Davis v. State , 784 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 2010)
(stating that a hearing is unnecessary if petitione r fails to allege facts sufficient to entitle
him to relief). We review the district cour t’s decision on whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012).
Here, appellant’s postconviction petition is un timely and his petition failed to satisfy the
newly-discovered-evidence exception to the statutory deadline. Thus, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.