Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam

1 
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A20-1304
Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action
against Howard S. Kleyman, a Minnesota
Attorney, Registration No. 0056558. Filed: June 9, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Amy M. Hallora n, Assistant Director, Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Howard S. Kleyman, Saint Paul, Minnesota, pro se.
_______________________
S Y L L A B U S
Disbarment is the appropriate discipline for an attorney whose misconduct includes
misappropriating client funds, knowingly misusi ng his client trust account to further
fraudulent schemes, making knowingly false st atements to the Dir ector, and failing to
cooperate during the disciplinary investigation.
Disbarred.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition
for disciplinary action against respondent Howard S. Kleyman. The petition alleged

2 
numerous acts of misconduct, including misappropriating client funds, knowingly
misusing his client trust account to further fr audulent schemes, knowingly making false
statements to the Director, and failing to cooperate during the disciplinary investigation.
Kleyman failed to file an answer to the petition. As a result, we deemed the allegations of
the petition admitted and allowed the partie s to file memoranda on the appropriate
discipline. Kleyman did not file a memorandum or appear at oral argument. The Director
asks that Kleyman be disbarred. We agree that the appropriate discipline is disbarment.
FACTS
Kleyman was admitted to practice in Minne sota in 1971. In October 2020, the
Director filed a petition for disciplinary action against Kleyman. After Kleyman failed to
file an answer, we deemed the a llegations in the petition admitted. In re Kleyman ,
No. A20-1304, Order at 2 (Minn. filed Dec. 9, 2020); see also Rule 13(b), Rules on
Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR) (stating that if th e respondent fails to file a
timely answer, “the allegations” in the petition “shall be deemed admitted”).
The petition for disciplinary action is 38 pages long and sets forth detailed accounts
of extensive misconduct by Kleyman. His mi sconduct falls into three broad categories.
First, Kleyman misused his attorney trust accounts and committed other misconduct related
to those accounts, including knowingly using these accounts to further fraudulent schemes.
Second, he misappropriated client funds. Th ird, he made knowingly false statements to
the Director and did not cooper ate in the disciplinary inves tigation. We summarize the
misconduct in each of these categories below.

3 
The first category of misconduct involves Kl eyman’s misuse of his trust accounts,
including his knowing use of those accounts to fu rther fraudulent schemes. In July 2017,
Kleyman acted as an escrow agent in the sale of a bank draft between the Hanson Group
of Companies (the Hanson Group), repres ented by Chief Execu tive Officer Harold
Boigues,1 and GCM Hong Kong Lim ited (GCM), represented by its president K.F.
Kleyman’s electronic signature appeared on the contract document, his initials were on all
four pages, and a s canned copy of his passport was a ttached to the document. The
document also contained information regardin g Kleyman’s attorney trust account into
which GCM was instructed to deposit the money. K.F. belie ved that the transaction was
legitimate because of the use of Kleyman’s trust account.
In August 2017, GCM paid the Hanson Group 50,00 0€ directly and deposited
$168,106.43 (the equivalent of 150,000€) into Kleyman’s Wells Fargo trust account.
Kleyman paid himself $1,680 of the funds that GCM wired into his trust account for his
role as an escrow agent in the transaction. The Hanson Group first provided GCM with a
bank draft, which K.F. rejected, and the Hanson Group then presented GCM with another
instrument, which K.F. also rejected, believing it to be a fraudulent and postdated personal
check.
K.F. contacted both the Hanson Group and Kleyman in November 2017, requesting
a refund and referencing his pr evious requests for a refund . In his response, Kleyman
claimed that he had never seen the agreement and did not be lieve that he had a personal

1 The Director’s petition asserts that Bo igues is a known fugitive who posted a
fraudulent bail bond after being arrested for a serious felony matter in 2014.

4 
responsibility to K.F. or GCM. He never returned the fee that he was paid for acting as an
escrow agent to his trust account after K.F. disputed Kleyman’s entitlement to those funds,
in violation of Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(b).2 Later, Kleyman tried to
contract with K.F. to withdraw his complaint to the Director, in violation of Rule 8.4(d).3
In March 2018, Kleyman e-mailed a lending institution, Platform, to disavow any
knowledge of the Hanson Group ’s transactions and any on going relationship with the
Hanson Group. Kleyman also sent Platform a copy of an e-mail from December 2017, in
which the Hanson Group claime d that it inserted Kleyman’s signature into the contract
with GCM by mistake, and that Kleyman had made no guarantees regarding the
transaction. Kleyman requested that Platform assist him in investigating the fraud.
Despite acknowledging the Hanson Group’s fraud, Kleyman continued to misuse
his trust accounts to facilitate transactions for the Hanson Group or its agents. In September
2018, Kleyman’s Wells Fargo trust account became over-drawn and the bank reported the
overdraft to the Director. The Director then requested an explanation for the overdraft
from Kleyman and asked to see records for the account from July to September 2018.

