Ray Danielson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1107

Ray Danielson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed May 3, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CV-20-203

Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ryan Pesc h, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Wo rke, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After failing an ignition-interlock test allegedly due to mouthwash, and failing a
retest due to blowing into the device off-camera, respondent commissioner of public safety
suspended appellant Ray Daniels on’s driver’s license. At a reinstatement hearing, the
district court rejected Danielson’s claims that the device was defective. Danielson

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challenges that ruling, arguing that the district court did not use the proper standard of
review when evaluating the lic ense revocation. Because the district court allowed for
Danielson’s testimony and weighed evidence to review the commissioner’s decision to
revoke Danielson’s driver’s license, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Ray Daniel son has a history of driving while impaired (DWI). His
driver’s license was canceled as inimical to public safety four times due to numerous DWI
offenses. While he claimed to become sobe r in 2013 after devel oping severe cirrhosis,
Danielson still was required to enroll in th e ignition-interlock-de vice program (the
program) in early 2014. An ignition-inte rlock device measures a driver’s alcohol-
concentration level and includes a camera that takes a picture of the user during a breath
test. Should the device detect alcohol, the vehicle will not start. If any alcohol is detected
during a breath sample, the incident is recorded and sent to the Minnesota Department of
Vehicle Services (the DVS). To enroll in the program, Danielson had to agree to the
program’s guidelines. The guidelines warn that any alcohol detected by the device will be
considered use of alcohol.
After six years in the program without a violation, Danielso n provided a failed
breath test that registered an alcohol concentration of 0.044. Approximately seven minutes
later during a retest, the device registered an alcohol concentration of 0.012, but the person
using the device was out of frame of the camera. DVS then sent a letter notifying Danielson
that his driving privileges we re revoked due to the failed test. Danielson petitioned the

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court for reinstatement, arguing that the devi ce was defective and asking that he at least
not have to sign a new last-use statement.1
At the hearing, Danielson testified that on the night of the violation he was sick with
pneumonia and impetigo, causing multiple painful sores in his mouth. Danielson said that
he frequently used mouthwash to relieve his impetigo, and did so that night after eating
dinner. He was unaware that mouthwash ha d alcohol in it. Nor, he explained, had
mouthwash use set off the ignition-interlock devi ce before. Danielson also testified that
since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemi c he has frequently used hand sanitizer,
which had caused the ignition-in terlock device to not start on the first try multiple times.
He acknowledged that the device detects hand sanitizer.
The district court was not persuaded that the device was defective, and reasoned that
because Danielson could not show that the commissioner of public safety (commissioner)
acted unreasonably or arbitrarily, he was not entitled to reinstatement. As a result, the court
sustained the cancellation of Danielson’s driver’s license and denied the request to strike
the commissioner’s requirement that Danielson submit a last-use statement as a condition
of a new ignition-interlock participation agreement.
Danielson appeals.

1 To enroll in the program, participants must sign a last-use statement, which states the last
date in which they consumed alcohol. In or der to rejoin the program and get his license
reinstated, Danielson would have to admit that he consumed alcohol that night, and restart
the program from day one.

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DECISION
Danielson argues that this matter should be remanded because the district court did
not use the proper standard of review when evaluating the license revocation.2 Rather than
conduct a de novo review of the commissioner’s decision to cancel the license, Danielson
contends that the district court applied an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. We review
this issue involving applica tion of the law in a license-re vocation proceeding de novo.
Igo v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 615 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 17, 2000).
To answer this question of what constitutes “de novo re view” of the decision to
cancel a license, we turn first to the governing statute and th en to caselaw. A person
challenging the cancellation of a driver’s li cense may bring a petiti on in district court
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 171. 19 (2020). The district court shall “take
testimony and examine into the facts of the case to determine whether the petitioner is
entitled to a license or is subject to revoc ation.” Minn. Stat. § 171.19. There is a
presumption of regularity and correctness when license matters are reviewed. Thorson v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 490, 493 (M inn. App. 1994). To overturn a license
revocation, the petitioner must show that the commissioner acted unreasonably. Id. The
petitioner has the burden of pr oving that he or she is entitled to reinstatement. Pallas v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. App. 2010).

2 At oral argument Danielson waived his challenge that the guidelines were inconsistent.

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In cases of license-revocation decisions, the district court conducts a de novo review
of the commissioner’s decision. Igo, 615 N.W.2d at 361. In that “independent” review,
the court weighs evidence, j udges credibility, and determines whether a cancellation is
justified. Madison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 585 N.W.2d 77, 82-83 (Minn. App. 1998),
review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1998). But, instead of reviewing the decision as to whether
the district court would have revoked the license, the court is ultimately reviewing whether
the commissioner acted unreasonably. Plaster v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 490 N.W.2d 904,
906 (Minn. App. 1992). Because this review by the district court is still conducted in light
of the presumption of regularity and correctness of the commissioner’s decision to revoke
a license, this is an arbitrary and caprici ous or substantial-evidence standard. Thorson,
519 N.W.2d at 493.
Here, the district court weighed the ev idence and testimony brought by Danielson
suggesting that the device had malfunctioned. This included Danielson’s statements on his
consumption of mouthwash the night of the fa iled test, as well as his custom of using
mouthwash to relieve his impetigo and applying hand sanitizer throughout the COVID-19
pandemic. But the district court reasoned that the device registering alcohol, whether it be
household items like hand san itizer or mouthwash instead of liquor, is evidence that the
device was working. The district court also reviewed the ignition-interlock participation
agreement, the program guidelines, and th e program statutes and found that the
commissioner’s actions were consistent with the expectations that Danielson expressly
agreed to. Minn. Stat. § 171.306 (2020). After evaluating the arguments brought by
Danielson, the court concluded that the commissioner acted reasonably and not arbitrarily,

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as Danielson did not meet his burden of proving otherwise. This de novo review of the
evidence and Danielson’s credibility—which established the commissioner’s actions were
not unreasonable—satisfies the review required of the district court.
Danielson suggests that the district court did not conduct a de novo review because
the court showed deference to the DVS by concluding that the commissioner did not act in
an arbitrary or capricious manne r. He argues that based on Madison, it is unambiguous
that de novo review is required for pe titions under section 171.19, meaning the
commissioner receives no deference. 585 N.W.2d at 79-80. But this is a misreading of
Madison, which involved a case where the district court relied solely on the commissioner’s
discretion, and did not make any credibility determination on testimony as required by
section 171.19. Id. This did not happen here.
The ultimate decision that the district c ourt must make after conducting a de novo
review of the evidence and testimony at th e hearing is whether the commissioner acted
arbitrarily or capriciously by cancelling th e license and whether there was substantial
evidence to support the commissioner’s decision. There is no indication in the record that
the district court limited Danielson’s testimon y, nor does Daniels on point to where the
district court acted improperly.
Therefore, because the district court a pplied the proper sta ndard of review as
required by section 171.19, we affirm.
Affirmed.