State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1109

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jacob Jordan Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed August 16, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-19-248

Keith Ellison, Attorney Genera l, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of aiding-and-abetting third-degree murder for
the drug overdose death of a friend, arguing that the evidence failed to show that he aided
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and abetted the murder. He also argues that the district court erred by declining to give the
jury a joint-acquisition instruction. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 14, 2018, J.B. contacted a ppellant Jacob Jordan Johnson and asked
for $20 worth of a controlled substance. Johnso n told J.B. where he was, and J.B. stated
that he would be right over. J.B. left his apartment, telling his son that he was going to the
store.
J.B. picked Johnson up. Using J.B.’s ce llphone, Johnson called “Memphis.” J.B.
and Johnson met Memphis at a gas station, a nd Memphis got into J.B.’s vehicle. J.B.
handed Memphis $20, and Memphis gave J.B. a tinfoil package. Memphis exited J.B.’s
vehicle, and J.B. dropped Johnson off.
J.B. returned to his apartment about an hour later, but he did not have any purchases
with him. Shortly after he returned, J.B. we nt to take a shower. While J.B. was in the
bathroom, his son noticed that Johnson wa s contacting J.B.’s cellphone. Johnson was
contacting J.B. because Memphis had locked hims elf out of his vehicle and lost his key.
J.B.’s son did not respond to Johnson’s attempts to contact J.B. J.B.’s phone also received
a text message from J.B.’s girlfriend. J.B.’s son responded to that message. He told J.B.’s
girlfriend that J.B. had been in the bathroom for a long time and asked her to come over.
J.B.’s girlfriend arrived at the apartment and pounded on the locked bathroom door.
When J.B. did not respond, she kicked th e door down and found J.B. on the floor
unresponsive. J.B.’s girlfriend called 911 and performed CPR. Acts to save J.B.’s life,
including the administration of Narcan, were unsuccessful.
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Police officers interviewed Johnson on Dece mber 17, 2018, afte r they heard that
Johnson was going “around [telling] some people that [he] had sold [J.B.] the [drugs] that
he may have overdosed on.” Johnson stated that he met J.B. the year prior through a mutual
friend, and they hung out togeth er in the “drug scene.” Jo hnson admitted that J.B. had
contacted him on December 14, and that he and J.B. met Memphis for the drug sale.
Johnson also stated that J.B. did not know Memphis and would not have known how
to contact him. Johnson admitted that J.B. “needed [him] to get to” Memphis and J.B. did
not have other connections “other than pe ople that he had met at [Johnson’s] house.”
Johnson stated that J.B. would “hit [him] up every couple days,” and he would take J.B. to
someone like Memphis to buy drugs. Johnson was charged with aiding-and-abetting third-
degree murder for serving as a middleman and facilitating the drug sale between Memphis
and J.B.
At Johnson’s jury trial, J.B.’s son and girlfriend testified about what they witnessed
on December 14. Police officers testified abou t their investigation and interview with
Johnson. Johnson’s recorded interview was played for the jury.
A forensic pathologist testif ied that J.B. died of the toxic effects of heroin and
fentanyl; the two drugs “enhance each other’s effects,” so together they “markedly”
increased his risk of overdose. A forensic toxicologist testified that the level of fentanyl in
J.B.’s system was “consistent with someone su ccumbing to the effects of using this drug
rather quickly . . . [his] body did not have enough time to metabolize that fentanyl all into
nonfentanyl, . . . [which is] consistent with an acute or immediate overdose.” Johnson did
not testify.
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Johnson requested a joint-acquis ition jury instruction based on State v. Carithers,
490 N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 1992), claiming that during his interview with police officers he
indicated that he also used the drugs that J.B. purchased from Memphis. The district court
declined to give the jury instruction. The jury found Johnson guilty of aiding-and-abetting
third-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.195(b), .05, subd. 1 (2018). The
district court sentenced Johnson to 74 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Sufficiency of the evidence
Johnson first challenges the su fficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.
In his principal brief, he argues that the state’s evidence satisfied neither subdivision 1 nor
subdivision 2 of the accomplice-liability statute, which provide alternative means by which
the state may prove that a defendant aided and abetted a crime. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05,
subds. 1, 2. His written argument focuse d on subdivision 2 by ar guing that the state’s
evidence did not establish that the murder wa s committed in furtherance of the drug sale
and was not reasonably foreseeable. His or al argument focused on subdivision 1 by
arguing that the state failed to prove that he “intentionally aided” third-degree controlled-
substance-sale murder on the ground that a person cannot intentionally aid another in
committing an unintentional offense. Specifically, Johnson asserts that he could not have
intentionally aided Memphis in committing a murder that Memphis himself did not intend
to commit; indeed, he claims that there ar e essentially no circumstances under which a
person could be an accomplice to third-degree controlled-substance-sale murder due to the
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conflict in intent requirements between th e accomplice-liability statute and the third-
degree-murder statute. We are not persuaded.
