Abdirahman Dayib Ahmed, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1127

Abdirahman Dayib Ahmed, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 5, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-18-4

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey D. Skonseng, Pelican Rapids City Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
On appeal from a n order denying his petition for postconviction relief, appellant
argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the prosecutor did not
impermissibly vouch for a witness’s credibility during closing arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Abdirahman Dayib Ahmed with misdemeanor domestic
assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2) (2016), alleging that on December
30, 2017, he assaulted his girlfriend. The case proceeded to a jury trial.
Trial, Conviction & Sentence
The victim testified that she was romantically involved with Ahmed during
December 2017. On December 30, 2017, she went to Ahmed’s brother’s home, where
Ahmed was staying. When the v ictim arrived, she heard Ahmed and the brother arguing
in Somali and assumed she was the cause of their fight. The victim took two shots of liquor
because she was “usually . . . really nervous” about going into the brother’s home. Then
she entered the residence and discovered that Ahmed had been drinkin g, causing her to
become angry. Approximately ten minutes after the victim arrived, she and Ahmed began
arguing. At some point, Ahmed told the victim he was “through” with her.
The victim testified that she left the living room and entered the bedroom to grab a
sweater. Ahmed allegedly followed her into the bedroom and slapped her with an open
hand. The victim claimed she returned to the living room, saw a bottle of vodka sitting on
the dining-room table, and grabbed it. According to the victim, “[T]hat’s when [Ahmed]

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started hitting [her].” She claimed that Ahmed “threw [her] on the ground, and then he
was kicking [her] and hit ting [her] with a closed hand .” She recalled that Ahmed “was
kicking [her] . . . kind of everywhere,” and that when she thoug ht he was finished, “he
kicked [her] . . . in [her] forehead.” The victim also testified that Ahmed “[p]ulled [her]
hair,” ripped her jacket, and pushed and pulled her around to the point her shirt was almost
off.
The victim testified that after the assault, she called 911 but hung up . Even so, an
officer arrived at the brother’s home a short while later. The victim told the officer that “it
was an accident.” The victim then went to a motel, where the owner allegedly gave her ice
packs. The victim testified that she contacted 911 again and explained what had happened.
An officer with the Pelican Rapids Police Department testified that he responded to
the brother’s home on a 911 call, m et the victim at the door, and spoke with her briefly.
The victim told the officer that there were no issues and informed him that she was leaving
for a motel. The officer testified that he did not observe any injuries to the victim’s face.
After the victim left, Ahmed’s brother answered the door and invited the officer inside.
The officer spoke with Ahmed and observed a bottle of vodka on the table but did not
observe visible signs of a struggle.
The officer testified that he returned to his regular duties until approximately three
hours later, when the victim called 911 a second time from a motel. The officer went to
the motel and met with the victim. He testified that he observed “[s]welling along [ the
victim’s] eyebrow line and on the upper bridge of her nose,” as well as a tear in the victim’s

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jacket. The officer photographed the victim’s face and jacket , and the jury viewed those
photographs.
Following the close of the evidence, the district court provided instructions to the
jury, including that “[d]eciding questions of fact” was their “exclusive responsibility”; “the
arguments or other remarks of an attorney are not evidence”; and they were “the sole judges
of whether a witness is to be believed and of the weight to be given a witness’s testimony.”
During closing arguments, t he prosecutor urged the jury to find that Ahmed
assaulted the victim, stating:
[The v ictim] provided testimony, very believable and
credible testimony, that she was struck, that she was kicked,
and that her clothing was ripped. She also provided testimony
that she was slapped in the face . . . .
Based upon her testimony, the fact that the officer
supported that testimony by indicating he could visually see
the results of having been hit upon [ the victim], we would
submit that . . . an assault took place . . . .
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel did not object to the argument.
Defense counsel argued that no assault occurred , emphasizing the seeming
implausibility of the timing of the victim’s version of events, the fact that the officer saw
no signs of injury when he first encountered the victim, various inconsistencies between
the victim’s testimony and the officer’s observations, the state’s failure to call other
corroborating witnes ses, the state’s failure to document further signs of the victim’s
injuries, and the victim’s failure to seek immediate medical attention. He also argued that
the photographs failed to demonstrate the victim’s claimed injuries.
The prosecutor offered the following brief rebuttal:

