State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1232

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nicholas Scott Thompson,
Appellant.

Filed July 26, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-CR-18-159

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Thomas J. Prochazka, Jackson County Attorney, Jackson, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s determination that appellant was competent
to waive counsel but incompetent to stand trial, appellant argues that the district court erred

2
by finding that he was incompetent to stand trial. Because the district court failed to apply
the proper competency standard, we reverse and remand the competency determinations.
FACTS
In September 2018, the state charged a ppellant Nicholas Thompson with three
counts of second-degr ee murder, alleging that he strangl ed his mother. Since then, the
criminal proceedings have cen tered on the issue of Thomps on’s competency. Given the
issues on appeal, we first summarize the proceedings that have occurred thus far and then
address the district court’s competency determinations in June 2020.
After he was charged in 2018, Thom pson underwent multiple competency
evaluations. The evaluators opined that Thompson was not competent to proceed because
he lacked the ability to rationally consult with counsel. Thompson objected and requested
a contested competency hearing. At a non-evidentiary court appearance in February 2019,
the district court concluded that Thomps on was incompetent to proceed based on the
evaluations. Thompson appealed the decision to this court, arguing that the district court
erred by not holding a conteste d hearing. In an order opin ion, this court agreed with
Thompson. We reversed and remanded the matte r of competency to the district court for
the purpose of holding a contested competency hearing.
After remand, the district court set a compet ency hearing to be he ld in June 2020.
Prior to the hearing, Thompson asked to re present himself. The district court asked
Thompson questions rega rding the nature of a competency hearing. 1 For instance, the

1 The district court inquired of Thompson at a court appearance on June 3, and again prior
to the evidentiary hearing on June 9.

3
district court asked Thomps on to describe the compet ency hearing, and Thompson
responded, “the contested competency hearing is where . . . the burden of proof is to prove
whether or not I’m competent to stand trial for criminal charges.” When asked what types
of evidence would be heard at the hearing, Thompson said, “witness testimony . . . other
evidence may be presented . . . documents , reports, and the like.” Thompson also
acknowledged that he understood that he would be held to the same standard as an attorney.
After finding that Thompson “does understand th e nature of today’s hearing and that he
wishes to represent himself regarding this hearing,” the district court allowed Thompson
to “represent himself as long as he follows [the] rules of de corum and evidence.” In its
written order after the hearing, the district c ourt memorialized the ba sis for its decision,
explaining that Thompson was intelligent, able to follow court procedures, able to function
when not affected by his false beliefs, and understood the nature of a competency hearing:
The Court considered whether a person who may be
incompetent can make a knowing, intelligent waiver of his
right to an attorney . The doctors who met with Thompson
found him to be inte lligent, able to follo w court procedures,
and able to function very capabl[y] when it did not relate to his
false beliefs. Further, Thompson never wavered in his desire
to represent himself or in his understanding of what the
competency hearing was about.

The district court never considered whethe r Thompson exhibited a reasonable degree of
rational understanding that could enable him to consult with counsel.
At the hearing, the district court asked Thompson to present evidence first.
Thompson chose not to call any witnesses, did not present testimony himself, and offered
only a single exhibit: a June 2015 request fo r information from the New Jersey Motor

4
Vehicle Commission regarding a particular vehicle. The state did not object to the single
piece of evidence, but reserved its right to challenge the relevance of this document to a
determination of competency. The district court received Thompson’s exhibit. The state
then presented the testimony of five witnesses, all of whom were forensic examiners who
previously evaluated Thompson. The state also introduced into evidence the competency
evaluations prepared by those examiners. All the evaluators reached the same conclusion
in their evaluations: Thompson was incompetent because he lacked the ability to rationally
consult with counsel.
After the contested competency hearing, the district court issued an order
memorializing its prehearing determinati on that Thompson was competent to waive
counsel and setting forth its posthearing analys is regarding Thompson’s competency to
stand trial. Relying on the evaluations and testimony of the five examiners, the district
court found that Thompson was experiencing delusional mental disorders. The district
court noted that Thompson had repeatedly refused to participate in treatment for his mental
illness. According to the district court, Th ompson’s delusional beliefs about the criminal
justice system prevented him from rationally co nsulting with counsel. The district court
found Thompson incompetent to proceed, and Thompson appeals.
DECISION
Thompson argues that the district court erred when it found him incompetent to
stand trial. Because the district court failed to apply the correct standard for determining
whether Thompson was competent to waive his right to counsel, we conclude that the

