A20-1369

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1360
A20-1369

Amanda Marie Van Ryswyk,
Respondent,

vs.

Joshua Thomas Van Ryswyk,
Appellant,

and

Joshua Thomas Van Ryswyk,
Appellant,

vs.

Amanda Marie Van Ryswyk,
Respondent.

Filed July 19, 2021
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File Nos. 24-CV-20-1076, 24-CV-20-1171

Amanda Van Ryswyk, Albert Lea, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant Joshua Van Ryswyk)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Larkin, Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In these consolidated appeals arising out of the grant of a harassment restraining
order (HRO) against appellant and the denial of appellant’s petition for a n HRO against
respondent, appellant argues that the district court erred by holding an evidentiary hearing
on his petition because respondent did not request a hearing , and by granting respondent’s
petition for an HRO against him and denying his petition for an HRO against respondent .
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Joshua Thomas Van Ryswyk (husband) and respondent -wife
Amanda Marie Van Ryswyk (wife) were married in November 2018. After the part ies
were married, they had an “on and off” relationship and ultimately separated in February
2020. They maintained two homes throughout the marriage and do not have any children
together.
On August 4, 2020, wife petitioned for an HRO against husband. Her petition
alleged that, following their separation, husband engaged in acts of harassment that
included following her, sending her harassing text messages, stealing her property, and
using social media in a harassing way. The district court granted an ex parte HRO, and
husband was served with a copy. On August 20, 2020, husband filed a request for a hearing
on wife’s petition. That same day, husband filed a petition for an HRO against wife.
Husband alleged that wife had engaged in acts of harassment tha t included physical abuse,
following him, threatening him, and violating medical-record privacy laws by accessing
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and disclosing his medical records. The district court granted an ex parte HRO, and wife
was served with a copy.
The district court schedu led a hearing on both petitions . At the conclusion of the
hearing, the district court commented that it was “abundantly clear” that the
communications between the parties were not repre sentative of their “best selves ” as they
went through “very tense and emotional times” due to their divorce. But the district court
determined that husband’s behavior amounted to harassment that warranted the grant of
wife’s petition for an HRO, but wife’s behavior did not. The district court thus issued an
HRO against hus band that prohibited him from contacting or harassing wife for a period
of two years, and dismissed husband’s petition for an HRO against wife . Husband now
appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by holding an evidentiary hearing on husband’s
petition.

Husband first argues that the district court erred by holding an evidentiary hearing
on his petition for an HRO because wife did not request a hearing. He argues th at the
district court thus lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 1 to hold an evidentiary hearing on

1 We disagree with husband that this presents an issue of subject -matter jurisdiction.
“Subject-matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear the type of dispute at issue and
to grant the type of relief sought.” Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147
(Minn. 2010). Here, the district court had the authority to hear and grant petitions for
HROs. The question is therefore not whether the district court had subject -matter
jurisdiction, but whether it was procedurally proper for the distr ict court to exercise its
jurisdiction under the statute. See Elbert v. Tlam, 830 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Minn. App. 2013)
(distinguishing between questions of subject -matter jurisdiction and procedural
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husband’s HRO petition and that , by statute , the ex parte HRO against wife should have
remained in place. See Fiduciary Found., LLC ex rel. Rothfusz v. Brown, 834 N.W.2d 756,
760 (Minn. App. 2013) ( “[W]hen no hearing is held because a respondent does not timely
request a hearing, an ex parte [temporary HRO] . . . becomes an ex parte HRO . . . and
remains in effect for the period set forth [in the temporary order].” ), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2013). The district court’s application of the HRO statute is a legal question that
we review de novo. Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Human Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 566 (Minn.
2016).
We reject husband’s argument because it appears that husband, himself, requested
a hearing on his petition for an HRO against wife. Paragraph 12 of husband’s petition
states, “I am requesting a court hearing. I would ask that it be schedule d in connection
with the contested hearing under court file number 24-CV-20-1076,” which is the court file
number for wife’s HRO petition against husband. (Emphasis omitted.) Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748 (2020) sets out the procedure for obtaining an HRO . Subdivision 3(a) of that
section provides that the petitioner may request a hearing and that “[u]pon receipt of the
petition and a request for a hearing by the petitioner, the court shall order a hearing.”
Because husband requested a hearing on his own petition, the district court was required to
schedule a hea ring irrespective of whether wife requested a hearing. The district court
therefore did not err by holding an evidentiary hearing on husband’s petition.

jurisdictional defects), review granted (Minn. July 16, 201 3), and review denied (Minn.
Sept. 25, 2013).
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s petition
for an HRO against wife.

