Robert D. Fineran, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1274

Robert D. Fineran,
Relator,

vs.

Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth,
Respondent.

Filed June 7, 2021
Reversed
Bryan, Judge

Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth, Minnesota

Gwen Updegraff, Legal Aid Service of Northe astern Minnesota, Duluth, Minnesota (for
relator)

Bridget A. Brine, Housing and Redevelopmen t Authority of Duluth , Duluth, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bj orkman, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges the hearing officer’s decisions upholding
the termination of relator’s ho using benefits and upholding th e denial of relator’s request
for a reasonable accommodation. We conclude that given the langua ge of respondent’s

2
written administrative plan, the hearing officer erred when it made these two decisions.
Therefore, we reverse.
FACTS
Relator Robert Fineran received housing benefits through respondent Housing and
Redevelopment Authority of Duluth (the HRA). The HRA te rminated Fineran’s benefits
in July 2020. Fineran appealed the termination and a separate decision denying his request
for a reasonable disability-related accommodati on. After a hearing in August 2020, the
hearing officer upheld both deci sions and Fineran appeals by wr it of certiorari. We first
address the relevant aspects of the housi ng benefits program before summarizing the
administrative hearing.
A. Background of the Voucher Program
The HRA operates a section 8 housing voucher program, which is governed by
United States Department of Housing and Urban Developm ent (HUD) regulations. The
purpose of the housing program is to assist low-income fa milies with obtaining a decent
place to live. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2018). Under the section 8 program, the agency
subsidizes the rental payments for a particip ant. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b) (2018). The HRA
is required to adopt a written administrative plan, which establishes local policies for
administering the housing program in acco rdance with HUD requirements. 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.54 (2018). The HRA may terminate a ssistance under the program for various
reasons, some mandatory and some permissive. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 (2018). The HRA is
permitted to terminate assistance “[i]f the family violates any family obligations under the
program.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i).

3
In this case, the relevant obligation is specifically set forth in the HRA’s
administrative plan, which requires participan ts to provide notice to the HRA when they
move out prior to the end of a lease. When a participant fails to do so, the administrative
plan allows for termination. The plan, however, also includes mandatory consideration of
several enumerated exceptions to termination for failing to pr ovide this notice, including
exceptions that apply when there is an emergency and when the participant has a disability:
If a family moves during the initial lease term, without
permission from the [HRA] a nd owner, subs idy will be
terminated.

. . . .

The [HRA] will consider exceptions to these policies
for the following reasons: to prot ect the health or safety of a
family member (e.g., lead-bas ed paint hazards, domestic
violence, witness protection programs), to accommodate a
change in family circumstances (e.g., new employment, school
attendance in a distant area), or to address an emergency
situation over which a family has no control.

In addition, the [HRA] will allow exceptions to these
policies for purposes of reasonable accommodation of a family
member who is a person with disabilities . . . .

In addition, the administrative plan includes specific mitigating factors that the HRA must
consider when deciding whether to terminate housing benefits:
The [HRA] will consider the fo llowing factors when making
its decision to terminate assistance:

The extent of participation or culpability of individual
family members, including wh ether the culpable family
member is a minor or a person with disabilities[.] . . .
The length of time since the violation occurred,
including the age of the indivi dual at the time of the conduct,

4
as well as the family’s recent history and the likelihood of
favorable conduct in the future.
B. Administrative Hearing
Neither party submitted transcripts of the August 2020 hearing. Instead, we
summarize the factual findings that the hear ing officer made in his September 2020
decision and the hearing officer’s summary of the evidence, which he filed with this court
on November 12, 2020, pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 110.03.
In December 2019, Fineran obtained a section 8 housing voucher and signed a one-
year lease. In May 2020, Fi neran’s mental health deterior ated and he stopped taking his
medications. Fineran was in and out of the ho spital several times in May 2020 due to his
mental illness. His symptoms included rand om thoughts, paranoia , losing things, poor
thought process, difficulty following directions, and a tendency to wander around the city.
In June 2020, the county petitioned for Fineran to be involuntarily committed as mentally
ill, alleging that law-enforcement officers found him running on the freeway and dodging
cars. A district court grante d the county’s petition, finding th at Fineran was mentally ill,
and ordering him to be civilly committed. Fineran was taken into custody and involuntarily
hospitalized from June 9 through July 17, 2020.
During his hospitalization, Fineran was concerned about his housing. Because of
his erratic behaviors, his landl ord had previously notified Fine ran that he would need to
vacate his apartment by June 30 , 2020. With the help of a charitable organization, he
moved his belongings out of his apartment around July 2. He did not provide notice to the

