A20-1351

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-1349
A20-1351

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
K.K. and K.M.R., Parents.

Filed: September 29, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Michael Schatz, Schatz Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota, for appellant K.K.

Mallory K. Stoll, Blahnik, Prchal & Stoll, PLLC, Prior Lake, Minnesota; and

Brooke Beskau Warg, Natalie Netzel, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, Child Pro tection
Clinic, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant K.M.R.

Karin L. Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Rebecca R. Church, Alexander J. Thillman,
Assistant Winona County Attorneys, Winona, Minnesota, for respondent Winona County
Health & Human Services.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. When taking the testimony of a child informally at a hearing under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 6 (2020), the district court cannot exclude a parent’s attorney from
that testimony when excusing the presence of the parent under Minn. Stat. § 260C.163,
subd. 7 (2020).
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2. Although th e r ight to cross -examine witnesses provided in Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.163, subd. 8 (2020), is unqualified , the procedure the district court establishes to
take a child’s testimony informally must be guided by the child’s best interests.
3. Any procedural error in taking the child’s testimony in this case does not
require a new trial in light of the clear and convincing evidence supporting the district
court’s decision to terminate parental rights.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
In this appeal, we consider the procedures for taking the testimony of a child in
proceedings to terminate parental rights under Minn. Stat. ch. 260C (2020). In the trial
held in this case on Winona County’s petition to terminate parental rights, the district court
took the child’s testimony informally, exc using the parents and attorneys while the judge
questioned the child with the child’s guardian ad litem present. The district court granted
the County’s petition. On appeal, the parents each asserted that the district court erred by
taking the child’s testimony outside of their presence or that of their attorneys, thereby
effectively preventing them from exercising their right of cross-examination. The court of
appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in excluding the parents or
the attorneys while the child testified, but if there was an error, it did not require a new trial
in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the County’s petition. In re Welfare of
Child of K.K. & K.M.R., Nos. A20-1349, A20-1351, 2021 WL 1343348, at *10–11 (Minn.
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App. Apr. 12, 2021). We granted review to address the procedures to be used when taking
a child’s testimony informally under Minn. Stat. § 260C.163.1
We held oral argument on August 10, 2021, and that day, issued an order that
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. This opinion explains the reasons for our
decision. Although we conclude that the district court’s procedures did not fully vindicate
the parents’ right to cross-examine the child, see Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 8, we agree
with the court of appeals that any error in the procedures used to take the child’s testimony
does not require a new trial. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Winona County Health & Human Services (the County) filed a petition in June 2020
to terminate the parent s’ rights to their child. 2 As the trial date approached , the County
asked the district court to take the child’s testimony informally, specifically proposing that
the child be questioned only in the presence of the judge and the child’s guardian ad litem.
Father, who was self -represented during the proceeding s in the district court , objected,

1 This statute was amended during the 2021 special session, see Act of June 29, 2021,
ch. 7, art. 9, § 5 (amending Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3), but these amendments are not
relevant to the issues presented by this case. Thus, we cite to the 2020 version of the statute
in this opinion, which governed the trial in this case.

2 The parents are generally identified in the record and on appeal by their initials,
K.K. and K.M.R. For convenience, we will refer to them as either “mother,” “father,” or
“the parents,” depending on the context.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether a new trial is required because the district
court erred in using procedures to take the child’s testimony informally that interfered with
the parents’ statutory right to be present at the trial and cross-examine witnesses. Because
the statutory basis asserted in the County’s petition to terminate is not at issue , we focus
on the facts regarding the child’s trial testimony.
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noting that the technology by which the child would appear allowed the court “to toggle
mute and video settings” so there was no need to exclude the parents and mother’s attorney
from listening to the child’s testimony. 3 At that point, it was uncertain whether the child
would testify, but if he did, the district court concluded that the child’s best interests would
be served by allowing him to testify remotely, in the presence of the child’s guardian ad
litem, who could then be cross-examined by the parties on the child’s testimony. In other
words, only the judge, the guardian ad litem, and the court reporter would be present; no
attorneys—for the County, for mother, or for the child —would be present or listening if
the child testified.
At trial, evidence was offered to show the child’s preferences regarding a return to
his parents. One of the child’s foster parents and several professionals who worked with
the child testified that the child did not want to return to his parents and had repeatedly said
so. The child had also written a letter, which was admitted into evidence, stating that he
did not want to return to his parents.
During the second trial day, the parties sought clarificati on on the procedure s for
taking the child’s testimony. The attorney for the C ounty, which had asked the district
court to take the child’s testimony informally, confirmed that the procedures that had been
proposed would allow only the judge and the guardian ad litem to listen or be present when
the child testified. Mother’s attorney objected to that procedure, stating that the