A dist rict court may issue an HRO if the court finds that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a person has engaged in harassment. Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3). “ Harassment” is defined to include “repeated incidents of intrusive or
unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect . . . on the safety,
security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship between the actor and the
intended ta rget.” Mi nn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1); see Peterson v. Johnson , 755
N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. App. 2008) (explaining that t he statute requires proof of
objectively unreasonable conduct on the part of the harasser and an objectively reasonable
belief on the part of the person subject to the harassment). A single incident of the type of
harassment presented in this case is insufficient to support an HRO. Roer v. Dunham, 682
N.W.2d 179, 182 (Minn. App. 2004).
We review the decision to grant or deny an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Witchell
v. Witchell, 606 N.W.2d 730, 731 -32 (Minn. App. 2000). A district court’s factual findings
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous, with due regard being given to the
district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Kush v.
Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 -44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29,
2004).
In claiming that the district court abused its discretion by denying his HRO petition,
husband argues that wife, a nurse with the Mayo Clinic, improperly accessed and disclosed
his medical information and that this constituted harassment justifying an HRO against
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wife. Husband testified that, after the parties’ separation, he became concerned that wife
was using the Mayo Clinic’s computer system to access his medical information. Husband
reported his concern to the Mayo Clinic’s Privacy Office, which in turn investigated the
matter. A privacy officer determined that on two o ccasions wife had accessed husband’s
general demographic information, which included his “name, address, date of birth,
medical record number, health insurance carrier, email address, home and work phone
numbers, the name of [his] primary care provider, pr imary language, religion, ethnicity,
and race.” She did not access any specific medical record. Wife acknowledged that she
accessed the information, but indicated that it was a mistake rather than the result of any
attempt to access or release husband’s medical records.
Husband also complained of wife’s disclosure of a document that wife claimed she
discovered in a box in her basement, wholly unrelated to the Mayo Clinic or her work. The
document was a report prepared by a psychologist in connection wit h an earlier court
proceeding in California involving husband. The parties agreed that the document was “a
report of an adverse medical examiner” (the adverse report) that was “created as part of
litigation . . . at the behest of someone other than ” husband. The adverse report contained
information about husband’s previous mental -health diagnoses of which wife had been
unaware. The diagnoses concerned her in light of his behavior during their separation.
Wife communicated her concerns about her own safe ty to a third party and sent the third
party a photo of the adverse report. Wife asked the third party not to disclose their
conversation to anyone.
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The district court determined that these allegations were not sufficient to support
the grant of an HRO against wife . The district court noted that the demographic
information she accessed on two occasions was information that wife would “already be
full well aware of like his religious preferences and his race.” The district court
acknowledged wife sent a picture of the adverse report to a third party, but determined that
“to claim that somehow [husband has] been tortured by the sharing of a single document
with one other identified individual, the Court just cannot find as credible.” The district
court also generally noted that the determination that husband was not entitled to an HRO
was based on the court’s “assessment of credibility and review of the exhibits that were
received.”
Husband challenges the district court ’s conclusions, arguing fi rst that the district
court inappropriately rejected his concerns related to wife’s access of his demographic data
at her work. But the district court asked husband if he “no longer [has] faith and confidence
in Mayo as a provider to protect [his] sensitive information” and whether husband had
looked for different providers. H usband responded , “I have full faith in the Mayo Clinic
protecting my privacy now they’re aware. I have no issue with them protecting my privacy
going forward” and tha t he had not made any effort to look for a different provider. This
testimony, combined with the district court’s observation that the only information
accessed was demographic information wife was already aware of, supports the district
court’s determination that the actions had little overall impact on husband.
Husband also asserts that the district court erred by determining that wife’s
disclosure of the adverse report did not violate the Minnesota Health Records Act, Minn.
8
Stat. §§ 144.291-.298 (20 20), because the act specifically covers independent medical
examinations. Husband, however, misreads the scope of coverage of the act. T he
Minnesota Health Records Act applies “to the subject and provider of an independent
medical examination requested by or paid for by a third party.” Minn. Stat. § 144.297.
While wife is a nurse, neither she nor her employer were the healthcare provider with
respect to the adverse report and the act was not violated.
We also disagree with husband’s assertion that the district court erred in declining
to conclude that wife’s actions were “intended to have an adverse effect” on husband. A
subjective standard may be applied when determining an alleged harasser’s intent. Kush,
683 N.W.2d at 845. Here, wife sent the adverse report to only one person and explained
that the contents of the report, which described multiple mental-health diagnoses, made her
concerned for her safety. Wife also noted that she was previously unaware of the diagnoses
and that husband had “adam antly denied a problem even exists.” Finally, she requested
that the third party not discuss their conversation with anyone. Given the limited disclosure
and the reasonable explanation for it, we conclude that the district court’s findings on this
issue were not an abuse of discretion.
Husband’s next argument is that wife’s emails and texts provided sufficient
evidence to support his claim that wife harassed him. He argues that the “communications
adversely impacted [him], often ultimately resulting in an inappropriate response. ” But as
the district court noted, the evidence submitted reflects that “while on the one hand he
claims he wants no contact, he responds to legitimate contacts from [wife] that normal
people can have during the course of a dissolution and he uses those as opportunities to
9
bully and badger her in ways that just do not reflect well on [him].” Again, the district
court’s findings are supported by the record and do not c onstitute an abuse of discretion.
Finally, husband argues that wife physically assaulted him. He acknowledges that
the district court discounted this testimony, but argues that when credibility determinations
“flow from a legal error, they require reconsideration.” He cites no legal authority to
support this assertion, and on appeal this court will “neither reconcile conflicting evidence
nor decide issues of witness credibility, which are exclusively the province of the
factfinder.” Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004). Here, the district
court’s findings are support ed by sufficient evidence and we reject appellant’s claims that
the district court made errors in applying the law. W e therefore conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying husband’s petition for an HRO.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting wife’s petition for an
HRO against husband.

