In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: T. D. S., Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1251

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
T. D. S.,
Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

Filed February 8, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-17-3601

Mark D. Fiddler, Delmar V. Flynn, Fiddler Osband, LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant-
foster parent A.L.M.)

N.K.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mary M. Lynch, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent departments)

Miquela Hernandez, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
H.B. (child) was placed in foster care with appellant A.M. (foster parent) days after
his birth. Soon after, child’s biological pare nts relinquished their parental rights. Foster

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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parent tried to adopt child, and the Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health
Department (department) supported foster parent as an adoptive placement. But after child
had lived with foster parent for almost four years, a lengthy relative search identified a
relative willing to adopt child. The department then withdrew its support of foster parent
as an adoptive placement, terminated foster parent’s adoption agreement and petition, and
now seeks to place child for adop tion with the relative. Fost er parent filed a motion for
adoptive placement and requested an evidentiary hearing on her motion. The district court
denied the motion, concluding that foster parent had not made a prima facie showing that
the department acted unreasonably in changing course to support adoptive placement with
the newly identified relative. We reverse and remand to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 260C.607, subdivision 6(c)-(d) (2018).
FACTS
Child was born in 2016. Days later, th e department removed child from T.D.S.
(mother) and, upon discharge from the hospital, placed child in foster parent’s care. The
department filed a child-in-need-of-protectiv e-services (CHIPS) petition against mother,
alleging substance abuse, prenatal exposure to chemicals, homelessness, and neglect.
Child was adjudicated in need of protection or services, and legal custody was transferred
to the department in October 2016.
The department ultimately petitioned to terminate the parental rights of child’s
biological parents, who both vol untarily relinquished their ri ghts in writing. The district
court issued an order finalizing the termina tion of parental rights (TPR) and formally
placed child under the guardianship of the commissioner of human services pending a final

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placement decision. Mother notab ly asked the department to place child with a paternal
aunt (R.M.).
After child had spent the first 20 months of his life with foster parent, the department
removed child from foster parent’s care and placed him with R.M. in March 2018. But the
placement did not last long. After about five months, the department became concerned
for child’s immediate safety after learning th at a search warrant had been executed at
R.M.’s residence, resulting in an arrest and the discovery of contro lled substances. The
department no longer supported placing child with R.M. and looked for an alternative
relative placement. Wh en no known biological relatives were available, the department
decided that returning child to foster parent “on an emergency basis” would be in child’s
best interests because foster parent and child had established a “significant relationship.”
Soon after accepting child b ack into her home in Septem ber 2018, foster parent
notified the department of her interest in a doption. Foster parent enrolled in adoption
classes and prepared to move forward with the adoption process. Additionally, foster
parent tended to child’s wellbeing and developmental needs, which seemed to have stunted
while in R.M.’s care. Foster parent took child to necessary medical appointments, which
included replacing child’s bilateral ear tubes, and scheduled a speech assessment to address
child’s speech delays. Accordin g to foster parent, after the five months in R.M.’s care,
child seemed “significantly more aggressive ,” he tried to bully other kids, he was
“constantly dysregulated,” and “his sleep suffered a lot.”
Months later, the guardian ad litem ( GAL) asked the department to reopen the
kinship search, asserting that doing so would be in child’s best interests. The GAL

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indicated that several relatives had recently i ndicated interest in a doption. Additionally,
the GAL expressed similar concerns to those of foster parent regarding child’s speech
development. The GAL also questioned foster parent’s ability to style child’s hair in a
“culturally appropriate” manner. Around the same time, th e department filed a report
updating the district court on permanent placement options for child. The department ruled
out a local relative, noting problems with a background check, and advised the district court
that placement with an out-of-state relative would continue to delay child’s placement for
another 12 to 18 months. Despite the GAL’s objection, the department maintained that
adoption by foster parent was in child’s best interests, observing that child and foster parent
“are attached and bonded” and that foster parent attended to all of child’s needs.
The department executed an adoptive placement agreemen t with foster parent in
January 2019, formally placing child in he r care under Minnesota Statutes section
260C.613, subdivision 1 (2018). The GAL opposed that decision and again recommended
that the department continue the kinship search. Despite the GAL’s objection, the
department filed an adoption petition to finalize foster parent’s adoption of child in early
February 2019.
Shortly thereafter, child’s maternal great grandmother moved to intervene,
requesting that she be considered an adoptiv e placement option for child. Additionally,
the GAL moved to reopen the department’s kinship search. The department opposed both
motions because it believed finalization of fost er parent’s adoption was in child’s best
interests. The district court denied the intervention motion, but granted the GAL’s motion
and ordered the department to reopen the kinship search required under Minnesota Statutes

