State of Minnesota,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A20-1151

Court of Appeals Chutich, J.

State of Minnesota,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: July 13, 2022
Office of Appellate Courts
Ron Wesley Epps,

Respondent.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman , Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Gina D. Schulz,
Assistant State Public Defender s, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent .

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. A manifest injustice does not occur, and withdrawal of a guilty plea is not
required, when a plea colloquy omits questions about uncontested pr evious convictions
that were alleged in the complaint.
July 13, 2022
2
2. Plea withdrawal is not required because the defendant did not establish a
manifest injustice.
Reversed and remanded.
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
The issue we consider here is whether a manifest injustice requiring plea withdrawal
occurs when a guilty-plea colloquy omits questions about uncontested previous convictions
that were alleged in the complaint. In November 2019, the State charged respondent Ronn
Epps with violating a domestic -abuse no- contact order. 1 The complaint alleged that Epps
had at least two previous convictions for violating a domestic-abuse no- contact order,
which enhanced the charge to a felony. Epps plea ded guilty to the charge d offense . No
party questioned Epps about his previous convictions during his plea colloquy. On appeal,
Epps argued that his failure to personally admit the previous convictions during his plea
colloquy made his plea inaccurate, and therefore a manifest injustice occurred that required
a plea withdrawal. The court of appeals agreed. Because we hold that the failure to
question a defendant about uncontested pr evious convictions that we re alleged in the
complaint does not give rise to a manifest injustice, we reverse and remand the case to the
court of appeals to consider a separate argument by Epps that the court did not previously
address.

1 The complaint, as well as the caption in the court of appeals, spells Epps’s name
“Ron,” but Epps spelled his name “Ronn” during his plea hearing. We accordingly use
“Ronn” here but keep the caption and other quotes to the record referring to “Ron”
unchanged.
3
FACTS
In November 2019, a Hennepin County District Court issued a domestic -abuse
no-contact order prohibiting Epps from contacting a person he allegedly abused. In
March 2020, law enforcement conducted a welfare check at the alleged victim’s home and
found Epps and the alleged victim in th e home. The State charged Epps with a felony
count of violating a domestic -abuse no-contact order under Minnesota Statutes
section 629.75, subdivision 2(d)(1) (2020). The charging section of the complaint read:
COUNT I
Charge: Violate No Contact Order - Within 10 years of the first of two
or more convictions
Minnesota Statute: 629.75.2(d)(1), with reference to: 629.75.2(d)
Maximum Sentence: 5 YEARS AND/OR $10,000
Offense Level: Felony

Offense Date (on or about): 03/07/2020

. . . .

Charge Description: That on or about 3/7/2020, in Minneapolis, Hennepin
County, Minnesota, RON WESLEY EPPS violated a domestic abuse no
contact order and less than 10 years had elapsed since RON WESLEY EPPS
was convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for the first of two or more
previous qualified domestic violence -related offenses.
Minimum Sentence: 30 DAYS

In the probable cause section of the complaint, the State alleged that Epps was
previously convicted of two separate violations of a domestic-abuse no- contact order in
2011, citing the relevant district court files .
2

2 Although not alleged in the complaint, Epps’s criminal record summary shows that
he was also convicted of a felony violation of a domestic-abuse no- contact order in 2015.

4
When Epps appeared before the district court for a first-appearance hearing under
Rule 5 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court set bail.3 Three
weeks later, on April 13, 2020, the parties reached a plea agreement. Under the agreement,
Epps would plead guilty to the charged offense , and the State would dismiss a pending
felony assault charge and recommend a stayed sentence of 15 months. Epps’s attorney
confirmed that Epps was of sound mind and established that Epps was pleading guilty
voluntarily before Epps signed the written plea petition. The court confirmed that Epps
understood the contents of the plea agreement, and when the court inquired whether Epps
was guilty of the charged offense, Epps answered: “I’m guilty.”
Defense counsel proceeded to establish the factual basis for Epps’s guilty plea. In
establishing the factual basis , Epps admitted that he knew a valid domestic -abuse
no-contact order prohibi ted him from having contact with his alleged victim. Epps also
admitted that, on March 7, 2020, he intentionally contacted his alleged victim in violation
of the order. Neither counsel nor the court questioned Epps about his previous convictions.

