State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1189

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stacie Rebecca Corbett,
Appellant.

Filed April 19, 2021
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File Nos. 64-CR-18-741; 64-CR-19-268

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s revocation of her probation , arguing that
the district court abused its discretion by revoking based on technical violations and
because the policies favoring continued probation outweigh the need for her confinement.
We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Stacie Rebecca
Corbett with two counts of financial-transaction-card fraud and one count of theft. Corbett
pleaded guilty to one count of financial-transaction-card fraud, and the remaining charges
were dismissed. The district court stayed imposition of a 13 -month sentence and placed
Corbett on probation for five years. As a condi tion of probation, Corbett was required to
remain law abiding.
In March 2019, the state charged Corbett with five criminal offenses, including
unlawful possession of a firearm. The charges were filed after the police located Corbett,
R.S. (the father of Corbett’s child ), and a firearm when executing a residential search
warrant. Corbett was prohibited from possessing a firearm due to a prior conviction for
aiding and abetting simple robbery.
Corbett pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm , and the remaining
charges were dismissed. The district court imposed a 60-month prison sentence, but stayed
execution of the sentence and placed Corbett on probation for seven years. Th at sentence

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constituted a downward dispositional departure. The di strict court ordered Corbett to
successfully complete a drug-court program as part of her probation.
Corbett admitted that by unlawfully possessing a firearm, she had violated the terms
of her probation in her fraud case. As a sanction, the district court ordered Corbett to serve
30 days in jail, but it continued the stay of imposition of sentence on Corbett’s fraud case.
The district court made successful completion of the drug -court program a condition of
Corbett’s probation in the fraud case.
Corbett started the drug-court program in April 2019. On January 23, 2020, the
drug court terminated Corbett from the program. The p robation department filed a
violation report alleging that Corbett was terminated for “multiple and ongoing violations
of program rules.” The report noted over a dozen drug -court violations, which occurred
between August 2019 and January 2020. The report stated that the most concerning
violations were Corbett’s “continued dishonesty about compliance with program
conditions and continued contact with [R.S.] despite multiple warnings, repeated sanctions
and orders from the Court.”
In February 2020, Corbett admitted that her termination from drug court violated
the terms of her probation . She acknowledged that the grounds fo r her termination
included: breaking a no-contact agreement, being “short on hours” and “meetings,” failure
to complete treatment requirements as directed, and unsatisfactory progress towards
program completion. The district court scheduled a contested di sposition hearing, but the
parties agreed to written submissions in lieu of a hearing.

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In arguing against execution of her prison sentences, Corbett noted that her life
“unraveled” after she suffered the death of her six-month old son in 2015. She
acknowledged that she had “used methamphetamine and heroin to push away her intense
emotions and quickly became addicted.” She started an abusive and codependent
relationship with R.S., the fath er of her one-year-old child. Corbett highlighted her early
successes in the drug -court program, which included completing inpatient treatment and
transitioning back into the community.
The district court revok ed Corbett’s probation and executed Corbett’s prison
sentences. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Corbett argues that the district court erred by revoking her probation because the
revocation was based on a single violation—termination from drug court—and the majority
of Corbett’s drug-court infractions were “technical.”
“The [district] court has br oad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 249 -50 (Minn. 1980). A district court
“abuses its discretion whe n its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
Before a district court revokes a d efendant’s probation, it must (1) “designate the
specific condition or conditions that were violated ”; (2) “find that the violation was
intentional or inexcusable ”; and (3) “find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the