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section 260C.221(f) (2018) and to contin ue communication and coordination with
relatives.
Upon resuming the relative search, th e department identified three potential
placements, including two out-of-state relatives. The district court ordered the department
to refer any potential relatives for a home st udy and found good cause to delay foster
parent’s adoptive placement proceedings in th e interim. Before the home studies were
complete, the department tried to finalize foster parent’s adoption during a review hearing
in August 2019, but the district court denied the request. In a written order, the district
court again found good cause to postpone finalizing foster parent’s adoption, stating, “The
Department is not authorized to go forward with the adoption placement agreement. The
Department shall continue to exercise due di ligence in the relative search, including by
referring [a local relative] for a home study.”
On February 18, 2020, foster parent petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition or
mandamus. In re A.L.M. , No. A20-0265 (Minn. App. March 17, 2020) (order), review
denied (Minn. May 27, 2020). We denied her petition as “an improper collateral attack”
on the district court’s order to reopen the kins hip search because foster parent was not a
party in those TPR proceedings. The supreme court subsequently denied review. Id.
In the meantime, the GAL info rmed the district court that child’s biological mother
had given birth to two additional children since the TPR involving child. The GAL advised
that the two children remained in mother’s care after she successfully completed a case
plan in a separate CHIPS matter that had been dismissed. She recommended that child

6
have contact with his siblings, other relatives , and mother. The district court issued an
order granting regular visits between child and his relatives.
In July 2020, when child was approximately four years old and had spent all but
five months of his life in foster parent’s car e, the department notified the district court of
its decision to go in a different direction. The department explained that, upon receiving
two approved home studies for local relatives, it had evaluated child’s best interests under
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subdivis ion 2(b) (2018), and decided to withdraw
from its agreement with foster parent’s adoption petition and te rminate the adoptive
placement agreement. The report mentioned a “tentative transition plan” to remove child
from foster parent’s care and finalize placement with a local relative, child’s paternal aunt,
on August 11, 2020.
When foster parent learned of this de velopment, she filed a motion for adoptive
placement under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.607, subdivision 6(a)-(b) (2018), and
asked the district court to stay any change in child’s placement pending a ruling on her
motion. The district court declined to stay the placement change and scheduled a hearing
to address foster parent’s motion.
Foster parent argued that she was entitle d to an evidentiary hearing on her motion
for adoptive placement, alleging that her mo tion and supporting documents satisfied her
statutory burden for obtaining such a heari ng—establishing a prima facie case that the
department had acted unreasonably in rejecting her as a candidate for adoption. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.607 subd. 6(b). In support of the motion, foster pa rent submitted a lengthy
affidavit detailing how she was meeting child’s developmental, cultural, educational, and

