Itasca County, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1243

Itasca County,
Respondent,

vs.

Itasca County Employees’ Association,
Appellant.

Filed May 3, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CV-20-228

Jennifer C. Moreau, Scott M. Lepak, Barna, Guzy & Steffen Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Jane C. Poole, Andrew, Bransky & Poole, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Peterson,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Itasca County Employees Associ ation (ICEA) appeals the district court’s
order vacating an arbitrator’s grievance award and remedial award in a labor dispute with

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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respondent-employer Itasca County (the county ). Because we conclude that the district
court erred in determining that the grievanc e was rendered moot by the parties’ adoption
of a successor collective bargai ning agreement and in concluding that the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of the arbitrator’s authority, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
ICEA represents approximately 25 superv isory employees who work for the county.
These employees are “essential” under Minneso ta law and cannot strike. They must
resolve any contract disputes through the process of interest arbitration.1
In 2016, ICEA and the coun ty entered into a collective bargaining agreement that
would remain in effect through December 31, 2018 (the 2016-2018 CBA). One of the
terms of the 2016-2018 CBA provided IC EA members with a choice among several
specific health-insurance options . Additionally, the 2016-2018 CBA stated that if “the
County Board decides to change insurance carriers, it is u nderstood and agreed that the
County shall continue to provide equivalent coverage to the present hospital/medical or
dental insurance covering the employees under [the 2016-2018 CBA], if such alternative
should become available.” In the event of disputes, th e 2016-2018 CBA established a
grievance procedure, which included the oppo rtunity for appeal to binding arbitration
governed by the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 179A.01-.60 (2020).

1 Interest arbitration is used to negotiate the terms of a contract, whereas grievance
arbitration is used to resolve disputes relati ng to the interpretation or application of terms
in a contract. See Metro. Airports Comm’n v. Metro. Airports Police Fed’n , 443 N.W.2d
519, 526 (Minn. 1989) (Simonett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

3
The county’s insurance carri er unexpectedly dissolved, effective June 30, 2018. On
June 28, 2018, the parties entered into a memorandum of understanding (the MOU) where
they agreed that the existing insurance options would be replaced by specific plans with a
new carrier.
Because the change in insurance carriers caused a 15% increase in premium costs,
the county requested bids from other insurance carriers for 2019. During this process, the
county discovered that it could save more than $700,000 in annual premiums by
eliminating some plans and offering only hi gh-deductible plans, and by changing its
pharmacy network. From October to December 2018, the county approached each of the
county’s bargaining units with a proposal to make these modifications for the insurance
year beginning on January 1, 2019. Bargaining units repr esenting 84% of the county’s
employees agreed to the proposed changes by early December 2018. But three bargaining
units, including ICEA, rejected the county’s proposal.
On December 12, 2018, the county emailed ICEA’s pres ident advising that the
county’s board had voted to eliminate tw o existing insurance plans for all county
employees. With the exception of ICEA, the bargaining units that initially rejected the
county’s proposal ultimately agreed to the changes.
ICEA filed a grievance on December 19, 2018 , alleging that the county had violated
the 2016-2018 CBA by unilaterally reducing its health-insurance options to the high-
deductible plans. Th e county denied the grievance, an d ICEA appealed the grievance to
arbitration. Effective January 1, 2019, ICEA employees covered by the eliminated health-
insurance plans were required to change their coverage to one of the high-deductible plans.

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The parties also reached an impasse in negotiating the successor collective
bargaining agreement (the successor CBA)—which would have commenced on January 1,
2019—in large part due to the same dispute about health-care options. While contract
negotiations were stalled, the county also ch anged the life insurance benefit provided to
ICEA members.
The Bureau of Mediation Services certified to interest arbitration the issue of health-
insurance plans under the successor CBA. Then, a single arbitrator heard both the interest
and grievance arbitrations in a consolidated hearing held in August 2019.
On November 3, 2019, the arbitrator issued awards in both matters. In the interest
arbitration, the arbitrator awarded the county its proposed health-insurance program, which
only included the two high-deduc tible plans. Based on a sti pulation of the parties, the
arbitrator declared that th e successor CBA would be effec tive from January 1, 2019,
through December 31, 2021. In the grievance matter, the arbitrator sustained ICEA’s
grievance, concluding that the county violated the 2016-201 8 CBA by unilaterally
implementing the health-insurance changes and that ICEA me mbers were harmed by the
violation. The arbitrator directed the county to pay ICEA “an amount that reflects the
premium savings experienced by the County fro m January 1, 2019 to the date of [the]
award.”
In January 2020, the county moved to vacate the grievance award. Because the
parties could not agree on the amount of the aw ard, they returned to the arbitrator for
resolution of that issue. On April 6, 2020, the arbitrator issued a remedial award directing

