State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1302

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Billy Gene Hunt,
Appellant.

Filed April 5, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-17-1823

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After convicting appellant Billy Hunt of aggravated controlled substance crime in
the first degree, the district court sentenced Hunt to a presumptive sentence of 158 months’
imprisonment. Hunt now challenges the district court’s calculation of his criminal-history

2
score, arguing that five of his prior burglary convictions—all committed at different storage
units on the same day—are part of a “single behavioral incident,” 1 and that his
criminal-history score should have been reduced accordingly. Because individually-owned
storage units are effectively different locations, the district court did not err in classifying
Hunt’s burglary convictions as multiple incidents. As a result, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Billy Hunt was convicted of aggravated controlled substance crime in the
first degree in July 2018. Mi nn. Stat. § 152.021 subd. 2b(2) (2018). The district court
sentenced him to 158 months’ imprisonment, which is the presumptive sentence for a
criminal-history score of six or above for a severity leve l D9 offense. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.C. (2018). Hunt’s score was calculated as 16 based on 17 prior Iowa
convictions. Hunt did not challenge his crimin al-history score at th e original sentencing
hearing.
Hunt appealed, challenging the search and the calculation of his criminal-history
score. State v. Hunt, No. A19-0336, 2020 WL 522167, at *1 (Minn. App. Feb. 3, 2020),
review denied (Minn. Apr. 14, 2020). With regard to the score, Hunt disputed the inclusion
of the Iowa convictions in the calcula tion of his criminal-history score. Id. at *3-4. This
court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing due to an insufficient
record. Id. at *4.

1 “Legal authorities use the terms ‘single c ourse of conduct’ and ‘single behavioral
incident’ interchangeably.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.B.116 (2018).

3
On remand, Hunt argued that his criminal-history score should be reduced from 16
to four, which would ultimately reduce his sentence from 158 months to 134 months. The
district court concluded that Hunt had at least six felony points from Iowa convictions.
These convictions and offense dates were: (1 ) one conviction of third-degree burglary on
October 17, 2007; (2) one convic tion of third-degree burglary on May 9, 2008; (3) five
convictions of third-degree burglary on Ma y 27, 2008; and (4) one conviction of
third-degree burglary on March 29, 2011.
Specifically at issue in this case are th e May 27 burglary convictions. The first
conviction was for the burglary of a storage unit in Williamsburg. Hunt admitted to stealing
power tools and a projector from the Williamsbur g unit. The next f our convictions were
for burglaries of four storage units at Deneve Storage near Victor. Each unit had a separate
renter. Surveillance video showed Hunt forci ng open each storage un it, going into each
storage unit, and taking property—a bicycle and a computer—from just one of those units.
Hunt did not take anything from the three other units he entered.
The district court determined that the five burglaries on May 27, 2008, were to be
calculated as separate crimes because the evid ence showed that Hunt ’s actions involved
burglaries of separate storage units rented by different victims. Each of Hunt’s convictions
was calculated as one point, for a total crimin al-history score of eight. Based on this
calculation, the district court imposed the pr esumptive 158-month sentence for a severity
level D9 offense with a criminal-history score of six or above.
Hunt appeals.

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DECISION
Hunt argues that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him with
a criminal-history score of mo re than six. He asserts th at because his five May 2008
burglary convictions involved a single beha vioral incident, only two of his burglary
convictions can be counted in his criminal-h istory score under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines. State v. Stillday , 646 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. App. 2002), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). Because Hunt c oncedes that the score for the three other
burglary convictions was proper ly assigned for the other thre e burglary convictions, the
issue before us is whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that Hunt
should be assigned five points—one for each of the five burglaries on May 27.
To consider this issue, we turn first to the sentencing guidelines. The guidelines
determine presumptive sentences based on the severity of an offense and the offender’s
criminal-history score. Minn. Sent. Guidel ines 2.B.1 (2018). An offender is assigned a
particular score, typically one half-point or one point, for every felony conviction for which
a felony sentence was stayed or imposed not including the current sentencing. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.B.1 & cmt. 2.B. 101 (2018). Criminal-history score calculations count
out-of-state convictions as felonies if the same crime would be de fined as a felony in
Minnesota, and the defendant received a senten ce that is equivalent to a felony-level
sentence in Minnesota. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.5.b (2018).2

2 The Iowa burglaries are felonies under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: (1) they are
the equivalent of burglary in the third degr ee, a felony violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.582, subdivision 3 (2018); and (2) Hunt received felony-level sentences. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 2 (2018).

