In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: S. C. and J. J. A. L., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1113

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: S. C. and J. J. A. L., Parents.

Filed March 15, 2021
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Reilly, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-JV-20-77

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Gerald M. McCabe, Assistant County
Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for appellant county)

Erick G. Kaardal, M ohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents parents)

Tricia Utsch, Willmar, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this juvenile-protection appeal, the district court dismissed appellant -county’s
petition to terminate parental rights (the TPR petition). In the TPR petition file and in the
underlying Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) file, the district court found
due-process violations and ordered appellant to create and implement remedial plans and
consult with the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS). Appellant appealed
the dismissal of its TPR petition, and, in a separate appellate file (A20-1114), sought a writ

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of prohibition to preclude the district court from enforcing the requirement in the CHIPS
matter that appellant and the office of the county attorney consult with the DHS. This court
denied the petition for a writ of prohibition in A20-1114 and directed the parties to address
the order issued in the underlying CHIPS file in this appeal of the order dismissing the TPR
petition. In this appeal, appellant argues that the district court (1) abused its discretio n by
dismissing the TPR petition, (2) abused its discretion by determining that it was not in the
children’s best interests to terminate parental rights, (3) erred by determining that appellant
failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and (4) erred by determining on a
sua sponte basis that appellant violated the family’s due -process rights. We affirm the
district court’s termination decision, but reverse the district court’s due -process-violatio n
determinations.
FACTS
Appellant Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services (KCHHS) challenges the
district court’s determination that there was not a statutory basis to terminate the parental
rights of respondent-father, J.J.A.L., and respondent -mother, S.C. (the parents), to their
two minor children, I.C., born in 2017, and V.C., born in 2019. On September 22, 2019,
mother noticed that V.C. was in pain, that her cry was “different,” and that she had trouble
breathing. Mother brought V.C. to the emergency room. Emergenc y-room providers
performed an x-ray on V.C., but the x -ray did not show that V.C. had any fractures. The
next day, mother brought V.C. to the doctor for a medical appointment. Mother told a
health-care provider that a few days prior, she had left V.C. on the parents’ bed to run
upstairs. Mother heard V.C. crying and ran back downstairs. Mother found V.C. on the

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bed, but noticed that V.C. seemed to have difficulty breathing and that her chest looked
abnormal. The examining doctor decided to transfer V.C. to the hospital, where doct ors
discovered that V.C. sustained acute rib and hand fractures. Imaging suggested that V.C.
sustained her fractures in the 7-10 days before the medical visit. The parents did not know
how V.C. was injured. Although the parents are V.C.’s only caregiver s, the family lives in
a single-family home with mother’s parents and two of mother’s siblings.
On September 24, 2019, KCHHS filed an emergency request for protective care and
detention. The district court issued an order on the same date, determining that the children
should remain in protective care. KCHHS removed V.C. and I.C. from their parents’ home
and placed them into emergency protective care.
On September 26, 2019, KCHHS filed a Petition–Child in Need of Protection or
Services (the CHIPS petition) in court file number 34-JV-19-219. The district court held
an Emergency Protective Care (EPC ) hearing on September 26, 2019 . Following the
hearing, the district court issued an order determining that the petition established a prima
facie showing that a juvenile-protection matter existed and found that the children were
endangered.
On March 18, 2020, KCHHS filed the TPR petition. The TPR petition asserted
three statutory bases for termination: (1) the parents substantially, continuously, or
repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon them by the
parent-child relationship under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2018); (2) the
parents were palpably unfit to be parti es to the parent-child relationship under Minn. Stat.

