State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1115

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdifetah Ali Kalif,
Appellant.

Filed April 19, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-15076

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Amber S. Johnson, Johnson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding a
purported birth certificate from evidence and by denying a motion to dismiss for lack of

2
subject-matter jurisdiction based on its determination that appellant was at least 18 years
old on the date of the charged offense. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Abdifetah Ali Kalif with first -degree criminal sexual
conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2018) . The basis for the
criminal charge originated from allegations that on April 23, 2019, Kalif attempted to
undress a 14-year-old girl in the backseat of a moving vehicle, grabbed her by the throat,
threatened to stab her, attempted to penetrate her vaginally with his penis, and punched her
repeatedly in the face. Kalif filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that he was younger than 18 years old at the time of the
alleged offense and that the juvenile court therefore h ad exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. The matter proceeded to a contested hearing. We summarize the evidence and
proceedings relevant to the issues on appeal as follows.
Sergeant Testimony
A sergeant with the Minneapolis Police Department testified that in April 2019, he
began investigating the allegations against Kalif. The sergeant obtained information from
the Minnesota Department of Public Safety, Driver and Vehicle Services (DVS), indicating
that Kalif was born on January 1, 2001. On June 25, 2019, law enforcement arrested Kalif.
The sergeant conducted a recorded interview of Kalif, during which Kalif claimed his
birthdate was January 1, 2001, and that he had already turned 18. The sergeant also
testified that he requested a forensic examination of Kalif’s cell phone, which revealed chat
logs containing photographs of immigration documents and a Social Security card. Kalif’s

3
permanent resident card indicated a birthdate of January 1, 2001. The sergeant testified
that he also contac ted a special agent with the United States Department of Homeland
Security, who provided documentation from Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) that listed Kalif’s date of birth as January 1, 2001.
Associate Principal Testimony
An associate principa l from Kalif’s high school testified and produced school -
registration records. Kalif’s father signed a middle-school registration form dated February
24, 2015, indicating that Kalif’s birthdate was January 1, 2001. Kalif’s father also signed
a high-school registration form dated August 24, 2015, indicating that Kalif’s birthdate was
January 1, 2000. The associate principal also testified that in February 2020, she spoke
with Kalif when he inquired about competing on the track team for another year. The
associate principal advised him at that time that “once you have your four years of
eligibility through the state high school league, there’s no thing anybody can do about it .”
Kalif then told the principal that his birthday was not correct in the system, so he should
still be eligible to participate. The associate principal testified that, over the span of her
career, she had become “pretty good” at estimating the age of students based on
observation. She also testified that she never had the suspicion that a student was younger
than their reported birthdate.
Kalif’s Mother’s Testimony
Kalif’s mother testified that she and her family fled from Somalia to Ethiopia in
1992 to escape violence. She lived in a refugee camp in Ethiopia until she, her husband,
and many of her children immigrated to the United States. At that time, Kalif’s mother

4
received an immigration document listing biographical informati on about her, Kalif’s
father, Kalif, and eight of his siblings. Eight family members’ birthdays were listed as
January 1, including Kalif’s birthdate of January 1, 2001 . The mother testified that many
of those birthdates did not match her recollection. She also testified that Kalif was born on
October 8, 2002, and she remembered that date because the community gathered to pray
for the birth two days prior, on October 6.
Neighbors’ Testimony
A woman who was Kalif’s neighbor (Neighbor H.A.) at the Ethiopian refugee camp
testified that she had a son (Neighbor F.M.) in 2002 who was, at the time of the hearing,
18 years old. Neighbor H.A. claimed her son was older than Kalif by a few months.
Neighbor F.M. also testified that he thought he was older than Kalif because he had been
told so growing up and because he would “beat [Kalif] up all the time” when they fought
as children.
The Purported Birth Certificate
Kalif attempted to introduce his purported birth certificate into evidence through his
mother’s testimony. The document was typewritten in Somali. The document’s contents
were translated to English and included the caption “Birth Certificate” and an agency
title—“The Agency of Registering the Important Phases of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Et hiopia.” It included various information, including Kalif’s name, gender,
birthplace, nationality, parents’ names, and a birthdate of October 8, 2002. The document
also indicated a “Birth Registration Month” and “Issued Month” of November 23, 2019,
along with a registering officer’s name. The front of the document bore a stamp with

