City of Cambridge, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1313

City of Cambridge,
Respondent,

vs.

One Love Housing, LLC, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed June 28, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CV-18-778

Michelle A. Christy, Jessica E. Schwie, Kennedy & Graven, Char tered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Elizabeth J. Vieira, Rupp, Anderson, Sq uires & Waldspurger, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Scott A. Benson, Joseph A. Pull, Briol & Benson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Fabian S. Hoffner, Samuel J. Merritt, The Hoffner Firm, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota;
and

David L. Lillehaug, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this zoning-enforcement action, appellant-property-owner and appellant-resident
argue that the district court erred by granti ng summary judgment for respondent-city and
by dismissing appellants’ counterclaims for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Fair Housing Act. Appellants also argue that the district court erred in its discovery
rulings. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises out of a zoning-enfor cement action brought by respondent City
of Cambridge (the City) against appellant One Love LLC (One Lo ve). One Love and
appellant Nate Pearson (Pearson) 1 filed counterclaims against the City for violating the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA) and the Fair Housing Act (the FHA).
On December 19, 2017, One Love bought a five-bedroom, single-family house in
the City to operate as a sober house. Pear son lives and works at the house as a house
manager. The house is in a zoning district classified as an “R-1” district. The City’s zoning
code prohibits more than four unrelated peopl e from living together in a house in an R-1
zoning district, although it pl aces no limits on the number of family members who may
live together in a single house.
In March 2018, One Love contacted the City’s development director, Marcia
Westover, seeking information about submitting a request to operate a sober house. At that

1 The term “One Love” refers collectively to both the sober house and Pearson.

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time, One Love explained that four resident s lived at the house. Westover responded on
April 16, 2018, conveying that the City would permit up to six unrelated people to live
together as a single housekeepin g unit. The City identified this measure as a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA and the FHA. Westover requested more information from
One Love, including “a plan/la yout” of the house showing “where the residents and staff
will be sleeping,” and a parking plan. On April 24, 2018, One Love provided more
information to Westover and revealed that it intended to use the house as a residential
sober-living house with up to 14 residents. This was the fi rst time One Love notified the
City that it intended to request a reasonable accommodation for this number of people.
On May 1, 2018, One Love’s attorney se nt a letter to the City requesting a
reasonable accommodation under the FHA. One Love requested that the City treat the
residents as a family by waiving the number of unrelated persons who can reside together
and treat the use of the dwelling as a single-fa mily use. The City rejected One Love’s
request by letter dated May 16, 2018.
On June 20, 2018, One Love’s attorney sent a letter to the City attorney stating that
it intended to begin providing housing for up to 13 people at the house beginning on July
1, 2018, despite the City’s de nial of One Love’s request. On August 6, 2018, the City
responded to One Love’s letter. The City reiterated that it was willing to allow up to six
people to reside together as a single house keeping unit. The City asked One Love “to
confirm [by August 14, 2018] the residence ha s no more than six individuals residing at
the dwelling and to schedule a time for sta ff to conduct a site inspection to confirm
compliance.” The City advised One Love that if it did not contact the office by August 14,

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“further legal action [would] be pursued.” The City scheduled the matter for a hearing
before the city council on August 20, 2018, at which time “the City Council will determine
if the City will seek legal action.”
At the August 20 hearing, the City Council considered whether to allow One Love
to have 13 unrelated residents living at the h ouse, but “decided not to allow that.” The
council ultimately resolved to pursue a zoning-enforcement action against One Love for
housing 13 unrelated individual s at the house. During this time, six to eleven people
resided at the house.
In September 2018, the City filed an enfo rcement action in district court seeking
declaratory judgment that One Love violat ed the city ordinance by housing up to 14
individuals in the house. The City also requested a permanent injunction prohibiting One
Love from housing more than six unrelated indi viduals at the house. One Love filed an
answer raising defenses and asserting three counterclaims. One Love alleged that the
City’s partial denial of its request vi olated the ADA and the FHA because it
(1) failed to provide reasonable accommodation, (2) led to disparate treatment, and (3) led
to disparate impact. Later, One Love and re sident Nate Pearson filed a second amended
answer and counterclaim alleging, among other things, that the City violated the FHA by
declining to grant the requested accommodation.
The parties cross-moved for dispositive relief. The City moved for summary
judgment on its enforcement-action claim and sought dismissal of One Love’s
counterclaims, seeking relief on standing grounds as well as on the merits. One Love cross-
moved for summary judgment asking the district court to dismiss the City’s claim and grant

