State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1238

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Santacruz Espinoza,
Appellant.

Filed August 9, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-18-5024

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Pamela L. Foss, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Daniel Espinoza sent a video to a child of himself masturbating and—
after law enforcement learned of this exchange—pleaded gu ilty to electronic solicitation
of a child. But before sentencing, Espinoza moved to withdraw his plea. The district court

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denied his motion, finding that withdrawal was neither necessary to correct a manifest
injustice nor fair and just. Espinoza appeals. Because the facts admitted in Espinoza’s
plea colloquy support the inference that he se nt the video of himself masturbating to the
victim with the intent to arouse a person’s sexual desires, we affirm.
FACTS
After receiving a report that a 14 year old (t he victim) sent pictures of herself to an
adult—later identified as appellant Daniel Espinoza—for money, police started an
investigation. In interviewing the victim, o fficers learned that Espinoza offered to be her
“sugar daddy,” asked her to send pictures of herself in exchange for money, and sent her a
video of himself masturbating. Based on this information, the state charged Espinoza with
engaging in electronic communications with a child relating to or describing sexual
conduct (count I) and distributing material re lating to or describing sexual conduct to a
child (count II).1
Prior to trial, the state offered Espino za a plea agreement. In exchange for
Espinoza’s plea of guilty to either count, the state would agree to a reduced sentence.
Espinoza accepted the deal and entered a guilty plea to coun t I. At the plea hearing,
Espinoza described the facts establishing his guilt for the offense:
I had told her that if she was old enough, if she was 18, I would
send her more money and I coul d be her sugar daddy if she
was 18. And then that’s when she got into that conversation of
asking for other stuff and—othe r requirements and I told her
no. . . . And she started—we started—she started discussing
pictures for money and that’s how everything turned out.

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2)-(3) (2018).

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But when the prosecutor asked Espinoza about the types of pictures the victim had sent, he
replied: “I can’t really say because none of the pictures were really confirmed on what she
talked. I never said nude pictures. I just said pictures.” After conferring with his attorney,
Espinoza instead entered a plea to count II.
After the court reaffirmed that Espino za understood the crim e to which he was
pleading guilty and the rights he was waiving in entering his plea, the state continued its
questioning:
STATE: Mr. Espinoza, talking about that same time
period as before, September 25, 2018 to
October 15th of 2018, you were talking with
a minor who was between the ages of 13 and
14 during that period; is that right?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
STATE: Via Snapchat?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
STATE: And at some point did you send her a video?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
STATE: And what was that video of?
DEFENDANT: It was a video of me masturbating.
STATE: Okay. Would you agree that that video
constituted sexual conduct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.

Based on the plea petition and Espinoza’s plea colloquy, the district court found a sufficient
factual basis for the plea and that Espinoza entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. The court deferred acceptance of the plea until sentencing and ordered a
presentencing investigation report and a sex offender evaluation.
But despite pleading guilty, Espinoza to ld the presentence investigation report
writer that he did not discuss sex or have se xual conversations with the victim or send a
video of himself masturbating. He also stated that he only admitted to the crime to obtain

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the plea deal and wanted to wi thdraw his plea. And during his sex offender evaluation,
Espinoza again denied having sexual conversations with any minors via Snapchat or other
social media. But Espinoza admitted to accidentally sending the masturbation video to the
victim.
Espinoza then moved to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, claiming that (1) at
the plea hearing, he did not give an accurate description of the factual basis of what
happened; (2) he was told by law enforcement that he wo uld not be charged with the
crimes; and (3) he was not guilty of either cr ime. At a hearing on the motion, the state
argued that there was a sufficient factual basi s for the plea because Espinoza admitted to
sending the video to the victim. Additionally, the state noted that in the six months since
Espinoza had entered his plea, the victim moved out of state and was now unavailable as a
witness. Allowing Espinoza to withdraw his plea, the state argued, would be prejudicial to
its case. Espinoza relied on his affidavit and did not present further argument.
The district court denied Espinoza’s moti on. Withdrawal of the plea, the court
determined, was neither necessary to correct a manifest injustice nor would be fair and just.
The court found that although Espinoza “struggled to admit to facts” in relation to count I,
he admitted to sending the vi deo to the minor victim, “agr eed that the video contained
sexual conduct[,] and that he knew he was sending it to a child.” And despite Espinoza’s
request to withdraw his plea, the district court found that he “provided no explanation for
pleading guilty to the charge under oath, nor raised deficiencies in his plea,” and “failed to
show how the plea entered . . . was inaccura te, involuntary, or unintelligently made.”

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Following its decision, the district court sentenced Espinoza acco rding to the plea
agreement.2
Espinoza appeals.
DECISION
Espinoza assigns error to the district cour t’s denial of his mo tion to withdraw his
guilty plea, arguing that becaus e he did not admit to an esse ntial statutory element of the
crime—sending the video with an “intent to arouse”—there is an insufficient factual basis
to support his plea. As such, Espinoza asserts, his plea was invalid. According to Espinoza,
not only was the district court’s acceptance of his plea a manifest injustice, but allowing
him to withdraw his plea would be fair and just.
Although a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, the
district court must allow the defendant to withdraw th eir plea to correct a “manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. And even where withdrawal is not necessary
to correct a manifest injustice, a district court may allow a defendant to withdraw their plea
before sentencing if doing so would be fair and just. Id., subd. 2. We address Espinoza’s
arguments under each standard in turn.

2 The district court sentenced Espinoza to 15 months’ imprisonment, stayed for five years
of supervised probation. Espinoza was also required to serve 120 days in jail (with credit
given for four days already served), pay fines, and follow the conditions established by the
court and as recommended by the sex offende r evaluator, which included restricting
Espinoza’s use of social media and barring any unsupervised contact with minors.