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§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018); and (3) the children experienced egregious harm under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6) (2018).
The district court held a trial on the TPR petition in June and July 2020. On August
10, 2020, the district court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for
Dismissal, concluding that KCHHS failed to prove a statutory basis for termination and
dismissing the TPR petition. The district court determined that KCHHS failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence that the parents harmed V.C. The district court determined
that KCHHS did not show by clear and convincing evidence that either of the parents knew
or should have known that V.C. suffered substan tial bodily harm. The district court
reasoned that “It is possible that neither [parent] caused [V.C.’s] fractures. It is possible
that neither [parent] knows who harmed [V.C.]. It is possible that [parents] have provided
truthful information and testimony that they do not know what happened to [V.C.].” G iven
all the evidence presented, the district court determined that the children “continue[d] to
be in need of protection or services because [V.C.] experienced unexplained rib fractures
while in the home[. . . .]” Thus, the district court determined that while KCHHS failed to
establish a statutory basis for termination, “the safety concerns in the [family] home have
not been mitigated.” The district court also determined that termination of parental r ights
was not in the best interests of the children, and that KCHHS had not made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. Lastly, the district court made a sua sponte finding that “[t]he
Due Process Rights of [the family] have been violated in this proceeding and in the CHIPS
proceeding . . . .” The district court then dismissed the TPR petition.

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On August 11, 2020, the district court issued an order in the CHIPS case . The
district court found that there were due -process violations “related to how [KCHH S]
initially assesses egregious harm cases and any removal determination [s].” The district
court ordered KCHHS and the Kandiyohi County Attorney’s Office (the KCAO) to
“engage in coordinated efforts to establish objective processes for making removal
determinations, making maltreatment determinations, and when to make determinatio ns
for filing permanency petitions that are not based upon the passing of permanency
timelines.” The district court ordered KCHHS and the KCAO to “creat[e] objective
processes identifying means to create safety and for making safety plans for parents in
difficult and extraordinary circumstances,” and to “create a plan to coordinate efforts to
determine the elements of proof at the outset of all CHIPS an d TPR cases . . . .”
KCHHS appeals the August 10, 2020 or der dismissing the TPR petition. KCHHS
and the KCAO also filed a separate petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus, seeking
to preclude the district court from enforcing the parts of its August 10 and August 11 orders
regarding the due-process violations and remedial provisions (A20 -1114). We declined to
address the writ of mandamus because it was not adequately briefed. We also determined
that a writ of prohibition was not an appropriate remedy because KCHHS and the KCAO
had an adequate remedy at law. We directed the parties to the TPR case to address the
August 11, 2020 CHIPS order in this appeal.

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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that there was
not a statutory basis to terminate parental rights.
a. Standard of review
A natural parent is generally “ presumed to be fit and suitable to be entrusted with
the care of his or her child.” In re Welfare of D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App.
2003). “Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons,” In re Welfare
of Children of B.M. , 845 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2014) ( quotation omitted), and “when
the evidence clearly mandates such a result, ” In re Welfare of S.Z. , 547 N.W.2d 886, 893
(Minn. App. 1996). “To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the district court must find
that at least one of the eight statutory conditions for termination exist[s].” In re Welfare of
L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2018)
(listing statutory grounds for termination).
While we afford “considerable deference” to the district court, we will carefully
inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it is clear and convincing.
In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) . On appeal from
a district court’s termination-of-parental-rights order, “we will review the district court’s
findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its determination of
whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present
for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901
(Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A finding is clearly erroneous if
“the review of the entire record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that

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a mistake has been made.” In re Welfare of B.A.B. , 572 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App.
1998) (quotation omitted).
b. The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
KCHHS argues that the district court made “multiple critical errors of fact,” leading
to factual findings that were not supported by the record. We review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 901. “That the record might support
findings other than those made by the [district] court does not show that the [district]
court’s findings are defective.” In re Welfare of Child of T.C.M. , 758 N.W.2d 340, 345
(Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). We defer to the district court’s “determinations of
witness credibility and the weight to be given to the evidence.” In re Welfare of Child of
T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007).
First, KCHHS argues that the district court failed to give enoug h weight to the
testimony of its expert witness, Pediatrician Dr. Mark Hudson. Dr. Hudson is the Medical
Director of Midwest Children’s Resource Center. Dr. Hudson testified that in his medical
opinion, V.C.’s injuries resulted from abusive trauma. Dr. Hudson ruled out other causes
such as underlying bone disease, other types of significant trauma from non -abusive
sources, a fracture caused by routine care, or injuries caused by I.C., V.C.’s two -year-old
sibling. KCHHS argues that the district court clearly erred by failing to find, based on Dr.
Hudson’s testimony, that V.C.’s injuries stemmed from parental abuse.
We disagree. The district court determined that Dr. Hudson was “qualified to testify
as an expert regarding pediatrics and the subspecialty o f pediatric child abuse . . . .” That
said, the district court weighed Dr. Hudson’s testimony against all of the other evidence

