In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of S. S., Custodial Parent, A. S., Stepparent, and J. D. J.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1326

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of
S. S., Custodial Parent,
A. S., Stepparent, and J. D. J.

Filed March 22, 2021
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*
Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-JV-19-806

Lee Novotny, Novotny Law Office, Ltd., Chatfield, Minnesota (for appellant father J.D.J.)

Alexandra R. Griffin, Danielle L. DiFiore, Anderson Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for
respondent mother S.S. and respondent stepparent A.S.)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant-father J.D.J. challenges the district court’s order terminating his parental
rights to children R.J. and E.J. The distri ct court found that appellant abandoned the
children, neglected them, was palpably unfit to parent the children, and that it is in the best
interests of the children to terminate appellant’s parental rights. Because we conclude that

*Retired judge of the Minnesot a Court of Appeals, servin g by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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appellant neglected and abandoned his children and that termination is in the children’s
best interests, we affirm.
DECISION
A child’s natural parent is presumed to be fit and suitable to be entrusted with the
care of the child. In re Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (M inn. 1995). Parental
rights are terminated only for “grave and weighty reasons” and “when the evidence clearly
mandates such a result.” In re Welfare of Children of B.M., 845 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn.
App. 2014) (quotation omitted); In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996).
The district court may terminate parental rights (TPR) if it finds that one or more
statutory bases has been met. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2020). The standard
of proof for proceedings concerning termination of parental rights is “clear and convincing
evidence.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). That burden is on the petitioners. In
re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980). The petitioners must show that
the conditions justifying termin ation exist at the time of tr ial and will continue for an
indeterminate period of time. Id.
Ultimately, we review the district court’ s factual findings for clear error and its
determination that a statutory basis is present for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of
Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6,
2012). A finding is clearly erro neous if it is “manifestly c ontrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Children of T.R.,
750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “A district court abuses its
discretion if it acts against logic and the facts on record, or if it enters fact findings that are

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unsupported by the record, or if it misapplies the law.” In re Adoption of T.A.M. , 791
N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted). We defer to the
district court’s “determinations of witness cr edibility and the weight to be given to the
evidence.” In re Welfare of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007).
1. Abandonment
The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if the parent has abandoned the
child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 , subd. 1(b)(1). Abandonment may be established absent
any presumption of abandonment if the parent “has actually deserted the child and has an
intention to forsake the duties of parenthood.” In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678
N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004) ( quotation omitted). Abandonment that is intentional, and
not due only to misfortune and misconduct, is an important factor favoring termination. In
re Staat, 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Minn. 1970). Spor adic visitation history alone cannot
support TPR. In re Welfare of Solomon, 291 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1980); see also In
re Welfare of J.K. , 374 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Min n. App. 1985) (noting that father’s “prior
abandonment” had been “terminated by his vi gorous defense of hi s parental rights”),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985). The evidence relating to termination must address
conditions existing at the time of the hearing. Chosa, 290 N.W.2d at 769.
Here, the district court found that appellant abandoned the children for
approximately six years “while allegedly dealing with his chemical dependency.” Even
after achieving sobriety, appellant “failed to take the steps set forth in the family court order
to regain his parenting time and made no indication as to when he would do so. . . .” The
district court found that he did not use the supervised parenting time available to him, even

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throughout the proceedings. Thus, the district court found that appellant had intentionally
forsaken the children, that it was not due to misfortune or misconduct, and that it will
continue into the foreseeable future.
The record supports the district court’s fi nding. The district court ordered that while
J.D.J. completed conditions before re-comme ncing his parenting time, J.D.J. “shall be
entitled” to one hour per week visitation with the children, supervised by his mother or
another mutually agreeable responsible adult. On cross-examination, appellant admitted
that he did not exercise this supervised visitation. He did not ask his mother to serve as a
third-party supervisor to his visits. He al so did not pursue any non-physical ways to
communicate with the children, such as writing letters, bi rthday cards, or checking up on
their milestones through the children’s custodial parent. Accordingly, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discreti on in finding that appellant abandoned the
children.
2. Neglect
Another statutory ground for termination is if “the parent has substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or negl ected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat . § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).
Such duties may include providing “food, clot hing, shelter, education, and other care and
control necessary” for healthy child development. Id. The district court must “determine
that, at the time of termination, the parent is not presently able and willing to assume [his]
responsibilities and that the condition will continue for the reasonably foreseeable future.”
In re Welfare of the Child of: A.M.C. and G.J.F., 920 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. App. 2018).

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Failure to comply with a court-ordered case plan is evidence of neglect of parental duties.
In re Child of Simon, 662 N.W.2d 155, 163 (Minn. App. 2003).
The district court found that appellant failed to comply with the duties and
responsibilities imposed on him as a parent for around seven ye ars. It also found that
appellant’s chemical depende ncy did not justify him neve r exercising his supervised
visitation. Furthermore, appellant did not take the steps to comply with the order or to use
the supervised visitation even once he reached sobriety. The district court also found that
because appellant has not maintained his sobr iety outside a controlled environment while
living with his sponsor, “there is no indication he will be able to assume his responsibilities,
which are more than just supervised parenting time, for a prolonged, indeterminate period
of time.”
The record supports the district court’s finding. The guardian ad litem reported that
appellant had an “all or nothing approach” to parenting while he was chemically dependent.
As a result of this approach, appellant did not contact the children. Appellant testified that
even after he was sober, he did not request c ontact with the children. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not ab use its discretion in finding that appellant
neglected the children.
“Termination of parental rights will be affi rmed as long as at least one statutory
ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” R.W., 678 N.W.2d
at 55. The record supports by clear and convincing evidence that appellant abandoned and
neglected the children, based on two statutory grounds for termination. Therefore, we need
not address whether appellant is palpably unfit to parent the children.

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3. Best Interests of the Children
Appellant also argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that termination
of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We review a district court’s
best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. When
analyzing a child’s best interests, the court must consider the child’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship, the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship, and any competin g interests of the child. Id. “Competing interests include
such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” Id.
(quotation omitted). In a case in which statutory basis to te rminate parental rights exists,
if the interests of the parent and those of the child compete, the child’s interests are
paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020). “Because the best-interests analysis
involves credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s
global review of the record, we give considerable deference to the district court’s findings.”
In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
The district court found that because the children have been raised by S.S. and A.S.,
and they do not remember or identify appellant as their father, termination of his parental
rights is in the best interests of the children. We defer to the district court’s best-interests
determination because the r ecord supports that determin ation. The children do not
currently have an interest in preserving the relationship with appellant. Appellant testified
to an interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, however he has taken no steps
outside of appearing through this proceeding to learn about the children, express an interest
in them, or fulfill the conditions in the court order to regain his parenting time. The children

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wish to be adopted and have the same last name as S.S. and A.S., and to keep their current
family intact as they know it. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in determining th at termination of appellant’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interests.
Affirmed.