5
Somali words. The back of the certificate included other stamps with English words,
including: (1) “Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Document Authentication Service”; (2) “SRS Vital E vents Registration Agency”;
(3) “Tariku . . . Dadi Document Authorization Officer”; (4) “Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs”; and (5) “Signature and Seal Authenticated.”
There was n o signature visible on the provided line for the signature and seal, but there
were markings below and outside the provided box.
Kalif’s mother testified that she spoke with former neighbors from Ethiopia,
informed them that she needed Kalif’s birth cer tificate, and sent them pictures of Kalif.
She claimed that another woman traveled from Minnesota to Ethiopia, received the
purported birth certificate from the neighbors, and returned to Minnesota with the
document. The mother did not identify these parties by name.
The state objected to the admission of the document as containing hearsay and
lacking foundation. When asked by the district court whether defense counsel had
“something to back up” the assertion that the document “isn’t just a made -up document,”
defense counsel stated:
I do have an offer of proof, although it’s not what I have.
But I did receive a report from the investigator in this matter
for this county, and it says that the investigator received an
email from U.S. Immigration. They ha d looked into the birth
record and that the office informed them that a copy appears to
be [the] newer form of Ethiopian birth certificate. The
representative observed the authenticated stamp on the second
page, and it appeared to be a valid stamp and aut henticated by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Order Excluding Purported Birth Certificate
The district court sustained the state’s objection and excluded the purported birth
certificate from evidence. It concluded that the document was not authenticate d through
extrinsic evidence pursuant to Minn. R. E vid. 901, noting that Kalif’s mother had “no
personal knowledge about how the former neighbor obtained the document, what
information was needed to obtain the document, who provided it to her, or how it wa s
created.” The district court also concluded that the document was not self -authenticating
pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 902(3) given the absence of a verifiable signature and a final
certification of genuineness. It also declined to find good cause to tre at the document as
presumptively authentic because Kalif did not explain why he failed to acquire a final
certification or detail his efforts to do so.
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss
The district court determined that the state proved by a preponderance o f the
evidence that Kalif was at least 18 years old at the time of the alleged offense. It found
that (1) Kalif’s government-issued documents and related documents listed his date of birth
as January 1, 2001; (2) Kalif told the investigating sergeant that he was 18 with a birthdate
of January 1, 2001; (3) Kalif’s father represented Kalif’s birthdate as January 1, 2001, when
enrolling Kalif in middle school; and (4) the associate principal “expressed her opinion that
[Kalif’s] age is consistent with a date of birth of January 1, 2001.” The district court also
noted that the associate principal would have noticed had Kalif been two years younger
than his reported age.

7
The district court discredited most of Kalif’s evidence. It reasoned that Kalif
personally raised issues about his birthdate with the associate principal only after he filed
a motion to dismiss and only in relation to his “self-serving effort to obtain another year of
eligibility for high school sports.” It found that Kalif’s mother’s testimony was not credible
because (1) she was unable to recall her other children’s specific birthdates but was able to
identify a specific date for Kalif’s birth; (2) she failed to explain how she recalled the
specific date of the religious gathering preceding K alif’s birth; and (3) she did not record
important dates in any form. The district court discredited Neighbor H.A.’s testimony that
her son was born on January 1, 2002, noting that the fact would have been inconsistent
with her testimony that her son was born only a “few months” before Kalif, who claimed
a birthdate of October 8, 2002. And the district court rejected Neighbor N.A.’s testimony
for lack of first-hand knowledge.
The district court acknowledged the fact that Kalif’s birthday might not have be en
January 1 specifically, but it explained that “[t]he state need only prove . . . that [Kalif] was
18 years old as of the day of the alleged offense.” The district court found that the state
met its burden “because the only credible evidence shows that [Kalif’s] birth date is
January 1, 2001.” Accordingly, the district court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. This pretrial appeal follows.1

1 An order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction is
immediately appealable pursuant to State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Minn. 2011).

8
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the purported birth
certificate from evidence.
Kalif contends that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the purported
birth certificate from evidence because the document (A) was authenticated by extrinsic
evidence or (B) should have been treated as a self -authenticating document . The state
urges us to affirm because the extrinsic evidence was insufficient and because Kalif failed
to establish a basis to admit the document as self -authenticating. We review the district
court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. Turnage v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535,
542 (Minn. 2006). “[W]e may reverse the district court when the district court’s ruling is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State
v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015).
A declarant’s out-of-court statement is typically hearsay if it is “offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Certain types of evidence
are not excluded by the hearsay rule, including “[r]ecords or data compilations, in any form,
of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office
pursuant to requirements of law.” Minn. R. Evid. 803(9); see also Minn. R. Evid. 803(8)
(records of public offices and agencies regarding activities and matters observed). But
“[t]he requirement of authentication or identification” (“that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims”) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of such evidence. Minn.
R. Evid. 901(a). “Foundation can be established in either of two ways: through extrinsic
evidence, as contemplated by Minn. R. Evid. 901 . . . ; or by a finding that the evidence is