3 The trial began on August 31, 2020, during a phase of the COVID -19 pandemic in
which very limited in -person proceedings were held in Minnesota’s district courts.
Accordingly, some witnesses appeared at this trial and testified virtually, via Zoom.
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opportunity to hear testimony is fundamental to the ability to cross -examine and confront
a witness. The attorney asked, at a minimum, to be allowed to listen to the child testify.
Father did not state an objection to the procedure at this point. When the child confirmed
that he w ould testify, the district court stated that the te stimony would be taken as an
informal conversation, held over Zoom, with only the judge, the guardian ad litem, and the
court reporter listening.
The district court questioned the child about school, likes and dislikes, and current
living arrangements. Th e child voluntarily stated that he did not want to return to living
with his parents. When the testimony ended and the child was off the Zoom call, the district
court thoroughly summarized the child’s testimony for the parents and the attorneys .
Neither parent asked the district court to present follow-up questions to the child, either in
writing or by calling the child to testify again. Neither parent requested a transcript of the
child’s testimony, nor questioned the child’s guardian ad litem about the child’s testimony.
After the trial, the district court granted the County’s petition to terminate the parental
relationship.
The parents each appealed, asserting among other issues that the district court erred
in taking the child’s testimony outside their presence.4 Father asserted that the district court
erred in excluding the attorneys from being present during the child’s testimony and asking
questions regarding the child’s preferences. This error required a reversal and new trial,
father argued, because the child’s testimony “significantly influenced and impacted” the

4 Father, who was self-represented at the trial, has been represented on appeal.
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district court’s decision on the child’s best interests. Mother a rgued that the child should
have testified “openly” at trial, noting that no findings were made on the need for the
procedure used in light of the child’s best interests. Neither parent asserted that the district
court’s procedure for taking the child’s testimony violated a specific constitutional right.
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that “the plain language of subdivisions 6
and 7” of section 260C.163 allows the district court “to take the testimony of a child witness
privately and informally when it is in the child’s best interests” to do so by excluding “the
parties and their attorneys” from being present during that testimony. In re Welfare of
Child of K.K. & K.M.R., 2021 WL 1343348, at *10. The court of appeals also concluded
that any error in the procedure used to take the child’s testimony did not require a new trial
because the evidence, which the court of appeals described as “overwhelming ,”
independently supported the district court’s decision. Id. at *11.
We granted the parents’ petitions for review to address the procedures for taking a
child’s testimony informally under Minn. Stat. § 260C.163.
ANALYSIS
Minnesota Statutes § 260C.163 states that a child and the child’s parent, guardian,
or custodian are entitled to “participate” in the proceedings on a petition to terminate
parental rights, and “are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the case, and
to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.” Id., subds. 2, 8. If a child testifies,
the district court can take that testimony “informally when it is in the child’s best interests
to do so.” Id., subd. 6. Among other procedures that can be used to take testimony
informally, the court may “excuse the presence of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian
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from the room where the child is questioned.” Id. When a parent is excused, the “attorney
or guardian ad litem, if any, has the right to continue to participate in proceedings during
the absence of the minor, parent, or guardian.” Id., subd. 7.
The parties agree th at section 260C.163 allows the district court to take the
testimony of a child witness informally. The questions presented here concern how to do
so while balancing the child’s best interests, which is the “paramount consideration,” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3, with the parents’ right under section 260C.163 to participate and
to cross -examine witnesses. These issues require us to interpret the language of
section 260C.163, which is a legal question that we review de novo. See In re Welfare of
Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. 2004).
I.
We first consider whether the district court erred in excluding the parents and
mother’s attorney from the proceeding while the child testified.5