5
HRA that he was vacating his apartment, nor did any of the people helping him with his
mental health treatment.
During this time, Fineran’s county social worker helped Fineran with his section 8
voucher. According to the social work er, Fineran’s thinking remained “quite
disorganized.” The social worker contacted the HRA in early July 2020 and spoke with
Fineran’s housing specialist on July 14. The housing specialist informed the social worker
that Fineran’s section 8 voucher had already been terminated. After this conversation, the
HRA sent Fineran a notice of termination on July 27, 2020. The notice gave the following
reason for the termination: “Moved without proper notice,” “Moved in July of 2020 before
your 12 month lease expired on 12/31/2020.” Fineran app ealed the termination of his
benefits on July 23, 2020. He explained th at he was appealing “due to mental/medical
issues occurring in May, June, and July.”
On the same day that he received the notice of termination, Fineran submitted a
request for a reasonable accommodation with the HRA. He lis ted the reasonable
accommodation requested as: “mai ntain Section 8 voucher.” Fineran explained that he
needed the accommodation “due to an involuntary hospitalization because of an untreated
mental health crisis.” Fineran’s social worker signed the accommodation request, attesting
that Fineran had a disability that significa ntly affected his ab ility to perform normal
activities. The HRA denied the reasonable-accommodation request. Fineran also appealed
the denial of the request.
Fineran’s housing specialist testified a bout the reasons for the termination and
denial of the reasonable-accommodation request. She stated that the HRA could not grant

6
an exception to the notice-o f-vacating requirement because “p rogram participants were
required to give HRA a pre-move out notice regardless of their mental status.”
Fineran argued that he was entitled to a reasonable accomm odation based on his
mental illness and maintained that the HRA failed to cons ider mitigating circumstances
before terminating his voucher, which was contrary to the HRA’s administrative plan. The
HRA argued that Fineran was not entitled to a reasonable accommodation because there
was no connection between his mental illness and his failure to provide notice of vacating
the apartment. In addition, the HRA argued that Fineran’s request amounted to an
exception and there could be no exceptions to the notice requirement.
The hearing officer issued his report in Se ptember 2020. He found that Fineran’s
mental health crisis in May and June 2020 prevented him from understanding the
requirement to give notice to the HRA of his intent to move out:
This hearing officer finds that Mr. Fineran’s mental
health crisis in May and June 2020, with his commitment on
June 23, 2020, was a severe mental health crisis which
interfered with his ability to understand that he had to give
notice to HRA of his intent to move out of his apartment and
that his mental illness interfered with his ability to functionally
do so.

. . . .

It is the finding of this he aring officer that Mr. Fineran
did not have a reasonable capacity to take acts to notify HRA
that he was terminating his te nancy at the end of June 2020
. . . .

It seems quite harsh that Mr. Fineran should lose his
Section 8 voucher when he di d not have the capacity to
understand and take the step s to notify HRA that he was
moving out at the end of June 2020. The issue therefore

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becomes whether HRA’s notice requirements are “essential”
such that it cannot reason ably grant a reasonable
accommodation to excuse that failure to give notice.

The hearing officer then considered whet her the HRA could make an exception to
the notice requirement. The hearing officer agreed with the HRA that any exceptions
would constitute waiver of an essential requirement. Based on this reasoning, the hearing
officer concluded that the requested accommodation was not reasonable.
DECISION
Fineran challenges the decision upholding the denial of his request for a reasonable
accommodation and upholding the termination of his secti on 8 housing vo ucher. We
conclude that both of the hearing office r’s decisions were erroneous because the
administrative plan mandated consideration of specific exceptions. Based on this language,
the accommodation Fineran request ed would not alter or wa ive any essential program
requirements.1 In addition, the termination cannot be upheld because the HRA refused to
consider these exceptions prior to termination.
The HRA acted in a quasi-judicial capacity. Carter v. Olmsted Cty. Hous. & Redev.
Auth., 574 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 1998) (concluding that when an HRA receives
evidence, hears testimony, and makes a decisi on regarding section 8 be nefits, it acts in a

