Charity Amber Billings, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1284

Charity Amber Billings,
Respondent,

vs.

Aaron Louis Olson,
Appellant.

Filed May 17, 2021
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CV-19-38

Christopher T. Kalla, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Aaron Olson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that the district
court (1) abused its discretion by denying his request to move the hearing location to
accommodate his disability, (2) erred by admitting evidence of “settlement offers” he
emailed to respondent’s attorney, and (3) abused its discretion by making the HRO
effective for longer than two years. We affirm.
2
FACTS
In 2017, when respondent Charity Billings was 17 years old, a friend introduced her
to appellant Aaron Olson at a skating rink. The following J anuary, she began receiving
Facebook messages from “ Evan Jacobson .” From the substance of the messages, she
discerned Olson was the true author. She also learned that he is in his 40s. Billings became
uncomfortable when Olson told her that he wanted to marry her and have children, and she
asked him to leave her alone. He did not.
In March 2018, Billings petitioned for an HRO. The district cour t granted a
temporary ex parte HRO . But after a hearing , it denied an HRO, reasoning that the
Facebook messages were “unpleasant” but not harassment, and that emails Olson sent to
Billings’s attorney while the ex parte HRO was in effect were “mere settlement efforts,”
that did not constitute harassment . The court added: “In the future if [Olson’s] words or
actions amount to harassment . . . , this Court suggests [Billings] bring forth another
petition.”
Before long, Olson began contacting Billings again . First, he sent her several
messages via Snapchat as “Dotty McNelson.” Then he sent her Snapchat messages under
the name “Mary Springer.” Each time, Billings recognized Olson from the content of the
messages, including repeated references to his interest in having a relationship with her.
On January 4, 2019, Billings initiated this HRO proceeding, recounting Ols on’s
pattern of unwanted social -media contacts. The district court determined that Billings ’s
petition presented reasonable grounds to believe Olson harassed her, noting that “[a]cts of
harassment have occurred since the last co urt’s order.” T he court granted a temporary
3
ex parte HRO prohibiting Olson from having any “direct or indirect contact” with Billings
until January 4, 2021 , and advised Olson that he could request a hearing to “change or
vacate” the order. For some reason not apparent in the record, Olson was not served with
the order until February 7, 2020. He then requested a hearing.
After a delay related to the COVID -19 pandemic, the district court conducted a
virtual hearing on July 1 and 20. Billings testified and presented screenshots of Olson’s
messages to her , and Olson cross -examined her at length . But technical difficulties
disrupted both hearing dates. T he district court attributed the difficulties to Olson’s
unauthorized attempt to record the proceedings and, at the end of the July 20 hearing,
ordered Olson to appear in person for the third hearing date.1 Olson did not ob ject but
requested that the hearing be in Apple Valley as a “reasonable accommodation, given that
I simply don’t have mobility, transportation, to get to Hastings .” The court stated the
hearing would be in Hastings because “[t]hat’s where we’re having hea rings.” The court
set the hearing for August 14 and advised Olson that if he failed to appear, it “may result
in default.”
The morning of the hearing, Olson filed a motion requesting that it be moved to
Apple Valley to accommodate his unspecified “disability.” The district court rejected the
motion as “untimely and unsupported” and permitted Billings to finish presenting her case
in Olson’s absence . To demonstrate that Olson violated the ex parte HRO, Billings
presented emails that he sent to her attorney, in which Olson offered to drop a federal action

1 The district court permitted Billings to continue attending virtually.
4
he was pursuing against the skating rink where he met Billings in exchange for B illings
working as his personal-care attendant and then marrying him. He also offered to buy her
a diamond ring that her attorney would “hold . . . until the six-month trial period without
sex is completed.”
The district court granted the HRO, finding that Olson sent Billings harassing
messages under “three separate fake accounts,” despite knowing that she did not want to
communicate with him. Based on its finding that Olson “has violated a prior or existing
restraining order on two or more occasions,” the district court made the HRO effective
until August 14, 2025. Olson appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Olson’s untimely
request for an accommodation.

Federal and state law prohibit excluding any person from public services based on
a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018); Minn. Stat. § 363A.12, subd. 1 (2020). But a party
asking a district court to alter its proceeding to accommodate his disability must bring a
motion 21 days before the hearing. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.04(a) (setting 21-day
deadline for nondis positive motions) . This notice affords the opposing party time to
respond, id. (b), and the court time to analyze and rule on the motion, Minn. R. Gen. Prac.
115.01(b). We review a district court’s decision regarding the timeliness of a motion for
an abuse of discretion. See Rhee v. Golden Home Builders, Inc. , 617 N.W.2d 618, 621
(Minn. App. 2000).
5
Olson did not bring his motion until approximately two hours before the hearing.
He contends he waited so long because he was attempting to “exhaust all possible avenues”
for complying with the court’s order. But he had nearly a month after the court set the
hearing date to find a way to appear as directed. By waiting until the morning of the hearing
to seek an accommodation, Olson truncated Billings’s opportunity to respond and
prevented the district court from fully examining the merit s of his request. Indeed, if he
had made a timely motion, he may have been able to address the court’s expressed concerns
about the merits of his request. On this record, we conclude the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Olson’s accommodation request as untimely.
II. The district court did not err by admitting evidence of “settlement offers” that
Olson emailed to Billings’s attorney.