5 The County argues that the parents waived their challenge to the procedure used to
take the child’s testimony at trial because they did not object to that procedure in the district
court. This assert ion is incorrect. Father objected to taking the child’s testimony before
only the judge and the guardian ad litem; mother’s attorney stated that listening to the
child’s testimony is “fundamental” to cross -examination. The parents’ challenge to the
procedure used to take the child’s testimony therefore is preserved for appeal.
On the other hand, father’s arguments regarding a self -represented party’s rights
were forfeited. Father asserts that references to “attorney” or “counsel” in subdivisions 6
and 7 of section 260C.163 must be read to encompass the right of a self-represented parent
to participate and cross -examine witnesses. Father did not assert in the district court that
as a self-represented party he had the same right to be present during the child’s testimony
as did mother’s attorney. Nor did he make this argument before the court of appeals.
Because father forfeited this issue by not raising it below, we do not address it. See In re
Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 177 n.10 (Minn. 2002) (declining to address an issue
that was not raised in the district court or in the court of appeals).
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We begin with the parents, who have a “right to participate in all proceedings on a
petition” to terminate parental rights . Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 2(a). The right to
participate, however, is not necessarily commensurate with the right to be presen t at all
stages of these proceedings. The plain meaning of “participate” is “ [t]o take part ,” The
American Heritage Dictionary 905 (2d ed. 1982), that is, in this case , to take part in the
proceedings on the County’s petition to terminate. In the same statutory provision,
however, the Legislature separately addressed a parent’s right to “personally attend all
hearings,” Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 2(a) (emphasis added), and in other provisions,
authorized the district court to “excuse the presence of” a parent from a hearing , id.,
subds. 6–7 (emphasis added). We assume that the Legislature’s use of “participate” to
broadly describe a parent’s right to take part in the proceedings on a county’s petition,
while also authorizing the district court to “excuse” a parent’s “presence” in specific
circumstances, see Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subds. 6–7 (when “the child is questioned” or
when it is in the child’s best interests) is intentional. See Nelson v. Schlener, 859 N.W.2d
288, 294 (Minn. 2015) (“When the Legislature uses different words, we normally presume
that those words have different meanings.”). By using different words, the Legislature
signaled that a parent’s right to “participate” in the proceedings can be narrowed when
circumstances require excluding the parent’s physical presence at a particular hearing.
There is no dispute that the parents participated in the proceedings before the district
court on the County’s petition to terminate their parental rights. They received notice of
scheduled hearings, they filed motions and disclose d witnesses and exhibits, and they
attended the admit/deny hearing, pretrial hearings, and review hearings. They also attended
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the trial and were present for the testimony of all witnesses other than the child. T he
question is simply whether they had a statutory right to be present for the child’s testimony.
The plain language of subdivision s 6 and 7 answers this question: the district court was
authorized to excuse the parents from the trial while the child testified . See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.163, subd. 7 (allowing the court to “temporarily excuse” a parent from a hearing);
id., subd. 6 (allowing the court to excuse a parent from the room when a child testifies “in
accordance with subdivision 7”). The parents therefore did not have a statutory right to be
present when the child testified informally.
We reach a different conclusion with respect to mother’s attorney, based on the plain
language of subdivisions 6 and 7 . Unlike the decision to “temporarily excuse” a parent’s
presence at a hea ring, nothing in the language of section 260C.163 suggests that the
attorney for a party can be excluded from the hearing.6 To the contrary, when describing
who can be excused from the hearing, the Legislature identified only specific parties—a
parent, a guardian, or a custodian—not the attorney who represents one of those parties.
In other words, while the district court “m ay excuse the presence of the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian ,” and may “temporarily excuse the presence of the parent or
guardian,” Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subds. 6–7 (emphasis added), nothing in the plain
language of these provisions authorized the district court to also exclude the parent’s