Subdivision 1 of the accomplice-liability statute requires the state to prove that the
defendant intentionally aided and abetted another in committing the crime. Id., subd. 1 (“A
person is criminally liable for a crime comm itted by another if th e person intentionally
aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit
the crime.”). “Intentionally aiding” is an element of accomplice liability that the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in addition to the elements of the substantive offense.
State v. Huber , 877 N.W.2d 519, 523-24 (Minn. 2016). To establish that the defendant
“intentionally aided” in the commission of a crime, “the [s]tate must prove that the
defendant knew his alleged accomplice was goi ng to commit a crime and the defendant
intended his presence or actions to furt her the commission of that crime.” Id. at 524
(quotation omitted).
The third-degree-murder statute requires th e state to prove that a person, without
intent to cause death, intentionally sold a controlled substance that proximately caused the
death of another. Minn. Stat . § 609.195(b). Examining th e elements of the accomplice-
liability statute and the third-degree-murder controlled-substance-sale statute together, we
discern no conflict between the mens rea elements.
To prove that a defendant aided and abetted third-degree controlled-substance-sale
murder, the state must show th at (1) the defendan t intentionally aided the principal in
supplying a controlled substance to an indi vidual—that is, knew that the principal was
going to sell a controlled substance and intended to act in furtherance of the sale, and (2) the
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controlled substance was the pr oximate cause of the individu al’s unintentional death.
Thus, the only intent and conduct required is the intentional aiding of the drug sale.
Having concluded that a defendant intentio nally aids in third-degree controlled-
substance-sale murder by aiding/abetting th e sale of a controlled substance that
proximately causes death, we now turn to th e evidence presented at trial to determine
whether it was sufficient to sustain Johnson’s conviction. Johnson asserts that the evidence
supporting his conviction is all ci rcumstantial, but there is direct evidence, in the form of
his statement to police offices, showing his facilitation of the drug sale.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this c ourt carefully examines the
record “to determine whether the facts and the legitimate infere nces drawn from them
would permit the [jury] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d
895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). We view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the verdict” and assume that the jury “disbelieved any evidence that conflicted
with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 2 57, 263 (Minn. 2016). The verdict will
not be overturned if the jury , after applying the presumption of innocence and the state’s
requirement of proving the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have
found the defendant guilty of the charged offense. Id.
In reaching its verdict, the jury had to find that the evidence proved that Johnson,
“without intent to cause death,” “intentionally aid[ed], advise[d], hire[d], counsel[ed], or
conspire[d] with or otherwise procure[d]” Memphis in “proximately caus[ing] the death of
[J.B.] by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling, giving away, bartering, delivering,
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exchanging, distributing, or administering a controlled substance classified in Schedule I
or II.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.195(b), .05, subd. 1.
Johnson claims that the evidence showed that he intended to aid Memphis in the
sale but fell short in proving that he intended to aid in the murder. But as the state asserts,
and as we just concluded, the evidence need not establish that Johnson intended to aid in
causing the death itself. Under the statute, the murder does not require intent; all that is
required is that Johnson intentionally aided in the sale of the controlled substance that
unintentionally caused J.B.’s death.
Johnson admits that he aided Memphis in the sale, and the ev idence corroborates
this admission. J.B. asked Johnson to arra nge for him to buy $20 worth of a controlled
substance. Johnson called Memphis to meet hi m and J.B. Johnson stated that J.B. could
not have contacted Memphis without him, and he admitted that he arranged drug sales for
J.B. on multiple occasions. Without Johnson, the transaction between J.B. and Memphis
would not have happened. Thus, the evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
Johnson also argues that he cannot be liable because he believed that Memphis sold
heroin to J.B. and not a mixture of heroin and fentanyl. But even if Johnson believed that
J.B. purchased only heroin, he would still be liable as a proxim ate cause of J.B.’s death.
For purposes of Minn. Stat. § 609.195(b), we interpreted “proximate cause” to mean
“something that had a substantial part in br inging about the individual’s death either
directly and immediately or through happenings that follow one after another.” State v.