9
‘self-authenticating’ under Minn. R. Evid. 902 . . . .” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 244 -
45 (Minn. 2014).
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the
document was not authenticated through extrinsic evidence.
“The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims. ” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). “[T]he authenticity of
proffered evidence may be established through extrinsic evidence .” Ali, 855 N.W.2d at
245; see also Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1)-(10) (providing illustrations of conforming methods
of authentication).
Kalif argues that testimony from his mother, Neighbor H.A., and Neighbor N.A.
authenticated the document, generally because they clarified the bases for their respective
claims that Kalif was younger than his reported January 1, 2001 birthdate would suggest.
But as the district court explained, those wit nesses’ claims regarding Kalif’s age and date
of birth do not demonstrate that the purported birth certificate is actually a birth certificate.
As the district court noted, neither Neighbor H.A. nor Neighbor N.A. testified about the
document. The district court meanwhile rejected Kalif’s mother’s testimony based on its
findings that she had “no personal knowledge about how the former neighbor obtained the
document, what information was needed to obtain the document, who provided it to her,
or how it was created.” Those findings are supported by the record.
Kalif also argues that he offered “reliable hearsay” based on a disclosed report “that
the [s]tate[’]s investigator had received an email from U.S. Immigration [indicating] they

10
have contacted a representative from the Ethiopian Embassy to look at the Birth
Certificate,” and that the embassy “told them that the document appears to be the newer
form of Ethiopian birth certificates” with a valid, authenticated stamp. The district court
made no findings regarding these communications. But Kalif fails to demonstrate why the
multi-layered hearsay was reliable, and he cites no authority for the proposition that the
district court abused its discretion by failing to credit such layered hearsay.
In sum, Kalif offered insufficient extrinsic evidence “to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). The individual s
who supposedly obtained the document did not testify, leaving the district court with no
evidence as to exactly when, how, where, and from whom the document was obtained.
Kalif’s mother lacked firsthand knowledge of such details. Accordingly, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the document was not authenticated pursuant
to Minn. R. Evid. 901(a).
B. The district court did not abuse it s discretion by declining to treat the
document as self-authenticating.
Pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 902(3), “[e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity” is not
required with respect to foreign public documents as follows:
A document purporting to be executed or a ttested in an
official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign
country to make the execution or attestation, and accompanied
by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature
and official position (A) of the executing or atte sting person,
or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness
of signature and official position relates to the execution or
attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of
signature and official position relating to the exec ution or
attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary of

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embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular
official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the
United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all
parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of official
documents, the court may, for good cause shown, order that
they be treated as presumptively authentic without final
certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested
summary with or without final certification.
The district court determined that Kalif failed to satisfy either requirement. Kalif does not
challenge the finding that he failed to provide a final certificate of genuineness.
Even so, Kalif argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding no “good
cause” to treat the document as presumptively authentic. The district court concluded that
Kalif failed to establish good cause because he did not explain his failure to obtain a final
certification or describe the efforts he undertook. Rather than challenging the district
court’s reasoning, Kalif emphasizes that good cause existed because the state had ample
opportunity to investigate the authenticity of the birth certificate but did not produce
evidence refuting its authenticity. Kalif misstates the state’s burden. The state bore the
burden of proving that Kalif was at least 18 years old on the date of the alleged offense,
see Ali, 855 N.W.2d at 243, but Kalif bore the burden of authenticating the document as
the proponent of the purported birth certificate. See State v. Lopez -Ramos, 913 N.W.2d
695, 708 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d, 929 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2019). The district court did
not abuse its discretion by declining to treat the document as self-authenticating.
Because the document was not authenticated pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 901(a) or
902(3), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the
purported birth certificate from evidence.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kalif’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Kalif challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the district court erroneously ignored e vidence,
discredited certain testimony , declined to find Kalif’s witnesses credible on the basis of
cultural bias , and misconstrued certain testimony . The state contends that t he district
court’s decision rested on its credibility determinations and that it correctly applied the law.
We typically review a district court’s denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Olson, 884 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 2016). We review
factual findings for clear error. Id. at 399. Subject -matter jurisdiction is meanwhile a
question of law that we review de novo. Ali, 806 N.W.2d at 54.
Generally, district courts have original jurisdiction over “all cases o f crime
committed or triable therein.” Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(2) (2018). But subject to
certain exceptions, “ the juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning any child who is alleged to be delinquent . . . prior to having
become 18 years of age. ” Minn. Stat. § 260B.101, subd. 1 (2018); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.103, subd. 1 (2018) ; Ali, 806 N.W.2d at 50 . “[W] hen the age of the defendant
determines the jurisdiction of the court, the [s]tate has the burden of p roving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the defendant’s age on the date of the alleged offense.” Ali,
806 N.W.2d at 54.