5
relief to One Love on its counterclaims. The district court granted the City’s summary-
judgment motion, rejecting the City’s sta nding argument, but determining that it was
entitled to summary judgment on the merits. The district court denied One Love’s motion.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. One Love has standing to pursue a discrimination claim.
The City challenges One Love’s standing to assert claims under the ADA and the
FHA. The district court determined that On e Love had standing; th e City did not appeal
this decision. One Love argues that the City forfeited this issue because it didn’t appeal
the issue. But while the City did not appeal the district c ourt’s standing determination, it
did raise standing in its responsiv e brief to this court. “After an appeal has been filed,
respondent may obtain review of a judgment or order entered in the same underlying action
that may adversely affect respon dent by filing a notice of rela ted appeal.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 106. Generally a respondent is barred from presenting issues not raised by a notice
of related appeal. Arndt v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 394 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn. 1986). Still,
a respondent is not required to file a notice of related appeal to pr eserve an alternative
theory on which the judgment may be affirmed. Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347 ,
781 N.W.2d 321, 332 (Minn. 2010). Here, the district court did not issue a decision adverse
to the City. Thus, the City did not need to file a notice of related appeal.
Having determined that the City did not forfeit its argument by failing to file a notice
of related appeal, we next turn to the standi ng issue. Standing is a threshold requirement
and parties cannot waive it. United States v. Hays , 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S. Ct. 2431,

6
2435 (1995); In re Horton, 668 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Minn. App. 2003) (noting that standing
may be raised at any time and cannot be waived). The absence of a party’s standing “bars
consideration of the claim by the court.” In re Custody of D.T.R ., 796 N.W.2d 509, 512
(Minn. 2011). We may examine standing at any time. League of Women Voters Minn. v.
Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 645 n.7 (Minn. 2012); see also Patzner v. Schaefer, 551 N.W.2d
736, 737 (Minn. App. 1996) (noting that appellate courts “are required to address the issue
[of standing] even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to
raise the issue before us” (q uotation omitted)). We review the question of standing de
novo. D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d at 512.
At the summary-judgment hearing, the City argued that One Love lacked standing
to raise discrimination claims on behalf of the residents. The district court rejected this
argument:
[I]t is evident that One Love has standing as a business
organization that provides hous ing environments for persons
suffering from various addic tions. Addiction has been
recognized [as] a form of ment al impairment and disability.
Therefore, One Love has standing for this suit under [the ADA
and the FHA].
The protections of the ADA and the FHA are not limited to individuals who are
themselves handicapped. Instead, the ADA and the FHA also prohibit discrimination
against persons “associated with” a buyer or renter with a handicap. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(2)(C) (2020) (providing that it is unlawful “to discriminate against any person in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of

7
services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of . . . any
person associated with that . . . [resident]”).
Other jurisdictions have fo und standing for operators of sober or recovery houses
who assert discrimination claims under the ADA and the FHA.2 See, e.g., Tsombanidis v.
W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 574 n.6 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating in context of zoning-
related claim under FHA that “it is clear that both [landlord], as owner of the [group home
for recovering alcoholics], and [the operating entity], as the parent organization, will incur
an injury and have standing in this [ADA and FHA] case”); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior
Court of Puerto Rico for Dist. of Arecibo, 988 F.2d 252, 257 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing
cases); Caron Found. of Fla., Inc. v. City of Delray Beach , 879 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1364
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (acknowledging that a rehabilitation facility for recovering alcoholics and
substance abusers had standing based on its status “[a]s a pr ovider of services for these
[disabled] individuals”); Sharpvisions, Inc. v. Borough of Plum, 475 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521
(W.D. Pa. 2007) (stating that “agencies, such as [the operator of a group home for disabled
individuals], that provide residential services to persons with disabilities, have standing to
challenge municipal attempts to preclu de them from pursuing their missions”); Horizon
House Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Southampton , 804 F. Supp. 683, 692 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (stating that “[c]ourts have explicitly held that a person who is not himself

2 While federal caselaw is not binding, we may look to persua sive federal court opinions
for guidance, particularly where our own jurisprudence is underdeveloped. See Citizens
for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App.
2003) (“Although not binding, . . . other federa l court opinions are persuasive and should
be afforded due deference.”).

