In the Matter of: Diana Murack.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1178

In the Matter of: Diana Murack.

Filed March 8, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 38102914-3

Thomas A. Krause, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., Winona,
Minnesota; and

Charles H. Thomas, Southern Minnesota Regi onal Legal Services, Inc., St. Paul,
Minnesota (for relator Diana Murack)

Katherine Conlin, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
SYLLABUS
Principles of statutory interpretation apply to the interpretation of executive orders
issued under the authority of the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996, Minn.
Stat. §§ 12.01-.61 (2020).
OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
This unemployment-benefits appeal raises the issue of whether an unemployment -
law judge (ULJ) violated a provision of an executive order issued by the governor in
conjunction with the COVID -19 peacetime emergency. The first operative paragraph of

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that order suspended “stri ct compliance” with the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance
Law (unemployment statute), Minn. Stat. §§ 268.001-.23 (2020). Without considering the
impact of the executive order, t he ULJ dismissed as untimely relator Diana Murack’s
appeal of an initial determination of ineligibility for unemployment benefits.
Murack asserts that strict compliance with the administrative appeal deadline was
suspended by the executive order and that, consequently, the dismissal must be reversed.
Respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED),
the agency that administers the unemployment statute , claims that the executive order is
more limited in its scope.
We agree with Murack that the plain language of the first paragraph of the executive
order suspended strict compliance with the administrative appeal deadline and reverse the
dismissal. The suspension of strict compliance did not, however, eliminate the deadline.
We therefore remand this case for consideration of the impact of the executive order and,
specifically, whether relator was in substantial compliance with the deadline.
FACTS
On March 13, 2020, Governor Tim Walz declared a peacetime emergency in
Minnesota because of the COVID -19 pandemic. See Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-01,
Declaring a Peacetime Emergency & Coordinating Minnesota’s Strategy to Protect
Minnesotans from COVID-19 (Mar. 13, 2020). The COVID-19 peacetime emergency has
been extended multiple times and is currently in effect through March 15, 2021, subject to
further order of the governor or termination by a majority vote of each house of the
legislature. See Minn. Stat. § 12.31, subd. 2; Emerg. Exec. Order No. 21-08, Extending

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the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency Declared in Exec. Order No. 20-01 (Feb. 12, 2021).
Since March 13, 2020, the governor has issued numerous additional emergency executive
orders, requiring such things as the temporary closure of certain business es and a
suspension of most evictions and writs of recovery. See, e.g. , Emerg. Exec. Order
No. 20-04, Providing for Temporary Closure of Bars, Restaurants & Other Places of
Public Accommodation (Mar. 16, 2020); Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-14, Suspending
Evictions & Writs of Recovery During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (Mar. 23,
2020). The legislature also enacted provisions in response to the pandemic, including a
suspension of the statutes of limitation during the pendency of the peacetime emergency.
See 2020 Minn. Laws ch. 74, art. 1, § 16; 2021 Minn. Laws ch. 3, § 1.
On March 16 , 2020, the governor issued Emergency Executive Order No. 20-05,
Providing Immediate Relief to Employers & Unemployed Workers During the COVID -19
Peacetime Emergency (Mar. 16, 2020) (EEO 20 -05 or the executive order ). EEO 20 -05
modified provisions of the unemployment statute to help mitigate the consequences of the
COVID-19 pandemic on workers and employers.
During the COVID-19 peacetime emergency, DEED issued an initial determination
that Murack was not eligible for unemployment benefits for reasons un related to this
appeal. The determination stated that it would be final unless an administrative appeal was
filed within 20 calendar days from the date of mailing, or by April 13, 2020.
According to Murack, she attempted to appeal online and believed that a telephonic
hearing on her appeal was scheduled for June 19, 2020. Unbeknownst to Murack, she did
not complete all online steps necessary to submit her appeal. After no telephonic hearing

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was held on June 19, Murack filed an appeal online on June 22, 2020, this time successfully
completing all necessary steps. The appeal, however, was dismissed by a ULJ as untimely
because it was filed ten weeks after the April 13 deadline. Murack sought reconsideration,
but the dismissal was affirmed.
Murack filed this certiorari appeal in which she contends that the ULJ erred by
dismissing her administrative appeal because strict compliance with the 20-day statutory
time period for f iling an administrative appeal was suspended by EEO 20-05. On the
parties’ joint motion, we expedited scheduling of this appeal to address the time -sensitive
issue of whether EEO 20 -05 suspends strict compliance with the 20-day administrative
appeal period during the COVID-19 peacetime emergency.1
ISSUE
Did the ULJ err by requiring strict compliance with the administrative appeal
deadline?
ANALYSIS
The only issue for our determination o n this appeal is whether the ULJ erred by
dismissing Murack’s administrative appeal as untimely without considering the impact of
the executive order. See Christgau v. Fine, 27 N.W.2d 193, 199 ( Minn. 1947). A ULJ’s
decision to dismiss an appeal as untimely raises a jurisdictional question of law, which we

1 Before oral argument, we provided an opportunity for input from the Office of the
Minnesota Attorney General, which has the authority to enforce executive orders related
to the current peacetime emergency. The Office of the Minnesota Attorney General
submitted a letter indicating agreement with DEED’s interpretation of EEO 20 -05 and
declining to provide further briefing on the issue.