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policies favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. We review de nov o whether a
district court made the required Austin findings. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605
(Minn. 2005).
As to the first two Austin factors, the district court revoked Corbett’s probation for
failing to successfully complete the drug -court progr am. Corbett admitted that her
termination from the program violated a condition of her probation. The district court
found the violation to be intentional and inexcusable. The court noted that Corbett
struggled with dishonesty in the program and that on two occasions , she violated a no -
contact order imposed to prevent her from contacting R.S., who was also struggling with
sobriety. The court found that Corbett’s second violation of the no -contact order was
“more problematic” because the contact was discovered after a random check of Corbett’s
phone and Corbett initially denied the contact. The record supports the district court’s
determination that Corbett intentionally and inexcusably violated the terms of her
probation.
Corbett focuses her argument on the third Austin factor. She asserts that the district
court erred by revoking her probation because she is a “very low risk to public safety,”
there are “ rehabilitation options outside of prison,” and revocation is contrary to the
“policies favoring probation.”
Once a district court finds an intentional or inexcusable violation of a specific
probationary condition, it must “determine whether the need for confinement outweighs
the policies favoring probation.” Id. at 606. In doing so, the district court “must balance
the probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring [her] rehabilitation

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and the public safety.” Id. at 606-07 (quotation omitted). The district court must bear in
mind that “the purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as
a last resort when treatment has failed.” Id. at 606 (quotation omitted). In deciding whether
to revoke probation, a district court should determine whether “confinement is necessary
to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender,” “the offender is in need
of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if [she] is confined,” or
“it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.”
Id. at 607 (quotation omitted).
The district court determined that Corbett need ed correctional treatment in a
confined setting. The court reasoned that Corbett had participat ed in community work
service and addiction programming while in jail following her termination from drug court.
The court stated that her participation was “consistent with her participation in the Drug
Court program” and that Corbett “most effectively engaged in treatment while in a confined
(inpatient) setting.” Although that rea soning suggests that Corbett might succeed in an
inpatient-treatment program outside of a correctional facility, Corbett acknowledged that
funding for inpatient treatment was unavailable and argued for “community-based
outpatient substance abuse and mental health services.” (Emphasis added.) The district
court’s finding that Corbett needed correctional treatment in a confined setting is supported
by the record.
The district court also determined that not revoking probation would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the violation. The court found as follows:

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[I]n light of the initial downward dispositional departure, and
given the gravity and number of these violations, simply
reinstating [Corbett] on probation with a correctiona l term
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation . . . .
Simply stated, placing [Corbett] back on traditional probation
. . . with fewer conditions and less supervision would [be]
ineffective. The basis for the initial downward departure –
particular suitability for treatment in the community setting –
has shown to be incorrect. Probation “empties the toolbox”
with Drug Court participants, and the program provides a level
of supervision and accountability not found under traditional
probation.

In reaching its determination, the district court was permitted to rely on the
underlying downward dispositional departure. See State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331
(Minn. App. 2015) (stating that the district court properly considered a “grant of a
downward dispositional departure when deciding whether to revoke probation”), aff’d, 883
N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). And Corbett herself acknowledged numerous grounds for her
termination from drug court, including violating a no-contact agreement, being “short on
hours” and “meetings,” failing to complete treatment requirements as directed, and making
unsatisfactory progress towards program completion. The district court’s finding that not
revoking probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of th e violation is supported
by the record.
Because the record supports the district court’s determinations that Corbett needed
treatment in a confined setting and that not revoking probation would unduly depreciate
the seriousness of the violation, we need not consider the district court’s determination that
confinement was necessary to protect the public . A district court need only rely on the
existence of one of the policy bases discussed in Modtland to support a determination that

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the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. See Modtland, 695
N.W.2d at 607 (using the disjunctive “or” in discussing the bases for revocation).
In conclusion, Corbett received a second chance from the district court when the
court continued her stay of imposition on her fraud case even though she had been charged
with a felony-level firearms offense months into her probationary term. In addition, t he
record shows that Corbett received many chances in drug court. Yet, she continued to
violate the rules of drug court and actively and dishonestly concealed her prohibited contact
with R.S. Given that the district court granted Corbett a downward dispositional departure
and sent her to the drug-court program to address her chemical issues—instead of sending
her to prison—after she was convicted of the felony firearms offense , we disagree that
Corbett’s drug-court infractions were “technical violations.”
Although the district court’s revocation of Corbett’s probation could seem like a
harsh outcome, the district court is entrusted to make such difficult decisions. Here, the
district court’s decision to revoke was based on detailed findings addressing the applicable
factors, and there is no basis for this court to conclude that the district court abused its
discretion.
Affirmed.