8
handicapped, but is prevented from provid ing housing for handic apped persons by a
municipality’s discriminatory acts, has standing”), aff’d, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
One Love asserts that it has been harmed by the City’s actions as a result of its
association with disabled individuals. Based on 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(C) and persuasive
caselaw from other jurisdictions, we conclude that One Love has standing to assert its
discrimination claims.3 We next turn to the merits of the appeal.
II. The district court did not err by gran ting the City’s mo tion for summary
judgment.

A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matte r of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. “A
genuine issue of material fact exists if a rati onal trier of fact, considering the record as a
whole, could find for the nonmoving party.” Leeco, Inc. v. Cornerstone Bank, 898 N.W.2d
653, 657 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2017). A material fact is one
that will affect the outcome or result of a case. O’Malley v. Ulland Bros., 549 N.W.2d 889,
892 (Minn. 1996). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolv[ing] all doubts and
factual inferences against the moving part[y].” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc ., 929
N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). The inte rpretation of a statute or
ordinance presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Eagle Lake of Becker Cty.

3 The City also argues that One Love lack s standing because the residents are not
substantially impaired in thei r daily activities. We determin e that this argument goes to
the merits of the appeal, rather than to standing, and we address it in the following section.

9
Lake Ass’n v. Becker Ct y. Bd. of Comm’rs , 738 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Minn. App. 2007).
Typically, “when the material fa cts are not in dispute, an appellate court will review the
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Melrose Gates, LLC v. Moua , 875
N.W.2d 814, 819 (Minn. 2016).
B. Legal and Statutory Framework
i. The ADA
The ADA prohibits discrimina tion “on the basis of disab ility in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any pers on who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2020). Prohibited
discrimination under the ADA includes:
(i) the imposition or appli cation of eligibility criteria
that screen out or tend to scre en out an individual with a
disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully
and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria can be
shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantag es, or accommodations being
offered; [and]
(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are
necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodatio ns to individuals with
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations . . . .
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (2020).

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“Disability,” a term of art under the ADA, is defined as: “( A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or mo re major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”
42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1) (2020). 4 Congress amended the ADA in 2008, stating that the
term “disability” was to “be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this
Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.” Pub. L. No. 110–325
§ 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553–3554 (2008) (ADA Amendments). Under post-2008 law, the
ADA provides that a qualifying disability is any “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.108(a)(1)(i) (2020).
ii. The FHA
The FHA prohibits discrimination in housi ng against persons with handicaps. 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (2020). The FHA provides that it is unlawful
to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because
of a handicap of—
(A) that person; or
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling
after it is sold, rented, or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that person.

Id. § 3604(f)(2)(A)-(C) (2020). The FHA also prohibits discrimination in the form of “a
refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s] equal

4 One Love does not make any claim for impairment under sections 12102(1)(B) or (C).

11
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2020). The FHA defines a
person with a handicap as one who has a “physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such pers on’s major life activities,” “a record of such
impairment,” or who is considered to have “such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1)-
(3) (2020).
When analyzing disability claims, courts interpret the ADA cons istently with the
FHA because the definition of disability under the ADA an d the definitio n of handicap
under the FHA are the same—a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities. See Hinneberg v. Big Stone Cty. Hous. & Redevelopment
Auth., 706 N.W.2d 220, 225 (Minn. 2005) (stating that “the substantive similarities in the
relevant language of the [ADA and the FHA] and the federal precedent interpreting them
persuade us that the provisions can be treated as identical”); see also Developmental Servs.
of Neb. v. City of Lincoln , 504 F. Supp. 2d 714, 723 (D . Neb. 2007) (interchangeably
analyzing ADA and FHA cases to determine whether a reasonable accommodation was
made). Thus, “[c]ourts generally consider in dividuals deemed to be ‘handicapped’ under
the FHA to likewise be ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the . . . ADA.” McKivitz v. Twp.
of Stowe, 769 F. Supp. 2d 803, 821 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
C. One Love Has Failed to Present Evidence to Support its Claim
i. Reasonable Accommodation, Disparate Impact, and Disparate
Treatment Claims Require a Showing of Disability

One Love asserted three theories of liability against the City under the ADA and the
FHA: (1) reasonable accommodation, (2) disparate impact, and (3) disparate treatment.

