In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1181

In re the Marriage of:

Alberta Okrah Danso, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Ransford Frimpong,
Appellant.

Filed April 19, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-FA-14-1683

Alberta Okrah Danso-Boadi, Burnsville, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Ransford D. Frimpong, Savage, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant-father Ransford Frimpong challe nges the district court’s order denying,
without an evidentiary hearing, his motion to modify child custody, arguing that he
established a prima facie case for modificati on based on endangerme nt. He also argues

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that the district court abused its discretion in increasing respondent-mother Alberta Okrah
Danso’s parenting time. We affirm.
FACTS
Father and mother, both sel f-represented in this appeal, married in December 2007
and became parents when child was born in October 2008. After separating in 2009,
mother petitioned the district court to dissolve the marriage, and the divorce was finalized
by a July 2010 judgment and decree. Under the decree, mother was granted sole legal and
physical custody of child. Father was given “reasonable” parenting time: every Tuesday
(8:00 a.m.) through Thursday (4:00 p.m.); ever y other Saturday (3:00 to 8:00 p.m.); and
rotating holidays.
Months later, mother traveled to Ghana with child without advance notice, father’s
consent, or court authorization. 1 Father moved for permanen t sole legal and permanent
sole physical custody, claiming that moth er’s actions amounted to a change in
circumstances and child endangerment, and caused child to suffer “severe emotional
distress.” The district court stayed fathe r’s motion to modify custody but awarded him
temporary sole legal custody and temporary sole physical cu stody until mother’s return.

1 Both father and mother are originally from Ghana and have family there. Mother states
that she traveled to Ghana with child because her uncle fell ill. Father insists that mother
failed to obtain his consent before taking child outside of the country, even though mother
had sole physical custody at the time. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(a), (c) (2020).
Still, the district court appropriately found that mother’s unannoun ced travels deprived
father of his assigned parenting time afforded to him by the July 2010 judgment and decree.
See generally Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 6 (2020) (establishing remedies for deprivation
of parenting time). As a resu lt, mother was criminally charged with depriving another of
parental rights in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.26, subd. 1(3) (2010).

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The court also suspended mother’s parenting time, ordered her to immediately return child
to Minnesota, and granted father permission to retrieve child from Ghana if mother failed
to comply.
Father eventually traveled to Ghana and returned to the United States with child in
the summer of 2011. 2 Mother later returned and filed a motion in the district court to
reestablish custody and parenting time. After lengthy litigation, the district court issued an
order in September 2013 that modified the custodial arrangement to joint legal and joint
physical custody shared between mother and father. The district court acknowledged that
mother had unilaterally traveled to Ghana with child—an act that also resulted in mother’s
conviction for depriving father of parenting time—and accordingly found that permitting
mother to maintain sole lega l custody and sole physical custody posed a risk of future
emotional harm or endangerment to child. But the district court also found that substantial
involvement from both parents was in child’s best interests and therefore awarded the
parties joint legal custody and joint physical custody.
A few months after the district court’s order, venue was transferred from Hennepin
County to Scott County. Both parents later filed competing motions to modify parenting

2 Although the district court considered and ruled on thes e facts in a 2013 custody-
modification order, the parties still dispute the events surrounding father’s trip to Ghana in
this appeal. Because father has appealed from a 2020 or der on requested custody and
parenting-time modifications, the conflicting versions of what transpired in Ghana back in
2011 are not critical to the precise issues currently before us. Our focus here is limited to
addressing whether the district court’s 2020 order contains a prejudicial error that entitles
father to a reversal and remand for further pr oceedings. In other words, our task is to
examine whether the district court correctly denied father’s motions and granted mother
additional parenting time. Thus, we only consider the parties’ travels to Ghana to the extent
those facts relate to the district court’s most recent decision in 2020.

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time. In a May 2014 order, the district court found that increasing mother’s parenting time
was in child’s best interests and granted mother one additional overnight each weekend
that mother had child and one new overnight during the weeks that father had child for the
weekend. This order remained in place for about six years.
Mother moved to modify parenting time in June 2020, seeking “more equalized”
parenting time. Father also moved to modify parenting time. And, alleging endangerment,
he moved for sole legal and sole physical custody of child. Father reasserted that mother
endangered child by bringing him to Ghana in 2010. He claimed this event caused child
to develop autism, a diagnosis that was made in July 2014. Father also alleged that mother
“abused” child by preven ting child from receiving county disability benefits, repeatedly
feeding child hot dogs in spite of child’s sensitivity to this food, and failing to treat child’s
“hairline bumps” with father’s recommended product.
After a nonevidentiary heari ng on these motions, the distri ct court denied father’s
requested custody and parenting time modifi cations without granting an evidentiary
hearing. The district court determined that father had failed to allege a prima facie case of
endangerment, finding that the unauthorized trip to Ghana was addressed in 2013 and that
father’s other allegations did not constitute endangerment. Furthermore, the court granted
mother’s motion to modify parenting time because “slightly increasing” her parenting time
was in child’s best interests.
Father appeals.