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medical needs, and explaining why adoptive placement with her wa s in child’s best
interests. She described the bond that had fo rmed between child and her family over the
past four years, stating that child tells he r “you’re my mommy” and “we are a family.”
Foster parent detailed how abrupt changes in child’s situation have proven to be difficult
for child. For example, when child was emergently returned to foster parent after the five-
month placement with a relative, foster pare nt noticed that child suffered developmental
delays and seemed unsettled a nd anxious. More recently, af ter attending visitations with
the newest relative identified for placement , child threw tantrums and had problems
sleeping at night.
Foster parent also submitted a written re port from a licensed independent clinical
social worker who is an expert in family ther apy. The expert opined that removing child
from foster parent’s home after four years woul d cause child to lose his sense of security
and safety. According to the expert’s report, it is unrealistic to as sume child will readily
adapt to an abrupt and significant change in his home environment. The expert expressed
concern that such a change would cause child to have an attachment disorder, anxiety, and
other mental health problems in the future.
The department opposed foster parent’s motion for adoptive placement. According
to the department, it had acte d reasonably by following the court’s order to reopen the
relative search, “pursu[ing] placement with a biological relative,” and considering child’s
best interests in its July 2020 report.
After considering the procedural history, competing allegations, and the parties’
arguments, the district court denied foster parent’s motion without an evidentiary hearing.

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The court recognized that foster parent has acted lovingly and diligently to meet child’s
needs and has developed an attachment. But even though foster parent’s affidavit “outlines
how she is suited to meet the child’s needs,” the district court determined foster parent had
failed to “allege facts showing that the De partment’s decision to place the child for
adoption with the paternal aunt was unreasonabl e, irrational or capricious.” The district
court concluded that foster parent failed to make a prima facie showing that the department
had acted unreasonably, and accordingly, was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Foster parent appeals.
DECISION
This case turns on th e answer to one question: Did foster parent make a prima facie
showing that the department was unreasonable in failing to place ch ild for adoption with
her? If so, foster parent is entitled to have an evidentiary hearing on her motion for adoptive
placement. And if not, Minnesota law requires dismissal of foster parent’s motion. As the
appellate court, we are tasked with reviewing the district court’s answer to this question.
“A motion for adoptive placement is analogous to a motion to modify custody.” In
re Welfare of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013). In the analogous context
of a motion to modify custody, we have stated that: “At the prima-facie-case stage of the
proceeding, [the movant] need not establish anything. [The movant] need only make
allegations which, if true, wo uld allow the district court to grant the relief [the movant]
seeks.” Amarreh v. Amarreh , 918 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. App. 2018) (emphasis in
original), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2018); see Tousignant v. St. Louis County , 615
N.W.2d 53, 59 (Minn. 2000) (stating that a prim a facie case is “one that prevails in the

9
absence of evidence invalidating it” (quotation omitted)). Thus, in reviewing the district
court’s decision here—that foster parent di d not make a prima facie showing—we must
determine whether foster parent’s motion a nd supporting documents failed to set forth
allegations which, if true, show that the de partment acted unreasona bly in declining to
place child with foster parent for adoption.
In considering this issue, we begi n with the statutes governing adoption
proceedings, before turning to the standard of review. “Adoption is a creation of statute
and therefore the [district] court’s authority in matters relating to adoption is limited to the
authority set forth by [the Juvenile Court Act].” In re Adoption of C.H., 554 N.W.2d 737,
740 (Minn. 1996); see Juvenile Court Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001-.637 (2018).
When a child has been plac ed under the guardianship of the commissioner of human
services after the biological parents’ rights have been terminated , an agency acting on
behalf of the commissioner must make “reasonable efforts” to finalize an adoption. Minn.
Stat. §§ 260C.601, subd. 2, .605, subd. 1. Reasonable efforts include identifying an
appropriate prospective adoptive parent in accord with the child’s best interests, see Minn.
Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b), performing an up-to-date rela tive search, and ultimately
finalizing the child’s adoption, Minn. Stat. § 260C.605, subd. 1. To determine the needs
and best interests of the child, the agency must consider various factors, including:
(1) the child’s current functioning and behaviors;
(2) the medical needs of the child;
(3) the educational needs of the child;
(4) the developmental needs of the child;
(5) the child’s history and past experience;
(6) the child’s religious and cultural needs;

