In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. A. W. and F. N.,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1118

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
S. A. W. and F. N.,

Commissioner of Human Services,
Legal Custodian.

Filed February 16, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-JV-18-179

Y. V. W., Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Philip Miller, Benton County Attorney, William V. Faerber, Assistant County Attorney,
Foley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lisa Gertken, Waite Park, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s denial of her motion for permissive
intervention in a child-protection proceeding involving her grandson, as well as the district
court’s denial of her request to be considered as an adoptive placement for her grandson.
Because the district court had already rule d out appellant as a placement option, and

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because the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that appellant’s
intervention was not in the child’s best interests, we affirm.
FACTS
This case began in March 2017 when respondent Benton County filed a petition
alleging that the child, J.N., was in need of protection or services 1 due to concerns of
neglect by the child’s mother, S.A.W. At the time, S.A.W. (mother) was the child’s
primary caregiver. The county removed J.N. and his two siblings from mother’s care after
the children were adjudicated as children in ne ed of protection or se rvices. The county
placed all three children together with a foster family. In September 2017, mother gave
birth to a fourth child and, in October, the county filed an additional CHIPS petition. The
district court granted that petition and the fourth child was placed with the child’s siblings.
Appellant’s son, F.N. (father), is the father of J.N. but not the three other children.
In January 2018, the county filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to
J.N. The county also filed a petition to terminate father’s pa rental rights to J.N. Father
was incarcerated at the time. The county filed similar petitions relating to the other three
children.
In June 2018, the district court held a consolidated trial re garding the county’s
petitions to terminate mother’s parental rights to all four children and the parental rights of
the respective fathers. Both mo ther and father appeared and testified. The fathers of the

1 A petition alleging that a child is in need of protection or services is commonly referred
to as a CHIPS petition. In re Welfare of Children of J.D.T. , 946 N.W.2d 321, 324
(Minn. 2020).

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other children did not appear, and, as a result, the district court orally granted the county’s
request to find the other named-fathers in default.
In July 2018, the district court issued a written order involuntarily terminating
mother’s parental rights to all four children. The district court did not terminate father’s
parental rights to J.N. at that point because father was working on a reunification case plan
to the best of his ability despite his incarcer ation. While working with father on his case
plan, the county also worked on a permanency plan for the children. After considering
several placement options, including appellant (grandmother), the county determined that
it was in the children’s best in terests to place all four child ren with J.G., the paternal
grandmother of one of the four siblings. In May 2018, grandmother moved to intervene as
a party in the child-protecti on proceeding and requested that she be considered as a
permanency placement for her grandson, J.N., and his siblings. In July 2018, grandmother
filed an amended motion to intervene. The district court granted grandmother’s motion to
intervene at this stage in the proceedings.
In November 2018, the district court held a contested hearing on grandmother’s
motion to be appointed the permanency placement option. Grandmother’s counsel
requested that the district court transfer cu stody of the child and his siblings from the
county to grandmother. Grandmother testifie d that she was involved in the lives of the
three oldest children, including her grands on, prior to the children being removed from
mother’s care. Grandmother further testifie d that when Benton C ounty social workers
informed her that mother was pregnant again in 2017 and asked if she was “interested in
getting the baby,” she initially sa id, “No, I don’t want any mo re kids. I just want the

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three . . . .” Three or four months later, grandmother changed her mind and informed the
county that she would take all four children. Grandmother te stified that she had a strong
bond with her grandson and was able to care for all four children.
At the hearing, an attorney for the county in formed the district court about the
process that the county used to decide on the best placement option for the children. The
placement team “seriously considered” grandmother as a placement option. The team also
considered three other options: (1) the childr en’s maternal grandmother, (2) the original
foster parents, and (3) J.G., the paternal grandparent of one of the children, with whom all
four children were ultimately placed. In maki ng its determination, the county considered
the statutory best interests factors. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b) (Supp. 2019)
(enumerating ten best interests factors).
The placement team ruled out the maternal grandmother because of a concern that
she was not able to set adequate boundaries with mother. The placement team did not favor
placing the children, who are biracial, with th e foster parents because of a concern about
the lack of ethnic diversity in the area in which they lived. And, the placement team
determined that placing the ch ildren with grandmother was not in the children’s best
interests. The placement team recognized that grandmother was a good placement option
because she had a relationship with the child ren and owned a large enough residence to
accommodate the children. But the placement team identified the following concerns: one
of the children voiced a desire not to have contact with her, she showed favoritism towards
her grandson that the other chil dren noticed and brought up, she initially stated that she
only wanted to adopt her gra ndson, she minimized the trauma that the children suffered,