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The defense would have you believe . . . it’s all out of
revenge. [ The v ictim] did indicate that she still loves the
defendant. She stated that. She also indicated that things need
to stop. She didn’t look like she was havin g fun coming here
today.
They indicate the devils are in the details. You’re being
told, well, [the victim] testified the bottle fell on the floor but
when the officer got there it was on the table. Well, I would
submit a logical conclusion is somebody p icked the bottle up
and put it back on the table. . . .
The testimony and the believability of [the victim]—her
testimony’s credible . And I’m asking you, when you
deliberate, to recall that testimony and recall her responses and
recall . . . the frankness and sincerity with which she testified.
(Emphasis added.) Again, defense counsel failed to object.
The jury found Ahmed guilty. The district court adjudicated the conviction and
sentenced Ahmed to 90 days in jail with credit for time served and two years of probation.
Postconviction Proceedings
In July 2020, Ahmed filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing in part that a
new trial was necessary because the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the victim’s
credibility during closing arguments and that the misconduct likely affected the verdict.
The state conceded that the prosecutor’s statements “could be construed as improper
vouching” but urged the district court to deny the petition because the district court
provided several cautionary inst ructions regarding closing arguments, the relevant
statements were brief, and there was ample evidence of guilt.
The district court denied the petition . It concluded that “[t]he [p]rosecution never
gave any guarantees or injected any personal opinions reg arding the credibility of [ the

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victim’s] testimony. Looking at the [p]rosecution’s closing argument and rebuttal as a
whole, the statements do not rise to the level of [prosecutorial] misconduct . . . .” The
district court did not consider the prejudicial effect of any potential misconduct.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Ahmed urges us to reverse the district court’s denial of his postconviction petition
and remand for a new trial, arguing that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct
by vouching for the victim’s credibility during closing arguments. The state contends that
the prosecutor’s statements were not improper vouching and that any potential error does
not warrant a new trial.
We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). “A postconviction court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id. Claims
of unobjected -to prosecutorial misconduct are reviewable under a modified plain -error
framework. See State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 803 (Minn. 2016).
Under that test, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate
that the misconduct constitutes (1) error, (2) that is plain. If
plain error is established, the burden then shifts to the [s]tate to
demonstrate that the err or did not affect the defendant’ s
substantial rights. To meet the third prong, the [s]tate must
show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of
the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect
on the verdict. If all three prongs of the test are met, we may

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correct the error only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Id. at 803 -04 (quotations and citations omitted). We assume without deciding that the
prosecutor plainly erred by vouching for the victim’s credibility because we are satisfied
that the state has demonstrated that any error did not affect Ahmed’s substantial rights. See
State v. Mosley , 853 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2014) (explaining that if one plai n-error
prong is dispositive we need not consider other prongs) ; see also Hummel v. State , 617
N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 2000) (affirming district court’ s postconviction decision on
alternative grounds).
The state contends that any potential misconduct was n ot prejudicial because there
was ample evidence of Ahmed’s guilt, the statements were brief, and the jury received
cautionary instructions regarding their consideration of closing arguments. We agree.
“[W]e consider the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness
of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made
efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn.
2007); see also State v. Parker , 901 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017). A district court’s
cautionary instructions are also relevant in assessing prejudice because “[w]e presume that
the jury followed the court’s instruction.” State v. Taylor , 650 N.W.2d 190, 207 (Minn.
2002).
The challenged statements were undeniably brief. They constituted fragments of
two sentences in the prosecutor’s principal and rebuttal arguments. Ahmed acknowledges
this brevity but emphasizes that the prosecutor’s arguments were shor t in their entirety.

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Even though the challenged statements were delivered during brief closing arguments, the
prosecutor did not linger on any improper suggestion, and he did offer other reasons to
credit the victim’s version of events.
Despite Ahmed’s claim that the state’s case “was riddled with inconsistencies and
conspicuously missing evidence,” the state’s case was not weak. Ahmed emphasizes that
there was no sign of a struggle, that the officer saw no signs of an injury or distress when
he first arr ived, that the photographs of the victim show no obvious injury, and that law
enforcement failed to conduct any follow-up with the victim to document her injuries days
after the assault. The jury was aware of many of these circumstances and heard testimony
offering additional context. For instance, the officer testified that the victim kept her face
down initially, that his encounter with her was brief, and that he personally observed the
injuries to the victim’s face hours after the assault. As for the photographic evidence of
the injuries, the officer indicated the location of the injuries displayed on the photographs
during the trial, and our examination of those photographs indicates perceptible areas of
swelling at the mid -point of the victim’s brow. All of this evidence contextualizes the
strength of the victim’s testimony itself, which described Ahmed’s assault in detail.
In addition, counsel for Ahmed presented extensive argument to the jury to rebut
any improper suggestion by the prosecutor . Counsel’s argument spanned 11 transcript
pages and consisted of meticulously fact-oriented arguments attempting to convince the
jury that the victim was not a credible witness. Counsel emphasized various
inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and developed a theory as to why the victim was
motivated to lie. These efforts were exhaustive.

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Last, we note that the instructions given by the district court mitigated the
potentially prejudicial nature of the prosecutor’s statements. The jury was instructed that
they were the sole judge of credibility; that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence;
and that they bore the exclusive duty to resolve questions of fact. We presume that the jury
followed these instructions in its deliberations. See id.
On balance, we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of
the challenged statements would have had any significant effect on the jury’s verdict. See
Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at 803 -04. Because the alleged misconduct did not affect Ahm ed’s
substantial rights, we see no abuse of discretion by the district court in its denial of the
petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.