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(7) the child’s connection with a community, school, and faith
community;
(8) the child’s interests and talents;
(9) the child’s relationship to current caretakers, parents,
siblings, and relatives;
(10) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court, or the
child-placing agency in the case of a voluntary placement,
deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preferences.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b). When a prospective adoptive parent has been
established, and after considering these fa ctors, the agency ma y execute an adoptive
placement agreement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.613, subd. 1.
A relative or foster parent with a comp eting interest in ad opting the child may,
within the statutory time period, move the dist rict court for an adop tive placement of the
child with the movant. Minn . Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(a ). “The motion and supporting
documents must make a prima facie showing that the agency has been unreasonable in
failing to make the request ed adoptive placement.” Id., subd. 6(b). If the district court
determines that the movant’s motion and supporting documents fail to “make a prima facie
showing” that the agency acted unreasonably in refusing to make the adoptive placement
requested by the movant, “the court shall dismiss the motion.” Id., subd. 6(c) (emphasis
added). If, however, the district court determines that the movant’s motion and supporting
documents assert a “prima facie basis” that the agency acted unreasonably in denying the
movant’s requested placement, “the court shall set the matter for evidentiary hearing.” Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, whether the movant’s motion and supporting documents allege a
prima facie case that the ag ency acted unreasonably in failing to make the adoptive
placement requested by the movant is dispositive of whether the district court must set an

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evidentiary hearing on th e movant’s motion. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2018)
(stating that “‘[s]hall’ is mandatory”).
At an evidentiary hearing on the movant’s motion, the agency presents evidence to
support its decision not to make the adoptiv e placement with the movant. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(d). Thereafter, “[t]he moving party has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency has been unr easonable in failing to make
the adoptive placement” sought by the movant. Id. The district court “ may” order the
agency to make an adoptive placement of the child with the movant if, at the conclusion of
the hearing, the district court “finds” both th at (a) “the agency has been unreasonable in
failing to make the adoptive placement” sought by the movant and (b) the movant provides
“the most suitable adoptive hom e to meet the child’s needs using the factors in section
260C.212, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).” Id., subd. 6(e) (emphasis added); see Minn. Stat.
§ 645.44, subd. 15 (2018) (stating that “‘[m]ay’ is permissive”).
A district court’s denial of an adoptive- placement motion is an appealable order.
L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 568-69. We review the denial of an adoptive placement motion
without an evidentiary hearing in three parts. See id. at 570. First, we apply de novo review
in examining whether the district court treated the parties’ supporting documents
“properly.” Id. (citing Boland v. Murtha , 800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011)).
Second, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
movant failed to make a prima facie showing. Id. And third, we apply de novo review in
considering the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing. Id. (noting that the failure
to make a prima facie showing is dispositive of the need for an evidentiary hearing).

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Applying these standards of review, we conclude that the district court erred in each
of the three parts of the analysis. We address each error in turn.
I. The district court erred in its trea tment of foster parent’s motion and
supporting documents.

As noted, the first step in reviewing the district court’s decision requires us to
determine whether the district court trea ted foster parent’s motion and supporting
documents “properly.” See id. A district court treats an adoptive-placement motion and
supporting documents “properly” by accepting the facts allege d by the movant as true,
disregarding any contrary allegations, and on ly considering the respondent’s allegations
and the procedural history to the extent either “explain[s] or provide[s] context.” Id. Here,
foster parent argues that although the district court accurately summarized the law, it failed
to accept the facts alleged in her motion and supporting documents as true and it weighed
the procedural history against the facts that she alleged. The department counters that the
district court “clearly accepted the facts in [foster parent]’s affidavit as true,” did not weigh
evidence, and conducted a proper prima facie an alysis devoid of reve rsible error. After
carefully reviewing the record and the district court’s order, we agree with foster parent.
The district court’s order provides an accurate summation of the law regarding
proper treatment of the foster parent’s motion papers. But the district court failed to accept
the facts alleged by foster parent as true in performing its subsequent analysis. For
example, the district court stated: “While the Movant’s Affidavit outlines how she is suited
to meet the child’s needs, it does not allege facts showing that the Department’s decision
to place the child for adoption with the paternal aunt was unreasonable, irrational or