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and mother did not want the children to go to grandmother. The county attorney
acknowledged that grandmother later stated that she would adopt all four children and not
just her grandson, but argued that her later stat ements needed to be considered in light of
her earlier statement where she indicated that “she wanted only her grandchild.”
The placement team ultimatel y decided that the other pa ternal grandparent, J.G.,
was the best permanency pla cement option for the children . The team’s decision was
unanimous. The placement team placed the children in the custody of the other paternal
grandparent because she was re lated to one of the four ch ildren, had a residence large
enough for all the children, and “had experience in adopting a sibling of these children and
had shown her ability to work with the [c]ounty and services to achieve what is best for the
sibling.” The other paternal grandparent “understood and verbalized the needs of the
children to transition once they were placed with her,” and mother approved of the children
going to her. Because placing so many children with a singl e caregiver was a concern to
the county, it explored the possibility of “separat[ing] some siblings to each grandmother,”
but the state informed the county that was not an option. The placement team then
concluded that placing all four children with the other pate rnal grandparent was in the
children’s best interests.
The guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that he agreed with the county’s placement
decision. The GAL opposed placing the children with grandmother for reasons similar to
those articulated by the county attorney. The GAL testified that he had visited the children
in their current home with the other grandmother, that they were “thriving” there, and that
he did not support the children being disrupted out of that home.

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After hearing from grandmother, the county attorney, and the GAL, the district court
expressed empathy for grandmother’s position, but it explained that the court’s job was “to
find what is in the best interests of these children.” Based on th e county attorney’s
explanations, the district court stated: “I can ’t tell you that the [c]ounty hasn’t carefully
considered all of [the] ten [best-interests] factors appropriately and made the right
decision.” The district court explained: “I am not in a position to substitute my judgment
for the [c]ounty’s judgment in making this permanency determination.” The district court
reiterated its desire for grandmother to remain involved with the children through
visitation, but denied her motion to be appointed the permanency placement option.
In early December 2019, th e county filed another petition seeking to terminate
father’s parental rights to the child. The county filed the petition because father ceased to
make progress on his case plan following his release from prison in April 2019. Because
father was no longer incarcerated, the district court changed grandmother’s status in the
case from party to participant. Grandmother m oved to intervene as a party. The district
court denied grandmother’s mo tion, explaining that “[gr andmother] was previously
determined not to be a viab le placement option for the [c]h ild in the underlying child
protection matter.”
In February 2020, the district court involuntarily terminated father’s parental rights
after he failed to appear for a pretrial hear ing despite having notice . The district court
found that termination was in the child’s best interests and that the criteria for termination
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5 ) (2018) were satisfied. At that point,
because the parental rights of both parent s had been terminated , the county undertook

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adoption efforts for the child. The county recomme nded to the court that the child be
adopted by J.G., the other paternal grandparent with whom he was living, so that the child
could remain in a home with his siblings.
Grandmother filed a motion to interven e in April 2020—her third motion to
intervene. The district c ourt denied that motion in an order dated May 4, 2020.
Grandmother did not appeal the denial of that motion. In August 2020, grandmother filed
another motion to intervene—her fourth moti on. The motion also sought an order to
consider her as an adoptive placement for her grandchild a nd requested an evidentiary
hearing. The district court denied that motion in all respects.2 Grandmother now appeals
the district court’s denial of her August 2020 motion to intervene and to be considered as
an adoptive placement.
DECISION
A two-pronged process begins when a child is adjudicated to be in need of protection
or services. In re Welfare of Children of J.L.G. , 924 N.W.2d 9, 12 (M inn. App. 2018).
The first prong involves effort s aimed at reunifying the child with the parents. Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018). The second, called concurrent permanency planning, identifies
a permanent home for the child in case the reunification efforts are not successful. Minn.