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A. The district court did not ignore evidence regarding the exact birthdate.
Kalif argues that the evidence “supports the position . . . that the [s]tate cannot say
with any degree of certainty that [Kalif] was actually born on January 1, 2001,” and that
the district court erred by ignoring this fact. Contrary to Kalif’s argument, the district court
acknowledged potential uncertainty regarding the specific birthdate of January 1,
explaining: “The state . . . does not need to prove that January 1, 2001, is [Kalif’s] actual
birthdate. The state need only prove . . . that Defendant was 18 years old as of the day of
the alleged offense . . . .”
Although most of Kalif’s arguments focus on the district court’s rejection of the
evidence he submitted, we emphasize that the state presented ample evidence supporting
the district court’s f indings and conclusions. Multiple government-issued documents
indicated that Kalif’s birthdate was January 1, 2001. Kalif admitted to the sergeant that he
was 18 years old. Kalif’s father twice represented January 1 birthdates in school -
enrollment forms (one for 2001 and one for 2000). Kalif suggests that these representations
merely repeated erroneous information from government documents, but we cannot say
that the district court erred by assigning greater weight to that evidence , all of which
demonstrate that Kalif was at least 18 years old at the time of the charged offense.
B. The district court did not clearly err by discrediting the testimony of
Kalif’s mother, Neighbor H.A., and Neighbor N.A.
Kalif argues that the district court erred by failing to “properly consider” the
testimony of Kalif’s mother, Neighbor H.A., and Neighbor N.A. “and the cumulative effect
of the testimony” claiming that Kalif was born in October 2002. We review a district

14
court’s credibility determinations for clear error. See Andersen v. State, 940 N.W.2d 172,
177 (Minn. 2020).
The district court set forth in detail the reasons why it discredited the three
witnesses’ claims. It noted that Kalif’s mother did not explain “how she recalled the date
of the community gathering” and emphasize d that she did not record or remember other
important dates. It rejected Neighbor H.A.’s testimony based on her inability to recall any
specific details regarding Kalif’s birthdate and her testimony’s inconsistency with Kalif’s
claim that he was born in October 2002. And the district court rejected Neighbor N.A.’s
claim for lack of first -hand knowledge. 2 The dist rict court’s credibility determinations
were supported by the record and explained thoroughly.3
C. Kalif’s claim of cultural bias is unsupported.
Kalif argues that the district court’s credibility determinations and its rejection of
Kalif’s witnesses’ testimony resulted from the district court’s cultural biases. He contends
that “[t]he witnesses’ testimony must be viewed and assessed from the lens of their culture,
living situation, and limitations. What may not make sense as an explanation for an average

2 With regard to Neighbor N.A.’s testimony, Kalif argues that no one could have personal
knowledge of his own birthdate nor the birthdates of others born close in time. But the
district court was able to hear testimony directly from Neighbor H.A. —the person who
allegedly told Neighbor N.A. that he was older than Kalif —and the district court rejected
Neighbor H.A.’s testimony as not credible.

3 Kalif also argues that an advisory given to Kalif’s mother regarding perjury penalties
“undeniably influenced th e court in [its] determination of [the] credibility of [Kalif’s
mother] and [Kalif’s] other witnesses.” Kalif does not explain how the proceedings
affected the district court’s findings regarding Neighbor H.A. and Neighbor N.A. And we
cannot discern how the mother’s awareness of perjury consequences would persuade the
district court that she gave knowingly false testimony.

15
person who grew up in the United States may be very logical for an illiterate person living
in a hut in a refugee camp in Ethiopia.”
Kalif cite s no authority requiring the district court to assess testimony in such a
manner. Even so, our review of the record shows that the district court made numerous
findings regarding the witness es’ backgrounds, especially concerning Kalif’s family’s
refugee status and the circumstances of their immigration. The district court’s reasons for
rejecting witness testimony were premised on imprecise recollections and inconsistencies.
Nothing in the record suggests that the district court was biased in its role as a fact-finder.
D. Any misconstruction of the associate principal’s testimony was
harmless.
The district court found that the associate principal “expressed her opinion that
[Kalif’s] age is consistent with a date of birth of January 1, 2001.” Kalif correctly argues
that the associate principal did not testify to that fact. But in light of the district court’s
other findings crediting the state’s evidence and discrediting Kalif’s evidence, we are
confident that this single error was harmless. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“Any error that
does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
Because the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and because it did not
misapply the law, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court. Accordingly, we
affirm the order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Affirmed.