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the county to pay ICEA $129,905.70. That same day, the county filed an amended motion
to vacate, challenging both the grievance award and the remedial award.
In August 2020, the district court granted the county’s motion and vacated both the
grievance and remedial awards. First, the district court determined that the grievance was
moot because “there was no period between the last day of the express term of the [2016-
2018 CBA] and the point at which the [suc cessor CBA] took effect” and the arbitrator
exceeded her authority in considering the moot grievance. Second, the district court
concluded that the arbitrator exceeded her au thority in addressing the substance of the
grievance. Specifically, the district court dete rmined that the arbitrator had exceeded her
authority by concluding that the two high-de ductible health-insurance plans failed to
provide “equivalent coverage” without defini ng that term, finding that the county denied
ICEA the ability to bargain, de termining that the remedial period should include the 51
days between the arbitration hearing and the issuance of the grievance award, and issuing
a remedial award that failed to draw a remedy from the essence of the 2016-2018 CBA.
ICEA now appeals from the district court’s order vacating the awards.
DECISION
“Arbitration is a proceedi ng favored in the law.” City of Brooklyn Center v. Law
Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d 236, 241 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 11, 2001). In th e absence of an agreement limiti ng an arbitrator’s authority, the
arbitrator “is the final judge of both law and fact, including the interpretation of the terms
of any contract.” State Office of State Auditor v. Minn. Ass’n of Prof’l Emps., 504 N.W.2d
751, 754 (Minn. 1993) (quotation omitted).

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A district court must vacate an arbitrati on award if the arbitrator has exceeded the
arbitrator’s powers under the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. Minn. Stat.
§ 572B.23(a)(4) (2020); see State v. Berthiaume , 259 N.W.2d 904, 910 (Minn. 1977)
(“[O]nly when it is established that an arbitrator has clearl y exceeded [the arbitrator’s]
powers under the agreement to submit a dispute to arbitra tion must a court vacate an
award.”). But “[e]very reasona ble presumption must be exercised in favor of the finality
and validity of the arbitration award,” and “courts will not overturn an award merely
because they may disagree with the arbitrators’ decision on the merits.” State Auditor, 504
N.W.2d at 754-55; see Ramsey County v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council
91, Local 8, 309 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Minn. 1981) (“Neither the correctness of the arbitrator’s
conclusion nor the propriety of [the arbitrator’s] reasoning is relevant to a reviewing court,
so long as [the] award complies with the . . . standards to be applied by the reviewing court
in exercising its limited function.” (quotation omitted)). The scope of judicial review of
an arbitration award is accordingly extremely narrow. State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 755.
We review a district court’s determination th at an arbitrator exc eeded the arbitrator’s
authority de novo. Klinefelter v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 675 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Minn.
App. 2004).
I. The district court erred in determinin g that the arbitrator’s grievance award
was moot.

ICEA first contends that the district cour t erred in determining that the arbitrator’s
grievance award was moot and vacating it on that basis. According to ICEA, the grievance

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was not moot because the county’s violation of the 2016-2018 CBA needed to be addressed
and could be remedied.
“Mootness has been describe d as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d
1, 4-5 (Minn. 2015) (quota tion omitted). But “the moot ness doctrine is a flexible
discretionary doctrine, not a mechanical rule that is invoked automa tically whenever the
underlying dispute between the particular parties is settled or otherwise resolved.” State v.
Rud, 359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984). An action “should be dismissed as moot when
a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer
possible.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5.
The district court determined that the arbitrator “clearly exceeded her authority by
issuing a decision on a moot grievance issue.” Observing that the “last day of the express
term of the 2016-2018 CBA wa s December 31, 2019” and th at the successor CBA “took
effect [on] January 1, 2019, the day after th e 2016-2018 CBA expired,” the district court
reasoned that there was “no period between the last day of the express term of the prior
agreement and the point at whic h the subsequent agreement to ok effect.” The district
court’s analysis suggests that it determined that the grievance was moot because the
arbitrator was unable to grant effective relief, although the district court did not specifically
make this finding.
Mootness has generally been treated as an issue of procedural arbitrability for
determination by the arbitrator. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Wo rkers Int’l Union Local 5–

