In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Harry Denton Lewis.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1209

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Harry Denton Lewis.

Filed February 16, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-MH-PR-19-459

Kathleen K. Rauenhorst, Rauenhorst & Associates, P.A., Roseville, Minnesota (for
appellant Harry Lewis)

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Timothy P. Carey, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his indeterminate commitment as mentally ill and da ngerous
by the district court. He argues that he does not meet the statutory requirements of Minn.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
Const. art. VI, § 10.

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Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 17 (2018), for commitment because respondent failed to establish
that (1) he caused or intended to cause harm and (2) he poses a risk of inflicting serious
harm on another. Appellant asks this court to reverse the order and dismiss the petition in
its entirety, or, in the alternative, he requests a remand for an order for a less restrictive
alternative. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Harry Lewis has a lengthy history of mental illness. One of several
psychologists familiar with this case diagnosed appellant with multiple disorders,
including: Antisocial Personality Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder, and Substance Abuse
Disorder. The psychologist stated that appellant also suffers distorted beliefs, paranoid
delusions, auditory hallucinations, command -based hallucinations, and visual
hallucinations; he has behavior manifestations of mood disturbances, including decreased
need for sleep , flight of ideas, rage, distractibility, and depression with multiple suicide
attempts.
Appellant’s mental -health and chemical -health issues have resulted in frequent
encounters with law enforcement, dating back to the late 1980s. Appellant lived in Ut ah
where he was physically and sexually violent to women on multiple occasions. After
serving a sentence under the supervision of the correctional department in Utah, appellant
moved to Minnesota. He has resided here for almost 20 years. Over this time, appellant
has almost always been under a type of civil commitment, residing either in the community
or in a secure facility. Despite this supervision, appellant continues to engage in dangerous
behavior and illicit drug and alcohol use. As one psychologist determined, “it is therefore

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nearly impossible to argue [appellant] does not pose a continuing risk to the public, as there
is no indication his violent behavior will cease, particularly should he continue to abuse
alcohol and illicit substances.”
Appellant was in the Minnesota Department of Corrections’ custody in 2019, and
upon his release from treatment, respondent State of Minnesota filed a petition requesting
an order committing appellant as a mentally ill and dangerous person. A hearing was held
on June 2, 2020, and the district court found appellant mentally ill and dangerous and
placed him under indeterminate commitment by order on August 18, 2020. This appeal
follows.
DECISION
“We review de novo whether there is clear and convincing eviden ce in the record
to support the district court’s conclusion that appellant meets the standards for
commitment.” In re Thulin , 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003). The record is
reviewed according to a clear -error standard of review of the district cour t’s findings of
fact, and this court reviews the case in the light most favorable to the findings of fact.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). Due deference
is given to the district court’s findings of fact, as the dist rict court is the best judge of the
credibility of witnesses. In re Civil Commitment of Crosby, 824 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Minn.
App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2013).
“A ‘person who is mentally ill’ means any person who has an organic disorder of
the brain or substantial psychiatric disorder.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a) (2018).
A person is considered mentally ill and dangerous if the person is mentally ill and

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who as a result of that mental illness presents a clear danger to
the safety of others as demonstrated by the facts that (i) the
person has engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to
cause serious physical harm to another and (ii) there is a
substantial likelihood that the person will en gage in acts
capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another.

Id., subd. 17(a) (2018) (emphasis added). Appellant does not challenge the fact that he is
mentally ill. Instead, appellant argues that respondent failed to prove that he engaged in
an overt act with intent to cause serious physical harm, and that respondent failed to prove
that there is a substantial likelihood that he will inflict serious harm on another in the future.
Appellant’s first argument is misplaced; the statute does not r equire that an
individual intend to cause physical harm. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that it
is not necessary that the person intend to, or even succeed in, causing serious physical
harm. In re Jasmer , 447 N.W.2d 192, 195 -96 (Minn. 1989). Later , this court reiterated
the same principle: “The person’s intent or the outcome of the action is not relevant to the
determination of whether the conduct meets the overt act requirement.” In re Civil
Commitment of Carroll, 706 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Minn. App. 2005). To satisfy the first
requirement, respondent must merely show that “the person has engaged in an overt act
causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.02,
subd. 17(a)(2)(i). Respondent satisfied this requi rement; the record is replete with
instances of violent conduct by appellant spanning over 30 years.
In its August 2020 order, the district court found that “[appellant] has engaged in
remote overt acts of violence that form part of the determination that he is a dangerous
person, including several sexual assaults that occurred over thirty years ago in the state of

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Utah.” The district court went on to state that this “initial concern about his dangerousness
is expanded by more recent conduct that has demo nstrated a danger to others.” For
example, in 2017, after being asked to leave a bar due to his aggressive conduct towards
other patrons, appellant held a pair of scissors over the bartender’s head and told her that
he would stab her, then rape her. In 2 018, he approached a vague acquaintance on the
street and began yelling obscenities and threats. He retreated after punching the man in the
face, but he returned with a large stick and continued the assault. During his transport to
jail, he threatened the arresting officers’ lives. According to the district court, the appellant
stated: “[Y]eah, because they brought me to jail and not him (the victim)[.] I’m not bullsh-
tting, somebody is going to f -ing die.” The record clearly supports the finding that
appellant “engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to
another” as required under Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(a)(2)(i).
The statute also requires a showing that “ there is a substantial likelihood that the
person will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another .” Id.,
subd. 17(a)(2)(ii). The district court stated several times in its order that the capacity for
serious harm to another is evident by individual instances of violent behavior. The district
court also stated that “[o]f particular concern, is that [appellant] has actually delivered on
these threats during his most recent time in the community.” Appellant was under
commitment as a person who suffered from mental illness with chemical dependency, with
community support from case management and probation officers, during both the 2017
and 2018 incidents. Additional violent episodes occurred while appellant was in the more
restrictive environment of the Anoka Metro Regional Treatme nt Center pending

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proceedings on this matter. According to the district court’s findings, appellant threw a
cup of water at a care provider, called her a “f-cking b-tch,” and continued berating her as
she walked away. The fact that appellant continues to engage in violent behavior despite
being under supervision—in the community and in secure facilities—supports the finding
that he has caused, and is capable of causing, harm to another.
At the commitment hearing, several psychologists presented diagnostic reports and
opinions regarding the threat that appellant continues to pose to the community. One
psychologist completed a 60 -day evaluation for the district court and opined, “multiple
unmitigated clinical risk factors remain present that likely further [appellant’s] risk for
engaging in violence.” Another psychologist submitted a report stating that appellant
presents with a substantial likelihood of engaging in future acts capable of inflicting serious
physical harm on another, and emphasized the point that over the past sixteen years, he
issued violent threats, including threats of sexual violence, and assault ed others. As the
district court found, this conduct “bear[s] a strong resemblance” to the actual sexual
violence appellant engaged in when he lived in Utah. And finally, one of the psychologists
who conducted a violence -risk assessment concluded that ap pellant’s likelihood for
recidivism was “substantially higher than the base rate . . . and at the high end of the scale.”
Based on the expert testimony from several psychologists, and appellant’s lengthy
history of violence in both Utah and Minnesota, the district court concluded that he met the
statutory requirements of Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17. The record clearly supports the

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district court’s decision to place appellant under indeterminate commitmen t as a mentally
ill and dangerous person.
Affirmed.