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presented and found that “[i]t is very difficult to determine when [V.C.’s] injuries
occurred” and that “[t]here is no way to k now if the person who caused this injury did it
intentionally or with a purpose to injure the child.” The record supports the district court’s
finding that the witnesses could not identify who caused V.C.’s injuries.
KCHHS argues that “[e]ven the parents’ own proffered experts and the mother’s
counsel acknowledged at trial that Dr. Hudson’s diagnosis was abuse.” This statement is
inaccurate. The parents called Dr. Marvin Miller, a physician in the Department of Medical
Genetics and Birth Defects for Dayton Children’s Hospital in Ohio, to testify about brittle
bone disease. Dr. Miller testified that he reviewed Dr. Hudson’s conclusions and diagnosis,
but “respectfully disagree[d]” with them. Ultimately, the district court did not give Dr.
Miller’s testimony much weight because his opinions about brittle bone disease rested on
a “novel theory” and lacked “the appropriate objective and independent validatio n
necessary for the [district] [c]ourt to rely upon it.” KCHHS’s contention that the district
court failed to give proper weight to Dr. Hudson’s abuse determination is unfounded.
Second, KCHHS argues that the district court erred in “important medical findings”
supporting a determination that V.C. suffered abuse. KCHHS mischaracterizes the district
court’s factual findings. The district court acknowledged that Dr. Hudson testified that
V.C.’s injuries could have been the result of abuse. The district court did not deny the
extent of V.C.’s injuries or disregard the medical opinions of the radiologists o r medical
doctors. Instead, the district court reasoned that while V.C. suffered injuries, there could
have been other possible, unknown explanations for those injuries. The district court heard
testimony from Dr. Janice Ophoven, MD, a pediatric forensic pathologist. Dr. Ophoven

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conducted an independent forensic review of V.C.’s injuries and reviewed V.C.’s medical
records. Dr. Ophoven testified that there are a “number of considerations that have to be
made as to why this child might present with —with abnormal bone on X -ray.” As an
example, Dr. Ophoven identified as possible factors:
The mother’s history of malnutrition and Vitamin D deficiency
as well as the manipulation of the baby [during her delivery],
the [fact that she was] small for [her] gestational age, and the
fact that there may have been an incident of an accidental
impact from the siblings to me all together basically says there
is a very legitimate[] trauma[] [as] to why this family is having
to identify or uncover possible explanations.
Dr. Ophoven testified that V.C. also could have been injured by I.C., and she could not
conclude that V.C.’s injuries were definitely caused by parental abuse.
The district court found Dr. Ophoven’s testimony credible. The district court found
that the pos sibilities raised by Dr. Ophoven constituted a “realm of logically possible
explanations for [V.C.’s] injuries.” Because of the varied possibilities raised by Drs.
Hudson and Ophoven, the district court found that “KCHHS did not fully investigate all of
the logically possible explanations before choosing one possible explanation that [V.C.] is
a normal child with non -accidental, inflicted trauma.” The order reveals that the district
court carefully weighed the testimony of three expert witnesses, Dr. Huds on, Dr. Miller,
and Dr. Ophoven, and made credibility determinations based on their testimony. In
weighing this testimony, the district court could not say with the certainty required by the
clear and convincing burden of proof that V.C.’s injuries were caused by parental abuse.
Viewing this record in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, these
findings are not clearly erroneous.