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DECISION
I. The district court properly denied fath er’s motion to modify custody without
an evidentiary hearing.

Father first argues that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his motion
for modification without ordering an evidentiary hearing. We are unpersuaded.
Minnesota statutes section 518.18 (2020) governs custody modification, allowing a
district court to modify custody only u nder limited circumstances. One of those
circumstances is endangerment. Modifica tion is allowed if “the child’s present
environment endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s
emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv).
A party seeking modification on the basis of endangerment must first make a prima
facie showing of endangerment. See Crowley v. Meyer , 897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Minn.
2017). To make a prima facie showing of e ndangerment, the movant must allege: (1) a
change of circumstances; (2) modification is in the child’s best inte rests; (3) the child’s
“present environment endangers their physical health, emotional health, or emotional
development;” and (4) the benefits of modification outweigh any detriments. In re Custody
of M.J.H. , 913 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 2018). In reviewing a district court’s
determination regarding whether a party seek ing to modify custody made a prima facie
case to do so, it is important to remember that “[a]t the pr ima-facie-case stage of the
proceeding, [the moving party] need not establish anything. [The moving party] need only
make allegations which, if true, would allow the district court to grant the relief he seeks.”

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Amarreh v. Amarreh , 918 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 24, 2018). Thus, if the movant’s submissions do not allege facts, which, if true, would
allow the district court to grant the relief so ught, no evidentiary hearing is required. See
id. at 230. Conversely, if the m ovant does allege facts that would allow the district court
to grant the relief sought, the district court mu st hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether those allegations are, in fact, true. M.J.H., 913 N.W.2d at 440.
Our appellate review of a district cour t’s decision to deny an endangerment-based
motion to modify custody without an evidentiary hearing is threefold. Amarreh, 918
N.W.2d at 230-31 (citing Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 183-85 (Minn. App. 2011)).
First, we review de novo whethe r the district court accepted as true the allegations in the
moving party’s submissions. Id. at 230. Second, we review for an abuse of discretion the
district court’s determination that the movi ng party’s allegations failed to make a prima
facie case for the relief sought. Id. at 231. And third, we review de novo whether the
district court properly declined to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id.; see Geibe v. Geibe, 571
N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. App. 1997) (explaining that “the court must hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine the truth of the allegations” if the movant’s asserted facts establish a
prima facie case for custody modification).
Father initially argues that, in consider ing whether there was endangerment, the
district court failed to accept as true the allegations in his affidavit and supporting
documents. Specifically, father notes that the district court did not accept his assertions
that child experienced a subs tantial life change when he was diagnosed with autism in
2014; that mother intentionally fed child hot dogs although they made child ill; that mother

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neglects child by not using father’s recommended product to treat child’s hairline bumps;
and that mother attempted to “block” child’s county disability benef its. But in denying
father’s motion, the district court recited these allegations and explicitly stated: “The Court
has reviewed Father’s allegations and accepted them as true for purposes of this motion.”
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, the district court’s subsequent analysis assumed the truth of
father’s allegations but still determined th e allegations were insufficient to establish
endangerment. We therefore conclude, applyi ng de novo review, that the district court
properly accepted the truth of father’s allegations and supporting documents.3
Father also contends that the district cour t abused its discretion in concluding that
his allegations and supporti ng documents failed to show a prima facie case of
endangerment. A district court abuses its discretion if, among other things, it “misapplies
the law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.”
Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. App. 2019).
“The concept of endangerment is unusually imprecise, but a party must demonstrate
a significant degree of danger to satisfy the e ndangerment element of section
518.18(d)(iv).” Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (emphasis

3 Father also suggests that the district court made insu fficient findings to permit
“meaningful appellate review.” We disagree. When assessing whether a party seeking to
modify custody alleged a prima facie case, the district court must accept the moving party’s
allegations as true. Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d at 230. Therefore, at the prima-facie-case stage
of the proceeding, the district court does not find facts. Further, here, the district court
determined that father’s allegations “do not establish a prima facie case of endangerment.”
In conjunction with its consider ation of father’s specific claims, the district court’s order
provides adequate detail for appellate review.

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added) (quotations omitted); see Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d at 231 (expl aining that particular
facts in each case will determine whether endangerment exists).
Observing that a movant’s allegations mu st demonstrate a significant degree of
danger, the district court determined that father did not assert facts showing a prima facie
case of endangerment. The district court noted that mother’s act of taking child to Ghana
occurred long ago and was previously addresse d by a court order that removed mother’s
sole legal and physical custody. Moreover, the district court concluded that father’s other
allegations—that mother fed child hot dogs and did not use father’s preferred skin
product—did not “rise to the level of endangerment required for modification of custody.”
Upon thorough examination of father’s allegations and su pporting documents, we see no
abuse of discretion.
In his motion papers seeking custody mo dification, father alleges that mother
endangered child by taking him to Ghana, which according to father, caused child’s autism.
But the endangerment standard “is concerned with whether the child’s present environment
endangers the child[].” Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 285 (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv)).
Father’s allegation, involving events that oc curred six to ten years ago, does not concern
child’s present environment. Moreover, fath er’s conclusory claim that mother caused
child’s autism is wholly unsu pported by the records father submitted to the district court
with his motion. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007)
(affirming the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of a motion to modify custody where
the allegations of endangerment were conclusory); Weber, 653 N.W.2d at 811 (affirming
the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of a motion to modify custody where the motion