2 “If the right of the lawyer . . . to rece ive funds from the [trust] account is disputed”
by the client or a third person claiming entitlement to the funds “within a reasonable time
after the funds have been withdrawn, the disputed portion must be restored to the account
until the dispute is finally resolved.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(b).

3 “ It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d).

5 
Kleyman responded in October 2018 that the overdraft was the result of an
unexpected wire transfer fee from a transactio n made on behalf of an alleged client; 4 the
same alleged client, he claimed, who owned a ll of the funds within the account for that
period and for whom Kleyman performed all transactions. He pr ovided an unsigned
letter—purportedly from this client—to support this statement. Kleyman also provided the
check registers, which the Director believes were created in response to her request, rather
than maintained cont emporaneously. He did not provide any of the requested client
subsidiary ledgers, trial balanc e reports, or reconciliation repo rts. Further, many of the
payments from and deposits into the trust account involved the Aspen Financial Group, an
entity in which Kleyman appeared to have an interest, and a variety of other persons5 with
no discernible connection to any client. None of these transfers involved the representation
of a client, in violation of Rule 1.15(a).6
Through her investigation, the Director learned that Aspen had a bank account that
Kleyman used as his law firm operating account (operating account). The Director also
learned that Kleyman maintained other trust accounts, for which he also failed to maintain

4 The alleged client, Mark Neuhaus, had judgment entered against him by the United
States Securities & Exchange Commission in 20 09 for repeated acts of securities fraud
totaling over $14,000,000. Ther e were also over $1,000,000 of federal tax liens entered
against Neuhaus from 2002–2007.

5 One of these people was David Sinclai r, who was found by the Financial Conduct
Authority and Bank of Engla nd Prudential Regulation Authority to have set up shell
corporations for fraudulent purposes in 2011.

6 “ All funds of clients or third persons held by a lawyer or law firm in connection
with a representation shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts . . .”
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) (emphasis added).

6 
the required records, such as check registers, client subsidiary ledgers, trial balance reports,
and reconciliation reports, for any of his tr ust accounts, in violation of Rules 1.15(c)(3),7
and 1.15(h),8 and Appendix 1 of the Rules.
During a meeting with the Director in October 2018, Kleyman assured the Director
that he would not engage in further transactions with the Hanson Group or Boigues because
of their involvement in the fraudulent tran saction with GCM. Kleyman presented the
Director with the December 2017 e-mail from the Hanson Group and a 30-page document
that he claimed was the only document that he had received regarding the transaction
between the Hanson Group and GCM. Th e document, however, did not include any
mention of Kleyman’s involv ement in the transaction, even though Kleyman had
previously admitted to serving as an escrow agent. The Di rector told Kleyman explicitly
that use of his trust accounts was to be limit ed to the representation of clients in a legal
matter, but he continued to use these accounts when acting as an escrow agent, in violation
of Rule 1.15(a).
Despite Kleyman’s assurances to the Dir ector, and his evident knowledge of the
fraud perpetrated by the Hanson Gr oup, he continued to engage in transactions with the

7 “A lawyer shall . . . maintain complete records of a ll funds, securities, and other
properties of a client or third person coming into the possession of the lawyer and render
appropriate accounts to the client or third person regarding them[.]” Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 1.15(c)(3).

8 “Every lawyer engaged in private practic e of law shall maintain or cause to be
maintained on a current basis books and records sufficient to demonstrate income derived
from, and expenses related to, the lawyer’s private practice of law, and to establish
compliance with paragraphs (a) through (f).” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(h).

7 
Hanson Group and Boigues over a period of 3 years. In July of 2019, Kleyman again
transferred funds to Boigues and his wife in three separate transactions, two of which
involved illegitimate financial institutions. In one of these transactions, Kleyman accepted
a $75,000 loan application fee into his trust account from R.P., who expected that Kleyman
would disburse the funds to a bank to facilita te R.P.’s application for a $5,000,000 loan.
The financial institution was fraudulent, however, and Kley man never refunded R.P.’s
application fee. Kleyman’s c ontinued pattern of using his trust accoun ts to participate in
transactions with the Hanson Group and those connected to the Hanson Group, after he
knew the Hanson Group and its actors engaged in fraud, violated Rule 8.4(c).9
The second category of misconduct involves Kleyman’s intentional
misappropriation of client funds. Over the course of 4 years, Kleyman engaged in a pattern
of depositing advance filing fees that he receiv ed from clients into hi s operating account.
Kleyman used these advance filing fees to cover his own personal and business expenses,
resulting in repeated periods when his operati ng account lacked sufficient funds to cover
undisbursed advance filing fees. These shor tages ranged from nominal amounts to over
$200,000. On one occasion, Kleyman deposited settlement funds he received on behalf of
a client into his operating account, in violation of Rule 1.15(b).
Kleyman also misappropriated funds when he received a $335 advance filing fee
from M.V. for a bankruptcy petition. Afte r depositing these funds into his operating
account, Kleyman never filed a bankruptcy petiti on on behalf of M.V. He converted the

9 “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation[.]” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c).