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Third, KCHHS argues that the district court erred “with regard to who could have
caused the injuries” because only the parents spent time alone with V.C. During trial, both
mother and father testified that they were the primary caretakers for their children. But the
parties also presented evidence that the family lived in a single-family home with mother’s
parents and two of mother’s siblings. The district court noted that KCHHS “did not walk
through the entire [family] home . . . at any point during the investigation or case
management,” and likewise failed to “investigate who lived in the home with [V.C.] at [the
home] at any point during the investigation or case management.” The district court also
noted that KCHHS did not investigate who lived in the house with the parents. The district
court made factual findings that V.C. sustained serious injuries, which had not been
explained. But given the evidence presented by KCHHS and the questions remaining about
the family home, the district court did not find clear and convincing evidence to support an
egregious-harm determination. These findings are not cl early erroneous.
c. The district court’s legal conclusions do not con stitute an abuse of
discretion.

KCHHS argues that the district court’s erroneous factual findings affected its
ultimate conclusion that there was not a statutory basis to terminate parental rights. As
stated, we determine that the district court’s factual findings are supported by the record
and are not clearly erroneous. We now turn to KCHHS’s argument that the district court
abused its discretion by dismissing the TPR petition because a statutory basis was not
proven by clear and convincing evidence.

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KCHHS sought to terminate parental rights on the ground of egregious harm. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6).1 Termination is appropriate if the district court determines
that:
a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent’ s care
which is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack
of regard for the child’ s well -being, such that a reasonable
person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child
or of any child to be in the parent’s care .
Id. “Egregious harm” is “the infliction of bodily harm to a child or neglect of a child which
demonstrates a grossly inadequate ability to provide minimally adequate parental care.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14 (2018). “Egregious harm” includes, but is not limited to,
the infliction of “substantial bodily harm” to a child. Id., subd. 14(2); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 7a (2018) ( noting that “substantial bodily harm” includes “bodily injury
which . . . causes a fracture of any bodily member”).

1 The petition also sought to terminate parental rights for neglect and for palpable unfitness.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4). Before trial, the district court determined that
KCHHS’s petition did not establish a prima facie case for neglect and dismissed that
portion of the petition. KCHHS does not challenge this determination on appeal. The
district court also determined that KCHHS failed to prove that the parents were palpably
unfit. KCHHS did not elicit testimony from any of the witnesses at trial that the parents
were palpably unfit. Yet, KCHHS argues that “If the district court had found the parents
responsible for the egregiou s harm, then they too would likely meet the definition of
palpably unfit to parent.” KCHHS neither presents evidence nor cites caselaw in support
of this argument and we deem it forfeited. See Melina v. Chaplin , 327 N.W.2d 19, 20
(Minn. 1982) ( deeming arguments forfeited on appeal that are unsupported by facts in
record and contain inadequate citation to relevant legal authority); see also State, Dep’t of
Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address an issue absent adequate briefing); In re Welfare of Children of J.B. ,
698 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing this aspect of Wintz in a termination of
parental rights appeal).

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The district court determined that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence
of egregious harm. KCHHS argues that it provided a “significant volume of evidence” of
egregious harm and the district court abused its discretion by declining to terminate
parental rights on this basis. We begin by noting that the district court’s “determinatio ns
of witness credibility and the weight to be given to the evidence” are entitled to deference.
T.D., 731 N.W.2d at 555.
Here, the district court made thorough findings about the testimony of the witnesses.
The district court’s order relied, in part, on the testimony presented by Dr. Hudson about
the nature and extent of V.C.’s injuries. Dr. Hudson stated that in his opinion, V.C.’s
fractures were “all highly specific for abus e.” Yet, the district court also found that “Dr.
Hudson opined that there is no way to determine the mechanism of injury. Dr. Hudson
also opined that there is no way to determine who committed t he harm.” Dr. Hudson
became acquainted with V.C.’s case on September 24, 2019, when he consulted as a child-
abuse pediatrician. Dr. Hudson spoke to the parents, inquired into the family’s medical
history, and reviewed V.C.’s lab work. Dr. Hudson reviewe d V.C.’s vitamin D level,
which can relate to bone health, but documented a normal or adequate level of Vitamin D
in V.C.’s lab results. Dr. Hudson performed a physical examination of V.C. and testified
that she “looked like a normal infant” and did not have “any signs of external trauma.” Dr.
Hudson spoke to the parents, who could not identify any source of accidental trauma, such
as an accident or a fall. V.C. had a head CT scan to see if there was an “injury inside her
head” or to her eyes, but those tests came back negative. Based on the tests conducted and
his medical examination, Dr. Hudson concluded that V.C. had “acute” fractures to her ribs