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capricious.” In making this determination, th e district court overlooked foster parent’s
assertions about the strong a ttachment that child has developed to her after almost four
years in her exclusive care. Additionally, the district court did not accept the truth of foster
parent’s allegation—backed by the report of an expert witness—that removing child from
foster parent’s care to place child for adoption with a family member previously unknown
to child would hinder child’s development and cause additional trauma. 1 Although the
department attempts to cast foster parent’s claims as conclusory assertions, foster parent’s
detailed affidavit buttresses her concerns with specific, firsthand observations of child’s
behavior before and after visitations with the new relative placement (e.g., child throwing
tantrums, refusing to get into the car, and requiring hours of rocking to fall asleep
afterwards). Foster parent’s affidavit also details the difficulties th at child experienced
following an earlier unsuccessful placement with another relative. Thus, the district court’s
determination that foster parent’s factual allegations were limited to facts about her
suitability as an adoptive placement reveals the district court’s failure to accept all of foster
parent’s assertions as true.
The district court’s reasoning also sugges ts that foster parent had the burden to
disprove the reasonableness of the department’s decision to place child with the relative.
This is incorrect for two reasons. First, in considering whether to order an evidentiary
hearing, the district court was not tasked with deciding whether child’s relative was a more

1 Although the expert report discusses the harm in removing child from foster parent’s care,
the removal of child from foster parent’s care and the department’s refusal to place child
for adoption with foster parent are functiona lly the same given the factual circumstances
here.

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suitable placement option. Instead, under sec tion 260C.607, subdivision 6(b), (c), at the
prima facie stage of the proceeding, the ques tion before the district court is limited to
whether the movant alleged a prima facie case that the department acted unreasonably in
declining to make the placement requeste d by the movant. Thus, a focus on the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the placement with a relative is misplaced. Second,
foster parent was not required to prove anything. In Amarreh, a district court denied,
without an evidentiary hearing, a father’s motion to modify custody based on its
determination that “[f]ather ha[d] not established the four elements required to establish a
prima facie case [to modify custody.]” 918 N.W.2d at 231 (e mphasis added). This court
rejected that analysis, stating, among other things, that “[a]t the prima-facie-case stage of
the proceeding, father need not establish anything. Father need only make allegations
which, if true, would allow the district court to grant the relief he seeks.” Id. Thus, at the
prima facie case stage of the proceeding, the movant need not prove, or disprove, anything;
the district court’s inquiry is limited to evaluating whether the movant’s motion and
supporting documents make alle gations which, if true, woul d show that the department
acted unreasonably in declining to make the placement requested by the movant.
Finally, the district court used the procedur al history—and in particular, the district
court’s own prior order to reopen the kinship search—as evidence supporting its conclusion
that foster parent failed to make a pr ima facie showing of the department’s
unreasonableness. But the caselaw makes clear that in determining whether to order an
evidentiary hearing on a moti on for adoptive placement, the district court should only
consider the procedural history of a case for context, and not as evidence to be weighed in

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deciding whether an agen cy acted unreasonably. See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570 (“The
district court must . . . consider the non-moving party’s supporting documents only to the
extent that they explain or provide context. ”). Whether the department’s denial of the
movant’s requested placement actually was unreasonable is not relevant at the prima facie
case stage, where the question is whether th e movant made a prima facie showing of
unreasonableness.
In considering foster parent’s motion fo r adoptive placement, the district court did
not accept all of foster parent’s facts as true , imposed a different bu rden on foster parent
than required by law, and considered the proced ural history of the case as evidence. We
therefore conclude that the district court erre d in its treatment of foster parent’s motion
papers and supporting documents.
II. The district court abused its discreti on by concluding that foster parent failed
to make a prima facie showing of unreasonableness.