8 
advance filing fee, without M.V.’s knowledge or consent, and dis bursed those funds to
himself and his paralegal. This intentional misappropriation of client funds violated Rules
1.15(a) and 8.4(c).
Finally, Kleyman repeatedly failed to cooperate with the Director during the course
of the investigation and provided the Dir ector with knowingly false, incomplete,
contradictory, and misleading information. Several times the Director requested copies of
subsidiary ledgers and other records for his trust accounts or operating account, as well as
explanations for discrepancies in the ledgers . Kleyman did not provide a complete or
accurate accounting of the identity of those with whom he was conducting business. For
example, he told the Director that a certain person was a client, only to later claim he never
provided any legal work for this person. He also did not provide all of the requested
documents, and offered explanati ons for some of the transfers that contradicted what he
had previously told the Director. In fact, Kleyman provided the Director with contradictory
ledgers or accounts of his transactions on several occasions. This conduct violated Rules
8.1(b)10 and 8.4(c), and Rule 25 of the Rules of Lawyers Professional Responsibility.11

10 “[A] lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for informati on from a[]. . . disciplinary authority . . .”
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(b).

11 “It shall be the duty of any lawyer who is the subject of an investigation . . . under
these Rules to cooperate with . . . the Director, or the Dir ector’s staff . . . by complying
with reasonable requests” for documents and information. Rule 25(a), RLPR.

9 
ANALYSIS
Because we have already deemed the alle gations in the petition admitted, the only
remaining issue is the di scipline to be imposed. In re Lundeen , 811 N.W.2d 602, 608
(Minn. 2012). The Director asks us to disbar Kleyman.
“The purpose of discipline for professional misconduct is not to punish the attorney
but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct
by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” In re Rebeau, 787 N.W.2d 168,
173 (Minn. 2010). To determine the appropriate discipline for the established misconduct,
we consider the following four factors: “(1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the
cumulative weight of the disciplinary violation; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm
to the legal profession.” In re Nathanson , 812 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 2012) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the discipline imposed in similar cases. In re Tigue, 900 N.W.2d 424,
431 (Minn. 2017). “Sanctions are imposed according to the unique facts of each case, but
earlier cases are useful for drawing analogies.” In re Lochow, 469 N.W.2d. 91, 96 (Minn.
1991).
I.
Kleyman’s misconduct in this case was extr emely serious. We have consistently
considered the misappropriation of client funds to be very serious misconduct. See, e.g.,
In re Garcia, 792 N.W.2d 434, 443 (Minn. 2010) (“Misappropriation of client funds alone
‘is particularly serious misconduct and usua lly warrants disbarment absent clear and
convincing evidence of substan tial mitigating factors.’ ” (quoting In re Rhodes,

10 
740 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Minn. 2007))). “Misappropriati on occurs whenever funds
belonging to a client are not deposited in a trust account and are used for any purpose other
than that specified by the client.” In re Westby , 639 N.W.2d 358, 370 (Minn. 2002).
Kleyman’s conduct is clear misappropriation. He deposited advance filing fees from his
bankruptcy clients into his operating account. Over a 4-year period, he used these filings
fees for his own business and personal expens es. And in one case , Kleyman converted a
client’s advance filing fees to earned attorney’s fees without the client’s consent.
In addition, Kleyman’s use of his trust accounts to further fraudulent schemes is
very serious misconduct. An attorney’s use of her trust ac count to perpetrate fraud is “a
serious breach of the standards of professional conduct required of an attorney licensed [to
practice law] in Minnesota.” In re Engel , 859 N.W.2d 788, 789 (M inn. 2015) (order).
Kleyman continued to make transfers from hi s trust accounts on behalf of the Hanson
Group and Harold Boigues despite knowing— and communicating with Platform and the
Director—that they had defrauded K.F. In one particularly egregious example, he accepted
a loan application fee from R.P. and placed the funds in his trust accounts before disbursing
the majority of the money to Boigues’ wife and keeping the rest for himself. The financial
institution from which R.P. requested the loan was fraudulent and Kleyman never returned
the $75,000 application fee. He transferred funds to fraudulent financial institutions on
behalf of Boigues or an associate of Boig ues on at least one other occasion. Kleyman
benefited financially from these transactions because he was paid a portion of the funds
that were deposited into his trust account.