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and her hand. Dr. Hudson opined that V.C.’s fractures resulted from “abusive trauma.”
During cross -examination, parents’ counsel asked Dr. Hudson to confirm that he was
“unable to address . . . how this might have happened, specifically as far as the causatio n?”
Dr. Hudson responded, “[s]pecific to [V.C.], correct.” Dr. Hudson reiterated that, in his
opinion, “the injuries [are] inflicted or abusi ve trauma.” That said, he acknowledged that
it was impossible to say how the injuries occurred.
The district court also credited the testimony of Dr. Ophoven. Dr. Ophoven testified
that there were several possible explanations for V.C.’s injuries, includ ing:
l) Fractures due to accidental trauma in a normal child;
2) Fractures due to accidental trauma in a child with
abnormality of bone strength; 3) Fractures due to inflicted
trauma in a normal child; 4) Fractures due to inflicted trauma
in a child with abnormality of bone strength; 5) Fractures due
to activities of daily living in a child with abnormal bone
strength; 6) Abnormalities of bone or bone healing that do not
represent fracture in a child with metabolic bone disease; and
7) Combination of any o f the above.
The district court reasoned that the existence of V.C.’s fractures, “witho ut
investigation into all logically possible explanations, is insufficient to prove child abuse
occurred, even if the fracture is ‘highly suspicious of abuse.’” Based o n its review of the
witness testimony and its credibility determinations, the district court found that KCHHS
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that parents were responsible for the harm
caused to V.C. These findings —which are supported by the record—sustain the district
court’s conclusions of law.
KCHHS also argues that in some cases the egregious-harm provision may per mit
the termination of parental rights even if the parent did not personally inflict the harm or

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was not physically present when the egregious harm was inflicted. In re Welfare of Child
of T.P., 747 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Minn. 2008). If a parent did not personally inflict egregio us
harm on a child, a district court may terminate parental rights only if the district court finds
“that the parent either knew or should have known that the child had experienced egregio us
harm.” Id. Whether a parent knew or should have known of the egregious harm is
“necessary, but not sufficient” to satisfy the “nature, duration, or chronicity” requi rement
of section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(6). Id. at n.4. Further, the fact that a child
experiences harm “does not indicate a lack of regard for the well -being of the child on the
part of the parent who did not personally inflict the egregious harm, did not actually know
about the harm, and could not have been expected to know about the harm.” Id.
Here, the record does not support a conclusion that the parents knew or should have
known that V.C. suffered egregious harm. Mother testified that she noticed on September
22 that V.C. was in pain, had a “different ” cry, and had trouble breathing. Mother stated
that earlier in the week, she was in an upper level of the home when she heard V.C. crying
from her bedroom. Mother found V.C. on the bed and noti ced that she seemed to have
difficulty breathing and that her chest looked abnormal. Mother testified that she did not
harm V.C., and did not know how she sustained her injuries. Father also testified that he
did not know how V.C. may have become injured. The district court weighed the parents’
testimony, along with the testimony of the doctors and the expert witnesses and all of the
record evidence. While the district court found that V.C. suffered serious injuries, it also
determined that KCHHS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that V.C.
“experienced egregious harm in the parent’s care which is of a nature, duration, or

