Kathleen Corte, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1153

Kathleen Corte,
Appellant,

vs.

Matthew Jon Larson,
Respondent,

Kylie Rodgers Special Needs Trust,
Respondent.

Filed May 3, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-19-3948

Brian D. Stofferahn, Halunen Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Brian W. Varland, Valerie Sims, Heley, Duncan & Melander, PLLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Larson)

Paul A. Rajkowski, Derek C. Harvieux, Rajkowski Hansmeier Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota
(for respondent Trust)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of respondents, asserting that each owed her a duty of reasonable care to maintain a safe
premises. We affirm.
FACTS1
Appellant Kathleen Corte is a regist ered nurse who provides in-home care to
disabled patients. Corte cared for Kylie Rodgers, the daughter of respondent Matthew Jon
Larson. Corte routinely worked the overnig ht shift at the Larson residence, which
generally was scheduled from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. The residence was owned by
respondent Kylie Rodgers Special Needs Trust (the Trust) and leased to Larson.
Due to Rodgers’s disab ility, a wheelchair ramp was constructed to transport
Rodgers in and out of the house. A set of stairs also provides access to the house. Corte
does not recall receiving an instruction from Larson that the ramp was to be used only when
transporting Rodgers in her wheelchair. Corte regularly used the ramp to enter and exit the
residence, which was a common practice among the nurses.
While Corte and other nurses believed that the ramp was unsafe due to its steepness,
nobody relayed this concern to Larson because they thought that it was against policy to
do so. Rather, the nurses expressed their co ncerns to their employer. At some unknown
time, someone applied grip strips to every other slat of the ramp.

1 The facts are recited in the light most fa vorable to Corte, the non-moving party. See
STAR Ctrs. Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P. , 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).

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On the morning of November 12, 2016, Corte exited the Larson residence via the
ramp. As she descended the ra mp, Corte realized that it wa s covered in hoarfrost, which
had developed overnight. Despite the grip strips, Corte fell.
Corte filed suit against the Trust a nd Larson, alleging that they acted
negligently by failing to remove snow a nd ice from the ramp and failing to warn
individuals of the inherently dangerous condition of the ramp. Lars on and the Trust
each moved for summary judgment, arguing that Corte had not established that a duty
was owed. The district court granted both motions. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Corte argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
the Trust and Larson because landlords and possessors of land owe a duty to exercise
reasonable care in maintaining their premises. On appeal from summary judgment, this
court reviews de novo “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” STAR Ctrs. Inc. , 644
N.W.2d at 76-77. This court “view[s] the evidence in the light mo st favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment was granted.” Id.
The Trust
Corte challenges the district court’s dete rmination that, becaus e the Trust did not
maintain sufficient control over the leased property, it did not owe Corte a duty. The Trust
argues that we should not reach the merits of this argument because Corte failed to argue
it before the district court, and failed to cite authority supporting this argument on appeal.
While we do question whether the issue was prop erly raised in district court, it is

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unnecessary to evaluate the me rits of Corte’s argument due to her failure to adequately
brief the issue on appeal.
“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument
or authorities in appellant’s brief is [forfeited] and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obviou s on mere inspection.” State v. Modern Recycling, Inc. , 558
N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997) (quotation omitted).
Corte fails to cite any authority that directly relates the requisite level of control that
a landlord must possess over a leased property in order to establish a legal duty. Corte cites
caselaw that relates to general principles of premises liability, but she fails to articulate
how these authorities lead to her claim surviving summary judgment against the Trust. It
also is not obvious that prejudicial error has occurred. Thus, Corte has forfeited her
argument against the Trust because it was not properly briefed.
Larson
Corte argues that the distri ct court erred when it determined that Larson did not owe
a duty to Corte to fix the dangerous conditions of the ramp or to remove the hoarfrost from
the ramp. Because Larson did no t assert that Corte failed to preserve this argument for
appeal or that it was inadequately briefed, we will address the merits of Corte’s argument.
In a negligence action, the district cour t may grant summary judgment in favor of
the defendant “when the record reflects a complete lack of proof on any one of these four
elements: (1) the existence of a duty of care, (2 ) a breach of that du ty, (3) an injury, and
(4) the breach of duty being the proximate cause of the injury.” Senogles v. Carlson, 902
N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). The existe nce of a duty of care is a

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question of law that the di strict court determines. Zimmer v. Carlton Cty. Co-op. Power
Ass’n, 483 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. June 10, 1992).
Landowners possess a duty to use reasonable care in maintainin g a safe premises for all
entrants. Senogles, 902 N.W.2d at 42. “But even when landowners owe persons a duty to
keep and maintain their premises in a reasonably sa fe condition, they ar e not insurers of
safety.” Rinn v. Minn. State Agric. Soc’y , 611 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. App. 2000).
Landowners are, however, expe cted to be aware of and remedy foreseeable harms. See
Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009).
The district court determined that it was not foreseeable to Larson that Corte would
slip and fall on the ramp on the morning of November 12, 2016. Foreseeability depends
on “whether the specific danger was objectively reasonable to expect, not simply whether
it was within the realm of an y conceivable possibility.” Senogles, 902 N.W.2d at 43
(quotation omitted).
We agree with the district court’s conclu sion. Larson was never notified by Corte
or any other nurse that the ramp was slippery or dangerous. Corte also testified that she
never had any issues with the ramp in the past and produced no evidence of anyone ever
falling on the ramp. Lastly, Corte testified that the frost developed overnight while Larson
was sleeping, leaving him no opportunity to beco me aware of or cure the slippery
condition. See Mattson v. St. Luke’s Hosp. of St. Paul, 89 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Minn. 1958)
(allowing for reasonable time after icy cond itions develop to rectify them). Because
Corte’s fall and injury were not foreseeable to Larson, the district court properly granted
summary judgment in his favor.

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Corte also argues that there is an issue of material fact as to whether Larson
instructed the nurses to use the stairs instead of the ramp. Summary judgment is improper
if a dispute of material fact exists. O’Malley v. Ulland Bros. , 549 N.W.2d 889, 892
(Minn. 1996). Although Corte did not recall receiving such instruction, she did not deny
that Larson gave the instruction. And even if th is fact is in dispute, it is not material. “A
fact is material if its resolution will affect the outcome of a case.” Id. Although the
district court stated that Larson’s supposed instruction was evid ence that Corte’s fall
was not foreseeable, it relied on other, clea rly undisputed eviden ce to determine that
Larson lacked awareness of a dangerous cond ition. Therefore, because there are not
genuine issues of material fact as to fo reseeability, the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Larson.
Corte also places great emphasis on the grip strips that were on the ramp when
she fell. She argues that on e would only put such strips on an inherently dangerous
ramp, and that the strips should have been placed on every sl at to make the ramp safe.
But Corte failed to identify any evidence in th e summary-judgment record to support
her argument that the ramp even required grip strips or that the strips were
inadequately applied. And ev en if Corte did show that th e strips were inadequate, she
failed to show that Larson was or should ha ve been aware of this inadequacy. Corte
merely speculates as to why the grip stri ps were placed on the ramp and of their
effectiveness, which is insufficien t to survive summa ry judgment. See Bob Useldinger
& Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben , 505 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 1993). The district court

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correctly concluded that, on this record, Larson did not owe an additional duty to make the
ramp safer.
Affirmed.