County of Dakota, ex rel., Michelle Marie Hinz, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1244

County of Dakota, ex rel., Michelle Marie Hinz, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Bryan Arthur Rittweger,
Appellant.

Filed August 30, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19WS-FA-19-909

Johanna Petronella Clyborne, Brekke, Clyborne & Ribich, LLC, Shakopee, Minnesota (for
respondent Hinz)

Kathryn M. Keena, Acting Dakota County Attorney, Brita Ana Carnine, Assistant County
Attorney, West St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Dakota County)

Ronald B. Sieloff, Sieloff and Associates, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to reduce his child-support obligation,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by determining that there had not been
a substantial change in his circumstances, erred by stating that it could not make a
parenting-expense adjustment absent court-ordered parenting time, abused its discretion by
awarding respondent $999 in conduct -based attorney fees, and erred by not providing an
independent de novo review of the child support magistrate’s (CSM’s) 2020 order and by
finding that appellant’s failure to challenge the CSM’s 2019 order earlier deprives him of
the right to challenge it in 2020. Because we see no abuse of discretion and no error in the
district court’s determinations, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Bryan Rittweger and respondent Michelle Hinz are the parents of J., born
in October 2006, and R., born in April 2008. Following an October 2019 hearing, a CSM
found that: (1) appellant’s monthly income consisted of $2,557 from his Veterans’
Administration (VA) disability benefit and $4,728 from his business, Sunlite Window and
Door Inc.; (2) if appellant was no longer operating the business, that was his choice;
(3) respondent’s average monthly income from providing child care in her home was
$3,472; (4) appellant owed respondent $31,540.70 for past basic child support;1 and

1 This was the amount remaining of $38,718 in arrears after appellant’s payment of
$7,177.30.
3
(5) appellant owed respondent Dakota County $1,280 for the children’s past medical and
dental expenses.2
The CSM issu ed its 2019 order requiring appellant to pay $1,434 for basic child
support, $160 for medical support, and 70% of the children’s unreimbursed medical and
dental expenses. Because appellant had no court-ordered parenting time, the district court,
in accord with Minn. Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 1(b) (2018), did not apply a parenting-expense
adjustment. Appellant’s motion for review of t he CSM’s order was denied, and the order
was affirmed.
In April 2019, appellant’s current spouse incorporated a business called Sunlite
LLC. In January 2020, appellant dissolved Sunlite Window and Door Inc.
Appellant filed a motion to modify his basic child-support and his medical-support
obligations in March 2020. Following a remote hearing, another CSM found that:
(1) appellant’s spouse’s incorporation of Sunlite LLC and appellant’s dissolution of Sunlite
Window and Door Inc., were “a sham designed to create the illusion of [appellant’s]
reduced income,” (2) no substantial change in appellant’s circumstances had occurred ;
(3) appellant’s monthly income now consisted of his increased VA benefit, $3,492, and the
imputed average monthly income from his business, $4,728 , a total of $8,220 ; and
(4) respondent’s monthly income was $3,472. In its 2020 order, t he CSM denied
appellant’s motion to modify basic child support, granted his motion to modi fy medical
support, credited $456 to his arrearage amount; and granted respondent’s request for $999

2 Appellant does not challenge the district court’s decision as it pertains to Dakota County.
4
in conduct-based attorney fees. 3 After a remote hearing, the district court affirmed the
CSM’s 2020 order.
Appellant challenges the district court’s decisions pertaining to the absence of a
change in appellant’s circumstances, the absence of a parenting-expense adjustment to his
basic child -support obligation, respondent’s award of conduct -based attorney fees, the
review of the CSM’s 2020 order, and appellant’s fail ure to challenge the 2019 order in
earlier proceedings.
DECISION
1. Absence of a Substantial Change in Circumstances
On appeal from a CSM’s ruling that has been affirmed by the district court, the
standard of review is the same as would have been applied if the decision had been made
by a district court in the first instance. Ludwigson v. Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 445-46
(Minn. App. 2002). This court reviews the district court’s ruling rather than the CSM’s
ruling. Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 673 N.W.2d 528, 530 n.2 (Minn. App. 2004). Whether to
modify child support is within the broad discretion of the district court, and that discretion
is abused if the district court’s decision is based on a misapplication of the law, is contrary
to the facts, or is contrary to logic. Shearer v. Shearer , 891 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. App.
2017).