Next, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
allegations in foster parent’s motion and supporting documents did not show a prima facie
case that the department acted unreasonably in declining her reque st to adopt child. See
id. Generally, a district court abuses its disc retion if it makes findings of fact that are
unsupported by the record, it improperly applie s the law, or it otherwise resolves the
discretionary question in a manner that is contrary to logic and facts on the record. Dobrin
v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997); see In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d
573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010) (applying this aspect of Dobrin in an adoption appeal). When

16
assessing whether a movant makes a prima faci e case, however, the district court accepts
the movant’s assertions as true and disregards contrary assertions of the nonmoving party.
L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 570-71. Therefore, at the prima facie case stage of the proceeding,
(a) the district court does not find facts and (b) the “facts” rele vant to the district court’s
assessment of whether the movant’s motion and supporting documents make a prima facie
case are those alleged by the movant.
As a threshold issue, foster parent cont ends that the district court misread or
misunderstood the term “unreasonable” in section 260C.607, subdivision 6, to mean “not
guided by reason; irrational or capricious,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 1851
(11th ed. 2019). Foster parent argues that “ unreasonable,” as used in the statute, is
ambiguous and urges us to look beyond th e plain meaning of the term, and adopt a
definition of “unreasonable” that incorporates the statutory best-interests factors. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b) (providing best-interests factors).
Appellate courts review a district cour t’s interpretation of a statute de novo. State
v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015); see In re Welfare of Children of A.M.F., 934
N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn. App. 2019) (applying the de novo standard of review to a district
court’s reading of Minn. Stat . § 260C.607, subd. 6). The reviewing court must first
determine whether a statute’s language is ambiguous. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d
432, 435 (Minn. 2017); A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122. “A st atute is ambiguous when its
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682;
see A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122. In interpreting a statute, “words and phrases are construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.

17
Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018). If the court determines that a statute is unambiguous, the statute’s
plain meaning controls. Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 2015); see A.M.F., 934
N.W.2d at 122. When analyzing the plain and ordinary meaning of words or phrases that
are not explicitly defined by a statute, a c ourt may consider dictionary definitions. See
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 436; In re Welfare of J.L.G, 924 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Minn. App.
2018) (using dictionaries when addressing th e meaning of Minn. St at. § 260C.607, subd.
2).
We do not agree with foster parent that the term “unreasonable” is ambiguous. The
common and ordinary usage of the term—and the definition applied by the district court—
is “not guided by reason; irrational or capricious.” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 1851;
see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1898 (5th ed. 2018)
(defining “unreasonable” as “[n]ot governed by or based on reason”). This is not a term
that is subject to more than one reasonable in terpretation. Of course, whether an agency
actually acted unreasonably is inevitably a fact-driven dete rmination that will depend on
the unique circumstances of each case. But the necessity of a fact-specific inquiry, which
requires the district court to exercise discretion, does not make the term itself ambiguous.
Because the statute is unambiguous, we must give the term “unreasonable” its plain
meaning. See Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d at 39; A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122. We see no
error with the district court’s definition of the term, and we use the same definition here in
reviewing the district court’s exercise of its discretion.
Applying that definition, we conclude th at foster parent satisfied her burden of
establishing a prima face case that the department acted unreasonably in refusing to make

18
her requested placement. In concluding otherwise, the district court resolved the question
in a way that was contrary to logic and the facts2 on this record—the district court abused
its discretion.
We first emphasize that foster parent’s burden was not high. Our supreme court has
defined a prima facie case as “one that prevails in the absence of evidence invalidating it.”
Tousignant., 615 N.W.2d at 59 (quotation omitted ). But the supreme court has also
acknowledged:
[T]he term “prima facie case” is a legal term of art that does
not always carry the same meani ng in every context. Rather,
the specific quantum and quality of evidence that is necessary
to establish a prima facie ca se may vary depending on the
nature of the proceedings, the type of action involved, and the
stage of the litigation.

Braylock v. Jesson , 819 N.W.2d 585, 590 n.2 (Minn. 2012). In a juvenile protection
proceeding, where “[t]he paramount considera tion” is a child’s “health, safety, and best
interests,” see Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a), “[ t]he laws relating to the juvenile
protection proceedings shall be liberally construed to carry out [the purposes of the Juvenile
Court Act],” id., subd. 4; see also In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d 315, 319
(Minn. App. 2015) (liberally construing fa ther’s pleading obliga tions in petitioning for
permanency, which required father to establish a prima facie case for transfer of permanent
custody), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). Against this backdrop, foster parent’s
motion and supporting documents were more than sufficient to make a prima facie showing

2 As noted, at the prima facie case stage of the proceedings, the relevant “facts” are those
asserted by the movant in her motion and suppor ting documents (but not yet proved or
disproved by the parties).

