State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1357

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cassandra Lynn Sheimo,
Appellant.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-19-1651

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Heather Kjos Schmit, Assistant County
Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and John Smith,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
On direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for gross -misdemeanor child
endangerment, appellant argues that the district court erred by summarily denying her
petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw her guilty plea based on her trial
counsel’s ineffective assistance of counsel. Because appellant’s trial counsel’s
performance was not objectively unreasonable and because appellant failed to allege
sufficient facts that would entitle her to relief on her ineffective -assistance-of-counsel
claim, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2019, appellant Cassandra Lynn Sheimo was charged with felony domestic
assault by strangulation, gross-misdemeanor child endangerment, and misdemeanor
domestic assault. The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred on December 16,
2018, when appellant drove her vehicle into a ditch with her daughter inside. She then
made her daughter walk across a field in cold conditions, pushed her to the ground, and
choked her. Appellant pleaded guilty to gross -misdemeanor child endangerment and ,
pursuant to the plea arrangement, the state dismissed the other charges. The district court
accepted appellant’s guilty plea and released her from custody with several conditions on
November 27, 2019. Less than a week later, appellant violated several of the conditions,
including failure to abstain from methamphetamine and marijuana , which resulted in new
charges. At appellant’s first appearance for her new charges, she asked the district court if
“there was any way [she could] just go to prison.”
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Appellant’s attorney filed a motion under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure
20. At a hearing on the motion in January 2020, appellant’s attorney informed the district
court that he was “[h]aving difficulty having consistent and . . . intelligent conversations
with [appellant] about the procedural posture of the case and what [they were] trying to
accomplish.” At the hearing, appellant told the district court that she “requested an appeal
or to withdraw [her] plea” to the child-endangerment charge because she was not aware of
the presentence investigation, and she was not able to “converse with [her] CHIPS lawyer.”
The district court ordered a competency examination to assess appellant’s mental h ealth
and suspended the criminal proceedings pending the evaluation. While the matter was
suspended, appellant was assigned a new public defender. According to appellant’s
affidavit, she informed her new attorney that she wished to withdraw her guilty pl ea
multiple times between May 18, 2020, and June 4, 2020.
Appellant was found competent on June 4, 2020. At the competency hearing,
appellant told the district court that she was “contemplating withdrawing [her] plea” in the
child-endangerment case, but neither appellant nor her attorney made any plea-withdrawal
motion. At the sentencing hearing, appellant requested that her sentence on the child -
endangerment charge be executed. The district court sentenced appellant to 365 days in
the Mower County jail.
In October 2020, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s judgment
of conviction. She then moved to stay the appeal to pursue postconviction relief. This
court granted appellant’s motion and remanded the case to the district court. In April 2021,
appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief in the district court. In June 2021, the
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district court summarily denied appellant’s request to withdraw her guilty plea. Following
the district court’s order, this court granted appellant’s motion to reinstate her direct appeal.
DECISION
I. Ineffective assistance of counsel
When an appellant first files a direct appeal but later moves for an order staying the
direct appeal to proceed with a postconviction hearing, we apply the standard for direct
appeal. Santiago v. State , 644 N.W.2d 425, 439 (Minn. 2002). Because an ineffe ctive-
assistance-of-counsel claim presents mixed questions of law and fact, our review is de
novo. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003).
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. U.S.
Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. This right is the “right to the effective
assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). This court
analyzes ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims under a two -prong test set forth in
Strickland. State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017). To prevail on
such a claim, appellant must demonstrate (1) that “counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that there is “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, ‘the result of the proceedings would have been different.’” Peltier
v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020) (quoting Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 390
(Minn. 2010)). A court need not address bo th prongs of the test if one prong is
determinative. Id.
Under the first prong, appellant must show that counsel’s “representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. An objective
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standard of reasonableness is the level of “the customary skill s and diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney would employ under similar circumstances. ” Leake v.
State, 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009). There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance was reasonable.” Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Minn. 2016).
Appellant asserts that it was objectively unreasonable for her attorneys to ignore her
requests to withdraw her guilty plea because the decision to plead guilty or withdraw a
guilty plea belongs to the client.
It is true that the decision to plead guilty belongs to the defendant and that the
attorney’s role is limited to informing the defendant’s decision. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (recognizing that an improper concession of g uilt conflicts
with a defendant’s autonomy to decide the objective of their defense). However, a
defendant is not competent to enter a plea, stand trial, or be sentenced if he or she lacks the
ability to “(a) rationally consult with counsel; or (b) understand the proceedings or
participate in the defense ” due to mental illness or deficiency. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01,
subd. 2. If reason exists to doubt the defendant’s competency, the district court is required
to suspend the criminal proceedings. Id. at subd. 3.
According to appellant’s affidavit, she made multiple requests to withdraw her
guilty plea between November 27, 2019 , and June 4, 2020. However, the criminal
proceedings against appellant were suspended from January 22, 2020, until June 4, 2020,
pending a rule 20 evaluation. Because appellant could not withdraw her guilty plea while
the matter was suspended, it was not objectively unreasonable for her attorneys to ignore
such requests.
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Further, appellant did not request to withdraw her plea any time after she was found
competent. At her competency hearing, she told the district court that she was
“contemplating” withdrawing her plea . She then appeared at three subsequent court
hearings. On July 9, 2020, appellant did not indicate that she wished to withdraw her guilty
plea, but rather, requested that the district court execute her sentence for the gross -
misdemeanor child-endangerment charge. On July 30, 2020, she again appeared in court
but did not request or move to withdraw her guilty plea. Lastly, at her sentencing hearing
on August 3, 2020, appellant did not indicate she wished to withdraw her guilty plea.
Because appellant only requested to withdraw her guilty plea at times when her
competency was in question, her attorneys’ failure to file a pre-sentencing plea-withdrawal
motion was not objectively unreasonable.1
Because appellant’s requests to withdraw her guilty plea occurred either while her
case was suspended or when there were serious doubts as to her competency, defense
counsel’s decision not to move to withdraw her guilty plea was not objectively