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But if an offender has multiple offenses oc curring in a “single course of conduct”
in which state law prohibits the offender from being sentenced on more than one offense,
“only the offense at the highest severity le vel should be considered.” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines cmt. 2.B.107 (2018). The stat e has the burden to es tablish a defendant’s
criminal history. State v. Edmison , 379 N.W.2d 85, 87 n.1 (M inn. 1985). We review a
district court’s criminal-history score ca lculation for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Edwards, 900 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. App. 2017), aff’d mem., 909 N.W.2d 594
(Minn. 2018). But when the is sue involves the proper interp retation of the sentencing
guidelines, the issue is a question of law that the appellate courts review de novo.
State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Minn. 2007).
With these principles in mind, we cons ider whether Hunt’s Iowa convictions
constitute a single behavioral incident. To do so, we consider factors such as (1) time and
place, and (2) whether the offenses were “motivated by a desire to obtain a single criminal
objective.” State v. Gould , 562 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. 1997). For time-and-place
factors, we determine whether the acts occurred at “substantially the same time and place
and arise out of a continuous and un interrupted course of conduct.” State v. Johnson ,
141 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. 19 66). But, merely because the “crimes were committed
within a short time span and w ithin the same area does not mean the single behavioral
incident prohibition is violated.” State v. Thomas , 352 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Minn.
App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1984). As fo r the remaining factor, “Broad
statements of criminal purpose do not unify separate acts” into a single criminal objective.
State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014).

6
Looking first at the time-and-place factors, Hunt’s burglaries happened on the same
day, but not in the same loca tion. One of the five burgla ries occurred in Williamsburg, a
town far from where the other four burglaries took place at Deneve Storage. To discern
whether different storage units in the Deneve Storage complex are also different locations,
we turn to State v. Drljic, 876 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. App. 2016). In that case, the defendant
broke through a wall and sealed door of businesses that were “physically connected as part
of one building.” Drljic, 876 N.W.2d at 354. Yet we held the businesses were
“functionally separate” and treated them as different locations. Id. Similarly, in this case,
although the units were physically in the same building, Hunt had to cut the padlock off of
each door in order to access them. Following the logic of Drljic, we conclude that the time-
and-place factors are not in Hunt’s favor.
As for the overall criminal objective, Hunt only took a few ite ms from the storage
units. In three of the units he opened, he did not take anything at a ll. This demonstrates
he did not have the same criminal objective in each unit. Removing different items from
each location is considered a different criminal purpose. Id. Based on the items he took—
including power tools and a projector from one unit, and a bicycle and computer from
another—Hunt’s burglaries do not fit a singular criminal objective. This factor is also not
in Hunt’s favor.
To convince us otherwise, Hunt contends that he was on a “crime spree,” which
should be construed as a unifying criminal purpose. Langdon v. State, 375 N.W.2d 474,
476 (Minn. 1985) (characterizing trying to get as much money as possible as a singular
criminal purpose). In Langdon, the defendant entered the communal laundry rooms of

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multiple buildings within the same apartment complex in a single afternoon to steal from
locked coin boxes from washers and dryers. Id. at 475. This series of burglaries, the
supreme court concluded, arose from a single behavioral incident because the defendant
had a similar criminal purpose for each burglary. Id. at 476-77. But the supreme court
noted that if the defendant had burglarized a number of ap artments owned by different
people, then multiple punish ments might be appropriate.3 Langdon, 375 N.W.2d at 476.
Here, as noted above, breaking into individua lly owned storage units by different owners
is more analogous to breaking into individually owned businesses in the same building than
multiple common spaces in an apartment complex. And the “single motive” of obtaining
money from locked coin boxes is far differe nt from the eclectic items taken (and passed
over) from the units by Hunt. Thus, the criminal purpose in Langdon is distinguishable
from the facts before us.4
Because the factors for a single behavioral incident were not me t for Hunt’s five
May 27, 2008 burglary convictions, each conviction warrants one separate point, totaling
a criminal-history score of eight. The dist rict court’s 158–month presumptive sentence,
based on a total criminal-history score of above six, fell within its wide discretion.
Affirmed.

3 In Drljic, this court applied this aspect of Langdon to a defendant breaking into multiple
businesses in the same buildin g and treated the burglary of each business as a separate
location and criminal objective. Drljic, 876 N.W.2d at 354.
4 Hunt also argues that the district court improperly elevated dicta in Langdon to be its
holding in the amended sentencing order. Th is argument effectively is another way to
argue that Hunt’s factual circ umstances fit within that of Langdon. As explained above,
Hunt’s burglaries are more analogous to Drljic, where this court determined the burglaries
were not a single behavioral incident. 876 N.W.2d at 354.