2 Following the denial of her motion to inte rvene and the filing of her notice of appeal,
grandmother moved the district court to stay the adoption pending this appeal. The district
court denied that motion because it concluded that grandmothe r lacked standing to bring
the motion. Grandmother then asked this court to review the district court’s denial of her
motion to stay the adoption. In an order, this court concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a stay.

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Stat. § 260C.223, subd. 1(b) (2018). In making such decisions, the ultimate touchstone is
the best interests of the subject child, as articulated by the following ten factors:
(1) the child’s current functioning and behaviors;
(2) the medical needs of the child;
(3) the educational needs of the child;
(4) the developmental needs of the child;
(5) the child’s history and past experience;
(6) the child’s religious and cultural needs;
(7) the child’s connection with a community, school, and faith
community;
(8) the child’s interests and talents;
(9) the child’s relationship to current caretakers, parents,
siblings, and relatives;
(10) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court, or the
child-placing agency in the case of a voluntary placement,
deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preferences.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b).
In addition to the ten above factors, othe r public policies weigh upon the responsible
social services agency’s decision. The agen cy is instructed to prioritize placing the
children with a relative if possible. See id., subd. 2(a) (Supp. 2019) (giving preference to
“an individual who is related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption”). The
responsible social services agency is also instru cted to keep siblings together if possible.
See, e.g., id., subd. 2(d) (Supp. 2019) (providing that “[s]iblings should be placed together
for foster care and adoption” unless it would be “contrary to the safety or well-being of any
of the siblings or unless it is not possible”); Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.613, subd. 3 (directing the
responsible social service agency to keep siblings together unless doing so would not be in
the best interests of the childre n), .617 (directing the responsi ble social service agency to

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“make every effort to place siblings together for adoption”) (2018). With this background
in mind, we turn to grandmother’s arguments.
Here, grandmother argues that (1) the distri ct court erroneously failed to provide her
with notice of review hearings regarding the county’s efforts to find an adoptive home for
her grandson, (2) the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on her request
to be considered an adoptive placement, and (3 ) the district court abused its discretion by
denying her motion to intervene. Grandmother’s arguments are interrelated because all of
her claims ultimately implicate the question of whether the di strict court had previously
ruled her out as a permanency option. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court was not required to give grandmother notice of hearings
regarding the county’s efforts to find an adoptive home for the child.
First, grandmother argues that the distri ct court failed to meet its obligation under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 2(5) (2018) to provide her notice of court hearings regarding
the county’s efforts “to finali ze adoption” of her grandchild after the court terminated
father’s parental rights. Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 2(5), relatives who have kept
the court informed of their whereabouts and who have indicated a willingness to provide
an adoptive home must be notified of review hearings regarding adoption efforts, “unless
the relative has been previously ruled out by the court as a suitable foster parent or
permanency resource for the child.” (Emphasis added.) The county argues that
grandmother was ruled out as a permanency resource at the No vember 2018 motion
hearing. We agree with the county that grandmother was previously ruled out by the

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district court and, therefore, conclude that the district court was not required to provide
grandmother notice of hearings regarding efforts to place the child in an adoptive home.
“The interpretation of a statute is a quest ion of law that we review de novo.”
Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016 ). We interpre t statutes to
determine the intent of the legislature. Kremer v. Kremer , 912 N.W.2d 617, 623
(Minn. 2018). Where the legislature’s inte nt “is clear from the plain language of the
statute, further statutory construction is not necessary.” Id.
We recently had the opportun ity to consider the meaning of the phrase “previously
ruled out by the court” in the context of Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 2(5). J.L.G.,
924 N.W.2d at 14-15. In J.L.G., a grandmother sought to adopt her grandchildren
following termination of their parents’ parental rights. Id. at 10. The co unty placed the
children with a foster family for adoption and did not notif y the grandmother because it
believed that the district court had previously ruled her out. Id. at 12. The district court
denied the grandmother’s motion for adoptive placement because it concluded that she had
not shown that the county was unreasonable in failing to place the children with her. Id.
The grandmother appealed, arguing that she had never been ruled out as a placement
option. Id. at 13. We concluded that the words “ruled out” in Minn. Stat. § 260C.607,
subd. 2(5) unambiguously required the district court “to make a ruling to that effect.” Id.
at 14. We reversed the district court because it had not expressly ruled out the grandmother
as a permanency resource. Id. at 16.
Here, unlike in J.L.G., the district court explicitly ruled out gra ndmother as a
permanency placement option. In November 2018, the district court held a full contested

