In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. R. M., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1104

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. R. M., Child.

Filed August 16, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-JV-18-2783

Bradford Colbert, Cresston Gackle, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant C.R.M.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John L. Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
This appeal derives from the district c ourt’s delinquency adjudication of appellant
C.R.M. for one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substa nce. Appellant argues that the district court erred by
adjudicating him delinquent without a best-int erest finding. Appellant also argues that
adjudication of delinquency was a violation of his constitutional ri ght to due process
because it resulted in mandatory predatory-offender registration. Because the district court
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was not required to make a best-interest finding in order to adjudicate appellant delinquent,
and because mandatory predat ory-offender registration di d not implicate appellant’s
procedural due-process rights, we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2018, respond ent State of Minnesota filed a juvenile petition charging
17-year old appellant C.R.M. with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609. 344, subd. 1(b) (2018); one count of third-degree sale of a
controlled substance, in viola tion of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2018); and one
count of fifth-degree possession of a controlle d substance, in viol ation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2018). Upon agreement by the parties the delinquency proceeding
was continued for dismissal pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14.01 and appellant was
placed on juvenile probation. The continuance was revoked following multiple controlled-
substance-related probation violations. This matter proceeded to trial and the district court
found appellant guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and fifth-degree possession
of a controlled substance.
Counsel for appellant requested that th e district court continue the proceeding
without adjudication pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2018) and Minn. R. Juv.
Del. P. 15.05, subd. 1. However, the district court adjudicated appellant delinquent of both
charges, which resulted in a mandatory ten-year period of predatory-offender registration,
and again placed appellant on juvenile probation until 12:01 a.m. the following day, which
was his 19th birthday. This appeal follows.

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DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court erred by adjudicating him delinquent when
the result was predatory-offender registration and the district court did not find adjudication
to be in his best interests. Appellant also argues that the result fo llowing adjudication of
delinquency—mandatory predatory-offender registration—was a violation of his
constitutional right to procedural due process. Each argument is analyzed below.
I. Adjudication of Delinquency
When deciding whether to adjudicate delinquency or continue the case without
adjudication of delinquency, the district court is not required to issue findings of fact.
Though a written order with “particularized fi ndings” is required when the court imposes
a juvenile disposition, no such written findings are required when deciding whether to
adjudicate. In re Welfare of J.L.Y. , 596 N.W.2d 692, 69 5 (Minn. App. 1999), review
dismissed (Minn. Feb. 5, 2000) (“[P]articularized findings . . . are required in determining
a disposition, but not when deciding whether to adjudicate or stay adjudication.”); see also
In re Welfare of C.A.R. , 941 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Minn. App. 2020), review denied (Minn.
May 19, 2020) (reiterating the difference between “the standard for staying adjudication
with the standard for ordering a particular disposition”) (emphasis in original) (quotation
omitted). The juvenile rules co nfirm that no findings are required to support a decision
regarding adjudication. Compare Minn. R. Juv. P. 15.05, subd. 2(A) (requiring written
findings for disposition), with Minn. R. Juv. P. 15.05, subd. 1 (stating no written findings
required for continuing adjudication). Be cause no findings are required prior to
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adjudication of delinquency, appellant’s argument that the district court erred by failing to
make best-interest findings fails.
Additionally, whether the district court decides to continue the matter without
adjudication is permissive. Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7, states that if “it is in the best
interests of the child to do so and not in imical to public safety . . . the court may continue
the case for a period not to exceed 180 days.” (emphasis added).
Turning our attention to the district court’s decision to adjudicate delinquency, we
observe that the district court—despite having no legal obligation to do so—made detailed
written factual findings to support its decision:
The Court finds no persuasive argument to continue this matter
without adjudication, given th e various interventions and
services already offered to the Juvenile through probation, and
the Juvenile’s history of probation violations . . . The Juvenile
has been brought before this Court several times because of his
continued use of controlled substances, his continued failure to
cooperate with his placemen t and with the probation
department, and his continued failure to remain at home and
follow the rules of the home when ordered to do so. Were the
Court to continue the matter wi thout adjudication, the Court
would essentially be dismissing the matter. The Court finds
that it is not in the best intere sts of the Juvenile and would be
inimical to public safety to continue this matter without
adjudication.