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chronicity that indicates a lack of regard for the child’s well -being, such that a reasonable
person would believe it c ontrary to the best interest of the child or of any child to be in the
parent’s care.”
Given the record before us, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that KCHHS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that a statutory basis supported termination.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that it is not in
the best interests of the children to terminate parental rights.
KCHHS argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that it is
not in the best interests of the children to terminate parental rights. Because we determine
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that KCHHS did not prove
a statutory basis by clear and convincing evidence, we need not reach this issue. See In re
Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014) (noting that “an involuntary
termination of parental rights is proper only when at leas t one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the termination is in the
child’s best interest”). But because the best interests of the children are the “paramount
consideration” in termination matters, we will br iefly address this argument. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
When analyzing the child’s best interests, the district court balances three factors:
“(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child. ”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii).

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“Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health consi deratio ns
and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992).
“We review a district court’s ultimate determination that termination is in a child’s best
interest for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (citation omitted).
In determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests, the district court
must “explain its rationale in its findings and conclusions.” In re Tanghe , 672 N.W.2d
623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003). But best-interests findings need not “go into great detail.” In
re Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004). While the district
court did not specifically address the factors outlined in Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii), it did discuss the children’s i nterest in preserving the parent -child
relationship, and the parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child r elationship with the
children.
The district court found that both children had a “significant interest in maintaining
the parent-child relationsh ip” with the parents. The district court noted that I.C. “in
particular suffered from his long separation from his parents,” and “did not want to be away
from his parents.” While V.C. was only three months old when she went into foster care,
the district court found that she “suffered from irreparable harm to what would have been
her expected attachment and bonding with her parents.”
And the district court found that both parents had an interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship. Unlike many te rmination cases that come before this court, the
parents here made significant efforts to preserve the parent -child relationship. A child
protection specialist with KCHHS referred the parents for parental capacity evaluatio ns,

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anger assessments for father , diagnostic assessments, supervised visits, and medical
appointments for the children. The district court found that, according to the specialist,
“all services that could be provided to this family were provided.” The district court found
that the pare nts cooperated with the out -of-home placement plan, and “completed
everything in their plan ,” except for certain aspects of genetic testing. The district court
described the parents as having a favorable demeanor in court, and noted that father even
left his job and took another job to meet all the demands of the child-protection case.
The district court’s best-interests findings are supported by the record. Further, the
district court’s findings are based, in part, on its assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses, and we will not reweigh these credibility determinations on appeal. See In re
Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Because the best -
interests analysis involves credibility determinations and is generally not su sceptible to an
appellate court’s global review of a record, we give considerable deference to the district
court’s findings.” (quotation omitted)). We therefore conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of parental rights would not be in
the best interests of the children.
III. The district court did not err by determining that KCHHS failed to make
reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
KCHHS challenges the district court’s determination that it failed to make
reasonable efforts to reunify the family. A county must make reasonable efforts at
reunification before the distri ct court can terminate a parent’ s rights. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(a) (2018). “Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere

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matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of
S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quot ation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 28, 2007). A district court’ s finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify
parent and children is reviewed for clear error. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 386 . Reasonable
efforts are not required when “the parent has subjected a child to egregious harm as defined
in section 260C.007, subdivision 14.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(1).2
The district court determined that KCHHS failed to prove egregious harm. It also
determined that “KCHHS did not provide reasonable efforts to reunify” the family. 3
KCHHS argues that these findings are unnecessary and must be reversed. That said,
KCHHS did not brief this issue or present any facts or legal authority to support its
argument, beyond its assertion that reasonable -efforts findings are unnecessary. “An
assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons
Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971); see also In re A.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 43, 50
(Minn. App. 2000) (apply ing Schoepke in a CHIPS case). We decline to consider this
argument. See Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480; J.B., 698 N.W.2d at 166.

2 A district court may, under certain circumstances, relieve a county from having to make
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunify a family. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.08,
subd. 1(e)(1). Here, KCHHS did not request to be relieved of its responsibility to make
reasonable efforts, the district court did not relieve KCHHS of that obligation, and the lack
of that determination is not at issue in this appeal.
3 We acknowledge that, in its lengthy order, the district court found, on the one hand, that
“all services that could be provided to this fa mily were provided,” and , on the other hand,
that KCHHS did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family.