3 The Child Support Guidelines Worksheet attached to the CSM’s 2020 order indicated
that appellant’s monthly basic child-support obligation would be $1,698, or $26 4 more
than the 2019 obligation of $1,434 that he sought to reduce.
5
A child-support obligation may be modified if there has been a substantial change
in one party’s circumstances, such as a decrease in income. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd.
2 (2018). In its 2020 order, the CSM found and the district court agreed that appellant’s
monthly income was $8,220, the sum of his current VA benefit of $3,492 and his average
2016-2018 monthly earning s from his business , $4,728. Appellant argues that his child -
support obligation should be reduced to $ 674 because of a substantial change in his
circumstances: i.e., he can no longer earn any income from his business because the VA
has declared him to be 100% disabled and unable to work. Therefore, he asserts, the district
court erred by finding that he had voluntarily chosen to cease operating the business and
imputing income from the business to him.
But the VA clearly stated in a letter to appellant: “Are you being paid the 100
percent rate because you are unemployable due to your service -connected disabilities:
NO.” Thus, there was no error in finding that the VA had not made a finding of appellant’s
individual unemployability.
Nor was there an error in the imputation of income from appellant’s business,
Sunlite Window and Door Inc. The imputation of income was based on findings that:
If [appellant] is in fact no longer operating his business, that
appears to be a voluntary choice he has made. . . .[Appellant]
indicates that his business became inactive in the spring of
2019 . . . and was dissolved on January 21, 2020. . . .
[Appellant’s] spouse on April 9, 2019, incorporated a business
called Sunlite LL C. . . . [Appellant] himself made no
explanation for the creation of Sunlite LLC by affidavit or
testimony. . . . The explanation of [appellant’s] counsel that
Sunlite LLC was created [by appellant’s spouse] in order to
wind down the affairs of Sunlite Window and Door Inc. utterly
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lacks credibility.4 . . . [T]he dissolution of Sunlite Window and
Door Inc. . . . [and t] he subsequent incorporation of Sunlite
LLC was a sham designed to create the illusion of reduced
income.

Appellate courts defer to distric t-court credibility determinations. See, e.g. , Sefkow v.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). This court has no basis to overturn the
determination that there was no credible explanation for the creation of Sunlite LLC by
appellant’s spouse prior to the dissolution of Sunlite Window and Door Inc . by appellant
other than an attempt to show that appellant’s income was reduced.
Appellant also argues that the CSM’s October 2019 use of appellant’s average
monthly earnings from his business in 2016, 201 7, and 2018 violates Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.32, subd. 2(1) (20 18) (giving “the parent’s probable earnings level based on
employment potential, recent work history, and occupational qualifications” as one option
for determining potential income) because it was not “recent work history.” But in 2019,
when the CSM made its findings, those three years were the most recent years from which
the CSM could base its finding of an average monthly earning of $4,728. The CSM’s 2020
order stated that appellant “continue[d ] to have the ability to earn” that amount, and the
district court affirmed that figure and thus adopted it. See Kilpatrick, 673 N.W.2d at 530
n.2 (“[T]o the extent the reviewer of the CSM’s original decision affirms the CSM’s
original decision, that original decision becomes the decision of the reviewer.”).