The court carefully considered its options, considered appellant’s failure to succeed while
on juvenile probation, and dete rmined that it would not con tinue adjudication, a decision
explicitly permitted by law. The district court did not abuse the “broad discretion” granted
to it in declining to continue adjudication. C.A.R., 941 N.W.2d at 422; see also J.L.Y., 596
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N.W.2d at 695 (“Imposing an adjudication within the limits prescribed by the legislature
is not an abuse of discretion.”).
II. Procedural Due Process 1
Because appellant was adjudicated delinqu ent for criminal sexual conduct pursuant
to section 609.344, appellant’s registration as a predatory offender was mandatory. Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(iii) (2018). To establish that the imposition of mandatory
registration results in a procedural due-process violation, appellant must first demonstrate
that he possesses “a protectable liberty interest [that] is at stake.” Boutin v. LaFleur, 591
N.W.2d 711, 718 (Minn. 1999).
In Boutin, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly adopted the so-called “stigma-
plus” procedural due-process test from the United States Supreme Court. Id. By that test,
“a liberty interest is implicated [only] when a loss of reputation is coupled with the loss of
some other tangible interest.” Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that
“[b]eing labeled a ‘predatory offender’ is injurious to one’s reputation.” Id. However, the
court found that the predatory-offender registration statute did not fulfill the test “because

1 In district court as well as in his initial briefing to this court, appellant argued solely that
a procedural due-process violation occurred upon the adjudication of delinquency. In
response to the opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Werlich v. Schnell, 958 N.W.2d
354 (Minn. 2021), in which the suprem e court expanded upon the holding of Boutin, this
court requested supplemental briefing from the parties. In his supplemental brief, appellant
argued—for the first time—that his substantive due-process rights were violated by his
adjudication as a predatory offender. We do not consider that argument. This court
specifically requested supplemental brie fing only regarding “the impact of the Werlich
decision on this case.” Moreover, we will not examine this issue for the first time on
appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 19 88) (holding appellate courts
“generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered
by the trial court in deciding the matter before it” (quotation omitted)).
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there is no recognizable interest in being free from having to update address information,”
as required by the predatory-offender-registration statute. Id. The court held that “[s]uch
a requirement is a minimal burden and is clearly not the sufficiently important interest the
‘stigma-plus’ test requires.” Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Werlich v. Schnell ,
reaffirmed Boutin’s use of the “stigma-plus” test to determine whether procedural
due-process rights are implicated. Werlich, 958 N.W.2d at 362.
Appellant argues that the holding of Boutin is no longer applicable because the
requirements of the registration statutes have increased substantially since Boutin was
decided in 1999. Appellant believes that these increased registration requirements,
especially for a juvenile, satisfy the “stigma-plus” test such that his procedural due-process
rights are implicated. 2 Appellant’s argument finds some support in Werlich as to the
importance to consider these increased statutory requirements. However, appellant has not
identified a liberty interest he has lost as a result of these increased statutory requirements.
Werlich acknowledged that “[s]ince Boutin, the Legislature has repeatedly
amended” the predatory-offe nder statute, imposing “a dditional consequences of
registration [that] are more substantial than the reputational stigma that Boutin discussed.”
As such, Werlich held that it was not bound to draw the same conclusion—that mandatory
predatory offender registration cannot result in a “loss of a recognizable interest.” Id. at
362 (quotation omitted). Regardless, the only such liberty interest explicitly recognized by

2 Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(iii), predatory-offender registration is
mandatory both for adults convict ed of certain offenses as well as juveniles adjudicated
delinquent for those same offenses.
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Werlich to be implicated by the expanded predatory-offender-registration statute involves
an individual’s “fundamental right to parent.” Id. at 371.3 No fundamental right to parent
is alleged to have been implicated here.
Furthermore, the new post- Boutin registration requirements identified by appellant,
including being required to pr ovide “place of employment, education, and other data,”
are—for the purposes of the “stigma-plus” analysis—functionally the same as the
requirement found by the court in Boutin to implicate no recognizab le liberty interest.
Though Werlich found an individual’s right to pa rent was such a recognized and
fundamental right, Boutin explicitly held that “there is no recognizable interest in being
free from having to update address information.” Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 718. Similarly,
there is no recognizable interest in being free from having to update employment location
information, education locati on information, vehicle inform ation, or telephone number
information, as now required under the e xpanded predatory-offender registration
requirements. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd . 4a (2010). Though th e requirements of
registration have been expanded, none have been identified by appellant to implicate “the
sufficiently important interest the ‘stigma-plus’ test requires.” Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 718.
Affirmed.

3 Specifically, the court held that mandatory predatory-offender registration implicated an
individual’s fundamental right to parent because a registered predatory offender living with
their child constituted “‘threat ened sexual abuse’ that re quires investigation,” which
“implicate[d] the presumption that [they are] a fit parent.” Werlich, 958 N.W.2d at 371.