6 The Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure distinguish between parties, who have
rights to participate and be present for proceedings, and participants, whose rights are less
extensive. Compare Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 32.01 (detailing the rights of parties), with
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 33.02 (listing the rights of participants). A child’s parents, the child’s
guardian ad litem, and a child’s legal custodian are parties , rather than participants, to a
parental termination proceeding. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 32.01, subds. 1, 3.
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attorney from a hearing or proceeding. Moreover, subdivision 7 specifically directs that
“[t]he attorney or guardian ad litem, if any, has the right to continue to participate in
proceedings during the absence of the minor, parent, or guardian.”
The court of appeals relied on this language in subdivision 7 to conclude that the
district court did not err in excluding mother’s attorney while the child testified .
Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that the plain language of subdivision 7 allows
either an attorney or a guardian ad litem to be present for the child’s testimony but not both.
In re Welfare of Child of K.K. & K.M.R., 2021 WL 1343348, at *10. Further, relying on
the “singular” form of the word “attorney,” the court of appeal s concluded that if an
attorney is to be present during a child’s testimony, the plain and unambiguous language
of subdivision 7 allows only the child’s attorney to be present, not the attorney for a parent.
Id. (stating that by referring “to a singular ‘attorney’ in the same sentence as the ‘child’s
guardian’ ” the plain language supported an interpretation of “ ‘attorney’ to mean ‘the
child’s attorney’ ”).
We disagree. Read ing subdivisions 6 and 7 together, it is apparent that the
“attorney” who “has the right to continue to participate in proceedings ” when a parent or
child is excluded is the attorney who represents the excluded party. This conclusion finds
support in the plain language of subdivision 6, which allows the district court to exclude a
parent “from the room where the child is questioned in accordance with subdivision 7.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 6; see Moore v. Robinson Env’t , 954 N.W.2d 277, 281
(Minn. 2021) (explaining that we “read the provisions” of a statute “in the context of” the
entire statute). In other words, the attorney’s opportunity to “continue to participate” arises
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because the district court has excused “the parent or guardian of a minor from the hearing.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 7. Surely the Legislature would have used more specific
language, for example by allowing only “the child’s attorney” to continue to participate ,
had it intended to exclude a parent’s attorney from continuing to participate if the parent—
the attorney’s client—is excused. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020) (explaining that statutes
should be construed to give effect to all provisions).
Finally, even if there is some uncertainty about the language in subdivision 7, the
plain language in the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure expressly excludes “counsel
for any party” from the category of those whose presence during a hearing can be excused.
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 38.04 (explaining that the decision to excuse a party is made “if it is
in the best interests of the child to do so” ( emphasis added) ). Plainly, under this rule,
mother’s attorney was permitted to remain for the child’s testimony even though mother
was excused. See also In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003) (explaining
that rules governing court procedure control over statutes in juvenile protection cases).
Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err b y excusing the parents from
the hearing during the child’s testimony but did err in excluding mother’s attorney during
that testimony.
II.
Next, we consider whether the procedure used to take the child’s testimony
adequately protected the parents’ statutory right “to be heard, to present evidence,” and “to
cross-examine witnesses.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 8.
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Initially, there was some question whether the child would testify at the tria l. The