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review de novo. Kennedy v. Am. Paper Recycling Corp. , 714 N.W.2d 738, 739 (Minn.
App. 2006).
In analyzing this issue, we first provide a n overview of the administrative appeal
process and law related to the appeal deadline. We then address the threshold question of
whether principles of statutory construction apply to interpreting emergency executive
orders. D eciding that question in the affirmative, we apply those principles to conclude
that the plain language of the executive order suspended strict compliance with the
administrative appeal deadline and that the ULJ erred by failing to consider whether
Murack was in “substantial compliance” with the appeal deadline.
Administrative Appeal Deadline
Under the unemployment statute, an applicant’s eligibility for unemployment
benefits is determined through a multi -stage administrative pr ocess. An applicant first
applies for benefits and establishes a benefit account. See Minn. Stat. § 268.07. Once a
benefit account is established, DEED issue s initial determinations of eligibility or
ineligibility. See Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2. An applicant may appeal an initial
determination of ineligibility, but only if the applicant files the administrative appeal within
20 days of the date that the initial determination is mailed. See Minn. Stat. § 268.101,
subd. 2(f). If the administrative appeal is timely, a ULJ will hold a hearing and issue a
final administrative decision on the eligibility issue. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105. If the

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applicant fails to timely appeal, the initial determination becomes final. See Minn. Stat.
§ 268.101, subd. 2(f).2
We have held that “[t]he statutory time for an appeal from a department
determination is absolute.” Cole v. Holiday Inns, Inc. , 347 N.W.2d 72, 73 (Minn. App.
1984) (construing predecessor statute with similar language to Minn. Stat. § 268.101,
subd. 2(f)); see also Semanko v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 244 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1976)
(characterizing as “absolute and unambiguous” time period to challenge initial
determination under predecessor statute). And we have repeatedly stated that w hen an
appeal is not timely filed, it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Stassen v. Lone
Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC , 814 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. App. 2012); Kennedy, 714
N.W.2d at 740.
Murack acknowledges the se well-established principles regardin g appeals from
initial determinations, but she argues that the principles do not apply here because of
EEO 20-05. More specifically, Murack relies on language in the executive order providing
that “strict compliance ” with the unemployment statute is “suspended” during the
peacetime emergency.

2 Likewise, an employer may appeal an initial determination of eligibility within 2 0 days,
triggering a hearing before a ULJ who will make the final administrative decision. See
Minn. Stat. §§ 268.101, subd. 2(f), .105.

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Applicability of Principles of Statutory Interpretation to Executive Orders
The governor declared the COVID -19 peacetime emergency pursuant to his
authority under the Minnesota Emergency Ma nagement Act of 1996, Minn. Stat.
§§ 12.01-.61. Executive orders issued pursuant to this authority have “the full force and
effect of law.” Minn. Stat. § 12.32.
Although it appears to raise an issue of first impression for Minnesota courts, courts
of other jurisdiction s have applied principles of statutory interpretation in interpreting
executive orders. See, e.g., Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 2005) (“As is true
of interpretation of statutes, the interpretation of an Executive Order begins with its text.”);
United States v. Abu Marzook , 412 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“The Court
interprets Executive Orders in the same manner that it interprets statutes.”); City of Morgan
Hill v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. , 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(“The construction of an executive order presents an issue akin to an issue of statutory
interpretation . . . .”). Relying on these cases, the parties have framed their arguments with
reference to principles of statutory interpretation. Because the governor’s emergency-
executive orders have “the full force and effect of law,” Minn. Stat. § 12.32, we agree that
it is appropriate to apply statutory-interpretation principles in interpreting them. Cf. Minn.
Stat. §§ 14.38, sud. 1 (providing that administrative rules filed with secretary of state have
“force and effect of law”) , 645.001 (providing that provisions of chapter 645 governing
statutory interpretation apply to administrative rules) (2020).