Under Minn. R. Evid. 408, evidence that a party offered to settle “a claim which
was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount.” We generally review evidentiary rulings for an abuse
of discretion. Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020) . But rule 408 is “a rule
of exclusion, and the district court has no discretion to admit evidence that falls within the
ambit of the rule.” In re Buckmaster, 755 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Minn. App. 2008).
Olson argues that the district court should not have admitted the emails he sent to
Billings’s attorney because they were settlement offers. This argu ment is unavailing.
Rule 408 bars admission of settlement offers only when used to prove or disprove liability
or damages. By its terms, the rule “does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered
for another purpose.” Minn. R. Evid. 408; see C.J. Duffey Paper Co. v. Reger, 588 N.W.2d
6
519, 525 (Minn. App. 1999) (stating that communications are not barred by rule 408 when
they are offered “neither as evidence of liability or damages”), review denied (Minn. Apr.
28, 1999). To the extent Olson’s offers of marriage and employment as his personal -care
attendant could be deemed “settlement offers,” they are not related to this case. The claim
that Olson offered to settle in the challenged emails was his claim against the skating rink.
Billings did not offer the emails to prove anything about that claim; she offered them to
prove that Olson continued to contact and harass her—through her attorney—in violation
of the ex parte HRO. As such, rule 408 does not require their exclusion.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by making the HRO effective for
approximately five years.

We review a district court’s issuance of an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Kush v.
Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).
“A district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard is given to the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.”
Id. at 843-44.
If a district court finds “rea sonable grounds to believe that the respondent has
engaged in harassment,”2 it may grant an HRO “ for a fixed period of not more than two
years.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b) (2020). Upon a further finding that “the

2 Olson’s principal brief does not dispute the district court’s finding that he harassed
Billings by sending her numerous unwanted messages via social media. In his reply brief,
he disputes the finding that he sent the Snapchat messages. He forfeited this challenge by
not asserting it in his principal brief. See Lund ex rel. Revocable Tr. of Kim A. Lund v.
Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 284 (Minn. App. 2019) (deeming forfeited issues argued for the
first time in a reply brief), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2019). And his argument fails
on its merits because numerous statements in those messages reveal Olson as the author.
7
respondent has violated a prior or existing restraining order on two or more occasions,” the
court may grant relief “for a period of up to 50 years.” Id.
Olson challenges t he district court ’s finding that he “violated a prior or existing
restraining order on two or more occasions, ” arguing that he could not have violated the
ex parte HRO before it was served on him in February 2020 . But the record contains
evidence of numerous violations after that time. Olson emailed Billings’s attorney more
than a doze n times in March and June 2020, including at least six emails in which he
expressly discussed Billings. While Olson directed those emails to the attorney, they were
plainly intended for Billings—he requested that she act as his personal-care attendant and
then marry him, proposed to relay a picture of himself to Billings through her attorney, and
suggested where Billings should and should not shop . And Billings’s attorney informed
her of them. In short, Olson used t he emails to indirectly contact Billings in violation of
the ex parte HRO. See State v. Egge, 611 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Minn. App. 2000) (affirming
finding of indirect contact in violation of HRO where the defendant directed his insurance
agent to call the victim), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2000).
Olson also argues that the district court erred in finding the emails violated the
ex parte HRO because the district court in the 2018 HRO proceeding determined that
emails to Billings’s attorney were merely settlement offers, not harassment. We are not
persuaded. Even if Olson’s 2018 emails to Billings’s attorney were not harassment, his
numerous emails in 2020 were—he used them as a means to continue pursuing a
relationship with Billings despite her express refusals and requests that he leave her alone.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2020) (defining harassment as “repeated incidents
8
of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or
are inten ded to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, sec urity, or privacy of
another”). More importantly, the emails did not have to meet the statutory definition of
harassment to violate the ex parte HRO. Rather, the ex parte HRO prohibited Olson from
having direct or indirect contact with Billings. As discussed above, Olson’s emails to
counsel were indirect contacts with Billings and not legitimate offers to settle this case.
In sum, Olson was served with the ex parte HRO prohibiting him from having direct
or indirect contact with Billings. He subsequently sent Billings’s attorney numerous emails
relaying personal messages and requests to Billings. On this record, the district court did
not clearly err by finding that Olson violated an HRO on two or more occasions. Based on
that finding, the court could have made the HRO effective “for a period of up to 50 years.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b). It opted for approximately five years. We are satisfied
that given Olson’s persistent multi -year pursuit of Billings , the district court was well
within its discretion in making the HRO effective for five years.
Affirmed.