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The ADA and the FHA require a municipality to make a reasonable accommodation
when necessary to give handicapped people equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.
Citizens for a Balanced City, 672 N.W.2d at 21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), (3)(B)). To
assert a failure-to-reasonably-accommodate clai m, a plaintiff must plead four elements,
including that the plaintiff is a person with a disability unde r the ADA or the FHA, or a
person associated with that individual. Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P ., 814 F.3d 1213, 1225
(11th Cir. 2016).
A plaintiff alleging discrimination may also assert disparate treatment as a result of
their disability. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
576 U.S. 519, 539, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015); Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831-
34 (8th Cir. 2010). In a disparate-treatment case, a plaintiff “mus t establish that the
defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs ,
576 U.S. at 525, 135 S. Ct. at 2513 (quo tation omitted). A disparate-treatment claim
requires proof of a discriminatory purpose, th rough either direct or indirect evidence.
Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 831. Absent direct evid ence of discriminatory intent, the burden-
shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct.
1817 (1973), applies. See id. A disparate-impact claim, distinct from a disparate-treatment
claim, arises when the plaintiff “challenges practices that have a disproportionately adverse
effect on minorities and are otherwise unj ustified by a legitimate rationale.” Texas Dep’t
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 576 U.S. at 525, 135 S. Ct. at 2513 (quotation omitted). To prove
disparate impact, the plaintiff must plead that a “facially ne utral policy had a significant

13
adverse impact on members of a protected minority group.” Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 833
(quotation omitted).
Disparate-treatment and disparate-impa ct claims are both predicated on a
disability. See Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
that a plaintiff can establish a disability-dis crimination claim under a theory of disparate
treatment, disparate impact, or failure to make reasonable accommodations); Peebles v.
Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2004) (“In disparate treatment cases, a similarly situated
disabled individual is treated differently because of his disability than less- or non-disabled
individuals.”); McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating
that in reasonable-accommoda tion claim, plaintiff must allege that non-disabled
individuals without plaintiff’s disab ility were treated more favorably); Weinreich v. Los
Angeles Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997) (noting that a plaintiff
must show that he or she is a qualified indivi dual with a disability to establish a violation
of the ADA).
Thus, as a threshold question we must determine whether the residents of the house
are “disabled” under the ADA or the FHA. If they are not, then One Love’s reasonable-
accommodation, disparate-treatment, and disparate-impact claims all necessarily fail.
ii. The Existence of a Handicap is an Individualized Inquiry
The ADA and the FHA recognize that th e term “handicap” may include drug
addiction and alcoholism. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(1), (2) (2020).
But alcoholism is not a disability per se. Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th
Cir. 1997); see also Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 859-60 (5th Cir.

14
1999); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, La., 932 F. Supp. 2d 683, 688 (M.D. La.
2013) (stating, “there is no per se rule that categorizes re covering alcoholics . . . as
disabled”). “[M]ere status as an alcoholic or substance abuser does not necessarily imply
a ‘limitation’ [for a disa bility determination].” Oxford House, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 689
(quotation omitted). Instead, “[t]he ADA requires an individualized inquiry” to determine
whether a particular plaintiff is disabled because of alcoholism. Burch, 119 F.3d at 317.
One Love argues that it is entitled to protection under the ADA and the FHA because
it houses residents who are recovering from al coholism or drug addiction. But the cases
that One Love relies on are inapposite or distinguishable. First, One Love cites Lakeside
Resort Enters., LP v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Palmyra Twp ., 455 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2006), as
amended (Aug. 31, 2006). The main issue in that case was whether a proposed drug- and
alcohol-treatment facility qualified as a “dwelli ng” under the FHA, which is not at issue
here.5 Id. at 156. One Love also relies on Innovative Health Sys., In c. v. City of White
Plains, which states that current users of illegal drugs are not considered handicapped. 117