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that the department acted unreasonably in de nying foster parent’s requested placement of
child.
First, the duration of child’s placement with foster parent for almost four years, and
the significant attachment that child developed to foster parent over the course of that
placement, which is detailed in foster parent’s motion papers , raises significant concern
about the reasonableness of the department’s actions. The department placed child with
foster parent immediately after his birth. Child continuously lived with foster parent during
the four-year period, except for a five-month interruption when child was a toddler and the
department unsuccessfully placed child with a relative. According to foster parent’s
affidavit, after almost four ye ars in her care, child considers her to be his “mommy,” has
developed a close attachment to foster pare nt’s biological child, and considers these
individuals to be his “family.”
Second, foster parent supplied detailed and specific informa tion, including the
opinion of a licensed social worker, about how removing child from her care would harm
child’s development and overall wellbeing. Foster parent explained that she has been the
only primary caregiver child has known. She detailed her firsthand experiences with child
that cause concern about disr upting child’s attachments. And foster parent’s expert
articulated the potential long-term harm to child that a new placement could cause.
Finally, foster parent’s motion and supporting documents described the
department’s inconsistent positions regarding child’s placement. As noted, the department
placed child with foster parent as a newborn. After a brief, unsuccessful placement with a
relative who exposed child to cr iminal activity, the department returned child to foster

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parent. Soon after, the department fully supported adoptive placement with foster parent,
representing to the district c ourt that adoption by foster pare nt was in the child’s best
interests. The department continued to support adoptive placement with foster parent until
it suddenly reversed course, due to no fault of foster parent. Upon locating a new relative,
a paternal aunt, the departme nt abruptly determined that removing child from foster
parent’s home and placing him with paternal aunt was in child’s best interests.
Accepting all of foster parent’s allegations as true, as the district court was required
to do, the department’s actions in rejecting foster parent as an adoptive placement appear
unreasonable—not guided by reason; irrational or capricious. Child was placed with foster
parent for an extended period of time from birth, developing a significant attachment to
foster parent. See In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Minn. 2014)
(“Under our law, children are not to be kept waiting, uncertain who will raise them or where
they will grow up.”); A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 124 (stating that “additional delays in the
adoption of a child under the guardianship of the commissioner are not in the child’s best
interests”). Foster parent ra ised substantial concern about the harm that could occur to
child with an altern ative adoptive placement at this juncture. See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at
571 (concluding that movants established a prima facie case requi ring an evidentiary
hearing by supplying specific information about how alternative adoptive placement would
harm child). And after consistently supporting foster parent as an adoptive placement, the
department abruptly shifted positions in favor of paternal aunt. Foster parent’s allegations
established a prima facie showing of the department’s unreasonableness. We conclude that
the district court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise.

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III. Because foster parent made a prima facie showing that the department was
unreasonable in failing to place child with her for ad option, foster parent is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Based on the erroneous determination that foster parent had not met her minimal
burden of showing a prima facie case that the department acted unreasonably in declining
to make foster parent’s requested placement of child, the district court denied foster
parent’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and dismissed foster parent’s motion for
adoptive placement. We conclude that foster parent’s motion for adoptive placement and
supporting documents satisfied the threshold requirement fo r an evidentia ry hearing—a
prima facie showing that the department ac ted unreasonably in de clining to make the
requested placement. Foster parent is accordingly entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her
motion. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(c); L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. We reverse
and remand for an evidentiary hearing on foster parent’s motion for adoptive placement.3
Reversed and remanded.

3 Although we conclude that foster parent established a prima facie case of the department’s
unreasonableness, we express no opinion about th e suitability of either foster parent or
paternal aunt as an adoptive placement. This is an issue for the district court to decide
following an evidentiary hearing.