Abas Ibrahim Mohamed, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1226

Abas Ibrahim Mohamed, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 2, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-13-386

Stephen V. Grigsby, Northfield, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from an order denying pos tconviction relief following a stay of
adjudication and discharge from probation, appellant Abas Ibrahim Mohamed argues that
the district court erred by construing his mo tion to withdraw his gu ilty plea as a petition
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for postconviction relief and then dismissi ng his petition because postconviction relief is
not available to challenge a stay of adjudication. Because the plain language of Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.05 permits a timely motion to withdraw a plea at any time,
and because the relevant caselaw does not dictate that a rule 15.05 motion be construed as
a petition for postconviction relief following a stay of adjudication and discharge, we
conclude that the district court erred by co nstruing Mohamed’s request to withdraw his
guilty plea only as a petition for postconviction relief and refusing to address it as a motion
under rule 15.05. We therefore reverse an d remand for the district court to address
Mohamed’s rule 15.05 motion to withdraw his guilty plea, including whether the motion
was timely, and for further proceedings as necessary.
FACTS
The following facts are drawn from the plea hearing and the record regarding
Mohamed’s request to withdraw his guilty plea. Mohamed arrived as a refugee in 2006 and
is now a lawful permanent resident 1 of the United States. In September 2013, Mohamed
pleaded guilty to a fe lony fifth-degree controlled-substance crime. Mohamed asserts that
his plea counsel told him that the guilty plea would not affect his immigration status.
During the guilty plea colloquy, the district court asked Mohamed if his attorney had
informed him about the potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea and asked
whether Mohamed wanted to plead guilty “with full knowledge of the potential of
immigration consequences.” Mohamed respo nded that he had been informed of the

1 A lawful permanent resident—colloquially known as a green-card holder—is an
immigrant authorized to live and work indefinitely within the United States.
3
potential immigration consequences of his plea and wished to plead guilty. After accepting
his guilty plea, the district court stayed ad judication for up to five years and placed
Mohamed on probation. Three years later, in 2016, the district court discharged Mohamed
from probation. Mohame d thus was not adjudicated guilty of the controlled-substance
crime.
In 2019, after learning that his guilty plea would render him automatically
deportable even though he ha d never been convicted of th e crime under Minnesota law, 2
Mohamed moved the district court to, among other things, (1) permit him to withdraw his
guilty plea pursuant to Minneso ta Rule of Criminal Procedur e 15.05, subdivision 1, or
(2) schedule an evidentiary hearing fo r postconviction relief. Mohamed’s motion was
based on a claim of violation of his constitutional right to counsel under Padilla v.
Kentucky, where the United States Supreme Court held that an attorney’s failure to properly
advise criminal defendants of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a crime
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 559 U.S. 356, 368-69, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483
(2010).
The district court cons trued Mohamed’s rule 15. 05 motion as a petition for
postconviction relief under Minnesota Statut es section 590.01 (2 020) and directed