11 
Finally, Kleyman’s refusal to cooperate in the disciplinary process is serious
misconduct. “[N]oncooperation with the disc iplinary process, by itself, may warrant
indefinite suspension and, when it exis ts in connection with other misconduct,
noncooperation increases the severity of the disciplinary sanction.” I n r e N e l s o n,
733 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Minn. 2007). Kleyman failed to turn over trust account records
upon request, and despite being admonished to keep contemporaneous records, failed to do
so. Not only did he refuse to share information with the Director, but when he did share
information, he provided false and contradictory information that hampered the Director’s
investigation. The seriousness of Kleyman’s misconduct supports substantial discipline.
II.
The second factor for consideration—th e cumulative weight of the misconduct—
also supports substantial discipline. In determining the cumulative weight of disciplinary
violations, we “distinguish between ‘a brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident’
from ‘multiple instances of mis[conduct] occu rring over a substantial amount of time.’ ”
In re Severson, 860 N.W.2d 658, 673 (Minn. 2015) (quoting In re Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d
734, 743 (Minn. 2011)). The Director’s i nvestigatory audit revealed that Kleyman’s
misappropriation of client funds occurred repeatedly over a peri od of at least 4 years.
Further, he continued to engage with Boigue s and the Hanson Group for at least 3 years
after the K.F. transaction. Kleyman’s failure to cooperate similarly spanned over 2 years.
None of his conduct, thus, can be said to be a mere lapse in judgment. Rather, Kleyman
demonstrated a consistent pattern of a wide variety of misconduct th at continued over a
long period of time.

12 
III.
Third, we consider the harm to the public and the lega l profession. In analyzing
harm, the court considers “the number of clie nts harmed [and] the extent of the clients’
injuries.” In re Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 308 (Minn. 2011) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Kleyman’s misappropriation of M.V.’s filing fee caused this client financial harm.
He never refunded the $335 that M.V. paid him for a filing fee, despite not filing a
bankruptcy petition for this client. The petiti on also alleges that Kleyman was late in
returning client fees to many other clients, though he did eventually return the money.
Even if these clients suffered no financial harm, we have noted that “[m]isappropriation of
client funds, by its very nature, harms not only the specific client, but also the public at
large, the legal profession, and the administration of justice.” In re Ruttger, 566 N.W.2d
327, 331 (Minn. 1997), see also In re Quinn, 946 N.W.2d 583, 589–90 (Minn. 2020) (“A
lawyer misappropriates funds when funds are not kept in trus t and are used for a purpose
other than one specified by the client.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). This harm results from the erosion of the public’s trust in lawyers and the legal
profession more broadly. See In re Harrigan, 841 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 2014). The
fraudulent schemes that Kleyman participated in, through the use of his trust accounts,
caused financial harm to others, including n on-clients such as GCM and R.P. He never
refunded GCM’s funds when the Hanson Group failed to deliver the agreed-upon bank
draft. Similarly, R.P. lost her $75,000 application fee and never got the loan for which she
applied.

13 
We have also determined that a lawyer’s failure to cooperate in a disciplinary
investigation “harm[s] the lega l profession by undermining th e integrity of the attorney
disciplinary system.” In re Brost, 850 N.W.2d 699, 705 (Mi nn. 2014) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Kleyman di d not fully cooperate with the Director’s
investigation; in fact, he actively thwarted it at times by presenting false information, which
we have found to be harmful to the profession as a whole. Therefore, we conclude that
Kleyman’s misconduct has caused serious harm.
IV.
Because Kleyman did not re spond to the petition, there are no mitigating factors for
us to consider. See In re Matson, 889 N.W.2d 17, 25 (Minn. 2017) (declining to consider
mitigating factors because the allegations have been deemed admitted.). The Director also
does not argue that any aggravating factors are present.
V.
We consider our prior decisions to “ensu re consistency” in attorney discipline
decisions. Tigue, 900 N.W.2d at 433. We “ ‘generally disbar attorneys who
misappropriate client funds,’ in the absenc e of ‘substantial mitigating factors.’ ” In re
Gorshteyn, 931 N.W.2d 762, 770 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Lundeen, 811 N.W.2d at 608); see
also In re Capistrant , 905 N.W.2d 617, 622 (Minn. 2018) (disbarring a lawyer for
misappropriating a $547 filing fe e, among other misconduct); Matson, 889 N.W.2d at 26
(disbarring a lawyer for misappropriating a $550 filing fee, among other misconduct); In
re Rodriguez , 783 N.W.2d 170, 171 (Minn. 2010) (order) (disbarring a lawyer who
misappropriated $650 from clients). The appropriate discipline in this case is disbarment.

14 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Ho ward S. Kleyman is disbarred from the
practice of law in the State of Minnesota, effective on the date of this opinion. Respondent
shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice to c lients, opposing counsel, and
tribunals), and shall pay $900 in costs under Rule 24(a), RLPR.
Disbarred.