5 Lakeside stated in a footnote that “two other cour ts have held that recovering alcoholics
and drug addicts are handicappe d, so long as they are not currently using illegal drugs,”
but did not substantively analyze the issue. 455 F.3d at 156 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 920-23 (4th Cir. 1992); Conn. Hosp. v. City
of New London , 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (D. Conn . 2001)). Other courts have cited
Lakeside’s footnote for this general proposition. That said, such cases are distinguishable
from our case. See, e.g., Cornerstone Residence, Inc. v. City of Clairton, Pa., 754 F. App’x
89, 91 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Lakeside and holding that municipal ordinance did not facially
discriminate against recovering addicts seeking to live in a treatment center). We note that
the issue and the holding in Lakeside related to whether a home qualified as a “dwelling”
under the FHA. 455 F.3d at 156. Some courts have misstated the holding in Lakeside to
the extent that they interpret Lakeside as supporting the argumen t that living in a sober
home supports a per se disability finding. Because we have not been asked to consider
whether One Love’s house is a “dwelling,” we do not find Lakeside instructive.

15
F.3d 37, 48 (2d Cir. 1997). Because One Love ’s residents must not currently be using
drugs or alcohol, our case does not involve this issue. And we do not consider it instructive.
Lastly, One Love cites United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992). That
case considered whether a plaintiff who had been drug-free for one year qualified as a
current drug user under the FHA. Id. at 919-23. Again, this issue is not before us and we
do not find this case persuasive. We ther efore consider it necessary to conduct an
individualized inquiry in this case.
iii. Substantial Impairment with Major Life Activities
To qualify as handicapped or disabled under the ADA and the FHA, a recovering
addict or alcoholic must demonstrate that he or she was actually addicted to drugs or
alcohol in the past, and also that this addic tion substantially limited a major life activity.
See Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 41 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that an
individual is considered to have a disability if he or she “(1) suffers from a physical or
mental impairment, that (2) affects a major life activity, and (3) the effect is substantial”)
(quotation omitted); see also Oxford Invs., L.P. v. City of Philadelphia, 21 F. Supp. 3d 442,
454 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“Drug addiction and alcoholism are both reco gnized as potential
handicaps where the addiction substantially limits a major life activity.” (citing 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.201)). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination and survive
summary judgment, “a plaintiff must prove a substantial limit with specific evidence that
his [or her] particular impairment substantia lly limits his [or her] particular major life
activity.” Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co ., 325 F.3d 652, 656 (5th Ci r. 2003) (noting that an

16
individual inquiry into a person’s disability “centers on substantial limitation of major life
activities, not mere impairment”).
“Major life activities” include “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, spea king, breathing, learning and working.” 24
C.F.R. § 100.201(b) (2020). “‘Substantially limits’ is no t meant to be a demanding
standard,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j )(1)(i) (2020), and “Congress has instructed the courts to
determine whether a limitation is substantial in light of its command to interpret disability
broadly,” Rinehart v. Weitzell , 964 F.3d 684, 688 (8 th Cir. 2020) (quoting Oehmke v.
Medtronic, Inc ., 844 F.3d 748, 756 (8th Cir. 20 16)). Before the ADA Amendments,
temporary impairments with little or no long-term impact were not disabilities. See Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams , 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002) (stating
that limitation on one’s major life activities “must also be permanent or long term”);
Samuels v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist. , 437 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that
“temporary impairments with little or no long -term impact are not disabilities”). But the
2008 ADA Amendments “broadened the definition of wh at constitutes a disability,” and
courts now construe “disability” more broadly. Nyrop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 616 F.3d
728, 734 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that ADA Amendments broadened definition of
disability); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2 020) (instructing that “[t]he definition of
disability in this chapter shall be c onstrued in favor of broad coverage”); Gardea v. JBS
USA, LLC, 915 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2019); Oehmke, 844 F.3d at 756.
Even with this broadened definition, however, federal courts in many jurisdictions
have repeatedly recognized in various contexts that alcoho lism is not a per se disability

17
under the ADA. Burch, 119 F.3d at 316-17 (declining to classify alcoholism as a per se
disability under the ADA and re quiring plaintiff to presen t evidence that addiction
interferes with a ma jor life activity); see also Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P’ship , 735 F.3d
242, 245 (5th Cir. 2013) (sta ting in context of employment action for plaintiff alleging
anxiety and depression that while ADA Amendment “makes it easier to prove a disability,
it does not absolve a party from proving one”). This principle remains good law.6
One Love did not present evidence of a substantial limitation on major life activities
of residents who wish to live in the house. 7 See Oxford Invs., L.P., 21 F. Supp. 3d at 454
(granting summary judgment in city’s favor where property owner “presented voluminous
record evidence that establishes that a large majority of potential residents of the Property

