In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. L. C. and T. H. F., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1359

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. L. C. and T. H. F., Parents.

Filed April 12, 2021
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-JV-20-124

Carol J. Mayer, Mayer Law Office, LLC, Arlington, Minnesota (for appellant- mother
A.L.C.)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bethene Hunsberger, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent-child)

T.H.F., Sr., Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent-father)

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Jennifer L. Christensen, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent Carver County Health and Human Services)

Dianne Schafer, Chaska, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Carver County successfully petitioned the district court to transfer legal and physical
custody of a ten-year-old child from his mother to his father following a trial precipitated
by repeated reports of his mother’s neglect and drug use. Mother argues on appeal that the
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transfer does not serve the child’s best interests and that the county failed to make
reasonable efforts to reunite her with the child. She also argues that the district court
improperly excluded her and the minor child from the custody proceedings. We hold that
clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s finding s that the transfer is in
the child’s best interests and that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother and
child, and we also hold that the district court acted within its discretion by removing mother
and child from the courtroom. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
This case involves the transfer of legal and physical custody of a ten-year-old child,
whom we will call Junior, from his moth er, A.C., to his father, T.H.F . Carver County
Health and Human Services removed all four of Mother’s children from her care in
November 2019 after learning about alleged child abuse, educational neglect, and drug use
in Mother’s home. The district court found the children to be in need of protection, and,
after Mother allegedly failed for four months to meet the consequent, court-approved case
plan, the county petitioned to transfer permanent legal and physical custody away from
Mother. Mother consented to voluntarily transfer custody of three of the children, but not
Junior. Junior’s custody was resolved by trial in July 2020 based on the following trial
evidence.
Mother had a lengthy history with child protection, culminating (as it regards this
case) in instances in 2019 involving Mother’s illegal drug use. In August 2019, sheriff’s
deputies encountered Mother when they removed Junior from the Chanhassen library after
a disturbance and took him home. Mother’s appearance and difficulty understanding the
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officers led them to suspect that she was under the influence of drugs. Mother denied any
drug use but refused to provide a urine sample for analy sis. About three weeks later,
deputies stopped Mother’s car for a traffic violation in the early morning hours. Three
minor children, including Mother’s oldest child, were in the car. After the deputies arrested
her for driving with a revoked license and no insurance, they found methamphetamine in
her purse.
The county opened a child-protection case. Case manager Haley Diser met with
Mother and her children to investigate drug involvement. Mother denied using drugs. But
on 11 occasions, she refused to submit to a urinalysis. She either cancelled or failed to
arrive for six scheduled interviews with Diser. She refused the county’s requests to
reschedule the interviews and refused its offer to conduct the interviews at her home or to
provide her with transportation to the meetings. It appeared to Diser that Mother was not
cooperating in her investigation.
Diser’s investigation included examining Mother’s history with child protection.
She found multiple reports involving suspected abuse of Junior between 2014 and 2018.
The record does not reveal that any of the reports led to criminal charges or judicial findings
of abuse. Diser also found multiple reports of neglect and maltreatment. She learned that
Junior did not attend school consistently, being absent or tardy 78 times in the 2018–2019
school year. And she learned that Mother would often leave the children without adult
supervision. Mother was evicted from her home and took the children to live in a shelter
for an extended period not specified in the record.
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The county removed the children from Mother’s care in November 2019. Two of
the children, including Junior, tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine. The
county successfully petitioned the district court to find that the children were in need of
protection. The district court adopted the county’s proposed case plan for Mother, which
prohibited her from using drugs and addressed mental-health issues.
In April 2020 the county petitioned the district court to transfer legal and physical
custody away from Mother, unsatisfied by her progress on the case plan. Mother challenged
the transfer only as to Junior. At trial, the district court heard testimony from Mother,
Mother’s caseworker, and Junior’s guardian ad litem. The caseworker and guardian ad
litem both opined that Mother had failed to meet the goals of the case plan and that it would
not be in Junior’s best interests to return to her care. The court heard testimony that Father
denied previous reports of abuse, that the county did not find that he had mistreated Junior,
and that Father had also engaged with the county in creating a safety plan and a safety
network, cooperating and addressing any concerns.
Mother was present the first two days of the five-day trial, but the district court
ordered her to participate in the proceedings through an online video-conferencing
application on the third and fourth day because she had COVID-19 symptoms. Mother’s
attorney objected, contending unsuccessfully that requiring her to participate remotely
violated her right to due process.
Junior’s foster parent brought Junior into the courtroom on the final day of trial, but
the district court prohibited his attendance. It surmised that the foster parent had brought
Junior at Mother’s behest and concluded that he was too young to observe or participate.
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The district court ordered Junior’s custody to transfer to father. It based the order
on its findings that Mother continued to use drugs and that her lack of progress under the
case plan prohibited safe reunification under her care. Mother unsuccessfully moved for a
new trial and amended findings, arguing that the district court erroneously refused to allow
Junior to attend the trial and violated her due-process rights by refusing to continue the trial
until she could attend in person.
DECISION
Mother presents a two -facet challenge to the custody -transfer decision, the first
procedural and the second substantive. Regarding procedure, she contends that the district