19
IV. The district court erred in determining , on a sua sponte basis, that KCHHS
committed due-process violations.
KCHHS argues that the district court’s due -process-violation findings are
erroneous. The constitutions of the United States and the State of Minnesota guarantee the
right to due process and a fair trial. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7.
“Although the amount of process due in a particular case varies with the unique
circumstances of that case, prejudice as a result of the alleged violation is an essential
component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J. -M., 744 N.W.2d
669, 673 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to due-
process-violations findings in a termination proceeding. In re Welfare of Children of D.F.,
752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008).
We determine that the district court erred because the due -process issue was not
properly before the district court in either t he CHIPS file or the TPR file.
At the hearing on August 10 that generated the August 11, 2020 order in the CHIPS
file, the district court stated that it “asked Guardian s ad Litem , Social Workers, and
Assistant Kandiyohi County Attorneys for Kandiyohi County to come to this hearing. ” 4
The district court began the hearing by announcing that “[w]e collectively got this case
wrong from the beginning. We is all-inclusive, including this Court” and conveyed that it
was time to address the due -process violations in the case. The district court then orally

4 We note that it is unusual for a district court to order people who did not work on a child
protection case to appear for a disposition hearing.

20
articulated findings and orders in the case. It followed up with written orders. In its August
10, 2020 order in the TPR file, the district court made these conclusions of law:
23. The failure of KCHHS to properly investigate who might
have harmed [V.C.] before filing a TPR petition led to Due
Process Violations suffered by [the family].
24. The failure of KCHHS and [the KCAO] to effectively
collaborate and communicate the legal standards relevant in
this case led to Due Process Violations suffered by [the
family].
25. The Due Process Rights of [the family] were violated when
KCHHS provided inaccurate information to the Court in the Ex
Parte EPC Affidavit and proposed order, and when that same
inaccurate information was submitted to the Court in the
CHIPS petition and the TPR petition as true. At the time
submitted, KCHHS knew or should have known the
information was inaccurate or obsolete.
In its August 11, 2020 order in the CHIPS file, the district court reiterated that
KCHHS and the KCAO violated the family’s due-process rights and ordered the following:
a. KCHHS and the [KCAO] shall engage in coordinated
efforts to establish objective processes for making removal
determinations, making maltreatment determinations, and
when to make determinations for filing permanency
petitions that are not based upon the passing of permanency
timelines.
b. KCHHS and the [KCAO] shall seek assistance from [DHS]
in creating objective processes identifying means to create
safety and for making safety plans for parents in difficult
and extraordinary circumstances.
c. KCHHS and the [KCAO] shall create a plan to coordinate
efforts to determine the elements of proof at t he outset of
all CHIPS and TPR cases so that the social workers and
county attorneys better understand what evidence is
relevant and what is not. The plan shall be approved of by
[DHS], and it shall be submitted within the next 60 days.

21
KCHHS argues that the district court exceeded its authority by making due-process-
violation findings on a sua sponte basis and requiring KCHHS and the KCAO to engage in
various affirmative efforts. We agree. Under Minnesota law, a district court “has original
and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child who is alleged to be in need
of protection or services.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 1 (2018). The district court also
has “original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning . . . permanency matters
under sections 260C.503 to 260C.521.” Id., subd. 2(2) (2018). The “termination of
parental rights is always discretionary with the juvenile court,” and the district court “is not
required to grant or to deny” any petition. In re Welfare of Children of J.D.T., 946 N.W.2d
321, 328 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
We recognize that it is the stated goal of Minnesota caselaw, statutory authority, and
the guidance of the Children’s Jus tice Initiative, to ensure permanency for children in a fair
and timely manner. See R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 135 (stating that purpose of Children’s
Justice Initiative is to ensure that “every Minnesota child, regardless of location, has the
best possible ch ance for a safe and permanent home, at the earliest possible time ”
(quotation omitted)); In re Welfare of J.R ., 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (discussing
importance of resolving child-protection matters in a fair and final manner); Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 1.02(b), (e) (noting that the purpose of these rules is to “provide a just, thorough,
speedy, and efficient” resolution, and “reduce unnecessary delays in court pr oceedings”).
We agree that district courts are responsible for overseeing and monitoring the p rogress of
each child-protection case at every stage of the case, including addressing the issues that
led to the petition, the reasonable efforts—if any —to reunify the family, and the progress

