John Louis Corrigan, petitioner, Appellant,

This is opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1323

John Louis Corrigan, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 14, 2021
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-16-14594

John L. Corrigan, Shakopee, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from the postconviction court’s denial of his second postconviction
petition, appellant argues that (1) his claims are not procedurally barred and (2) the former
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stalking statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(2) (2016), is overbroad and unconstitutional
as applied to him. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts underlying this case are set out in two prior opinions of this court. See
State v. Corrigan , No. A17 -1145, 2018 WL 3214271 (Minn. App. July 2, 2018), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2018) ( Corrigan I); State v. Corrigan , No. A19 -0019, 2019 WL
4010308 (Minn. App. Aug. 26, 2019) (Corrigan II). Appellant John Louis Corrigan drove
directly behind A.B. after she had maneuvered around him to access her highway exit. He
followed her for several miles through numerous turns before he eventually parked near
her when she stopped. At one point, A.B. yelled at him to stop following her or she would
call the police. Appellant responded, “I figured you already would have.” At the direction
of a 911 dispatcher, A.B. stopped at a nearby police station, where appellant likewise
stopped, and the police arrived . Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with
stalking under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(2). A jury found appellant guilty. The
district court convicted appellant and sentenced him to 120 days in jail.
Appellant, represented by an attorney, filed a direct appeal of his conviction. He
argued that the district court erred by failing to (1) recuse; (2) include appellant’s requested
jury instructions ; and (3) reject the stalking charge for lac k of probable cause. See
Corrigan I, 2018 WL 3214271 at *1. He also argued that insufficient evidence supported
his conviction. Id. This court affirmed the district court’s decision. Id.
Subsequently, appellant, then self-represented, filed his first postconviction petition.
He argued that his conviction relied on false testimony and that the district court misapplied
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the stalking statute. The postconviction court summarily dismissed his petition. On appeal,
this court construed his arguments to be that (1) the jury instructions incorrectly described
the law ; (2) the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by failing to correct false
testimony; and (3) the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing or new trial
on appellant’s motion alleging false testimony. Corrigan II, 2019 WL 4010308 at *2. We
affirmed, concluding that appellant’s claims were Knaffla-barred except for the
evidentiary-hearing claim, which we rejected on its merits. Id. at *2-5; see State v. Knaffla,
243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976).
Appellant, again self -represented, then filed his second postconviction petition,
arguing that the stalking statute , Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(2), is overbroad and
unconstitutional as applied to him. He argued that his clai ms are not procedurally barred
and that, even if they were, both exceptions to the Knaffla bar apply. The postconviction
court summarily denied all of appellant’s claims as Knaffla-barred. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant asserts that his constitutional arguments are not Knaffla-barred because
they rely on caselaw that was not available until after his conviction. We disagree.
“A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may
not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or
sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2018); see also Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
Thus, under the Knaffla bar, all claims that were raised, known, or should have been known
at the time of the direct appeal are barred. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
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Two exceptions to the Knaffla bar exist: when “(1) a novel legal issue is
presented . . . or (2) the interests of justice require review.” 1 Zumberge v. State , 937
N.W.2d 406, 411-12 (Minn. 2019). To meet the first exception, the petitioner’s claim must
be “so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time of the direct
appeal.” Swaney, 882 N.W.2d at 215; see also Ademondi v. State , 616 N.W.2d 716, 718
(Minn. 2000) (stating t hat Ademondi’s claim under Vienna Convention had reasonable
basis in law at time of appeal, even though no caselaw mentioned that law until after
Ademondi’s case). To meet the second exception, the petitioner must show that fairness
requires review and th at the petitioner unintentionally and excusably failed to raise the
claim on direct appeal. Fox v. State, 474 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1991). The petitioner
bears the burden of establishing a Knaffla exception. Buckingham v. State , 799 N.W.2d
229, 233 (Minn. 2011).
We review a postconviction court’s denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse
of discretion. Zumberge, 937 N.W.2d at 411. The postconviction court abuses its
discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s]
its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or [makes] clearly erroneous factual findings.”
Id. (quotation omitted). We review the postconviction court’s factual findings for clear
error and its legal conclusions de novo. Swaney, 882 N.W.2d at 214.

1 It is an open question whether these exceptions still apply after codification of the Knaffla
bar in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. See Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 215 n.4 (Minn.
2016). Because appellant’s claims do not satisfy either exception, we need not resolve this
issue.
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We first determine whether appellant’s claim is Knaffla-barred. Here, appellant did
not raise his constitutional argument s in either prior appeal. However, he argued that the
stalking statute was overbroad in his posttrial motion for a new trial, showing that he knew
of the claim. Further, a challenge to the constitutionality of a conviction statute is not a
novel argument on appeal or in postconviction proceedings . See, e.g., White v. State, 711
N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. 2006) (rejecting White’s claim that conviction statute was
unconstitutional as Knaffla-barred); Henderson v. State , 675 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn.
2004) (same). Because appellant knew or should have known of his constitutional claims
at the time of his direct appeal, his arguments are Knaffla-barred.
We next determine whether a Knaffla exception applies. The state argues that
appellant forfeited any argument that a Knaffla exception applies because he “never
claimed to meet an exception.” Indeed, appellant asserts that “[n]o Knaffla exception is
pleaded” because his claims are not Knaffla-barred. We agree with the state with respect
to the second exception. Appellant makes no legal or factual argument with regard to that
exception and we therefore conclude that he forfeited it. State v. Rey , 890 N.W.2d 135,
140 n.3 (Minn. App. 2017) (stating that “issues not briefed are forfeited”) (citing State v.
Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997)).
However, with regard to the first exception, a ppellant argues that the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Welfare of A.J.B. , 929 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 2019), and
this court’s decision in State v. Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. App. 2019), constitute
new legal authority that was not available at the time of his direct appeal. But the basis for
appellant’s constitutional arguments is the First Amendment and associated caselaw. That
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basis was not only reasonably available at the time of his direct appeal , but also known to
appellant as evidenced by its inclusion in his posttrial motion . Moreover, A.J.B. and
Peterson relate to different subdivisions in Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (2016) and therefore
merely bolster a then-existing legal basis. A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 848 (Minn. 2019)
(subdivision 2(6)); Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912 ( subdivision 2(4) ). That caselaw
unavailable at the time of direct appeal now provides analogous support for his argument
does not mean the basis for his argument did not exist at that time. See Ademondi, 616
N.W.2d at 718. Appellant does not meet the first exception.
Because appellant’s claims are Knaffla-barred and no exception applies, we do not
consider his substantive constitutional arguments.
Affirmed.