County asked the district court, by motion, to take the child’s testimony informally . See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 6. In an order filed a few days before the trial started, the
district court established the procedure to do so if the child testified. T he child would
appear remotely, with the testimony taken “in the presence of the Guardian Ad Litem,” and
the guardian ad litem could be cross-examined on the child’s testimony. The district court
concluded that this procedure would serve the child’s best interests. On the second day of
trial, when it became clear that the child would testify, mother’s a ttorney sought
clarification on who could be present during the child’s testimony, stating that the ability
to listen to the child’s testimony “is fundamental to being able to confront and cross
examine witnesses.” The district court confirmed that the child’s testimony would be taken
with only the judge, the guardian ad litem, and the court reporter listening; no one else
would be present or listening while the child testified . The district court would then
summarize the child’s testimony , and the guardian ad litem would be subject to cross -
examination on the child’s testimony. No other procedure was considered, and neither
parent nor mother’s attorney proposed or requested a different procedure.
Given their statutory right to participate in the proceedings, and the unqualified right
“to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing,” Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 8,
the parents argue that the procedure s the district court used to take the child’s testimony
was “wholly insufficient.” They note that the questions were framed by the judge, not the
parties. In addition, they assert that the context provided by seeing and hearing a witness
testify could not be captured in the district court’s summary of the child’s testimony. They
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further contend that the child’s guardian ad litem was not an adequate or permissible
substitute for cross -examination of the child because, despite the role as an advocate for
the child ’s best interests , a guar dian ad litem does not necessarily have the personal
knowledge to address matters that could be explored on cross-examination.
The County argues that parents do not have an absolute right to cross -examine a
child witness because a child’s best interests are paramount to a parent’s statutory right to
cross-examine witnesses.
The “paramount consideration” in proceedings to terminate parental rights is “the
best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3. Termination of parental rights
also implicates substantial and important interests of parents in a fundamental relationship
with a child. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 133 (Minn. 2014)
(explaining “the fundamental nature of parental rights”). Proceedings brought to terminate
parental rights thus use procedures that aim to balance these interests. See Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 1.02(b) (identifying, among other purposes of the procedures in juvenile protection
matters, a just determination that ensures “due process for all persons involved”).
The parents were not afforded an opportunity to cross -examine the child on the
informal testimony he provided; instead, they had the opportunity to cross -examine a
different witness, the child’s guardian ad litem, about the child’s testimony. Although the
parents did not pursue that opportunity, the y also did not have a transcript of the child’s
testimony on which to frame a cross -examination—they had only the district court’s
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summary of the child’s testimony .7 We conclude that these procedures did not vindicate
the parents’ statutory right to cross-examination for the following reasons.
First, subdivision 8 of section 260C.163 “entitle[s]” parents “to cross -examine
witnesses appearing at the hearing.” 8 This language is unqualified; there are no words of
exception or exclusion. The parents had no opportunity to cross-examine the child. The
procedure used here imposed a limitation on the plain language of subdivision 8 that we
cannot uphold. See Great River Energy v. Swedzinski, 860 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 2015)
(declining to “superimpose” limiting language onto a statute). Put simply , based on the