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hearing on the issue of perm anency placement. After hearing from grandmother, the
district court expressly ruled grandmother out as a permanency option. Grandmother
subsequently moved to be considered as a permanent placement option again in December
2019, April 2020, and August 2020. On each occasion, the district court denied
grandmother’s request. In the August 2020 or der, which is the focus of this appeal, the
district court noted that grandmother had file d similar motions in th e past and “the Court
repeatedly den[ied] the previous motions af ter the parties had a full and fair contested
hearing.” The district court also specifically noted that grandmother “was determined not
to be the preferred placement option for the child or his si blings as a more suitable
placement was found.” Because the district court previously ruled grandmother out as a
placement option, the district court was not required to provide gr andmother notice of
adoption-related review hearings under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 2(5).
II. The district court properly denied grandmother’s request for an evidentiary
hearing.
A relative who is not being co nsidered by the responsible social services agency can
move the district court for an order of adoptive placement to place the child with them.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(a) (2018). To succeed on such a motion, the relative must
“make a prima facie showing that the agency has been unreasonable in failing to make the
requested adoptive placement.” Id., subd. 6(b) (2018). If the relative’s motion and
supporting documents “do not make a prima facie showing for the court to determine
whether the agency has been unreasonable in failing to make the requested adoptive

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placement, the court shall dismiss the motion.” Id., subd. 6(c) (2018). If the relative makes
the required showing, the court will hold an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Upon review of a district court’s dism issal of a motion for adoptive placement
without an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo whet her the district court properly
treated the parties’ supporting documents. J.L.G., 924 N.W.2d at 15 (citing In re Welfare
of Children of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013)). But we review the district
court’s determination of whether an appellant established a prima facie showing that the
agency was unreasonable for an abuse of discretion. Id. A district court abuses its
discretion “if it acts against logic and the facts on record, or if it enters fact findings that
are unsupported by the record, or if it misapplies the law.” In re Adoption of T.A.M. ,
791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation and citations omitted).
In support of her motion to be consider ed as an adoptive placement and requesting
an evidentiary hearing, grandmother submitte d a memorandum setting out her position.
Grandmother also submitted an affidavit deta iling her involvement in the children’s lives
and her efforts to provide a safe home for them.
On appeal, grandmother argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing
to hold a hearing after she filed her August 2020 motion because (1) the district court “did
not rule on whether or not she had made a prima facie” showing, and (2) the county was
unreasonable in failing to pl ace the child with her becau se she is his biological
grandmother. The county argues that the district court implicitly determined that
grandmother failed to make a prima facie showing that the county was unreasonable in not
placing the child with her. The county notes that the district court denied grandmother’s

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August 2020 motion because the district cour t previously found th at the county acted
reasonably when it decided not to place the child with grandmother.
We agree with the county’s re ading of the district court’s August 2020 order. While
the district court did not explicitly state that grandmother failed to make the required prima
facie showing, it denied her motion because the county previously showed that placing the
child with grandmother was not in the child’ s best interests. And the district court
previously found that placement with J.G., the other patern al grandparent, was in the
child’s best interests. The logical implicati on of the district court’s determination that
placing the child with grandmother was not in the child’s best interests is that grandmother
failed to show that the county was unreasonable in not placing the child with her.
In her reply brief, grandmother argues that the November 2018 motion hearing
cannot have resolved the merits of her Au gust 2020 motion because she did not move to
be considered as an adoptive placement in November 2018. But grandmother’s burden on
appeal is to show that the district court ab used its discretion by ruling that she failed to
make a prima facie case that the county acted unreasonably “in failing to make the
requested adoptive placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(b). Grandmother did not
provide any new information with her August 2020 motion that calls into question the
district court’s prior determination that plac ement with grandmother is not in the child’s
best interests. Consequently, the district court’s prior determination stands as a barrier to
grandmother’s current argument that the coun ty was unreasonable in failing to place the
child with her.

