State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1252

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Todd Gerald Pletcher,
Appellant.

Filed August 30, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-19-72

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County A ttorney, David Hemming, A ssistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presidi ng Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Worke,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this direct appeal from convictions for 15 counts of possession of pornographic
works involving a minor, appellant Todd Gerald Pletcher challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence. Specifically, he argues that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to
2
establish that he knew or s hould have known that files on his cellphone and computer
contained child pornography. Pletcher alternatively argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a downwa rd dispositional sentencing departure and
imposing presumptive sentences. We affirm.
FACTS1
Between October 2018 and February 20 19, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) received a series of nine tips from the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children (NCMEC) regarding suspected child pornography downloaded by
someone in Minnesota. An internet search provider and a social media company provided
the initial tips, and they relayed specific usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and two
phone numbers associated with the accounts that download ed the suspect content. Three
of the email addresses had usernames cont aining “TGPCarpentry,” “goingmgtow,” and
“beeks.” The social media tip was for an account with the username Todd Pletcher.
After the NCMEC contacted the BCA, th e BCA used administrative subpoenas to
learn that the IP address associated with all nine tips was registered to Pletcher’s mother at
a specific residential address in Wyoming, Minnesota. A BCA investigator assigned to the
internet-crimes-against-children unit forwarded the information gathered from the tips to
the Wyoming Police Department. The investigat or identified the residents of the address
associated with the IP address, and then searched for any information connecting those
residents with the provided usernames, em ail addresses, and phone numbers. He

1 Our discussion of the facts is based on the evidence presented at Pletcher’s court trial.
3
determined that Pletcher, his mother, his si ster, and his aunt lived at the address.
Additionally, he discovered from public records that Pletcher previously owned a company
called TGP Carpentry, LLC.
The investigator obtained a search wa rrant for electronics, phones, computers,
tablets, and hard drives at the Wyoming addr ess where Pletcher was residing. A team of
officers executed the warrant on January 22, 2019. When the officers arrived at the house,
they found Pletcher, hi s mother, aunt, sister, and his frien d J.N. They detained Pletcher
and J.N. in the living room, and the others stayed in the kitchen.
During the search, the investigator asked Pletcher’s mother for Pletcher’s phone
number. She provided a current number for Pletcher, saved in her phone, which matched
one of the numbers from the tips. Additionally, the officers found a handwritten note in a
kitchen cabinet that listed a previous number for Pletcher that matched the second phone
number from the tips.
Officers asked Pletcher where his current cellphone was located, and Pletcher gave
evasive answers. He initially claimed that it was outside in a vehicle, and then stated that
it was outside in a fish house. When officers did not find the phone in either location, they
told Pletcher that they would search the house until they foun d it. Pletcher then stood up
and revealed that the phone was stuffed under the cushion of his chair. An officer called
the number that Pletcher’s mother had provided, and the call went through to the phone in
the chair, which police seized for later examination.
Officers seized additional electronic devi ces from the property. In a fish house
located behind the home and bearing Pletcher’s name and address, they discovered a
4
personal computer and another cellphone. They also confiscated devices from inside the
house that belonged to Pletcher’s mother, sister, aunt, and J.N. Subsequent forensic testing
revealed images and videos of child pornography saved on on ly two devices: the phone
from under the cushion and the computer from the fish house.
Following the search, respondent State of Minnesota charged Pletcher with 15
counts of possession of pornographic work in volving minors, in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 4(a) (2018). The first ten counts correspond with ten
specific files found on the cellphone, and the remaining five correspond with five specific
files found on the computer.
Pletcher waived his right to a jury trial and opted for a trial to the court. At trial, the
parties stipulated in writing that the images and videos identified in counts 1 through 15 in
the complaint each constituted a separate “por nographic work” as defined by Minnesota
law, see Minn. Stat. § 617.246, subd. 1(f) (2018), and that each pornographic work showed
“a separate and distinct child.” The state ad mitted 26 exhibits and ca lled five witnesses,
Pletcher’s mother, two Wyoming Police Depa rtment investigators, and two Chisago
County Sheriff’s Office investigators. Pletcher did not testify or call any witnesses.
Pletcher’s mother testified that Pletcher lives with her and has a room in her house,
and that he built the fish house—a small por table house with room for a bed and a few
chairs—located in the b ackyard. She stated that Pletcher spends “quite a bit” of time in
the fish house, and that he uses it to smoke and spend time away from the family. Pletcher’s
mother relayed that J.N. occas ionally stays over and sleeps in the fish house. She also
5
testified that Pletcher has only one computer, which Pletcher had moved from his bedroom
to the fish house.
Investigators testified about the cybe r tips, executing the search warrant, and
extracting information from the devices obtai ned. One investigator examined the
cellphone found in the chair, and he explai ned how he utilized a forensic examination
program to extract the files. His examination generated a phone extraction report that was
admitted as evidence. The re port identified the device owner’s name as “Looking
Forfuntimes,” with the “goingmgtow” email from the tips. And one of the email accounts
on the phone was the “beeks” email address from the tips.
The investigator retrieved files contai ning videos and photographs saved on the
physical memory of the cellphone. These included the ten videos and photographs that the
parties agreed were child pornography. Each file has a time stamp that reflects when it was
saved to the cellphone. These time stamps show that the files were saved on several
different days in 2017, 2018, and 2019. Th e investigator could not, however, provide
information as to when or if the files were viewed.
In addition to the images, the investigator also retr ieved text messages from the
cellphone. In one message, sent a few weeks be fore the search of the house, Pletcher’s
sister asked, “Do you have an y open account on Instagram w ith your beeks?” Pletcher
responded that he thought so but had not us ed it recently, and asked why she wanted to
know. His sister explained: “Because there are accounts that you follow that have pictures
of young girls. Not naked. Just thought maybe [C.] was screwing with you.” Pletcher
messaged back that he would check on it and delete the account.
6
Another investigator examined the files on the computer found in the fish house.
The computer had only one user account, “b eeks,” and logging in did not require a
password. The investigator used a software program to create a “m irror” image of the
computer’s hard drive, and he provided documentation at trial showing the file paths to the
evidence that gave rise to the five compute r-related charges. The computer’s hard drive
contained many personal photos, organized into folders, including photos of vacations and
vehicles, and photos that Plet cher had taken of himself. W ithin the same folders as the
personal pictures, the investigator found the five images and videos that Pletcher stipulated
were child pornography.
Following the parties’ written closing argume nts, the district court issued an order
finding Pletcher guilty of all 15 counts. At sentencing, Pl etcher moved for a downward
dispositional or durational depa rture, citing his particular amenability to probation and
mental health, among other departure bases. The state opposed the motion and requested
permissive consecutive sentences. The distri ct court rejected both requests and imposed
the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines for each count, with
all sentences to run concurrently. The longest of these sentences is a 60-month, executed
term of imprisonment.
Pletcher appeals.
DECISION
Pletcher first argues that his convictions must be reversed because they were not
supported by sufficient evidence. In the alternative, he argues that the district court abused
7
its discretion by denying hi s motion for a downward dispositional sentencing departure. 2
We address each argument in turn.
I. The evidence is sufficient to establish that Pletcher knew or had reason to know
that files on his cellphone and co mputer contained pornographic works
involving minors.