5
district court improperly allowed Thompson to represent himself at the competency
hearing.2
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee that a person cannot stand
trial if deemed incompetent by a district court. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113
S. Ct. 2680, 2685 (1993) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S. Ct. 836, 838
(1966)); State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 170-74 (Minn. 1997). Likewise, the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a defendant’s right to counsel, and a person
cannot waive the constitutional right to representation if incompetent to make that decision.
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 113 S. Ct. at 2687; Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 170; State v.
Thornblad, 513 N.W.2d 260, 262-63 (Minn. App. 1994).
The competency standard for a person to stand trial is the same standard as the one
used to determine comp etency to waive the right to counsel. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 391,
113 S. Ct. at 2682; Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171 (quoting Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 113
S. Ct. at 2682); see also Thornblad, 513 N.W.2d at 262-63 (concluding that because the
standard for competency to stand trial is the same standard as the one used to determine
competency to waive counsel, the district court erred in concluding that the defendant was
competent to stand trial but not competent to waive counsel). To determine that a person
is competent to stand trial or that a person is competent to waive the constitutional right to

2 On appeal, Thompson’s counsel argues that the district court erred in finding Thompson
incompetent to stand trial because the dist rict court applied different standards for
competency to stand trial and for competency to waive counsel. Rather than request
remand for another competency hearing, however, Thompson’s counsel requests that this
court allow him to stand trial. We agree that the district court erred, but to remedy this
error, a new hearing is required.

6
counsel, the district court must make each of the following two conclusions: (1) the person
has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding;” and (2) the person has “a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396, 113 S. Ct. at 2685 (quoting
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 789 (1960)); see also Camacho,
561 N.W.2d at 171; Thornblad, 513 N.W.2d at 262-63.
In this case, the district court did not consider the first part of the required
competency standard when it determined Thompson was competent to waive counsel. This
contravenes Godinez, Camacho, and Thornblad, which require that courts consider both
components of the co mpetency standard when determ ining competency to waive a
constitutional right. We therefore conclude th at the district court erred when it deemed
Thompson competent to waive his right to co unsel because the district court failed to
consider and inquire regarding whether Thompson presently exhibited an ability to consult
with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
In reaching this conclusion, we recogni ze that while the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure include a person’s ability to “rationally consult with counsel” in the
second subdivision regarding competency to stand trial, Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2,
the rules do not explicitly includ e this in the first subdivisi on regarding waiver, Minn. R.
Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 1. To the extent that the state interprets Rule 20.01, subdivisions 1
and 2, as establishing two diffe rent standards of competency, one to waive counsel and a
different one to stand trial, we decline to adopt this interpretation based on the rejection of
similar arguments in Godinez, Camacho, and Thornblad. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398,

7
113 S. Ct. at 2685 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’ s view that the standard for competency to
stand trial differs from the standard for competency to waive counsel and declaring that the
Ninth Circuit “errs in applying two different competency standards”); Camacho, 561
N.W.2d at 172 (rejecting Camacho’s request for a differentiation of competency standards
and Camacho’s suggestion that—unlike the sta ndard for competency to stand trial—the
standard for competency to waive counsel n eed only include “a determination that a
defendant would be competent to waive couns el, considering the de fendant’s individual
ability to comprehend and waive this right”); Thornblad, 513 N.W.2d at 262-63 (rejecting
the argument that competency to waive counsel must be measured by a different standard
than competency to stand trial). We cannot adopt an interpretation of the rules that allows
a district court to determin e competency without considering the person’s present ability
to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.3
Because the district court erred by allowing Thompson to repres ent himself at the
competency hearing, the entire h earing was procedurally invalid. 4 We therefore reverse
both of the district court’s competency determinations, and remand to the district court for

3 It is not immediately clear whether the st ate distinguishes between waiving counsel at
trial and waiving counsel at a competency heari ng. To the extent the state does so argue,
we are not convinced that separate standard s can apply. We are aware of no authority—
and the state cites none—that distinguishes between a constitutional right to counsel at one
critical stage in a criminal proceeding from the constitutional right to counsel at a different
critical stage in a criminal proceeding. Given the arguments presented to this court and the
authority relied on in the parties’ briefs, we decline to adopt a new legal rule today that
establishes two different competency standard s for waiver of counsel at two different
stages of a criminal proceeding.
4 We note that reversal of th e denial of one’s right to co unsel or self-representation does
not require a showing of prejudice. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171 (citing Flanagan v.
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1056 (1984)).

8
further proceedings, including another comp etency hearing, w ith Thompson properly
represented by counsel.
Reversed and remanded.