2 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), one convi ction for an aggravated
felony renders a lawful permanent resident deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iii) (2018).
The INA’s definition of “conviction” include s cases in which “adjudication of guilt has
been withheld” but the defenda nt “admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt”
and the judge imposed a punishment. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2018). Mohamed’s stay
of adjudication therefore constitutes a convi ction under the INA. Mohamed’s conviction
was for a felony fifth-degree controlled-s ubstance crime. This crime constitutes an
“aggravated felony” under the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2018).
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Mohamed to refile his motion as a petition pursuant to that chapter. Mohamed did. The
district court then denied the petition. The district court concluded that, because Mohamed
was not adjudicated guilty, he was not “convicted of a crime” and was therefore ineligible
for postconviction relief.
Mohamed appeals.
DECISION
We review denials of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.
See Pearson v. State , 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). “A [district court] abuses its
discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based
its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Mohamed’s petition for postconviction relief sought withdrawal of his guilty plea
based on ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla. Mohamed argues that the district
court erred by construing his plea-withdrawal motion as a petition for postconviction relief
and instead should have addre ssed his motion under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05. That rule
states, in relevant part:
At any time the court must allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the
satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct
a manifest injustice. Such a motion is not barred solely because
it is made after sentencing. If a defendant is allowed to
withdraw a plea after sentencing, the court must set aside the
judgment and the plea.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
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The state, in contrast, contends that the district court properly construed Mohamed’s
motion as a petition for postconviction relief and that, under the supreme court’s recent
decision in Johnston v. State , 955 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 2021 ), Mohamed is ineligible for
postconviction relief because he was not “convicted of a cr ime” as required by the
postconviction statute. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01.
We begin our analysis with Johnston. In that case, the supreme court considered
whether a defendant who received a stay of adjudication and was discharged from
probation could seek postconviction relief fo r ineffective assistance of counsel under
Padilla. Johnston, 955 N.W. 2d at 909, 913. Johnston, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded
guilty to of a deportable offense. Id. at 909-10. He received a stay of adjudication and was
placed on probation for one year. Id. at 910. Johnston then su ccessfully completed, and
was discharged from, probation. Id. Three days after his release from probation, Johnston
received notice that the federal government had initiated removal proceedings against him.
Id. He petitioned for postconviction relief, s eeking to withdraw his plea under Padilla,
arguing that his attorney did not compet ently advise him about the immigration
consequences of his plea and th at he therefore received ine ffective assistance of counsel.
Id.
The supreme court held that Johnston was not eligible for postconviction relief. Id.
at 913. To do so, it interprete d the language in the postconviction-relief statute providing
that “a person convicted a crime . . . may commence a proceeding to secure relief.” Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. The supreme court ob served that a stay of adjudication does not
constitute a conviction, explaini ng that “[i]f adjudication is stayed a guilty plea is not
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recorded because there is, by definition, no adjudication of guilt, and therefore no
conviction.” Johnston, 955 N.W. 2d at 911 (quotation omitted). And, the supreme court
reasoned, because Johnston did not have a conviction, he was not “a person convicted of a
crime” under the plain meaning of that phras e and was thus was not eligible to seek
postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01. Id. at 913.
Had Mohamed sought relief pursuant to chapter 590, Johnston would dictate denial
of his petition. As in Johnston, Mohamed received a stay of adjudication and was
discharged from probation before seeking withdrawal of his plea. He therefore was not “a
person convicted of a crime,” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, and is thus ineligible for postconviction
relief. But this case is pr ocedurally distinct from Johnston. Unlike Johnston, Mohamed
sought to withdraw his plea under rule 15. 05 and sought postconviction relief only when
the district court required him to reframe his motion as a postconviction petition.
The distinction is important because the supreme court in Johnston raised the
possibility of a rule 15.05 motion following a stay of adjudication and discharge, and, while
the court did not approve such an approach, neither did it foreclose it. In his dissent, Justice
Thissen observed that, at oral argument, the supreme court prompted the parties to address
whether Johnston could have moved to withdraw his plea under rule 15.05. Johnston, 955
N.W.2d at 915 n.2 (Thissen, J., dissenting). Justice Thissen wrote:
Whether a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was
available to Johnston to challenge a guilty plea that resulted in
a stay of adjudication after he had completed the conditions of
his probation and the stay (and case) disappeared is a question
we have not answered, and the court does not reach the issue
in this case.

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Id. Justice Thissen continued, “[I]f a Rule 15. 05 motion were available to Johnston, the
district court readily could have treated Johnston’s postconviction motion under section
590.01 seeking to vacate the guilty plea as a Rule 15.05 motion and addressed the merits
accordingly.” Id.
In response, the majority disagreed that postconvictio n relief was available under
section 590.01, and wrote:
However, Johnston does not have a conviction, but a vacated
stay of adjudication, and there is no procedural mechanism for
the district court to vacate a va cated stay of adjudication. As
the dissent suggests, if a Rule 15.05 motion was available to
Johnston, the district court c ould have addressed that motion
under section 590.01. This issue is not before us.