Due process requires the prosecution to prove every element of a charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Culver , 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn. 2020). In
considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, appellate
courts carefully analyze the re cord to determine whether the evidence, viewed in a light
most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the fact-finder to reach its verdict.
State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court will not disturb a
guilty verdict if the fact-finder, acting with due regard for the pr esumption of innocence
and requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have concluded that
the state proved the defendant’s guilt. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn.
2004). Appellate courts apply this same standard in reviewing convictions following both
court trials and jury trials. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
Pletcher was convicted of violating Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision
4(a), which makes it a crime for a person to possess a “pornographic work or a computer
disk or computer or other electronic . . . st orage system . . . containing a pornographic
work,” if the person knows or has reason to know “its content and character.” A

2 Pletcher does not challenge the district court’s decision to deny his request for a
downward durational departure.
8
“pornographic work” is defined to include a pi cture or video that us es a minor to depict
“sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 617.246, subd. 1(f).
The parties stipulated that the pictures and videos in each charged count constituted
pornographic works. And Pletcher appears to concede that the evidence sufficiently proved
that he possessed the phone and the computer and, by extension, the pornographic works.3
Pletcher contends, though, that the evidence was in sufficient to show that he knew or
should have known the content of the 15 pornographic works.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has explaine d that “under Minn. Stat. § 617.247,
subd. 4(a), a possessor of child pornography has ‘reason to know’ that a pornographic work
involves a minor where the possessor is subjectively aware of a ‘substantial and
unjustifiable risk’ that the work involves a minor.” State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 115
(Minn. 2007). Such knowledge may be pr oven through circumstantial evidence. Id.
Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts
in dispute existed or did not exist,” whereas direct evidence “is evidence that is based on
personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations omitted).