7 The parents did not ask for a transcript, did not object to the guardian ad litem being
used for cross -examination on t he child’s testimony, and did not ask the district court to
pose particular questions to the child. Father’s attorney asserted at oral argument that there
was no indication from the district court that other modes of cross -examination would be
allowed. T he parents, however, hold the right of cross -examination. Even though we
conclude that this right was not protected here, we do not endorse the suggestion that
parents can stand by silently without pursuing other options, particularly one expressly
authorized by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 6 (allowing the court to “require
counsel for any party” to submit questions before and after a child testifies informally).

8 The County asserted in its brief that because he testified informally, the child did
not appear at a hearing and, thus, the parents’ statutory right to cross-examine him was not
triggered. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 8 (stating that parents have a right “to cross-
examine witnesses appearing at the hearing” (emphasis added)). We disagree. This was
a public trial, see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 38.01 (stating that hearings in juvenile protection
matters are presumptively public), at which the County asked the court to take the child’s
testimony under the County’s proposed procedures. Nothing in section 260C.163 suggests
that a child who testifies informally does not appear at the trial; indeed, the child’s
testimony in this case is part of the official t ranscript. Further, nothing in the record
suggests that the trial in this case was anything other than a session of court presided over
by a judge, open to the public, to decide issues of fact and law relevant to the County’s
petition, including through witness testimony. See T.G.G. v. H.E.S., 946 N.W.2d 309, 316
(Minn. 2020) (explaining that a judicial hearing “could be held in the courtroom”).
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plain language of subdivision 8, the parents had a right to cross-examine the child because
the child appeared at the trial and provided testimony.
Second, nothing in the plain language of subdivision 6 of section 260C.163, which
addresses examination of a child, suggests that the cro ss-examination right provided by
subdivision 8 can be constrained to the point of excusing the testifying witness from cross-
examination. See In re Welfare of Children of S.R.K., 911 N.W.2d 821, 829 (Minn. 2018)
(concluding that an interpretation that leaves some provisions of the statute superfluous is
“untenable”). To the contrary, even when a child’s testimony is taken informally and even
when a parent is excused “from the room where the child is questioned,” the Legislature
plainly preserved the opportunity for cross -examination by allowing the court to “require
counsel for any party . . . to submit questions to the court” before and after the child’s
testimony is taken. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 6.
Third, the guardian ad litem is not an adequate stand-in for cross-examining a child
who testifies. The guardian ad litem is appointed to protect the child’s interests and
advocate for the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 5. This critically
important role does not necessarily translate to the requisite knowledge and foundation to
respond fully to questions that are posed on cross-examination based on a child’s answers
in direct examination. Further, a child’s testimony may carry considerable weight in a
district court’s decision, particularly with respect to preference as to custody, see, e.g., In
re Dependency & Neglect of Klugman, 97 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Minn. 1959) (explaining that
the testimony of a child of sufficient age on the child’s preference for future custody may
be entitled to considerable weight); In re Welfare of M.M.B., 350 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn.
16
App. 1984) (giving considerable weight to testimony of child who was “sufficiently mature
to make . . . a choice” as to future custody), and cross-examination is an important tool in
testing credibility, see, e.g. , State v. Ferguson , 742 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn. 2007)
(explaining purposes of cross -examination, including testing credibility). We are not
convinced that cross-examination via a substitute witness can adequately delve into these
issues.
Based on our analysis, we conclude that a child whose testimony is taken informally
is subject to cross -examination. Further, we conclude that the procedures suggested in
subdivision 6 of section 260C.163—including taking the testimony “outside the
courtroom,” requiring questions to be submitted in writing before and after the child
testifies, and excluding the parents “from the room where the child is questioned” —will
serve the child’s best interests while allowing parents to exercise the statutory right of
cross-examination. Nor are the proced ures specifically identified in subdivision 6 an
exhaustive list. E.g., LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. 2012)
(stating that the “word ‘includes’ is not exhaustive or exclusive” when used in a statute).
Other procedures can b e explored, depending on the circumstances of the case and the
child’s best interests. See In re A.M. & R.W., 13 P.3d 484, 488 (Okla. 2000) (“[W]hen a
court excludes a parent from the courtroom during a child’s testimony, the court should
consider alternative procedures to ensure the efficacy of the parent’s cross-examination of
the child.”). For example, as authorized by subdivision 7, a parent’s attorney can remain
while the child is examined . This feature allows the attorney to consult with the client —
17
the parent —about the child’s testimony and the options for cross -examination.9
Additionally, an expedited transcript limited to the child’ s testimony could be pr ovided,
see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 10.02 (allowing the district court to grant an “on the record
request for a transcript ”), to allow the attorney s and the parents to “submit additional
questions to the court for the witness after questioning has been completed ,” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.163, subd. 6. Other procedures may be appropriate in the context of case -specific
circumstances. See In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M. & H.W., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn.
2008) (stating that the “authority to regulate the procedures governing judicial proceedings
is an inherent judicial power”); In re Welfare of HGB, 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981)
(explaining that the “process due varies with the circumstances of the case”).
At all times, of course, the procedures for taking a child’s testimony informally and
allowing parents to exercise the statutory right of cross -examination must be established
consistent with the child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 6 (allowing a
child’s testimony to be taken informally “when it is in the child’s best interests to do so”).
The district court has broad discretion in establishing the scope of examination. See
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 57.02(d) (allowing the district court to establish at a pretrial hearing
whether the child will testify “and, if so , under what circumstances”); State v. Greer ,

