State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1188

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Arthur Jack,
Appellant.

Filed July 19, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-15693

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the victim’s
mother to testify and vouch for her daughter. We affirm.
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FACTS
The state charged appellant Michael Arthur Jack with first -degree criminal sexual
conduct for committing sexual penetration or sexual contact against a person un der 13
years of age, and second -degree criminal sexual conduct for committing multiple sexual
acts against a pe rson under 16 years of age with whom he had a significant relationship.
See Minn. Stat. § § 609.342, subd. 1(a) , .343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2008). These charges were
brought after N.S. disclosed during a CornerHouse interview that Jack, who was previously
married to N.S.’s mother , sexually abused her from when she was six or seven years old
until she was 13 or 14 years old.
Jack waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. Several
witnesses testified, including N.S.’s mother. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked
the mother whether she wondered if N.S.’s allegations could be untrue when she first heard
them. The mother responded, “No. . . . I don’t recall saying that but I probably was like,
oh, my God I can’t believe it, or it’s not untrue but there’s never a question in my mind
when [N.S.] came and told me. My daughter has always been able to come and talk to
me.” Defense counsel again asked the mother about her disbelief after the CornerHouse
interview:
Q: And at that time, same day, you were still expressing
surprise, right?
A: Disbelief, yes.
Q: Disbelief. You said that you hadn’t seen any signs of it,
right?
A: Right. Again, as a mom you think you catch everything.
You put filters on the computer, you do all that, you don’t
realize the monsters are in your house.
Q: You said that you didn’t know how it could have happened?
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A: Again, you’re quoting me like I’m saying – No, you are
taking it [out] of context. It’s disbelief, like how could this
have happened? I did everything I was supposed to do. I
thought I could catch all the signs. You don’t know that a
monster is in your house.

The state addressed the mother’ s reaction on redi rect examination, and defense
counsel objected:
Q: [Defense counsel] asked you about expressing disbelief
about saying it couldn’t be true. Do you think it’s untrue?
A: No
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
THE COURT: What’s the objection?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: She’s asking for a credibility
determination of a witness in this case.
THE COURT: I’m going to overrule the objection. I’m going
to accept the testimony as it goes to your questioning her about
that she didn’t think it could be true, not as to whether it
actually is true or not.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, Your Honor, if I may?
THE COURT: It’s not for the truth of the matter, it’s in
response to the door you opened.

The state asked the question again:
Q: So [defense counsel] asked you about learning about this
initially, expressing disbelief, thinking it couldn’t be true. Do
you believe it’s untrue?
A: I never once doubted [N.S.], no.
Q: And have you supported her since she disclosed this?
A: Every step of the way.

The district court later made a record explaining its reasons for overruling the
objection:
I did think the defense opened the door by asking those
questions. I also thought it was not for the truth of the matter
asserted whether the allegations actually were true or not, I was
not going to accept it or consider it for that, but it certainly did
[go to] her credibility as a witness based on what she had told
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police then and what she believed and that was, in my
understanding, what the state was asking that for. So I did
allow it for that purpose, the credibility of the witness.

The district court found Jack guilty on both counts and sentenced him to 172 months
in prison, the upper end of the presumptive range. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Jack argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting improper
vouching testimony.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and we
will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discret ion.” State v. Ali, 855
N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). The credibility of a witness is for the fact -finder to
determine; therefore , a witness cannot vouch for the credibility of another. State v.
Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998). Improper vouc hing testimony that
prejudices the defendant warrants a new trial. See Van Buren v. State , 556 N.W.2d 548,
552 (Minn. 1996) (reversing for a new trial because defendant was prejudiced by admission
of vouching testimony). Even when improper vouching testimony is admitted, we will not
reverse a conviction unless the appellant establishes “a reasonable possibility that the [fact-
finder] would have reached a different verdict had the wrongfully admitted testimony not
come in.” State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. 2019).
The district court first admitted the mother’s testimony because it did not go to the
truth of the matter asserted . The district court stated that the testimony related to the
mother’s first impression upon hearing the allegations and her credibility as a witness. In
its finding of facts, the district court wrote, “When she heard the allegations, [the mother]
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believed N.S.’s report, but she was in disbelief about the whole thing because she had not
seen any signs and thought that, as a mom, she would have seen some signs in her child
that she was being abused.” Therefore, the district court correctly determined that the
testimony did not relate to the t ruth of the matter asserted —whether the mother currently
believes N.S.—so it was not impermissible vouching testimony. Jack has not shown that
the district court abused its discretion.
The district court also admitted the testimony becaus e Jack opened the door on
cross-examination. “The opening -the-door doctrine is essentially one o f fairness and
common sense, based on the proposition that one party should not have an unfair advantage
and that the factfinder should not be presented with a misleading or distorted representation
of reality.” State v. Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d 425, 436 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Here, defense counsel asked the mother twice whether she thought that the initial
allegations were untrue. Defense counsel appears to have been trying to raise doubt about
Jack’s guilt by highlighting the mother’s initial d oubt. Therefore, fairness and common
sense would allow the mother to testify about how she did not doubt her daughter. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Jack opened the door to this
line of testimony on cross-examination.
Finally, even if there had been error, Jack has not shown that he was harmed. Jack,
citing Van Buren v. State, argues that the error was prejudicial because this was a case of
credibility. See 556 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. 1996). But in Van Buren, the supreme court
stated that the defendant was prejudiced because “[t]he evidence of Van Buren’s guilt in
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this case was close, and the jury’s verdict hinged on who the jury found more credible, [the
complainant] or Van Buren.” Id. at 551.
This case is distinguishable because there is substantial corroborating evidence.
N.S.’s testimony match es the same general accounts that several witnesses t estified she
told them. This includes N.S.’s friends who she initially told, the school nurse, the
CornerHouse interviewer, and the doctor who examined her. The district court also found
N.S. credible:
The Court finds N.S. to be a very credible witness. Although
she clearly was anguished and traumatized by her experiences,
her testimony was consistent and belie vable. She was
straightforward, regardless of whether what she said seemed to
support or negate the State’s case. She did not exaggerate or
embellish her report of [Jack]’s actions. She provided ample,
clear, details which were consistent with age -appropriate
perceptions of what she was experiencing at different ages.
N.S.’s testimony was also largely consistent with prior
statements . . . . She displayed no motive to fabricate and, in
fact, was reluctant to have the matter revealed.

N.S.’s testimony w as also corroborated by her mother testifying that N.S. was hysterical
when she said that she may be getting back together with Jack. N.S. also told her mother
that she would continue living with her grandmother if her mother and Jack got back
together.
Finally, the district court found Jack not credible in how he testified that he never
had any contact with N.S., even though he was her morning caretaker when she was four
to five years old. His testimony was contradicted by a photograph showing him with his
arm around her. The district court also found that he was not credible in testifying that, in
the nine to ten years of living at the home together, he was never in a room alone with her
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unless she happened to enter a room to ask him a question when he was playing video
games. Even if the mother’s testimony was admitted in error, Jack has not met his burden
in showing that he was prejudiced.
Affirmed.