State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1142

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Asa James Kingsbury,
Appellant.

Filed July 26, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-18-7725

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his false-imprisonment conviction, arguing that his conviction
must be reversed because the circumstantial evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable

2
doubt that he intentionally co nfined or restrained his girl friend inside their home. We
affirm.
FACTS
The jury heard the following testimony duri ng trial. In November 2018, appellant
Asa James Kingsbury lived with his then-girlfriend and their two children. One evening,
girlfriend fell asleep in the bedroom with the children. At about 1:00 a.m., appellant woke
girlfriend up and asked her to have sex with him. When she refused, appellant went into
the living room and began throwing things around. Appellant returned to the bedroom and
began to “attack [girlfriend] verbally” and called her a “whore.” Appellant told girlfriend
that he knew she planned to take the children and go stay with her grandmother, which she
had done in the past. Appella nt then retrieved a power dr ill and drilled screws into the
bedroom window, drilling it shut.
Girlfriend asked appellant to stop yelling. One of the children woke up and
appellant took the child into the living room. Girlfriend asked appellant to let her put the
child back to bed, but appellant refused. Appellant and girlfriend continued arguing about
letting girlfriend and the child go back to slee p. Girlfriend picked up her cell phone and
appellant began “hovering” over her, continuing to verbally attack her. Appellant told
girlfriend that he had videos of her from the home-video cameras, and began yelling at her
to watch the videos. Girlfriend stated she wanted to be left alone, and appellant pushed her
down on the bed and continued yelling at her.
During this time, both children woke up and began crying. Girlfriend wanted to call
911, get the children dressed, and leave th e home to go to her grandmother’s house.

3
Appellant told girlfriend she could not l eave and would not allow her to go to her
grandmother’s house. Girlfriend did not feel like she could leave because the bedroom
window was “screwed shut” and the door at the back of the house was dead-bolted and she
could not unlock it. Girlfriend called 911. While she was speaking on the phone, appellant
screwed all of the other windows shut with hi s power drill. Appellant also placed screws
into the front door frame.
Police officers arrived at the home and knocked on the front door. Girlfriend tried
to open the front door, but was unable to do so because the door was “drilled shut” and
“[t]here were screws in the frame.” Girlfriend did not see any way to leave the home with
her children. The dispatch operator, who was still on the phone with girlfriend, informed
the responding police officers that girlfri end could not open the door because it was
screwed shut. Officers forced entry into the home and placed appellant under arrest.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant by amended complaint with one
count of threats of violence under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2018), and one count of
false imprisonment under Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (2018). The district court held a
jury trial, and the jury found appellant guilty of false imprisonment and not guilty of threats
of violence. The district court stayed impo sition of sentence and sentenced appellant to
jail time. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his false-imprisonment
conviction because the circumst ances proved are consistent w ith the rational hypothesis
that appellant was trying to keep the police out of his home, not to restrain or confine his

4
girlfriend inside the home. To evaluate the sufficiency of the evid ence, appellate courts
“carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v.
Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the conviction” and “assume the jury believed
the State’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Ortega, 813
N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “will not disturb the
verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
There are two types of evidence, direct a nd circumstantial. Direct evidence is
“evidence that is based on pers onal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a
fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is “evidence from
which the factfinder can infer whether the fact s in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id.
(quotation omitted). We apply a heightened standard of review when the state’s evidence
on one or more elements of a charged offense c onsists solely of circumstantial evidence.
State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013). In a circumstantial-evidence case,
we apply a two-step test to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Moore, 846
N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). First, the court “identif[ies] the circumstances proved.” Id.
(citing State v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010)). “In identifying the