22
of the parents and the children on their case plan. And we encourage district courts to make
observations about the progress of the case, and generate or solicit suggestions on how to
improve the management of child-protection cases.
But central to the oversight of the case is the district court’s obligation to ensure that
all relevant persons and entities are afforded due process. Here, the district court violated
that duty. While we recognize the broad discretion granted to the district court in child -
protection matters, the district court exceeded its lawful authority when it found that
KCHHS and the KCAO committed due-process violations and ordered them to implement
remedial plans and consult with DHS. The district court did not indicate that it intended to
address due-process considerations in either the TP R or CHIPS file, until after the TPR
trial. Indeed, the transcript and the record reveal that the district court d id not even say the
phrase “due process” until the August 10 hearing, weeks after the TPR trial.
And more importantly, n either the KCAO nor D HS was a party to the CHIPS or
TPR matter. Because neither the KCAO nor DHS was a party in these proceedings, the
district court lacked authority to compel them to engage in remedial efforts such as
consulting with one another and with KCHHS. See Sammons v. Sammons , 642 N.W.2d
450, 457 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating, in the marital dissolution context, that the “district
court may not exercise jurisdiction over a nonparty” and “[lacked] personal jurisdiction to
enter a judgment affecting [the property rights of a nonparty]”); see also In re Ferlitto, 565
N.W.2d 35, 37 (Minn. App. 1997) (noting that a district court may not exercise jurisdictio n
over a nonparty).

23
We determine, further, that the district court’s due -process determinations violate
the separation of powers and interfere with executive branch functions. Chapter 260C of
the Minnesota Statutes governs child-welfare proceedings. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001 -
.637 (2020). Courts must be mindful not to “use judicial authority to enforce or restrain
acts which lie within the executive and legislative jurisdictions.” State v. M.D.T. , 831
N.W.2d 276, 280 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Here, the district court exceeded its
authority and interfered in the powers delegated to another branch of government when it
issued orders beyond those authorized by chapter 260C . It did so both by imposing
requirements on entities such as DHS, which are neither a party to nor a participant in the
proceedings, and by imposing on the county a duty to consult with other agencies regarding
the propriety of filing termination petitions; the statute simply does not require the
consultation ordered by the district court.
Additionally, the district court’s order impermissibly interfere s with the attorney -
client relationship between KCHHS and the KCAO. The attorney-client privilege protects
communications between attorneys and clients. Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(b) (2020).
Further, the rules of professional conduct prohibit an at torney from disclosing a client’ s
confidences. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a). The district court’s order would have
impermissibly required disclosure to the court of privileged information and
communications between the county and counsel. The order compelling KCHHS and the
KCAO to submit their plans to the district court for review and continued oversight would
have likewise violated the attorney-client relationship.

24
In sum, we determine that the district court’s sua sponte consideration of due
process, its decision to call nonparties to a hearing on August 10, its factual findings and
conclusions of law regarding due process, and its imposition of remedial provisions upon
nonparties, were improper. We therefore reverse those portions of the August 10, 2020
order in the TPR file related to the district court’s due-process analysis, and the August 11,
2020 order in the CHIPS file.5
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

5 The district court ordered KCHHS and the KCAO to undergo a number of remedial
efforts, such as consulting with DHS, who is not a party to this proceeding. B ecause we
are reversing the district court’s due -process rulings prompting the required consultatio ns,
KCHHS and the KCAO do not have to engage in the remedial efforts erroneously ordered
by the district court.