1 The HRA also argues that it offered an alternative accommodation to Fineran. The record,
however, shows this is not true. At the he aring before the hearin g officer, the housing
specialist mentioned to Fineran that perhaps Fineran could reapply in the future. If he did
so, the HRA might not penalize Fineran for his previous failure to provide notice prior to
moving out. At oral argument, the HRA c onceded that the housing specialist had no
authority to bind the HRA re garding future hypothetical a pplications and that the HRA
never made any formal offers or promises regarding future applications. Because the
record shows there was no alternative accommodation offered, we reject this argument.

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quasi-judicial capacity). We may reverse an agency’s quasi-judicial decision when the
decision is unconstitutional, ou tside the agency’s jurisdicti on, procedurally defective,
based on an erroneous application of the law, not supported by substantial evidence, or
arbitrary or capricious. Id. We review legal questions de novo. ITW Food Equip. Grp.
LLC v. Minn. Plumbing Bd., 933 N.W.2d 523, 531 (Minn. App. 2019).
I. Decision Upholding Denial of Fineran’s Requested Accommodation
When analyzing reasonable-accommodation claims, courts apply a burden-shifting
analysis. First, the participant must make a prima facie showing that the requested
accommodation is reasonable, by showing that the accommodatio n is “(1) linked to [the
participant’s] disability-related needs, (2) nece ssary to afford [the participant] an equal
opportunity to enjoy Section 8 benefits and (3) possible to implement.” Hinneberg v. Big
Stone Cty. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 706 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Huberty v.
Wash. Cty. Hous. & Redev. Auth. , 374 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773 (D. Minn. 2005)). If the
participant makes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the agency to show that
the requested accommodation would cause an undue hardship under the circumstances. Id.
An agency can prove that a requested accommodation woul d cause undue hardship by
showing either that it “would impose undue financial or administrative burdens” or that it
“would require ‘fundamental’ or ‘substantial’ modifications to its program.” Id. at 229.
Here, the hearing officer determined that Fineran made a prima facie showing, but
concluded that the HRA met its burden to show that the accommodation was

9
unreasonable.2 Specifically, the hearing officer c oncluded that making any exception to
the notice requirement equates to waiving an essential requirement. Fineran challenges
this reasoning. Given the language of the administrative plan, we agree with Fineran.
The language of the administrative plan requires that the HRA consider the
requested accommodation: “The [HRA] will consider exceptions to these policies . . . to
address an emergency situation over which a family has no control. In addition, the [HRA]
will allow exceptions to these policies for purpo ses of reasonable accommodation of a
family member who is a person with disabilities.” (Emphasis added.) The administrative
plan also requires the HRA to consider m itigating circumstances before terminating
benefits in general, including the circumstan ces present here, when the participant has a
disability: “The [HRA] will consider . . . [t]he extent of par ticipation or culpability of
individual family members, including whether the culpable family member is a minor or a
person with disabilities .” (Emphasis added.) We cannot disregard the permitted

2 To the extent that the HRA independently challenges the hearing officer’s determination
that the requested accommodation was connected to Fineran’s disability, we disagree. The
hearing officer’s quasi-judicial determinati on is supported by substantial evidence. See
Carter, 574 N.W.2d at 729 (stating the standard of review of an agency’s quasi-judicial
decisions); see also In re Excelsior Energy, Inc., 782 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn. App. 2010)
(“With respect to factual findings made by the agency in its judicial capacity, if the record
contains substantial evidence supporting a fa ctual finding, the agency’s decision must be
affirmed.” (quotation omitted )). The evidence presented shows that the accommodation
was requested as a result of Fineran’s invo luntary hospitalization and untreated mental
health crisis. There is no dispute that Finera n’s mental health deteriorated and he was in
and out of the hospital several times in May 2020. Likewise, is it undisputed that Fineran
was involuntarily hospitalized in June 2020. In addition, Fineran’s social worker
characterized Fineran’s thinking as “quite disorganized” during this time and attested that
Fineran’s disability significantly affected hi s ability to perform nor mal activities. Based
on this evidence, the hearing officer did not err in deciding that Fineran had established the
requisite prima facie case.