6 Even before the amendments, courts held the aggrieved party to its burden of proof. See
Wallin v. Minn. Dep’t. of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 686 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (expressing “doubt”
that employee could sustain discrimination case when he “presented no evidence showing
that his major life activ ities were impaired”); Bailey v. Ga.-Pac. Corp ., 306 F.3d 1162,
1167-68 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that ADA plaintiff “must offer evidence demonstrating that
the limitation caused by the im pairment is substantial in terms of his or her own
experience” and determining that plaintiff’s “summary judgment evidence is not up to this
ambitious a task”).
7 One Love claims the City forfeited consideration of this issue by failing to raise it below.
The City raised this issue in its summary-judgment brief to the district court in its
discussion of standing. The district court tr eated this issue as one of standing and, citing
Scheffler v. Dohman, 785 F.3d 1260, 1261 (8th Cir. 2015 ), recognized in a footnote that
“persons in recovery, whose major life activities have been substantially impaired, may be
deemed to have a protected ‘handicap.’” The district court did not analyze this issue on
the merits. As stated, we determine that this question goes to the merits of the case rather
than to standing. And we may “affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained
on any grounds.” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis , 817 N.W.2d 150, 163
(Minn. 2012). A reviewing court “can, if it needs to, affirm summary judgment on
alternative theories presented but not ruled on at the district court level.” Nelson v. Short-
Elliot-Hendrickson, Inc., 716 N.W.2d 394, 402 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 19, 2006).

18
suffer from physical or mental impairments in the form of addiction to drugs and alcohol,”
yet “offer[ed] no record eviden ce, however, to support a finding that these impairments
substantially limit a major life activity, as is required to find the existence of a handicap”
(quotation omitted)). Instead, One Love emphasized that pros pective residents must be
self-sufficient to qualify to live in the house, explained below.
iv. One Love’s Evidence Is Insufficient to Withstand Summary Judgment
One Love argues that because all the residents are recovering drug or alcohol addicts
“they are ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the FHA.” One Love conflates “alcoholism”
with “substantial impairment” and argues that the residents’ status as recovering alcoholics,
standing alone, is enough to establish disa bility. This contention is not supported by
caselaw or by the plain language of the ADA and the FHA, and One Love’s cases are
distinguishable, as discussed above. Mo reover, One Love’s assertion ignores settled
caselaw that courts must decide disability case-by-case and only where the cited disability
“substantially limited the major life activity.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118
S. Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998); see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3; Scheffler, 785 F.3d at 1261-62
(affirming dismissal of ADA discrimination claim where plaintiff failed to present
evidence that alcoholism limited major life activities).
One Love’s own submissions defeat its claim. One Love alleged in its answer that
“Neither One Love Housing nor the House is a substance abuse treatment center, halfway
house, shelter, or a residential facility. There [is] no treatment, counseling, therapy, or any
type of health care services provided at the House or by One Love Ho using.” One Love
does not claim to be a superv ised drug rehabilitation cente r, and the cases cited by One

19
Love—which do relate to treatment facilities—are di stinguishable and not dispositive of
the issues before us in this case.
Nor did One Love pr ovide evidence supporting a di sability-finding based on the
nature of the house itself. “In the context of a zoning application affecting yet-unidentified
prospective tenants, the court’s determination of ‘handicap’ is sometimes examined based
on ‘the criteria for admission to the facility at issue.’” Yates Real Est., In c. v. Plainfield
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 404 F. Supp. 3d 889, 915 (D.N .J. 2019) (considering disabled
status of residents in a “three-quarter” rec overy house where township did not contest
disability throughout course of administrative proceedings); see also Reg’l Econ. Cmty.
Action Program v. City of Middletown , 294 F.3d 35, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that
residents of halfway house for recovering alcoholics qualified as handicapped and disabled
based on state-specific regulations prescribing admission criteria for such facilities).8
One Love—unlike the cases cited here—failed to present evidence showing that the
ADA or the FHA apply, based on the criteria for admission to the house.9 One Love cited
no evidence in the record about its admission criteria for the house in Cambridge. Instead,
One Love emphasized the living environment once people were admitted. For example, in

