State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1140

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joel Orvin Torgerson,
Appellant.

Filed August 23, 2021
Reversed
Slieter, Judge

Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-CR-19-604

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brett Allyn Corson, Fillmore County Attorney, Preston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgme nt of conviction for two counts of public-
nuisance-ordinance violations, appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding
that the state provided adequate proof that the ordinances were valid. Because the record
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demonstrates that the ordinances appellant was found to have violated require that they be
published prior to implementa tion, and no evidence of public ation exists, the ordinances
were not validly enacted and we, therefore, reverse.
FACTS
This appeal stems from appellant Joel Or vin Torgerson’s convictions of two counts
of misdemeanor public nuisance pursuant to the City of Canton’s nuisance ordinances.
Appellant was first notified in July 2019 of the existen ce of a number of “nuisance
conditions” on his property in the City of Canton via a letter from the Canton city clerk and
treasurer. The letter informed appellant that, following an inspection, his property was
found to be in violation of a number of the city’s nuisance ordinances. The letter informed
appellant that he had to remedy all the violations by August 2, 2019.
Following an August 6, 2019 inspection, a second letter informed appellant that his
property remained in viola tion of multiple nuisance ordina nces due to the presence of
“unregistered vehicles,” “debris scattered around [the] yard,” and “overgrown trees and []
dead branches.” Ultimately, the city charged appellant pursu ant to Canton, Minn., Code
of Ordinances § 92.99 (2015) with four counts of misdemeanor nuisance violations.1
In a pretrial motion, appellant argued that the nuisance ordinances of which he was
formally alleged to have violated were invalid because they had not been properly enacted.
The district court denied appe llant’s motion to dismiss, but concluded that it would “be

1 Canton, Minn., Code of Ordinances §§ 92.01-92.71 (2015) set forth conditions deemed
to be public nuisances. Canton, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 92.99 indicates that violation
of any of the preceding nuisance provisions is considered a misdemeanor.
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[respondent]’s obligation to provide the Court the necessary information in order for the
Court to accept the ordinance as evidence,” including “that there [was] an ordinance that’s
in place.”
During trial, the district court received copies of ordinances the city claimed had
been enacted and also heard testimony from city council me mbers, including the city’s
mayor, and the city clerk. The district cour t concluded that the ordinances were validly
enacted pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 599.13 (2020), which allows for “conclusive proof of the
regularity of their adoption and publication,” and issued a written order finding guilt and
convicting appellant of two of the four counts. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court erre d in its conclusion that the city’s nuisance
ordinances were validly enacted.2 “The interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law
for the court, which we review de novo.” Eagle Lake of Becker Cnty. Lake Ass’n v. Becker
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 738 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Minn. App. 2007). “A district court abuses
its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark , 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted).
To interpret ordinances, we apply “recognize d principles of statutory construction.”
Eagle Lake, 738 N.W.2d at 792 (quotation omitted). In doing so we begin with the plain

2 Appellant also argues that th e ordinances were invalid beca use they conflict with state
nuisance law or, alternatively, that even if th e ordinances were valid and enforceable, he
was given insufficient notice. Because we c onclude that the city’s nuisance ordinances
were not validly enacted, we need not address these arguments.
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language of the ordinance: “[ W]hen the language of a statut e is susceptible to only one
reasonable interpretation, it is unambiguous and [appellate courts] must apply its plain
meaning.” See State v. Altepeter, 946 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
The plain and unambiguous language of the City of Canton ordinance, which
purports to adopt the Minnesota Basic Code of Ordinances and within which is chapter 92
identifying nuisances, states th at it will “take effect upon p ublication . . . in the city’s
official newspaper.” 3 Therefore, the ordinance does not become effective until it is
published. See Union Public Service Co. v. Village of Minneota, 2 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Minn.
1942) (“By the terms . . . of ordinance No. 1 65, [the statute in question] did not become
operative or go into effect until publication.”).
The city clerk testified that, though it was standard procedure for the city to publish
ordinances in the newspaper after they ha d been passed by the council and signed by the
mayor, he had been unable to find any notice of publication of the ordinances in question
despite searching the city’s own records as well as contacting the city’s official newspaper.
All of the council members who testified agreed that no such notice or other evidence of
publication could be found.
The record is devoid of any evidence of publication, as required by the language of
the ordinance itself. All of the evidence presented supports the conclusion that they had
not been published. Absent any evidence of publication, the city’s ordinances were never