Id. at 913 n.5.
Thus, the issue of the availa bility of a rule 15.05 motion to seek plea withdrawal
following a stay of adjudi cation was not answered in Johnston but is squarely before us
now. We thus must determine whether Mo hamed could pursue a rule 15.05 motion to
withdraw a plea or was limited to a petiti on for postconviction relief, for which he was
ineligible.
We look first to the rule at issue. “In in terpreting the rules of criminal procedure,
we look first to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” See State v. Lee, 929 N.W.2d
432, 439 (Minn. 2019) (quotat ion omitted). We interpret cour t rules using the rules of
grammar and the common meanings of words and phrases. See id. “If the language is plain
and unambiguous, we follow the plain language of the rule.” See id.
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Rule 15.05 states that “[a]t any time the court must allow a defendant to withdraw
a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. ” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1 (emphases
added). Under the plain language of the rule, defendants may move to withdraw their plea
at any time provided the motion is timely. Noth ing in the rule stat es that a motion to
withdraw a plea following a stay of adjudi cation and discharge ca n only be brought by
postconviction petition.
But the state argues that caselaw dictates that a postconvicti on petition is the only
avenue available to seek plea withdrawal in those circumstances. The state relies on James
v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 2005). In James, the appellant pleaded guilty to and was
convicted of a deportable offense and his stay ed prison sentence was ultimately executed
following violation of probation. Id. at 725-26. He then moved to withdraw his plea under
rule 15.05, subdivision 1, based on his challenge to the imposition of a conditional-release
term as part of his sentence. Id. at 726. In analyzing whet her James’s plea-withdrawal
request was time-barred, the supreme court wr ote that, “after the defendant has been
sentenced, the motion to withdraw the plea must be raised in a petition for postconviction
relief.” Id. at 727. The supreme court went on to conclude that James’s plea-withdrawal
request was timely. Id. at 728.
But, unlike the defendant in James, see id. at 726, Mohamed was never sentenced.
In Dupey v. State , the supreme court concluded that a stay of adjudication “is not a
judgment of conviction or [a] sentence” fo r purposes of the limitations provision of the
postconviction statute. 868 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Minn. 2015). And the supreme court reaffirmed
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that ruling in Johnston, 955 N.W.2d at 911-12. Accord ingly, because Mohamed was not
sentenced, James does not dictate that Mohamed’s pl ea-withdrawal request had to be
brought via a petition for postconvicti on relief. The state’s reliance on James is therefore
misplaced.
Mohamed, in turn, argues that another case, Campos v. State, authorizes a rule 15.05
motion here. 816 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 2012). In that case, Reyes Campos pleaded guilty to
a deportable crime without having been info rmed by his counsel about the immigration
consequences of his plea and without having been questioned by the district court about
his understanding of the immigration consequences of his plea. Id. at 483; see also Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)(l) (requiring a di strict court, before accepting a guilty plea,
to inquire about the defendant’s understanding of the immigration consequences of a plea).
The district court accepted Reyes Campos’s plea, stayed imposition of sentence, and placed
him on probation. Id. at 484. Months later, Reyes Cam pos was detained by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. Id. About nine months after his guilty plea and the district
court’s disposition of his case , Reyes Campos move d to withdraw his guilty plea under
rule 15.05, subdivision 1, on the ground of ineffective a ssistance of counsel under the
Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Padilla and on the ground of violation of rule
15.01. Id. at 485, 499. The supreme court held that Padilla does not apply retroactively and
denied Reyes Campos relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 499. But the
supreme court remanded to the district cour t the question of whether Reyes Campos was
10
entitled to withdraw his plea due to lack of compliance with rule 15.01, subdivision 1(6)(l).
Id. at 500.3
Mohamed argues that, just as Reyes Campos was permitted to pursue plea
withdrawal under rule 15.05 following a guilty plea and stay of imposition of sentence, he
can pursue plea withdrawal under rule 15.05 following his guilty plea and stay of
adjudication. But Campos is procedurally different from this case. Unlike Mohamed, Reyes
Campos did not have a stay of adjudication and had not been discharged from probation at
the time he brought his rule 15.05 motion. Id. at 484 (stating that Reyes Campos was placed
on probation for three years). Moreover, the supreme court in Campos did not discuss the
postconviction statute or its possible application. Campos therefore does not answer
whether a rule 15.05 motion must be tr eated as a postconviction petition in the
circumstances here.
In sum, we conclude that Campos does not authorize a rule 15.05 motion following
a stay of adjudication and discharge. But, at the same time, the state has not persuaded us
that a rule 15.05 motion must be construed as a petition for postconviction relief when the
defendant has been neither convicted nor sentenced. We therefore conclude that Mohamed
could move to withdraw his guilty plea under rule 15.05, rather than via a postconviction
petition, provided his motion was timely.
The district court therefore erred by co nstruing Mohamed’s rule 15.05 motion to
withdraw his plea as a petition for postconvic tion relief, for which he was ineligible.

3 In remanding, the supreme court emphasized the “unique facts” of the case, where the
state conceded error and was not arguing that the issue was waived. Id.
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Instead, the district court should have addressed Mohamed’s ru le 15.05 motion. We
therefore remand the matter for the district court to address Mohamed’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea under rule 15.05, including whether the motion was timely, and for further
proceedings as necessary.
Reversed and remanded.