4 We are unaware of any statutory requirement that a new corporation must be incorporated
in order to wind down the affairs of an existing corporation.
7
Appellant also argues that basing appellant’s gross monthly income on both his
actual income, i.e., the VA disability payment, and his imputed income, i.e., the income
from Sunlite Window and Door, Inc., violated Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (“If a parent
is voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or employed on a less than full -time basis, or
there is no direct evidence of any income, child support must be calculated based on a
determination of potential income.”). But appellant reads the word “only” into the statute
after “based”: based only on a determination of potential income. This court “cannot
supply language that the legislature may have omitted or overlooked.” State v. Hulst, 510
N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. App. 1984). Appellant provides no support for his view that
actual income and potential income are mutually exclusive.
Moreover, Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2018) explicitly contradicts appellant’s view:
“[G]ross income includes any form of periodic payment to an individual, including . . .
disability payments . . . and potential income under section 518A.29 . . . .” (emphasis
added). There is no error in considering both appellant’s actual income from his disability
payment and his potential income from his business in calculating his gross income for
child support purposes.
There was no misapplication of the law in not finding a change in circumstances
because appellant had dissolved his business.
2. Absence of a Parenting-Expense Adjustment
Interpreting the parenting -expense-adjustment statute is a legal issue reviewed de
novo. Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn. App. 2009).
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Appellant seeks a parenting-expense adjustment to his child-support obligation, but
the parties have no court -ordered parenting times. “If there is not a court order awarding
parenting time, the court shall determine the child support award without consideration of
the parenting expense adjustment.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.36. subd. 1( b) (2018); see also
Hesse, 778 N.W.2d at 103 ( noting that p arenting-time expense adjustment calculations
must be based on the scheduled amount of parenting time). Based on this statute, the CSM
declined to make a parenting -time adjustment to appellant’s c urrent child -support
obligation or to his arrears.
Appellant relies on Minn. Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 3 (2018): “If the parenting time is
equal and the parental incomes for determining child support of the parents also are equal,
no basic support shall b e paid unless the court determines that the expenses for the child
are not equally shared.” In the affidavit supporting his motion to modify child support,
appellant said “Since our separation, [respondent] and I have always exercised an equal
parenting time schedule until recently. . . . It was my understanding that our arrangement
meant that we had 50/50 parenting time, and that should be reflected in the arrears and the
[child-support] order.” But , even if appellant’s claim of equal parenting time were true,
the second requirement of Minn. Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 3, would not be met: respondent’s
monthly income was found to be $3,472, while appellant’s was found to be $8,220. Unless
appellant’s monthly income is restricted to his VA disability payment o f $3,492 (as he
claims it should be), the parties’ incomes are far from equal, and the statute does not apply.
Appellant also seeks a parenting -expense adjustment to his arrears. But “ [a]
modification of support . . . may be made retroactive only with respect to any period during
9
which the petitioning party has pending a motion for modification but only from the date
of notice of service of the motion on the responding party.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd.
2(f) (2018). His arrearage of $31,540.70 has not accrued since his March 2020 motion.