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circumstances proved, [this court] assume[s] that the jury resolved any factual disputes in
a manner that is consistent with the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citing Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at
329). Second, we independently examine the “reasonableness of the inferences that might
be drawn from the circumstances proved,” a nd “determine whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsiste nt with any rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). We consider the evidence as a whole and do not
examine each piece in isolation. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 332. Both parties briefed the
sufficiency of the evidence using the circumstantial-evidence analysis.
The jury convicted appellant of false imprisonment under Minn. Stat. § 609.255,
subd. 2. Under the statute, “Whoever, knowi ngly lacking lawful authority to do so,
intentionally confines or restrains . . . any . . . person without the person’s consent, is guilty
of false imprisonment.” Id. “Intentionally” means “the actor either has a purpose to do the
thing or cause the result specified or belie ves that the act performed by the actor, if
successful, will cause that result. ” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2018). “A jury is
permitted to infer that a pers on intends the natural and pr obable cons equences of their
actions.” State v. Johnson , 616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000). Respondent sought to
prove appellant’s intent to confine girlfriend against her will with the use of circumstantial
evidence.
We begin by identifying the circumstances proved. State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d
618, 623 (Minn. 2011). The ci rcumstances proved show that girlfriend was asleep in the
bedroom with the children. At about 1:00 a.m., appellant woke he r up and asked her to
have sex with him. When she declined, appellant began throwing things around the living

6
room and then returned to the bedroom and began verbally attacking her. Appellant called
girlfriend a whore and told her she was not allowed to leave the house with the children to
go to her grandmother’s house. Appellant used a power drill to screw the bedroom window
shut, and continued verbally attacking girlfriend. Appellant told girlfriend that he watched
videos of her from the home cameras and tried to force her to watch the videos. Girlfriend
refused, and appellant pushed her down onto the bed. Duri ng the argument, the children
woke up and girlfriend wanted to leave th e house and go to her grandmother’s house.
Girlfriend called 911. Appellant told girlfriend that she could not leave and drilled screws
into the other windows in the home and into the front door frame. 1 Girlfriend did not
believe she could leave the home because all the doors and windows were screwed shut,
and there was a deadbolt lock on the back door that she could not open. When the police
officers arrived, girlfriend tried to open the front door but could not do so. Girlfriend told
the emergency dispatcher that the door was sc rewed shut and she coul d not open it. The
dispatcher relayed this inform ation to the responding officers, who forced entry into the
home. The evidence presented at trial supports a determination that appellant intentionally
confined girlfriend in the home without her c onsent. Thus, the circ umstances proved are
consistent with guilt.
The next step requires us to evaluate “independently the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the ci rcumstances proved,” including inferences

1 We believe appellant’s statement and actio n of screwing the bedroom window shut are
direct evidence that establish his intent to confine and restrain his girlfriend. But because
neither party made arguments regarding direct evidence, we analyze the issue under the
heightened rational hypothesis standard.

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consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt. Id. at 622 (quotation omitted). Under this
test, the fact-finder “is in a unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and
weigh the evidence before it.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600. A ppellant argues that the
circumstantial evidence supports a reason able inference inconsistent with guilt,
specifically, that he intended to keep the police out of his home, not to confine or restrain
girlfriend. Appellant argues that girlfriend was able to “freely walk[] from room to room
in the home,” and notes that he allowed her to dress the children.
Appellant’s argument does not persuade us. Girlfriend testified that appellant
drilled screws into the bedroom window before she got her cell p hone and stated she
wanted to call the police. Girlfriend testifie d she did not intend to call the police when
appellant first drilled screws into the bedroom window. Thus, it is not reasonable to infer
that appellant intended to keep the police out of the home, when girlfriend had not yet tried
to call them. And it is unconte sted that after girlfriend called the police, appellant drilled
screws into the remaining windows and the doorframe. This action undoubtedly had the
effect of confining girlfriend indoors. Lastly, when girlfriend tried to open the door to the
responding police officers, she was unable to do so. Girlfriend told the emergency
dispatcher that the front door was screwed shut and she could not open it. It is unreasonable
to infer from all the circumstances proved that appellant only intended to keep the police
out and did not intend to keep girlfriend in the home.
A defendant may not rely on mere conject ure or speculation, but must point to
specific evidence in the record consistent with innocence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d
469, 480 (Minn. 2010). The inferences pres ented by appellant do not support his theory

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that he only intended to keep the police out of th e home. We consider the evidence as a
whole and do not examine each piece in isolation. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 332. Based
on the evidence presented, and viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that respondent proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of false
imprisonment.
Affirmed.