1 Appellant maintains that her attorneys’ deficient performance is established by their
failure to honor her request to withdraw her guilty ple a prior to sentencing pursuant to
Anderson v. State , 746 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. App. 2008), overruled on other grounds by
Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 2018). Appellant interprets Anderson to stand
for the proposition that the deficient -performance prong is established when an attorney
fails to file a pre -sentencing plea -withdrawal motion when a client requests to do so.
However, in Anderson, the attorney’s performance was deficient because he affirmatively
advised the appellant to wait to withdraw h er guilty plea until after sentencing without
adequately advising her of the higher standard applied to plea -withdrawal motions filed
after sentencing. Here, unlike in Anderson, appellant’s attorneys did not affirmatively
advise her to file a post -sentencing plea withdrawal. Instead, they did not file a pre -
sentencing plea-withdrawal motion due to continued doubts as to appellant’s competency.
Accordingly, Anderson is not dispositive of appellant’s case.
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unreasonable. Thus, the first Strickland prong is not met: appellant’s defense counsel’s
representation was not constitutionally deficient. Because appellant’s claim fails to satisfy
the performance prong, we decline to consider the prejudice prong. See Peltier , 946
N.W.2d at 372.
II. Evidentiary hearing
Alternatively, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying her request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether her defense
counsel’s failure to move to withdraw the guilty plea was due to concerns with her mental
competency. Because appellant did not allege facts that, if true, would entitle her to relief
under the statutory standard, we disagree.
A court may dismiss a petition for postconviction relief without conducting an
evidentiary hearing if “the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively
show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). To
determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required, the postconviction court must
consider the facts alleged in the petition as true and view them in “the light most favorable
to the petitioner.” Anderson v. State , 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 -23 (Minn. 2018) (quotation
omitted). If there are material facts in dispute and “the allegations in the petition, if true,
would entitle the petitioner to relief, then the court must schedule an evidentiary hearing.”
Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Minn. 2013). Conversely, the postconviction court
need not hold an evidentiary hearing “if the petitioner fails to allege facts that are sufficient
to entitle him or her to the relief requested.” Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 535. In the context of
an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim, a postconviction petitioner seeking an
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evidentiary hearing must “allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the
evidence,” would meet the two-prong Strickland test. Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d
665, 671 (Minn. 2020) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). A petitioner will not meet her
burden if she merely offers “conclusory, argumentative assertions, without fac tual
support.” State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2007).
Based on our thorough review of the record, we determine that the postconviction
court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the petition and records of the
proceeding conclusively show that appellant is not entitled to relief on her ineffective -
assistance-of-counsel claim. Appellant offered no specific factual support for her claim
that her defense attorneys ignored her requests to withdraw the guilty plea at a time when
withdrawal was appropriate and permitted. Further, counsel’ s subjective belief as to
appellant’s competency is not necessarily at issue because the standa rd for ineffective -
assistance-of-counsel claims is whether “counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
Affirmed.