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Interpretation of EEO 20-05
The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the legislature.
Svihel Vegetable Farm, Inc. v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 929 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn.
2019); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). When the language of a statute is cl ear, this
court will enforce that plain language without looking further. Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics
Advanced Info. Sys., Inc., 869 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Minn. 2015); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.18
(2020). Words and phrases should be construed “according to rules of grammar and
according to their common and approved usage.” Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018)). And
“[a] statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to all of its provisions;
no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Am.
Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted); see
also Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2020) (stating presumption that legislature “intends the entire
statute to be effective and certain”); Engfer, 869 N.W.2d at 300.
The executive order begins with the recognition that
[e]conomic insecurity because of involuntary unemployment
of workers in Minnesota is a subject of general concern. The
public good is promoted by providing workers who are
unemployed through no fault of their own a temporary partial
wage replacement to assist unemp loyed workers to become
reemployed. Providing a temporary partial wage replacement
to assist unemployed workers allows these workers to access
basic necessities and safeguard the health of themselves, their
families, and other Minnesotans. Current law and regulations
prevent the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Program
from providing immediate relief to employers and unemployed
workers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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EEO 20-05, at 1. The executive order then provides:
For these reasons, I [Governor Walz] order as follows:
1. Effective immediately, strict compliance with
Minnesota Statutes 2019, Chapter 268, Minnesota
Unemployment Insurance Law is suspended.
2. For unemployment insurance benefit accounts
established between March 1, 2020 and December 31, 2 020, I
am suspending the nonpayable week requirement under
Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 268.085, subdivision 1,
clause 6, which will allow workers to become eligible for
unemployment benefits as quickly as possible.
3. To further ensure that unemployme nt benefits
are available for workers who are not able to work directly or
indirectly as a result of COVID -19, I order that suitable
employment under Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 268.035,
subdivisions 23a (a) and (b) does not include employment that
puts the health and safety of the applicant at risk or
employment that puts the health and safety of other workers
and the general public at risk.
4. To further ensure that unemployment benefits
are available for workers who are not able to work directly or
indirectly as a result of COVID -19, I order that a leave of
absence will be presumed to be involuntary in accordance with
Minnesota Statutes 2019, section 268.085, subdivision 13a
[under certain enumerated COVID-19-related circumstances].
5. Notwithstanding Minnesota Statutes 2019,
section 268.047, I order that the Minnesota Unemployment
Insurance Program not use unemployment benefits paid as a
result of the COVID -19 pandemic in computing the future
unemployment tax rate of a taxpaying employer. This will
provide immediate relief to employers impacted by the
COVID-19 pandemic and will better allow their employees to
access unemployment benefits.
6. Notwithstanding Minnesota Statutes 2019,
section 268.085, subdivision 9, I order that the Minnesota
Unemployment Insurance Progra m waive enforcement of the
five-week benefit limitation for business owners.

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7. Because strict compliance with Minnesota
Statutes 2019, Chapter 268 and Minnesota Rules 2019, part
3310, will prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action under this
Executive Order, those provisions, and any other provisions in
Minnesota Statutes or Rules that are inconsistent with this
Executive Order, are waived and suspended during the
peacetime emergency declared in Executive Order 20-01.[3]

Id. at 1-3.

Murack argues that the language of the first numbered paragraph of the executive
order (paragraph 1) suspends strict compliance not just with the specific sections identified
in paragraphs two through six of the order , but with other provisions of chapter 268, such
as the administrative appeal deadline . In support of her argument, she claims that
paragraph 1 would be superfluous if it did not mean something different from the
paragraphs that follow. DEED’s interpretation is that paragraph 1 is just an introductory
passage for the subsequent paragraphs and has no independent significance.
In determining the correct interpretation, we turn first to the plain language of
paragraph 1, which literally states that strict compliance is being suspended for chapter
268—the unemployment statute.4 We further note that paragraph 1 contains no qualifying

3 EEO 20-05 has twice been amended by subsequent executive orders to add additional,
specific departures from the strict requirements of chapter 268 . See Emerg. Exec. Order
No. 20-29, Amending Executive Order 20 -05 to Expedite State Unemployment Insurance
Benefits During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (Apr. 6, 2020) (EEO 20-29); Emerg.
Exec. Order No. 20 -102, Amending Executive Order 20 -05 to Ensure Timely
Unemployment Insurance Benefits During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (Dec. 14,
2020) (EEO 20-102).