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was “devoid of allegations supported by a ny specific, credible evidence” (quotation
omitted)). The records here do not suggest that mother’s past actions caused child’s autism,
contrary to father’s characterization of these documents.
Similarly, although father asserts that child is allergic to hot dogs and submitted a
medical report to the district court in support of this claim, the medical report says nothing
of the sort. It does not mention hot dogs or allergies, and specifically states: “At this point
we do not have a definitive cause for [child ’s] vomiting.” Again, father’s conclusory
allegation that mother endange red child’s health by disr egarding a food allergy is
undermined by father’s own motion papers. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d at 292; Weber, 653
N.W.2d at 811.
Father’s remaining factual assertions—tha t mother did not trea t child’s “hairline
bumps” with father’s preferred product and that mother attempte d to block child’s
disability benefits in 2014—do not allege significant present danger. These allegations are
likewise insufficient to make a prima facie showing of endangerment.
In sum, father’s motion and supporting documents fail to allege that child was
presently endangered. Endang erment is a necessary elemen t of a prima facie case to
modify custody under section 518.18(d)(iv). Because we affirm the district court’s
determination that father failed to allege endangerment here, we need not address the other
elements of a prima facie case to modify custody. We conclude that the district court acted
within its discretion in determining that father failed to allege a prima facie case to modify
custody based on endangerment. See Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 285; Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d
at 231.

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Finally, we consider de novo whether the district court properly denied an
evidentiary hearing. See Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 185. Where the affidavits accompanying
a motion to modify custody ba sed on endangerment do not allege a prima facie case of
endangerment, a district court does not abus e its discretion in denying an evidentiary
hearing. Weber, 653 N.W.2d at 811; see Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 285-86. The district
court therefore properly denied father’s motion without an evidentiary hearing.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a “slight expansion”
of mother’s parenting time.

Father also challenges the district court’s order increasing mother’s parenting time.
The district court did not gran t mother’s full request for a dditional parenting time, but
recognized that a “slight expansion” of paren ting time would be in child ’s best interests.
Accordingly, the district court increased mother’s parenting time to include one additional
overnight each weekend that mother has child and one new overnight during the weeks that
father has child for the weekend. We see no error.
The district court is obligated to modify parenting time when a modification “would
serve the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2020); see Minn.
Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1 (2020) (“best interests” factors). But the district court has broad
discretion when determining whet her modification is in the child’s best interests, and its
decision will not be reve rsed absent an abuse of that discretion. Shearer v. Shearer, 891
N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App. 2017). “Reversible abuses of discretion include misapplying
the law or relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.” Id. (quotation
omitted).

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Here, mother requested “3 extra overnight s every 14 days” in her motion to modify
parenting time. The district court carefully considered mother’s request and noted that
mother was seeking a “signifi cant expansion.” But the c ourt also stated that it had
considered the statutory best interests fa ctors, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1, and
determined that a “slight expansion” of mother’s parenting time was in child’s best interests
“given [child’s] age,” and that such expansion “is unlik ely to impact the stability [child]
has obtained with Father’s home as his primary residence.”
Father contends that the district court misapplied th e law on parenting time and
should have restricted mother’s parenting time rather than expanding it. He also suggests
that mother’s motion was a “de facto motion to modify physical custody” and that the
district court erred when it failed to evaluate section 518.18(d)(iv) in expanding mother’s
parenting time.
Father’s arguments are without merit. Mother brought a motion to increase her
parenting time, and father’s appeal was taken from the district court’s grant of that motion;
the issue of restricting mother’s parenting time therefore is not properly before us. Thiele
v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (declining to consider matters not argued to
and considered by the district court). We are likewise unconvinced that mother’s motion
constitutes a de facto motion to modify custod y. A de facto moti on to modify custody
arises when, under “the totality of the circumstances,” the proposed modification involves
“a substantial change” to the existing custodial arrangement. M.J.H., 913 N.W.2d at 443.
Here, mother asked the district court for ad ditional parenting time, and she was granted
only a “slight expansion.” Furthermore, the di strict court did not apply the wrong statute

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as father claims; the court a pplied Minnesota Statutes secti on 518.17, subdivision 1, and
section 518.175, subdivision 5(b), which are the proper authorities for addressing a motion
to increase parenting time.
Our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion. The district court properly
exercised its discretion by expanding mother’s parenting time to serve child’s best interests.
Affirmed.