Schnagl, 907 N.W.2d 188, 1 96 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 28, 2018). A forensic pathologist testified that J.B. died of the toxic effects of
8
heroin and fentanyl. Thus, the heroin contributed to J.B.’s death and played a substantial
part in bringing about his death.
Even if there was no direct evidence, as Johnson claims, that he facilitated the
transaction—so eliminating Johnson’s ad mission—the circumstantial evidence also
supports the verdict.
When circumstantial evidence supports the verdict, this court applies a heightened
standard of review. State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). This
heightened standard of review involves two steps, the first being identification of the
circumstances proved. Id. In identifying the circumstances proved, this court defers to the
jury’s acceptance of the circumstances proved by the state and rejects conflicting evidence.
State v. Barshaw , 879 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 2016 ). The second step involves an
independent examination of reasonable “i nferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved [to determine] whether the circumstances proved are consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with any rationa l hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the
evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a
reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d
190, 206 (Minn. 2002). Because this second step requires an independent examination, we
do not give deference to the jury at this stage. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn.
2017).
The circumstances proved show that J.B. sent Johnson a message asking to purchase
$20 worth of a controlled substance. Johnson then sent a message to J.B. telling him where
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to pick Johnson up. J.B. left his apartment. The men contacted Memphis. Memphis was
in J.B.’s vehicle because the key that Memphis lost was found in J.B.’s vehicle. J.B.
returned home and went into the bathroom. Johnson attempte d to contact J.B. J.B. was
found in the bathroom unresponsive. A syringe was found in the bathroom. A pathologist
concluded that J.B. died of a heroin/fentanyl overdose. Police officers heard that Johnson
told people that he “sold [J.B.] the [drugs] that he may have overdosed on.”
The reasonable inferences that might be drawn from these circumstances are
consistent with Johnson’s guilt and inconsistent with any othe r rational hypothesis. This
evidence forms a “comple te chain” showing that Johnson played a substantial role in
bringing about J.B.’s death, because it shows that Johnson was the connection between J.B.
and Memphis. See Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 206.
Jury instruction
Johnson also argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by denying his
requested joint-acquisition jury instruction under Carithers. See 490 N.W.2d at 620. The
refusal to give a requested jury instruction lies within the discretion of the district court and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 50 (Minn.
1996). The focus of our analysis is whether the refusal resulted in error. State v. Kuhnau,
622 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 2001). “No error results from a refusal to instruct whe[n] the
evidence does not support the proposed instruction and no abuse of discretion is shown.”
State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 831 (Minn. 1985).
Johnson argues that the district court shoul d have instructed th e jury that if he
received drugs from Me mphis and used them with J.B ., he could not be Memphis’s
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accomplice. But the district co urt correctly declined to give the instruction because the
evidence did not support the proposed jury instruction.
Johnson’s statement to police shows that he did not jointly acquire drugs with J.B.
to use together. He stated that J.B. gave Memphis $20, and Memphis gave J.B. drugs. An
officer asked Johnson: “D o you get any of that?” Johnso n replied: “No, I didn’t.” The
officer testified that Johnson never mentioned sharing drugs with J.B. on December 14.
Further, testimony from the forensic toxicologist shows that J.B. did not share the
drugs with Johnson. The toxico logist testified that the level of fentanyl in J.B.’s system
was “consistent with an acute or immediat e overdose.” An immediate overdose would
have occurred immediately after J.B. injected the drugs, which shows that he injected it in
his bathroom and not while he was in his vehicle with Johnson. Additionally, Johnson did
not state that he suffered from any severe eff ects that he could have suffered if he had
injected the same mixture that killed J.B.
Lastly, Johnson relies on a statement that he made to police officers, which he claims
indicates that he used the drugs with J.B. During the interview, the officer asked how the
controlled substance from Memphis was packaged, and Johnson stated that he believed it
was in tinfoil. The officer asked Johnson: “Do you get any of that?” Johnson replied: “No,
I didn’t.” The officer asked if J.B. “shoots it,” to which Johnson agreed. The officer then
asked: “Do you?” And Johnson replied: “Yeah.” But the officer testified that this question
referred to general use and was not specific about the night of December 14.
Johnson never stated that he used drugs with J.B. that night; he stated that after the
transaction between J.B. and Memphis, J.B. drove him back to where he was staying.
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Additionally, as Johnson stated during his inte rview, he regularly arranged for J.B. to
purchase drugs from whomever Johnson contacte d for him, which indicates that Johnson
was serving as a middleman and not as a joint user with J.B. Therefore, there was no
evidence supporting the requested jury instruction, and the district court correctly declined
to give it to the jury.
Affirmed.