4 When a statute is ambiguous, we will defer to a reasonable inter pretation by an agency
charged with administering the statute. A.A.A. v. Minn . Dep’t of Human Servs. , 832
N.W.2d 816, 823 (Minn. 2013); Abdi v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 749 N.W.2d 812,

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clause tying it to the subsequent paragraphs, such as stating that strict compliance with
chapter 268 is suspended “as provided below.” And paragraphs two through six of the
order reference specific sections of chapter 268 and contain clear instructions to waive or
disregard certain requirements in each identified section. The paragraphs stand
independently and do not require any reference to paragraph 1 to be understood. Thus, in
order to give meaning to all paragraphs of the order, paragraph 1 must have a broader
meaning th an just as an introductory passag e. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17; Engfer, 869
N.W.2d at 300.
DEED acknowledges that the language of the executive order is not ambiguous, but
argues that ambiguity arises in determining how to apply the language. We recognize this
concern, but that does not allow DEED to simply ignore paragraph 1 of the executive order.
As the agency tasked with administering the unemployment statute, DEED must apply the
provisions of the executive order and make these assessments during this peacetime
emergency.
DEED further argues that interpreting paragraph 1 as having independent meaning
would have the effect of suspending all requirements of the unemployment statute and

815 (Minn. App. 2008). But, “[w]here an agency’s interpretation c ontravenes the plain
language of the statute, it is not entitled to judicial deference.” In re Application of Minn.
Power for Auth. to Increase Rates , 929 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 6, 2019). Because our holding in this case is based on the plain language of
the executive order, we do not defer to DEED’s interpretation. See Abdi, 749 N.W.2d at
815 (explaining that “if we conclude that the [statute] and regulations are c lear and
unambiguous with respect to the issue before us, DEED’s interpretation is entitled to no
deference”).

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would render the unemployment-benefits system nonfunctional and in violation of federal
law. This argument , however, goes well beyond any reasonable interpretation of
paragraph 1.
Paragraph 1 of the order suspends “strict compliance,” but not all compliance.
“Strict compliance” is a legal term that is generally understood to mean that a party must
exactly comply with a statute’s requir ements. Drews v. Fed. Nat ’l Mortg. Ass’ n, 850
N.W.2d 738, 742 (Minn. App. 2014). In the absence of strict compliance with a statutory
provision, there must still be a showing of at least “substantial compliance.” See, e.g.,
Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Minn. 2016) (“We have . . .
required strict or substantial compliance, depending on the circumstances, with the
unambiguous requirements of a statute or rule.”) ; Manco of Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Bd. of
Rock Dell Twp., 583 N.W.2d 293, 295 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20,
1998). A party may be said to have substantially complied with a statute where she has a
reasonable explanation for failing to strictly comply, has taken steps to comply with the
statute, and has g enerally complied with the statute’s purpose; and there is reasonable
notice and a lack of prejudice to other parties. See State by Spannaus v. Dangers , 368
N.W.2d 384, 385 (Minn. App. 1985) , review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1985) . These
requirements for “s ubstantial compliance” provide constraints to avoid the concerns
expressed by DEED.
With regard to DEED’s claim that applying paragraph 1 to the administrative appeal
deadline could result in Minnesota being out of compliance with federal unemployment -
law requirements, DEED has failed to identify any such federal requirements. We also

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note that unemployment laws from other states allow extensions of appeal deadlines for
reasons such as “good cause” or in the event of “circumstances beyond the claimant’s
control.” See, e.g., Mich. Comp. L. § 421.32a(1) -(2) (2020) (appeal deadline of 30 days
may be extended up to one year with good cause); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31 -248(a) (appeal
filed after the 21-day deadline may be considered to be timely filed if the filing party shows
good cause); West’s Alas. Stat. Ann. § 23.20.34 0(e) (reasonable extensions of 30 -day
appeal deadline for circumstances beyond the applicant’s control).
DEED’s final argument is that our interpretation of paragraph 1 is contrary to the
purpose of the executive order because it would further increase its workload. DEED
asserts that the volume of unemployment claims during the pandemic has increased such
that there is already a delay in scheduling hearings and that having to consider additiona l
cases would be contrary to the executive order’s purpose of providing “immediate relief to
employers and unemployed workers.” DEED essentially argues that we should factor its
staff resources into our interpretation of the executive order. Consideratio ns such as
agency resources are outside the scope of proper statutory interpretation, particularly when
interpreting unambiguous language.
We thus conclude that paragraph 1 suspended “strict compliance” with the 20 -day
deadline for administrative appeals set out in Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f).5 The ULJ

5 Murack appears to also argue that paragraph 7 of the executive order suspends strict
enforcement of the 20 -day deadline for administrative a ppeals during the COVID -19
peacetime emergency. Because we conclude that strict compliance with the administrative
appeal deadline is suspended under paragraph 1, we need not reach Murack’s arguments
regarding paragraph 7.

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therefore erred by dismissing the appeal as untimely without first determining whether
Murack had “substantially complied ” with the deadline. In reaching this conclusion, we
offer no opinion on whether Murack was in substantial compliance.
DECISION
Because EEO 20 -05 suspends strict compliance with Minn. Stat. § 268.101,
subd. 2(f), the ULJ erred by determining that he lacked jurisdiction to hear Murack’s appeal
without considering whether Murack was in substantial compliance with the administrative
appeal deadline. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
Reversed and remanded.