3 Canton, Minn., Code of Ordinances No. 101-2015 § 8.
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validly enacted and are ineffective. Id. The district court’s conclusion that the ordinance
had been validly enacted was therefore in error and an abuse of discretion.
Despite no evidence that th e ordinance had been published, respondent argues that
the district court was correct in concluding that, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 599.13, there
existed “conclusive proof” of the ordinances’ “adoption and publication.” We disagree.
First, as we explained above, no evidence exists that the ordinance was published.
We therefore need not consider section 599. 13 to reach our conclusion that the ordinance
was not validly enacted and that, therefore, appellant’s nuisance convictions must be
reversed. See Union Public Service Co. , 2 N.W.2d at 560 (“[B]y the terms of [the
ordinance in question] it di d not become operative or go in to effect until published.”).
Second, even if we consider section 599.13, it supports our conclusion that the district court
erred by concluding that the ordinances were validly enacted.
We review the district court’s interp retation and application of a statute de novo.
State v. Perez, 779 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Minn. App. 2010). Section 599.13 states:
[c]opies of the ordinances . . . of any city . . . certified by the
mayor or president of the council, and the city clerk under its
seal in the case of a city . . . and copies of the same printed in
any newspaper, book, pamphlet , or other form, and which
purport to be published by authority of the council of such city
. . . shall be prima facie evidence thereof and, after three years
from the compilation and publication of any such book or
pamphlet, shall be conclusive proof of the regularity of their
adoption and publication.

Minn. Stat. § 599.13 (emphasis added). As such, the plain language of section 599.13
unambiguously allows for two levels of proof—“prima facie proof” and “conclusive
proof,” with conclusive proof requiring a pr ogressively higher ev identiary burden.” Id.
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Prima facie proof requires “[c]opies of the ordinanc es . . . certified by the mayor . . . and
city clerk” as well as “copies of the same printed in any newspaper, book, pamphlet, or
other form, and which purport to be published by authority of the coun cil of such city.”
Conclusive proof requires that such ordinances be “compil[ed] and publi[shed]” in a “book
or pamphlet” for a period of three years. Id.
In its interpretation of this language, the di strict court concluded that, “a copy of the
ordinance, which was certified by the mayor . . . and the city clerk,” was sufficient to meet
the burdens for both prima facie as well as conclusive proof. We conclude this record is
insufficient to establish any evid ence of publication, enactmen t, or adoption of the city’s
nuisance ordinance pursuant to section 599.13.
During trial, the city clerk testified that th e city maintained a copy of the ordinances
in a “large binder” kept in Canton City Hall, into which the city would insert copies of all
enacted ordinances. A long-standing city co uncil member testified that this same “book”
of ordinances had been used for at least th e previous 22 years—since she had become a
council member—and that they would “keep updating” the bi nder as ordinances were
passed or repealed.
During trial, in an attempt to establish “conclusive proof” of the “adoption and
publication” of the ordinances contained within this binde r, respondent submitted as an
exhibit a copy of its purporte d ordinance. This exhibit st ated that it was a “CERTIFIED
TRUE COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.” However, this document was signed
by both the mayor and city clerk and dated July 29, 2020—the day before the trial
commenced.
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As noted above, “conclusive proof” requi res that the ordinances in question be
“compil[ed] and publi[shed]” in a “book or pa mphlet” for a period of three years. The
district court concluded that th e city’s “large binder” was sufficient under this standard.
This was an error. The district court’s reasoning fails primarily because the format of the
ordinances—in a “large binder”—does not satisfy the plain and unambiguous requirement
the ordinances be kept in a “book or pamphlet.” The “book or pamphlet” requirement was
examined by the supreme court in Pilgrim v. City of Winona , 256 N.W.2d 266 (Minn.
1977), in which it held that “[t]he underlying purpose of this rule is to prevent the
conclusive effect until the ordinance is available in permanent form for public circulation.”
Id. at 269 (emphasis added). A regularly-u pdated binder does not satisfy either the
language or purpose of section 599.13, which is, as stated in Pilgrim, to allow the public
access to the ordinances “in permanent form.” 256 N.W.2d at 269 (emphasis added). The
district court’s conclusion that the city’s binder of ordinances established conclusive proof
under section 599.13 was error.
As noted by the supreme court in Pilgrim, the “underlying purpose of this rule is to
prevent the conclusive effect until the ordina nce is available [to the public] in permanent
form. Id. The requirement that ordinances be published and kept in permanent book or
pamphlet form has the obvious benefit of providing all citizens with actual notice of their
municipality’s ordinances. This requirement also provides citizens an easy and reliable
opportunity to obtain a copy of the ordinances so as to review them in complete form and
to ensure compliance with them by all public officials.
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Respondent provided the district court with no evidence of the valid enactment of
the ordinances and we, therefore, reverse appellant’s convictions.
Reversed.