9 See, e.g., In re Dependency of A.D., 376 P.3d 1140, 1144–45 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016)
(rejecting parent’s challenge to exclusion during child’s testimony based in part on the
recess taken between the direct and cross -examination to allow discussion with counsel );
In re J.B., 616 S.E.2d 264, 277 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (describing procedures used to allow
parent to “view and hear” the child’s testimony and also consult with counsel); S.C. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. v. Wilson, 574 S.E.2d 730, 735 (S.C. 2002) (explaining that a parent “should
have reasonable opportunities to confer with counsel during the child’s testimony” even if
the parent is not in the room for the testimony).
18
635 N.W.2d 82, 89 (Minn. 2001) (stating that “trial courts have broad discretion to control
the scope of cross-examination”). But we intend this point to be perfectly clear: a child’s
best interests are paramount, Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3, and the district court must
always consider a child’s best interests when establishing the procedure for taking a child’s
testimony while also preserving the parents’ right to cross -examine the child . We have
carefully considered the record in this case, and we are co nfident that the procedure the
district court implemented he re was made with the child’s best interests firmly in mind.
We also recognize that the district court maintained a vigilant focus on the child’s best
interests while navigating a difficult and complex juvenile protection matter in the midst
of a pandemic. While we conclude that the procedure used here did not fully vindicate the
parents’ statutory right to cross -examination, we have no doubt that the child’s best
interests were front and center for the district court in this case.
III.
Finally, because we have held that the district court erred in excluding mother’s
attorney during the child’s informal testimony and the procedure s used for the child’s
informal testimony did not fully protect the parents’ statutory right to cross -examination,
we consider whether a new trial is required. See In re Welfare of R.M.M. III, 316 N.W.2d
538, 542 (Minn. 1982) (concluding that the failure to comply with statutory requirement
for a case plan did not require reversal “on the facts of this case”); In re Welfare of J.M.S.,
268 N.W.2d 424, 427–28 (Minn. 1978) (concluding that the failure to follow the procedure
to establish good cause for voluntary termination “is not grounds for reversal,” and noting
that substantial evidence supported the termination decision).
19
The parents argue that their inability to cross -examine the child was prejudicial
because they could not ascertain the child’s maturity to express a preference or alternative
reasons for the preference the child stated. In the absence of this opportunity, they argue,
they could not credibly challenge the evidence provided by other witnesses, who offered
testimony to corroborate the child’s stated preferences. We disagree.
The district court’s findings and decision are well-supported by the evidence in the
record. Over 20 witnesses testified at the trial, including medical professionals, scho ol
officials, therapists for the parents and the child, the child’s foster parent, and the two
guardians ad litem who worked with the child. Testimony was also presented by County
employees who worked with the parents and the child in the months leading up to the trial
in this case. Exhibits offered by the County and the parents were admitted into evidence.
The district court found based on testimony from multiple witnesses that with one
exception the child had refused to see his parents for almost one year and had consistently
stated to several witnesses , including his foster parent, two guardians ad litem, and his
attorney, that he did not want to return to his parents’ care . Detailed findings addressed
the child’s social, educational, emotional, health, and future needs; the child’s relationship
with his parents and foster parents ; and the credibility of various witnesses. The district
court also addressed in its findings the parents’ lack of or very limited cooperation with the
requirements of the case plan. All of these findings adequately support the district court’s
decision to terminate the parents’ rights , see Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)
(authorizing termination where reasonable efforts have failed to correct the conditions that
led to the child’s placement out of the parents’ home) , and the court’s conclusion that
20
termination is in the child’s best interests . See In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. ,
744 N.W.2d 381, 385 –87 (Minn. 2008) (affirmi ng decision to terminate parental rights
where findings regarding child’s best interests were supported by substantial evidence) ;
see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1 (requiring clear and convincing evidence to
terminate parental rights); In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn.
2004) (reviewing the record to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supported
termination decision).
Thus, there is sufficient, and substantial, evidence in the record to support the
district court’s findings, conclusions, and decision to terminate the parents’ rights to their
child. The district court’s findings and conclusions are thorough and detailed . We
therefore conclude that the error in the procedure used to take the child’s informal
testimony does not require a new trial.10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

10 In reaching this conclusion, we reject father’s suggestion to apply the prejudice
standard used in cases involving an alleged due process violation. See In re Welfare of
Child of B.J.-M. & H.W., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008). Neither parent alleged that
their due process rights were violated by the procedure used to take the child’s testimony.
In re Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d at 177 n.10 (declining to address a claim that was not
raised in the lower courts). In light of the substantial evidence in the record, we also
conclude it is unnecessary to require a new trial in an exercise of our supervisory authority,
as father suggests.