3 “Possession may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.” State
v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Th e district court found that Pletcher
actually and constructively possessed the phone found in the couch cushion, along with the
pornographic files on the phone, and that he constructively possessed the computer and its
pornographic files. On appeal, Pletcher does not appear to challenge these determinations.
Instead, he contends the evidence was insufficient to show that he “knew or had reason to
know that the fifteen files found on his cellphone and comput er contained pornographic
works involving minors.” The state argues in its brief that it offered direct, as opposed to
circumstantial, evidence showing that Pletcher possessed the devices and their files, but we
need not reach that issue because it appears that the element of possession is not in dispute.
9
The state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove Pletcher knew or should have
known that his cellphone and computer cont ained pornographic works involving minors.
See State v. Myrland, 681 N.W.2d 415, 420 (Minn. Ap p. 2004) (applying circumstantial-
evidence standard in case involving cons tructive possession of pornography because
appellant “was not seen viewing the imag es or using the computers to do so”), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 2004). When an elem ent of an offense is supported by
circumstantial evidence alone, appellate courts apply a heightened, two-step standard in
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying that element. State v. Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010); see also State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn.
App. 2013) (discussing heightened standard of review for circumstantial evidence), review
denied (Minn. Jun. 16, 2015).
The first step in evaluating the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is to identify
the “circumstances proved” by the state at trial. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329
(Minn. 2010). A reviewing court assumes the trier of fact believed the state’s witnesses
and rejected all evidence contrary to the verdict; all conflicting evidence is resolved in the
state’s favor. See State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 857-58 (Minn. 2008). After identifying
the circumstances proved, the reviewing court next determines whether those
circumstances are “consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.” State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013) (quotation
omitted). At this step of the analysis, unlike the first step, appellate courts do not defer to
the fact-finder’s choice among reasonable inferences. Id. If the circumstances proved are
10
consistent with a reasonable inference other than guilt, the evidence is insufficient and the
resulting conviction must be reversed. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 603.
The circumstances that the state proved regarding Pletcher’s knowledge of the
content and character of the pornographic files on his cellphone and computer are as
follows. Multiple cyber tips from the NCMEC, spanning from 2018 to 2019, were traced
to an IP address registered at the home where Pletcher lived. Several of the tips included
Pletcher’s current phone number, and the others had a phone number that he had previously
used. One tip involved a social media account for user Todd Pletcher, and others involved
email addresses with usernames containing “TGPCarpentry,” “goingmgtow,” and “beeks.”
Pletcher previously owned a business called TGP Carpentry. His current cellphone was
associated with both the “goingmgtow” and “beeks” email addresses. Pletcher’s computer
had only one user account, name d “beeks.” And s hortly before the search of the house,
Pletcher’s sister sent him a text message asking about an open social media account “with
[his] beeks,” and expressing concern that the “beeks” account followed accounts with
“pictures of young girls.”
When investigators executed the search warrant and aske d Pletcher for his current
cellphone, he was evasive about its location before finally revealing that it was stuffed
under the cushion of the chair where he was seated. Investigators discovered videos and
pictures of child pornography on the phone that were saved on several different days in
2018 and 2019. They also discovered vide os and pictures of child pornography on a
computer in the fish house, where Pletcher frequently spent time and which had his name
on it. These pornographic works were saved in folders that also contained personal photos
11
of Pletcher. The officers searched devices belonging to Pletcher’s mother, sister, aunt, and
J.N. but did not find any child pornography or information associated with the cyber tips.
Pletcher seemingly agrees th at these circumstances give rise to a rational hypothesis
of guilt. The record supports this conce ssion; the circumstances proved are certainly
consistent with a rational hypo thesis that Pletcher knew or should have known that his
cellphone and computer contained pornographic works involving minors. See Harris, 895
N.W.2d at 601-02. Pletcher contends, tho ugh, that there is an alternative rational
hypothesis: that he lacked any knowledge of the content of the files because someone else
downloaded them to his devices and he never viewed them.
Specifically, Pletcher argues that the state’ s evidence only showed that the images
and files were downloaded to the devices, not that they were ever viewed. He suggests that
someone else could have downloaded the pict ures and videos to his devices without his
knowledge, and he points to evidence showing that the computer was not password
protected and that J.N. spent tim e in the fish house. He furt her suggests that the images
could have been “placed on the devices via a cloud-sharing program.”
Pletcher cites this court’s decision in Myrland to support his position. 681 N.W.2d
415. In Myrland, pornographic works depicting minors were discovered on school
computers. Id. at 417. Myrland, who was a teacher at the school, admitted to using the
computers to view adult pornography but denied viewing any child pornography. Id. at
417-18. Testimony presented at trial showed that Myrlan d was “one of potentially
hundreds of people who could have accessed the computers in question.” Id. at 418, 420.
And the images of child pornography were st ored amongst thousands of other images in
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“unallocated space” on the computer hard drives, with “only a tiny fraction” appearing to
depict minors. Id. In light of those circumstances, this court concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to show that Myrland possessed, or intended to possess, child pornography
knowing or with reason to know of its content. Id.
This case is distinguishable from Myrland. Here, the computer in question was,
according to Pletcher’s moth er, Pletcher’s personal com puter. While the testimony
suggested that other people used the fish hous e, no evidence suggested that other people
used the computer. And the images were not stored in “unallocated space” on the
computer’s hard drive, but we re instead stored in categorized folders that contained
Pletcher’s personal pictures. Moreover, pornographic works were stored not only on the
computer, but also on Pletcher’s cellphone, which he attempted to hide from officers during
the search.
Although Pletcher contends that some one else could have downloaded the
pornographic works to his devices without his knowledge, either through cloud-sharing or
otherwise, this claim is inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances proved and relies
on theoretical possibilities. Ap pellate courts “will not reve rse a conviction, even one
grounded only in circumstantial evidence, based on mere conj ecture or the possibility of
innocence when the evidence shows such possibility is unreasonable.” Tscheu, 758
N.W.2d at 861. Given that multiple images and videos were downloaded over a span of
two years, that the tips about the downloads contained various em ail addresses, phone
numbers, and usernames associat ed with Pletcher, that Pletch er attempted to conceal his
phone from investigators, that none of the devices belonging to other household members
13
or J.N. contained pornographic works or information associated with the tips, and that the
pornographic works on the computer were in termixed with Pletcher’s personal photos—
the hypothesis that someone else downloaded the images and videos without his knowledge
is simply unreasonable.
In sum, because the circum stances that the state proved are consistent with a
reasonable inference of guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable inference of innocence,
the evidence is suffi cient to support Pletcher’s convictions. See Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at
861.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pletcher’s request for
a downward dispositional sentencing departure.