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exceptions to the notice requirement or th e mandate that the HRA consider making
exceptions during emergency medical situations and for people with disabilities. Because
the notice requirement itself requires considera tion of these exceptions, consideration or
application of an exception does not fundamentally alter the nature of the voucher program
or otherwise constitute a general waiver of the notice requirement. In light of the directives
on this issue contained in the administrative plan, we reject the HRA’s argument that there
are no reasonable exceptions to the notice requirement.
The HRA relies on Huberty as persuasive legal authority for its position that there
can be no exceptions to the notice requirement, but the HRA mischaracterizes that decision.
In that case, the federal district court explained that section 8 recipients automatically lose
their benefits after one year if they do not “re-certify” their eligibility. 374 F. Supp. 2d at
770. Huberty had not submitted the necessary informa tion to recertify her eligibility and
the housing authority terminated her from the program. Id. at 771. After Huberty received
a notice of termination, she requested a h earing. Huberty provided some additional
information at that hearing, but the hearing officer upheld her termination because the
information provided was still not sufficient to establish eligibility. Id. Huberty did not
appeal the hearing officer’s decision. Instead, she brought a new law suit in federal court
to challenge the denial of a requested accommodation. Id. at 770-71. The court granted
the housing authority’s summary judgment motion, concludi ng that Huberty’s “unsworn
assertions of compliance are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at
774. Because Huberty had never demonstrated eligibility in the program either before or
after the termination hearing, the district court characterized her requested accommodation

11
as a speculative determination of prospective eligibility, allowing her to continue receiving
benefits indefinitely:
Indeed, the request gave HRA no assurances that [Huberty]
would ever be able to respond to information requests in a
timely fashion. Even the word s [Huberty] chose to articulate
her request indicated significant doubt regarding the outcome.
[Huberty] requested HRA to “allow her time to complete her
mental health treatment plan to see if the timely response to
written requests by the HRA can be achieved.”

Id. at 774-75 (emphasis retained).
The decision in Huberty does not convince us to affirm the hearing officer in this
case. The court in Huberty reached its decision in light of a factual record that left no
question regarding Huberty’s ineligibility for section 8. Thus, the requested
accommodation in Huberty would have required the HRA to make payments on behalf of
someone who was not and might not ever beco me eligible for section 8. Moreover, the
requested accommodation would excuse Huberty’s failure to demonstrate eligibility for an
unlimited amount of time. By contrast, there is no similar eligibility dispute in this case.
Fineran was otherwise eligible for section 8 at the time of his termination. More
importantly, the requested accommodation here does not resemble Huberty’s speculative,
prospective, and indefin ite proposed accommodation.
3 Rather, Fineran requests a one-
time, retroactive application of the exceptions enumerated in the administrative plan. He
does not request the HRA to excuse any future notice requirements. Finally, contrary to

3 To the extent that some statements in the HRA’s responsive brief could be interpreted as
an argument that the requested accommoda tion would perpetuate an undue financial
hardship on the HRA, we disagree. Fineran’s one-time, retroactive request could not cause
undue financial hardship.

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the HRA’s argument on appeal, the federal court in Huberty did not conclude that the
move-out notice requirement is essential, di d not hold that there can be no reasonable
exceptions to this requireme nt, and did not address any exceptions to any program
requirement. In light of these distinctio ns, we conclude that, unlike the requested
accommodation in Huberty, Fineran’s requested accommoda tion does not fundamentally
alter the nature of the voucher program.
II. Decision Upholding Fineran’s Termination from Section 8
As noted above, Fineran also appeals the termination itself. We observe that the
hearing officer made no independent analysis of the termination decision; it focused almost
entirely on whether the requested accommodation fundamentally altered the nature of the
voucher program. We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude that there is no
factual dispute or argument regarding whether the HRA considered the relevant exceptions.
The HRA declined to consider Fineran’s medi cal emergency or the effect of Fineran’s
disability before terminating his section 8 voucher. Instead , Fineran’s housing specialist
testified that the termination occurred beca use the HRA could not grant any exception to
the notice requirement, regardless of the pa rticipant’s mental status. Because the
administrative plan requires the HRA to consider exceptions to the notice requirement prior
to termination and because the record shows that the HRA di d not do so here, we also
reverse the decision upholding the termination.
Reversed.