court improperly denied her posttrial motion. Regarding substance she contends both that
the district court wrongly concluded that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite her
with Junior and that the transfer does not serve Junior’s best interests. The challenge fails.
I
Mother first challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial and
amended findings, asserting that the district court wrongly excluded her and Junior from
the trial. The district court has broad discretion whether to grant a motion for a new trial,
and we will affirm its decision on a new-trial motion absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Christie v. Estate of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018). Mother identifies no
reason for reversal.
We reject Mother’s contention that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding Junior from the courtroom. The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection outline
procedures for hearings involving children in need of protection. See Minn. Stat.
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§ 260C.163 (2020); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 38 (outlining the hearing procedures for
placement proceedings). It is true that a child who is subject to a petition under the rules
has a right to participate in the proceedings by personally attending all hearings. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 2(a). But the district court “ may waive the presence of the minor
in court at any stage of the proceedings when it is in the best interests of the minor to do
so.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 7. And a child may testify in a placement proceeding
informally if the district court determines that doing so serves the child’s best interests.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 6. We therefore must decide whether the district court
abused its discretion by concluding that Junior’s presence and testimony would not have
served his best interests.
The record shows that when Junior’s foster parent brought him to observe the final
day of trial the district court opined that this was Mother’s attempt to allow Junior to “talk
to [the judge].” But Mother does not direct us to any place in the record where any party
properly asked the district court to allow Junior to testify formally or informally. And the
district court described the course for Junior’s attorney to procure Junior’s participation.
Mother also does not show how excluding Junior from being present on the last day
affected the outcome of the proceeding, and Junior, represented by counsel in this appeal,
presents no challenge.
Likewise uncompelling is Mother’s due-process contention arising from the district
court’s decision to proceed with Mother participating online rather than continue the case
until after Mother’s virus-related quarantine. To constitute a due-process violation, Mother
must show that the placement proceedings were fundamentally unfair and that she suffered
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prejudice as a result of any alleged violation. In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d
88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008). We have already determined that due process does not require
the physical presence of a parent at a placement proceeding. In re Welfare of A.Y.-J. ,
558 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997). Mother
was present for the first two days of trial, and she participated through an online program
on the third and fourth day. The district court balanced the importance of Mother’s physical
presence against the harm in delaying a custody decision, expressly recognizing that
Mother fully participated in the trial by her virtual presence and her attorney’s physical
presence. The district court also offered Mother additional time to discuss trial strategy
with her attorney given the circumstances. We see no procedural unfairness. The district
court did not violate Mother’s due- process rights in its response to her COVID-19
symptoms.
II
Mother also challenges the custody transfer on the merits. A district court may
transfer custody of a child if clear and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that
the transfer is in the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.163, subd. 1(a), .515,
subd. 4 (2020). A district court must consider whether the county made reasonable efforts
to reunite the parent with the child and whether the parent undertook efforts to correct the
conditions which led to out-of -home placement when determining whether to transfer
custody. Minn. Stat. § 260C.517 (2020). We review the district court’s factual conclusions
for clear error, In re Welfare of A.R.G.- B., 551 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. App. 1996), and
its decision to transfer custody for an abuse of discretion, In re Welfare of Children of A.I.,
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779 N.W.2d 886, 895 (Minn. App. 2010), review dismissed (Minn. Apr. 20, 2010). We
have seen no clear factual error or abuse of discretion here.
Mother challenges the district court’s best-interests determination, focusing on
allegations that Father abused Junior. A district court must address the suitability of a
prospective custodian before transferring custody. Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4(1); see
also A.I., 779 N.W.2d at 895. The district court acknowledged the abuse allegations. But
the district court balanced these allegations against Father’s consistent denials, which the
district court found credible, along with the lack of any administrative or judicial findings
of mistreatment by Father and Father’s cooperation with the county’s plan to address any
concerns. The district court also found credible the testimony of multiple witnesses that
Junior thrived while he was parented by Father, with no attendance or performance issues
in school. Other testimony suggested that Mother had been attempting to alienate Junior
from his father, diminishing her best-interests assertions. We are satisfied that the district
court thoroughly weighed the testimony in context and had ample evidence to find that
conferring custody to Father met the child’s best interests.
Mother’s contention that the county did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her
with Junior also fails. Reasonable efforts involve due diligence to identify services to meet
the child’s and family’s need. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(f) (2020). Mother’s contention rests
on her supposed broken relationship with her case worker and the county’s failure to
provide her transportation to reach service providers. Mother seems to argue that she would
have complied with her case plan if only she had a different case worker. The suggestion
that she would have otherwise met her case plan is speculation, lacking any factual support,
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let alone compelling support. And the assertion that the county did not offer her
transportation is belied by the record, which includes testimony that the county arranged
for taxi service and gasoline cards to accommodate Mother’s transportation challenges.
The district court had ample basis to conclude that the county made reasonable efforts.
Affirmed.