Pletcher next argues that we should reverse his sentences because compelling
factors exist to support a downward dispositiona l departure. This court reviews a district
court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-
08 (Minn. 2014).
District courts have a great d eal of discretion in sentencing. Id. at 305. That
discretion is limited, however, by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, which prescribe a
sentence that is “presumed to be appropriate for the crimes to which they apply.” Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2018). A district cour t may exercise its discretion to depart from
the guidelines only if there are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances that
distinguish a case and overcome the presumptio n in favor of the guidelines sentence.”
Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 (quotation omitted). “In fact, a sentencing court has no discretion
14
to depart from the sentencing guidelines unless aggravatin g or mitigating factors are
present.” State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. 1999).
The guidelines provide a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that can justify a
downward dispositional departure, including that “[t]he offender is particularly amenable
to probation.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D. 3.a.(7) (2018). The qualifier “particularly”
curbs the number of departures in a manner consistent with promoting the guidelines’
purpose of sentencing uniformity. See Soto , 855 N.W.2d at 308-09. In determining
whether a defendant is particul arly amenable to probation, courts may consider various
factors, such as “the defendant’s age, his pr ior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his
attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d
28, 31 (Minn. 1982). A distri ct court is not required to depart “from a presumptively
executed prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would
be amenable to probation.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. App. 2009).
Pletcher argued at sentencing that he was entitled to a downward dispositional
departure because he had been successful on probation for a previous offense, he had strong
family support, and he had a good attitude in court. His attorney also asserted that Pletcher
would be more successful in sex-offender tr eatment if he remain ed in the community
because he had mental and physical health issu es that would be exac erbated in prison.
While Pletcher continued to deny committing the offenses, his attorney contended that such
denial was not a barrier to sex-offender treatment because many people initially deny
committing these types of crimes.
15
In declining to grant the dispositional-departure request , the district court noted
several favorable factors that could support a finding of amenability, such as Pletcher’s
attitude in court and lack of pretrial violations. But the district court concluded that there
was not substantial and compelling evidence of Pletcher’s particular amenability to
probation. The district court reasoned that Pletcher’s age—approximately 50—did not
weigh in his favor, as his crimes did not refl ect a youthful mistake or miscalculation of
judgment. The district court also noted that while Pletcher was close to his family, he
seemed to lack other prosocial supports lik e healthy adult friendships, interests, and
hobbies. And the district court was also concerned that Pletcher did not show remorse, as
he continued to deny committing the offenses.
The district court’s sentencing decision do es not reflect any abuse of discretion.
Although there was some evidence that Pletcher was amenab le to probation, the district
court was within its discretion to conclude that the circumstances did not support a finding
of particular amenability. See Olson, 765 N.W.2d at 663. The district court accordingly
did not err by imposing presumptive sentences for the offenses.
Affirmed.