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391 v. Conoco, Inc. , 64 F. App’x 178, 184-85 (10th Cir. 2003); Local Union No. 370 of
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Morrison–Knudsen Co., 786 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir.
1986); W. Automatic Mach. Screw Co. v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., 335 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1964); Galveston Mar. Ass’n v. S.
Atl. & Gulf Coast Dist., Int’l L ongshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 307 , 234 F. Supp. 250, 252
(S.D. Tex. 1964); see also Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1109-10 (11th
Cir. 2204) (noting that matters of “justiciab ility” are for arbitrator, absent agreement to
contrary); cf. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 860 F.2d
1420, 1424 (7th Cir. 1988) (indicating in dictum that st anding—which is a component of
subject-matter jurisdiction—is a ma tter of procedural arbitrability). 2 And here, the
arbitrator specifically addressed the mootness issue.
The county argued to the arbitrator that the grievance was moot because, as a result
of the interest arbitration and the parties’ stipulation, the health-insurance changes
technically took effect on January 1, 2019, one day after the express duration of the 2016-
2018 CBA ended. But the arbitr ator rejected this argument, stating that the county failed
to account “for the period between the last day of the express term of the prior agreement
and the point at which a subsequent agreement takes effect.” The arbitrator explained that
“provisions addressing mandatory subjects of bargaining often are understood to remain in
effect, even after the expiration of the ex press duration [of] a collective bargaining

2 Federal court opinions other than those of the United States Supreme Court are not
binding on this court. Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church,
672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003). Bu t these federal opinions are persuasive and
should be afforded due deference. Id.

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agreement, until a subsequent bargaining agreement has been ratified.” And the arbitrator
reasoned that, until a successor CBA was estab lished, the terms of the 2016-2018 CBA
regarding health insurance were still in effect.
The county also argued to the arbitrator th at the health-insurance dispute need not
be resolved through the grievance award beca use it would already be addressed in the
interest-arbitration award. The arbitrator rejected that argument as well, reasoning that the
interest arbitration did not render the grievance award moot because “[t]he function of an
interest award is to establish the terms of any disputed issue for a subsequent collective
bargaining agreement, not to determine whet her a prior agreement has been violated or
whether damages should flow from any such violation.”
Rather than deferring to the arbitrator on the question of mootness as a matter of
procedural arbitrability, the district court substituted its own judgment on the mootness
issue and vacated the arbitration award on that basis. Because the arbitrator is the final
judge of the facts and the law, see State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 754, this was error.3
II. The district court erred in determin ing that the arbitrator’s grievance and
remedial awards exceeded the scope of the arbitrator’s authority.

Next, ICEA argues that the district court erred in concluding that the arbitrator’s
decision on the merits exceeded the scope of the arbitrator’s author ity. In vacating the

3 Before this court, ICEA did not challenge th e district court’s authority to reconsider the
arbitrator’s decision on the mootness issue and instead focused on the merits of the district
court’s decision. Even if we were to consider the merits of the issue, the county’s position
that the grievance was moot would be unavailing.

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arbitrator’s grievance award and damages, the district court listed several instances where
the arbitrator exceeded her authority. We consider each in turn.
Arbitrator’s Interpretation of “Equivalent Coverage”
The district court determined that th e arbitrator exceeded her authority by
concluding that the county’s high-deduc tible insurance options failed to provide
“equivalent coverage” under the 2016-2018 CBA without defining “equivalent coverage.”
According to the district court, the arbitrator then erroneously concluded that the remaining
high-deductible plans did not provide “equivalent coverage” because they created a cost-
structure change. The district court reasoned that “[i]t is undisputed that there was no
change to the physician netw ork under the new insurance pl ans, and that the employee
premiums are lower under the new plans than they were under the old plans.”
In interpreting an ambiguou s term in an agreement, “an arbitrator may look to many
sources, and his or her award will be upheld as long as it ‘draws its essence’ from the
agreement.” State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 755 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 1361 (1960)). Where
the parties failed to specifically define a term in their agreement, “the parties left this
decision to an arbitrator.” Id. A court’s role in reviewin g the arbitrator’s decision is
“‘solely to determine whether specific language in the agreement or submission precludes
[the arbitrator’s decision].’” Id. (quoting City of Bloomington v. Local 2828, AFSCME ,
290 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Minn. 1980)).
The 2016-2018 CBA did not define the term “equivalent coverage.” The arbitrator
determined that the county’s changes to the available in surance options resulted in

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“substantially more (and more unpredictable)” out-of-pocket costs for ICEA members who
were enrolled in an eliminated plan. Given this finding, the arbitrator concluded that the
coverage was not equivalent. Nothing in the 2016-2018 CBA precluded the arbitrator from
reaching this conclusion. The district court went beyond th e bounds of its authority in
substituting its own definition of “equivalent coverage.” See State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at
754. Because an arbitrator is the “final judge of both law and fact, including the
interpretation of the terms of any contract,” see id., the district court erred in determining
that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in interpreting the term “equivalent coverage.”
Arbitrator’s Finding Regarding ICEA’s Ability to Bargain
Next, the district court determined that the arbitrator exc eeded her authority by
concluding that ICEA was entitled to a remedy because the county denied ICEA the ability
to bargain. Disagreeing with the arbitrator, the district court stated that “[i]t is undisputed
that the parties engaged in ne gotiations in 2018 for a succe ssor agreement, in which they
discussed health insurance” and that it was “ICEA that refused to participate in bargaining
after it filed the grievance, despite the County’s willingness to do so.”
ICEA contends that the arbitrator had au thority to consider th is question. And,
according to ICEA, the arbitrator correctly concluded that the county denied ICEA’s ability
to bargain by unilaterally making changes to the agreed-upon health-insurance plans.
We agree with ICEA. Again, the arb itrator was the final judge of fact. See State
Auditor, 504 N.W.2d. The district court could not substitute its own factual findings for
the arbitrator’s findings or overturn the arbitr ator’s awards “merely because [the district
court] disagree[d] with the arbitr ator’s decision on the merits.” See id. at 754-55. Thus,