3 The transcript of the first-appearance hearing does not say whether Epps received a
copy of the complaint. We take this opportunity to remind district court s that, under
Rule 5.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court must inform defendants
of the charges, their rights, and “ensure the defendant has a copy of the charging
document.” Here, w e are confident that Epps received a copy of the complaint before he
pleaded guilty for two reasons. First, the written plea petition that Epps personally signed
in April 2020 expressly states that “I have received, read, and discussed a copy of the
(indictment) (complaint).” (Alteration in original.) Second, during his plea colloquy, Epps
personally affirmed that he and defense counsel had reviewed the plea petition and that he
understood everything in the plea petition, which was in front of Epps during the plea
colloquy.
5
The district court accepted his plea, ordered a presentence investigation, and scheduled a
sentencing hearing.
Three months after the plea hearing (but before sentencing), Epps moved to
withdraw his guilty plea under Rule 15.05, subdivision 2, of the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which permits a court to allow plea withdrawal “if it is fair and just to
do so.” He alleged that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he “entered his
plea under duress caused from being in custody during the COVID- 19 pandemic.” To be
clear, Epps did not allege that his factual basis was inadequate because the plea colloquy
omitted questions about his uncontested previous convictions. 4 The district court heard
Epps’s motion at his sentencing hearing but denied the motion, concluding that Epps ’s
motion merely reflected frustration with the criminal justice system. The court then
imposed the agreed -upon stayed sentence of 15 months, ordered a mental -health
evaluation, placed Epps on probation, and renewed the no-contact order. Epps appealed.
On appeal, Epps challenged the district court’s decision to deny his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea , asserting that a manifest injustice occurred . State v. Epps ,
No. A20-1151, 2021 WL 2908520, at *1 (Minn. App. July 12, 2021). In addition to his
original duress argument, Epps argued that his plea was not accurate because the plea
colloquy did not contain a personal admission that he had previous qualifying convictions

4 We have previously held , however, that defendants may challenge the validity of
their guilty plea for the first time on appeal. State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn.
2003); see also Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989) (stating that a defendant
“is free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and contend that the record
made at the time the plea was entered is inadequate” ).
6
that would elevate his March 2020 offense to a felony. The court of appeals concluded
that, “[b]ecause the admissions in this case made no reference to or acknowledgement of
any [previous no- contact order violations],” the factual basis failed to adequately support
Epps’s plea. Id. at *3. We granted the S tate’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
“Determining the validity of a guilty plea presents a question of law subject to de
novo review.” Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 2015). Epps has the burden
of proving that his plea was invalid. Id. We review an interpretation of the rules of criminal
procedure de novo. State v. Lee, 929 N.W.2d 432, 438 (Minn. 2019).
I.
The rules of criminal procedure require a court to permit plea withdrawal upon
“proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1 (emphasis added). A manifest injustice exists
when defendants plead guilty to a more serious offense than that for which they could have
been convicted had they insisted upon their right to trial. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90,
94 (Minn. 2010) . The accuracy requirement of a constitutionally valid plea protects
defendants from such an injustice. State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017);
Lussier v. State , 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012); State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248,
251–52 (Minn. 1983). To be accurate, a plea must be established by a proper factual basis.
Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 588. “The ‘factual-basis requirement is satisfied if the record
contains a showing that there is credible evidence available which would support a jury
verdict that defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to which he pled guilty.’ ”
7
Rickert v. State , 795 N.W.2d 236, 243 n.3 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Genereux ,
272 N.W.2d 33, 34 (Minn. 1978) ).
The court of appeals recently held that the factual -basis requirement is not satisfied
when, at the plea hearing, a defendant fails to personally “acknowledge the truth and
accuracy of the facts of the complaint or of the essential intent element of the crime.”
Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. A pp. 2021). Applying the Rosendahl
rule to the facts here, the court of appeals concluded that the prior convictions alleged in
the record could not be used to satisfy the factual -basis requirement because Epps did not
personally acknowledge the truth and accuracy of the prior qualifying convictions at the
plea hearing. Epps, 2021 WL 2908520, at *3.
We do not opine on the general soundness of the Rosendahl rule, but the rule is
unsound as applied specifically to the facts here . Here, Epps’s conduct in violating a
domestic-abuse order was transformed from a gross misdemeanor into a felony because of
his prior convictions. In these circumstances—w hen the felony complaint alleges prior
convictions, the defendant had the opportunity to review the felony complaint and discuss
the plea with his lawyer, and the defendant does not contest the validity of the prior
convictions—the defendant’s failure to expressly acknowledge those convictions in the
plea colloquy does not give rise to a manifest injustice . We conclude that , under these
circumstances, Epps admitted to each element of the offense for purposes of the guilty plea,
the guilty plea was valid, and no withdrawal of the plea was required under Rule 15.05 of
the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure .
8
We emphasize, however, that thorough guilty-plea colloquies are critical and that
our decision here is narrow. We acknowledge that the heavy caseloads that district courts
face sometimes make it difficult to attend as closely to rules of criminal procedure as is
ideal. Even so, the plea colloquy that occurred here could be substantially improved.
II.
Epps has not met his burden to establish a manifest injustice requiring a plea
withdrawal under Rule 15.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure , or that his
plea was otherwise invalid . As explained above, a manifest injustice does not occur, and
withdrawal is not required, when a plea colloquy omits questions about uncontested
previous convictions that were alleged in the complaint. Here, the complaint alleged
Epps’s previous convictions, and he did not contest the validity of these convictions in the
district court or the court of appeals. Accordingly, Epps did not plead guilty to a more
serious offense than that for which he could have been convicted had he insisted on his
right to trial. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Because no manifest injustice occurred, t he
court of appeals committed reversible error when it reversed Epps’s conviction on the basis
that his guilty plea was invalid . We remand the case to t he court of appeals to consider
Epps’s separate argument that he entered his plea under duress caused by his in-custody
status during the COVID -19 pandemic.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the case to the court of appeals
for consideration of Epps’s duress argument.
Reversed and remanded.