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Grandmother’s next argument is likewise unavailing. She argues that because she
is the child’s biological grandmother, she should have preference over the paternal
grandparent of one of the child’s siblings, an d thus she demonstrated that the county was
unreasonable in failing to place the child with her. Grandmother is correct that state policy
supports placing a child with relatives—but only to the extent that doing so is in the child’s
best interests. See J.L.G. , 924 N.W.2d at 15 (indicating that the legislature directed
child-placing agencies to consider relatives first, so long as doing so is “consistent with the
child’s best interests”); Minn. Stat. § 26 0C.212, subd. 2(a)-(b). And, grandmother’s
argument ignores that the other paternal grandparent is also a relative of one of the children.
As the county notes, after mother’s parent al rights were terminated and prior to
grandmother’s August 2020 motion, the other paternal grandparent adopted the child’s
half-siblings. By doing so, th e other paternal grandparent be came a direct relative of the
child. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 27 (2018) (defining “relative” to include, among
others, a person who is “the lega l parent, guardian, or custodian of the child’s siblings”).
Moreover, the placement statutes do not prioritize biological relation over the child’s best
interests. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.212, subd. 2(b) (providing for placement decisions
based on the best interests of the child), .613, subds. 1, 3 (requiring consideration of the
child’s best interests in adoptive-placements and generally requiring placement of siblings
together) (2018); see also In re Welfare of Children of A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d 119, 124 (Minn.
App. 2019) (noting that while the legislature has indicated a preference for placement with
relatives, such a preference does not “override the overall best interests of the child”
(quotation omitted)). For these reasons, we are not persuaded by grandmother’s argument

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that she made a prima facie showing that the county acted unreasonably by failing to place
the child with her, a biological relative.
Because the district court did not abus e its discretion by implicitly ruling that
grandmother failed to make the required prima facie showing, the district court properly
dismissed grandmother’s August 2020 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(c).
III. The district court did not abuse it s discretion by denying grandmother’s
motion to intervene.
Grandmother argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by denying her
motion for permissive intervention because it failed to consider whether she was an
appropriate placement opt ion for the child. Th e county argues that the district court
properly denied grandmother’s motion for in tervention because she “had already been
determined not to be the preferred permanency placement option after” the November 2018
motion hearing. We agree with the county.
The Rules of Juvenile Protection Pro cedure provide that “[a]ny person may be
permitted to intervene as a party if the court finds that such intervention is in the best
interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 34.02. A district court’s decision to deny “a
request to permissively intervene will be reversed only when a clear abuse of discretion is
shown.” State v. Deal, 740 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). As noted
above, a district court abuses its discretion “if it acts against logic and the facts on record,
or if it enters fact findings that are unsupported by the record, or if it misapplies the law.”
T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d at 578 (quotation and citations omitted).

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In its August 2020 order, the district court denied grandmother’s request to intervene
because the issue that she sought to have heard—the placement of the child—had already
been litigated in Nove mber 2018. The district court emphasized that grandmother had
previously “filed multiple motions seeking to have the Court reopen the issue of placement
for the child and the Court has repeatedly deni ed the requests as the issue has been fully
litigated and decided by the Court.” And, as discussed above, grandmother failed to make
a prima facie showing to support a new eviden tiary hearing on the issue of placement.
Accordingly, because grandmother failed to demonstrate any basis for another evidentiary
hearing on her request for placement, grandmot her has not shown that the district court
abused its discretion by denying her motion to intervene.
In sum, grandmothe r was not entitled to notice of the adoption-related court hearings
because she had been previous ly ruled out as a permanency resource. A nd grandmother
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because she failed to make a prima facie showing
that the county was unreasona ble in failing to place th e child with her. Finally,
grandmother has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
motion to intervene.
Affirmed.