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the district court erred by determining that the arbitrator’s finding exceeded the arbitrator’s
authority.
The Arbitrator’s Remedial Award
The district court also concluded that the arbitrator’s remedial award was improper.
According to the district court, in granting the remedial award, the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of her authority in two areas.
First, citing the interest-arbitration statute, Minnesota Statutes section 179A.16, the
district court found that the arbitrator had no authority to conclude “that the remedial period
should include the 51 days it to ok [the arbitrator] to issue her decision, which is 21 more
days than allowed by statute and/or the CBA.” This cited section of the interest-arbitration
statute requires an arbitrator to render a de cision “within 30 days from the date that all
arbitration proceedings have concluded.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.16, subd. 7. But the separate
grievance-arbitration statute, section 179A. 21, only cross-references the jurisdictional
limitations of the interest-arbitration statute, and not the time limit for the arbitrator’s
issuance of the decision. See Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.16, subd. 5, .21, subd. 3. It is therefore
unclear whether the 30-day timeframe to issue a decision in interest arbitrations also applies
to all grievance arbitrations governed by PE LRA. The district court also cited the 2016-
2018 CBA in support of its determinati on. The 2016-2018 CBA does require an
arbitrator’s decision to be “submitted in wr iting within 30 days following close of the
hearing or submission of briefs by the parties, whichever is later, unless the parties agree
to an extension.” However, the 2016-2018 CBA does not provide that an arbitrator cannot
include days outside the 30-day timeframe to issue a decision in a remedial period for an

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award. The district court accordingly erred in concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her
authority by including the 51 days between the arbitration hearing and the issuance of the
grievance award in the remedial period. Ne ither the interest-arbitration statute nor the
2016-2018 CBA support that conclusion.
Second, the district court determined that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by
issuing a remedial award that failed to draw a remedy from the essence of the 2016-2018
CBA. The district court noted that the arb itrator “did not receive expert or actuarial
evidence to justify her damages calculation,” observed that the type of damages in this case
were difficult to quantify, and acknowledged that the remedy awarded in this case—the
difference between premium payments before and after the unilateral change in health-care
options—was “uncommon.” Additionally, the di strict court highlighted the arbitrator’s
finding that an ICEA member who switched from one of the eliminated plans to a high-
deductible plan was likely to e xperience a dollar savings over the course of a year due to
health-savings account contributions made by the county.
ICEA argues that the arbitrator’s dete rmination of the appropriate amount of
damages to remedy the county’s contract viola tion was within the scope of her authority.
Moreover, ICEA contends, there is precedent for awarding th e premium differential paid
by a wrongful actor as a remedy for a unilateral reduction in health-insurance benefits. See
W. St. Paul Fed’n of Teachers v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197 , 713 N.W.2d 366, 378 (Minn.
App. 2006) (affirming district court’s dete rmination that the appropriate measure of
damages for PELRA violation was premium differential paid by wrongful actor as a result
of a unilateral change in health-insurance coverage).

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The county responds that W. St. Paul Fed’n of Teachers is factually distinguishable.
Additionally, the county argues that the arbitrat or erred by “refus[ing] to consider [its]
[health-savings account] contributions in determining damages.”
But “[n]either the correctness of the arbitrator’s conclusion nor the propriety of [the
arbitrator’s] reasoning is relevant to a reviewing court” in exercising its limited function of
determining whether the arbitrator ex ceeded the arbitrat or’s authority. Ramsey County,
309 N.W.2d at 792. And “[e]very reasonable presumption must be exercised in favor of
the finality and validity of the arbitration award.” State Auditor , 504 N.W.2d at 754.
Applying our highly deferential standard of review, we disagree with the district court that
the arbitrator exceeded her authority in issuing the remedial award.
In sum, the district court erred in subs tituting its own judgment and reversing the
arbitrator’s determination that the grievanc e was not moot, and in concluding that the
arbitrator exceeded the scope of the arbitrato r’s authority in addressing the grievance and
issuing a remedial award. We accordingly re verse the district court’s order vacating the
arbitrator’s awards and remand for entry of an order confirming the awards.
Reversed and remanded.