8 Courts have used a facilitie s-based approach in other circumstances, as well. See, e.g.,
Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr ., 49 F.3d 1002, 1010 (3d Ci r. 1995) (observing that
“no one would be able to meet a nursing home’s admissions requirements in the absence
of some handicapping condition necessitating nursing home care”).
9 One Love did not direct this court’s attention to particul ar admission requirements and
the court has no duty to search the record for that support. See generally Manning v. Jones,
875 F.3d 408, 410 (8th Cir. 2017) (noting that reviewing court will only consider
“contentions that include appropriate citations”); ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co .,
762 F.3d 744, 753 (8th Cir. 2014).

20
its answer, One Love describes the house as “provid[ing] a supportive atmosphere that is
designed to increase self-responsibility and suppo rt for persons in re covery.” One Love
acknowledges that it is not a substance-abuse-treatment center, halfway house, shelter, or
residential facility, and it also acknowledges th at it does not offer treatment, counseling,
therapy, or other healthcare-related services. Instead, One Love requires potential residents
to be self-sufficient as a precondition to living in the house. Residents willingly choose to
live in the house and no ev idence suggests that potential residents are ordered or
recommended to live in the house as a condition of recovery.
One Love requires its residents to “contribute to the operation of the house,” “attend
weekly house meetings,” and comply with “rules regarding cleanliness and upkeep” of the
house. Residents must “share in perform ing house duties, chor es, and home-related
responsibilities.” Each resident has “rotat ing responsibilities fo r keeping the common
areas both inside and outside cl ean and orderly,” and “[e]ach re sident is also responsible
for keeping his bedroom neat, clean, and orderly,” doing his own laundry, and completing
daily chores. “Each resident is responsibl e for purchasing and the cooking of his own
food,” and must be “accountable for cleaning up after themselves in both the cooking and
eating areas.”
One Love attached an exhibit to its answer entitled “Statement of Proposed Use and
Description of the Project,” which also in cluded its mission statement. The mission
statement does not explain how One Love id entifies or otherwise recruits potential
residents to the house. Once they enter the house, however, One Love requires its residents
to “work a full-time job (minimum 32 hours) or part-time job in addition to school hours

21
and or volunteer service (totaling minimum of 32 hours).” One Love’s mission includes
“provid[ing] job placement for those in recove ry to support the employment needs of the
community giving independence to those in recovery.” The statement of proposed use also
requires the residents to sign a contract sti pulating that they will, among other things,
“maintain at least 32 hours of employment per week” or be a “full time student.” One Love
does not assert that its residents or potentia l residents are unable to live on their own or
maintain independent living outside One Love. Cf. Oxford House, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 689
(finding recovery home residents were ha ndicapped based on specific testimony of
residents’ inability to live independently outside home).
One Love’s own expert, Chris Edrington, toured the house and reported that “[t]he
residents in this house are generally working men who have real jobs of at least 40 hours
per week.” Edrington also reported that the residents “shop for meals together at a grocery
store nearby” and “ride their bicycles, take local transportation and are able to live together
as a family.”
One Love deposed appellant Nathan Pearson, its employee, who lives and works at
the house. Pearson testified that he lives at the house to save money and to pay off his
debts. He does not claim that he is otherwise unable to live on his own. Pearson testified
that the residents have to do their own groc ery shopping, cook their meals, clean up after
meals, do their laundry, and wash their personal bedding. Pearson uses a “chore list” that
rotates every two weeks and includes such activities as mowing the lawn and cleaning the
house. Pearson agreed that part of One Love ’s mission is to encourage the residents to
engage in self-care and sel f-management, “to grow as h ealthy men” and to “be self-