Appellant relies on Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 3 (2018), providing that “[t]he
[c]ourt may conclude that an obligor has satisfied a child support o bligation by providing
a home, care, and support for the child while the child is living with the obligor, if the court
finds that the child was integrated into the family of the obligor with the consent of the
obligee . . . .” But appellant provided no e vidence of respondent’s consent to the 50/50
parenting-time arrangement he alleged. The district court here had no basis to make such
a conclusion and therefore did not find that appellant had satisfied his child -support
obligation.
Appellant argues f urther that the CSM and the district court erred in applying the
statutory requirement of a parenting -time order to make a parenting -time adjustment
(Minn. Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 1(b)) and the statutory restriction on retroactive modification
of child support (Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(f)) because “mechanically applied child
support statutes . . . do not always lead to a just and equitable result” and the district court
“refused to apply any equitable considerations to any of the issues in the case.” See
LaFreniere-Nietz v. Nietz , 547 N.W.2d 895, 898 (Minn. App. 1996) (“ [A] court may
supplement statutes with equitable principles.”). But, contrary to appellant’s statement that
“[the CSM] erred by not . . . applying equitable principles,” the fact that a court has
discretion to supplement statutes with equitable principles does not mean a court errs by
10
invoking an equitable consideration and ignoring an unambiguous statutory directive.
There was no error in the decision not to invoke a parenting-time directive.
3. Attorney fees
Conduct-based attorney fee awards “are discretionary with the district court.”
Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007).
The CSM granted respondent’s request for $999 in conduct -based attorney fees
against appellant, finding that appellant had “unreasonably increased [respondent’s]
attorney fees and added to the length of this proceeding” by: (1) insisting that a parenting-
expense adjustment be applied although there is no parenting order; (2) insisting on a
retroactive modification of child support by decreasing his arrears; (3) failing “to pay
voluntarily one penny in child support due [respondent] since October 2019”; (4 ) telling
respondent’s attorney that appellant had “made it clear . . . that he is not going to stop until
the arrears and current support obligations are corrected,” although appellant claimed to be
willing to negotiate; and (5) violating the parenting co nsultant agreement not to bring
motions until a parenting-time schedule was established.
Appellant addresses only the first of these findings. He argues that the CSM erred
“by using [its] erroneous and constricted view of the law as a weapon a gainst [a]ppellant
to award [r] espondent attorney fees” and not applying Minn. Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 3
(stating that , when the parties have equal parenting time and equal incomes, no child
support shall be paid) to conclude that no court -ordered parenting time was required to
make a parenting-expense adjustment to appellant’s child -support obligation. This
argument fails in view of our affirmance of the determination that the parties did not have
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equal incomes because there was no substantial change in circumstance s and income was
imputed to appellant.
4. De Novo Review of CSM’s Order
Appellant argues that the district court failed to provide a de novo review of the
CSM’s 2020 order. On an appeal from a district court’s review of a CSM’s order, this
court
will r everse a trial court’s order regarding child support
modification only if we are convinced that the court abused its
broad discretion and reached a conclusion that is against the
logic and the facts on the record. The standard for reviewing a
child support magistrate’s decision is the same as it would be
if the trial court had made the decision. Findings on net income
for child support purposes will be affirmed on appeal if those
findings have a reasonable basis in fact and are not clearly
erroneous.

Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d at 445 -46 (citations omitted); see also Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d
343, 348 (Minn. 2002) (where there had been no district court review of a CSM’s order,
the supreme court applied the abuse -of-discretion standard after noting that this cou rt
“applied the abuse of discretion standard and the parties agree that it is the appropriate
standard of review”).
The district court addressed each of the 21 findings to which appellant objected:
findings 6, 13, 14, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 52, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, and 65.
The district court noted that : (1) finding 6 was a clerical error and should b e amended;
(2) findings 25 and 28 were supported by the record and appellant’s motion for their review
was withdrawn; (3) finding 13 was t aken from the October 2019 order, which appellant
had not challenged previously; and (4) finding 14 was also taken from the October 2019
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order, appellant’s motion for review of this order had been denied, and appellant had not
challenged the denial. The district court also stated that findings 52, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, and
65 were all supported by the record and addressed the remaining nine findings in more
detail.
Finding 26
Finding 26 reads, “It is clear that the VA’s use of the term ‘ disabilities’ is highly
technical and does not necessarily mean that the veteran cannot work.” The district court
relied on a letter to appellant from the VA informing him that his service -connected
evaluation was 100% and saying, “Are you being paid at the 100 percent rate because you
are unemployable due to your service -connected disabilities: NO.” The document
appellant provides in support of his assertion that he cannot work is not from the VA or
from any medical professional; it is from the assistant director of a charity, the Veterans of
Foreign Wars. The CSM’s finding that the VA’s use of the term “disabilities” does not
mean that a veteran cannot work is supported by the record.
Findings 29 and 30
The district court again relies on the VA’s letter stating that appellant was not
receiving the 100% disability payment “because [he was] unemployable due to [his]
service-connected disabilities” in addressing the CSM’s finding 29 (that “[the VA] has not
determined [appellant] to be unemployable” ) and finding 30 (that “[appellant] can work
without affecting his veteran’s benefits because there has been no determination of an
award of ‘individual unemployability’”). The district court further noted that a ppellant
had not challenged the CSM’s finding 21, which addressed “the distinction between [VA]
13
disability ratings; including ‘ Percentage Scale ’ and ‘ Individual Unemployability ,’” and
concluded that findings 29 and 30 were also supported by the record.
Findings 34, 35, and 36
The CSM found that appellant himself did not explain the creation of Sunlite LLC
by affidavit or testimony (finding 34), that appellant’s counsel’s explanation that Sunlite
LLC was created to “wind down” Sunlite Window and Door was not credible (finding 35),
and that the dissolution of Sunlite Window and Door and the incorporation of Sunlite Inc .
was “a sham designed to create the illusion of [appellant’s] reduced income” (finding 37).
The district court rejected appellant’s argument s that he was not permitted to provide
testimony on this point and that he received information on it “too late” because the record
did not show that appellant requested to offer testimony or to have a continuance . The
district court went on to find that (1) Sunlite LLC was formed by appellant’s current spouse
on April 9, 2019; (2) appellant began winding down Sunlite Window and Door on April 19,
2019 and said he had not taken a check from it since April 12, 2019; and (3) appellant
provided no documentary evidence to substantiate his statements that he received no
income from the business after April 2019. The district court then concluded that findings
34, 35, and 36 were supported by the existing record.
Finding 37
The CSM found that appellant “continues to have the ability to earn $4,728.00 gross
per month profit from operation of the [Sunlite Window and Door] business.” The district
court noted that this language was “imprecise” and should be amended “to reflect that
appellant continues to have the ability to earn $4,728 per month in business income.”
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It noted further that appellant had the burden to prove by the preponderance of
evidence the justification for modifying child support and that he failed to meet this burden
by not providing any “bank records, up -do-date business financials, or tax records to
support his claim” that his income from the business had changed. The district court also
observed that the change in income would require a link between appellant’s increased
disability rating and his alleged decreased ability to earn and that neither appellant nor the
VA had established such a link. Thus, these three findings were supported by the record.
Finding 38
This CSM finding, that appellant’s gross monthly income is $8,220, resulted from
adding his VA benefit of $3,492 to his imputed business income of $4,728, both of which
are supported by the record, as discussed above.
Finding 45
This CSM finding, that respondent had two nonjoint children residing with her, was
accurate when it was made in 2019, although the older child had sinc e been emancipated.
But the finding was not unsupported by the record.
Appellant’s argument that the district court failed to conduct an appropriate review
of the CSM’s order fails.
5. Failure to challenge prior findings and orders
The CSM’s June 1, 2020, order said “[a]ll other support provisions of the prior order
remain in full force and effect.” Appellant argues that this language gave the district court
“equitable jurisdiction to amend the [CSM’s October 18, 2019] Judgment and Order and
[its Novem ber 27, 2019] Order.” But a ppellant offers no support for his view that this
15
language makes every provision of those orders “subject to . . . the application of equitable
principles to the same extent as any of the [other] issues raised .” Nor does appel lant
explain why Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, setting out the time limits f or filing an appeal,
would not apply to the CSM’s earlier orders. Therefore these questions a re not properly
before us. See Brodsky v. Brodsky , 733 N.W.2d 471, 478 (Minn. App. 20 07) (providing
that appellate courts do not address issues that have not been adequately briefed).
The district court did not err in determining that appellant’s challenges to parts of
the 2019 orders were untimely and outside its authority.
The distri ct court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that no substantial
change had occurred in the circumstances affecting appellant’s child-support obligation or
in imposing conduct-based attorney fees on appellant; nor did it err in concluding that no
parenting-expense adjustment could be made to appellant’s child-support obligation absent
a court-ordered parenting time schedule, that the CSM’s findings were supported by the
record, and that appellant’s failure to timely challenge the CSM’s findings in pr ior orders
precluded him from challenging them later.
Affirmed.