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Manifest Injustice
A manifest injustice arises when a guilty plea is invalid—that is, when the plea is
not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
The appellant bears the burden of pr oving that the plea was invalid. Id. Here, Espinoza
only disputes the accuracy of his plea. A plea is considered accurate if it is supported by a
“proper factual basis.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). In turn, a plea
is supported by a proper factual basis if there are “sufficient facts on the record to support
a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead
guilty.” State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 34 9 (Minn. 2003) (quo tation omitted). But
“when the defendant makes stat ements that negate an esse ntial element of the charged
crime,” the factual basis for a plea is insufficient. Id. at 350. Whether a defendant’s plea
was valid is a question of law which we review de novo. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
We begin our analysis by identifying the elements of the crime to which Espinoza
pleaded guilty. To convict a person of elect ronic solicitation of a child by distributing
material that relates to or describes sexu al conduct, the state must show that the
defendant: (1) used the internet , a computer, or other electronic device; (2) to distribute
“any material, language, or communication, in cluding a photographic or video message”
relating to or describing sexual conduct to a child; (3) with the intent to arouse the sexual
desire of any person. Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(3). Espinoza admitted in his plea
colloquy to the first and second elements of the offense a nd does not dispute them on
appeal. Only the third element—the “intent to arouse”—remains for consideration.

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The parties agree that Espi noza did not specifically admit to sending the victim the
video with the intent to arouse a person’s sexual desires. But even when a defendant does
not directly admit to an elem ent of the offense, “a distri ct court may nevertheless draw
inferences from the facts adm itted to by the defendant.” Rosendahl v. State ,
955 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. App. 2021) (citing Nelson v. State , 880 N.W.2d 852, 861
(Minn. 2016)).
A review of the plea hearing transcript s upports the inference that Espinoza intended
to arouse a person’s sexual desires when sending the video to the victim. When Espinoza
entered his plea to count I, he admitted to te lling the victim that he could be her “sugar
daddy if she was 18,” and discussing pictures for money. Then, when entering his plea to
count II, Espinoza admitted that he sent the vi deo of himself mastur bating to the victim
and conceded that the video constituted sexual conduct.3 Given the context of Espinoza’s
earlier admissions, it is difficult to imagine wh at purpose such a video could have, other
than to arouse a person’s sexual desires.
Despite this, Espinoza asserts that the district court could infer that he sent the video
by mistake or with the intent to “disturb or harass the child.” But the facts admitted in the
plea colloquy do not suppo rt these conclusions.4 And even if Espinoza intended to send

3 Although Espinoza contends that he never admitted that the contents of his
communications with the victim were sexual in nature, the transcript directly contradicts
that assertion. When the state asked wh ether the video constitu ted sexual conduct,
Espinoza replied in the affirmative.
4 Furthermore, because Espinoza did not admit to the contents of the complaint (where he
allegedly claimed to have sent the video to the victim accidentally), the district court could
not consider those assertions when de termining whether the plea was valid. Rosendahl,
955 N.W.2d at 300.

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the video to another adult, “the intent to arouse requirement applies to any person, not just
the adult and child engaging in the communication.” State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914,
922 (Minn. 2017).5
Because the facts admitted at the plea hearing support the inference that Espinoza
sent the video with the intent to arouse a person’s sexual desires, the district court did not
err by concluding that Espinoza’s plea was ac curate and that plea withdrawal was not
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
Fair and Just
When determining whether withdrawal of a plea would be fair and just, the district
court must consider the reasons the defendant provides to support withdrawal and whether
withdrawal would prejudice the state. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. We review a district
court’s determination under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, and
reverse “only in the rare case.” Id. (quotation omitted). A court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is not supported by the facts in the
record. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019). Under the fair-and-just
standard, the appellant bears the burden of producing reasons to support withdrawal, while

5 Espinoza also cites to State v. Muccio to support his argument that because he did not
explicitly admit his intent in sending the video, the district court’s application of the statute
was overbroad and facially invalid. 890 N.W.2d at 928-29 (c oncluding that the statute is
not overly broad, in part, be cause the specific-intent requirement ensures that protected
speech is not regulated). But the court may, and did in this instance, establish Espinoza’s
intent by inference from the facts admitted at the plea hearing. Rosendahl,
955 N.W.2d at 299.

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the state bears the burden of showing that prejudice would be caused by withdrawal.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97.
Espinoza identified two reasons to support th e withdrawal of his plea: (1) he did not
give an accurate description of the factual basis of his plea; and (2) he was not guilty of the
offense. But as explained above, the reco rd does not indicate that Espinoza’s plea was
inaccurate or that he is innocent. The fa cts admitted in Espinoza’s plea colloquy are
sufficient for the district court to infer that Espinoza sent the video of himself masturbating
with the intent to arouse a person’s sexual desires. As such, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by concluding that Espinoza did not provide adequate support for withdrawal
of his plea under the fair-and-just standard.6
In sum, the facts admitted in Espinoza’s plea colloquy support the inference that he
sent the video of himself masturbating to the victim with the intent to arouse a person’s
sexual desires. Because allowing Espinoza to withdraw his plea is neither necessary to
correct a manifest injustice nor would be fair and just, the district court did not err by
denying Espinoza’s motion to withdraw his plea.
Affirmed.

6 Because we conclude that Espinoza failed to demonstrate fair and just reasons to support
withdrawal of his plea, we do not address whether the state showed that a plea withdrawal
would result in prejudice. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98.