22
sufficient.” Residents also participate in weekly book studies and may host their friends
and family members at holiday functions at the house. One Love did not present evidence
or testimony from any other residents suggesti ng that they could not live independently
outside the house.
In the context of summary-judgment proc eedings, “conclusory declarations [of
impairment] are insufficient to raise a ques tion of material fact ” under the ADA and the
FHA. Mazzocchi v. Windsor Owners Corp ., 204 F. Supp. 3d 583, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(quotation omitted) (“non-medica l evidence that conveys, in detail, the substantially
limiting nature of an impairment may be su fficient to survive summary judgment,” but
granting summary judgment because tenant fa iled to present eviden ce she was disabled
under the FHA) (quotation omitted); Oxford Invs., L.P. , 21 F. Supp. 3d at 454 (granting
summary judgment for city be cause “[w]ith no direct or circumstantial evidence to
demonstrate a substantial limitation of the potential residents’ major life activities,
[plaintiff-property-owner’s] claim requires the Court to assume that all recovering addicts
are handicapped. Such an analysis clearly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s directive to
conduct individualized disability assessments and is fatal to all of [plaintiff’s] FHA
claims.”).
One Love failed to offer proof that the ADA or the FHA apply based on the nature
of the facility itself. A reasonable juror, reviewing the general facility requirements, would
not conclude that every hypothetical resident must be disabled. The house does not hold
itself out as a treatment center or halfway house. The requirements outlined in One Love’s
answer and mission statement are broad enough to include persons with or without a

23
disability. And as Pearson stated, he chose to live in the house for financial reasons and
did not claim he could not live on his own elsewhere.
To the extent that One Love urges this court to look at the facility requirements
without regard to actual residents, we would reach the same conclusion. The requirements
are broad enough to include persons without disabilities and we cannot therefore say that
One Love is entitled to a disability finding based solely on the nature of the facility.
One Love also failed to prove that reside nts, once they enter the house, have a
substantial limitation on a major life activity. The record is devoid of evidence that the
residents suffer from an impairment that affects a major life activity, or that the effect is
substantial. Residents are required to work, study, volunteer, complete their own chores,
cook their own meals, and find their own tr ansportation. None of these facts—even
construed in the light most favorable to On e Love—suggest that the residents are unable
to live independently, care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, breathe,
learn, or work. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b) (defining “[m]ajor life activities”). One Love has
not alleged facts or offered evidence sufficien t to prove that the residents are limited in
their ability to perform major life activities. “Whether an impairment substantially limits
a major life activity is a threshold question.” Samuels, 437 F.3d at 801 (quoting Snow v.
Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1997)). In this case, One Love’s own
pleadings and evidence defeat its discrimination claims. Given One Love’s own evidence,
a jury would be unable to find that the residents had a substantial impairment based on their
past addictions. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. See,
e.g., Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 441 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant

24
of summary judgment when recovering a ddict could work and was therefore not
handicapped within meaning of ADA); Mazzocchi, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 612 (determining
summary judgment was appropriate because th ere was not a genuine dispute of material
fact that individual was impaired under the F HA when she could care for herself, interact
with others, and work).
Because One Love cannot sustain its cause of action for discrimination, and because
One Love relies on a disability for its claims for reasona ble accommodation, disparate
treatment, and disparate impact, we determine that One Love’s counterclaims fail.
One Love makes no other arguments challe nging the district court’s ruling on the
city’s declaratory-judgment action. For the reasons articulated above, and after a careful
review of the record, we conc lude that One Love failed to present sufficient evidence to
withstand summary judgment. As a result, the district court did not err by granting
summary judgment to the City on its zoning-enforcement cl aim, or by de nying summary
judgment to One Love on its counterclaims.
D. We do not consider the district court’s discovery rulings.
One Love also challenges th e district court’s discovery rulings. One Love argues
that the district court erred by (1) lim iting written discovery, (2 ) denying One Love’s
motion to discover complaints from members of the public about the potential use of the
house, and (3) denying One Love’s request to depose city council members and the city
attorney. A district court may limit discovery “if the discovery would not assist the district
court or change the result of the summary judgment motion.” QBE Ins. Corp. v. Twin
Homes of French Ridge Homeowners Ass’n , 778 N.W.2d 393, 40 0 (Minn. App. 2010)

25
(declining to grant continuance to allow for more discovery where newly discovered
materials would not change summary-judgment decision). As for One Love’s discovery
arguments, those discovery requests would not have uncovered evidence about whether the
residents were substantially impaired in their major life activities. Because more discovery
would not change the result of the summary judgment decision, we need not address these
arguments.
Affirmed.