Husband next argues that the district court abused its disc retion by granting wife’s
petition for an HRO because the district court judge was biased and the record does not
support the grant of the HRO. We will address each assertion in turn.
A. Judicial Bias
An appellate court presumes that the district cou rt judge discharged all judicial
duties in a proper manner. McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998). And
we objectively r eview the facts and circumstances surrounding a claim of judicial bias .
State v. Burrell , 743 N.W.2d 596, 60 1 (Minn. 2008). The presumption that a judge
discharged all judicial duties in an objective and neutral manner may be overcome only if
10
the party alleging bias produces evidence of favoritism or antagonism. Id. at 603. Adverse
rulings are not a basis for i mputing bias to a judge. Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341
(Minn. App. 1986).
We first note that husband did not raise the issue of bias before the district court .
An appellate court considers “only those issues that the record shows were presented a nd
considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it. ” Gummow v. Gummow , 375
N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted). A party’ s failure to raise a claim
of judicial bias during the proceedings raises doubt about the timeliness of the issue . Id.
But regardless of whether the issue was raised before the district court, husband’s claim
fails on the merits.
Husband argues that the district court judge exhibited bias by repeatedly
interjecting, asking questions of t he parties, and in the court’s explanation of its decision.
The district court did interject on several occasions to ask husband’s attorney to move on
from questions that had already been asked and answered, but evidence of impatience with
an attorney does not demonstrate bias. Id. Husband also points, as evidence of bias, to the
district court’s observations that husband “presents as really having no insight into his own
behavior,” “no ability to take ownership for his own bad choices and bad actions,” and that
“during the course of the hearing he has under oath stated things that [were] contradicted”
by the evidence presented . However, “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or ev ents occurring in the course of . . . proceedings[] do not constitute a basis
for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep -seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible. ” Burrell, 743 N.W.2d at 603 (quoting Liteky
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v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994)). Here, the district
court’s opinions were based on the evidence and testimony presented and relevant to
assessing the parties’ harassment allegations. In context, the statements are reasonably
interpreted as an explanation by the court o f the basis for its rulings and not as evidence of
a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism .” We therefore conclude that husband has failed
to overcome the presumption that the district court discharged its duties in an objective and
neutral manner.
B. Evidentiary Basis
Husband’s second claim is that the record does not support the grant of the HRO
against him. The district court summarized its reasons for granting the HRO as follows:
Turning then to Ms. Van Ryswyk’s claims , she has
amply shown that Mr. Van Ryswyk has called her abus ive
names. That while on the one hand he claims he wants no
contact, he responds to legitimate contacts from Ms. Van
Ryswyk that normal people can have during the course of a
dissolution and he uses those as opportunities to bully and
badger her in ways that just do not reflect well on Mr. Van
Ryswyk.

So between the cyber -bullying of putting the false
information on Facebook and then trying to stir up public
sentiment against Ms. Van Ryswyk, his false allegations that
would undermine her employment and filing his own petition,
frankly and obviously, in retaliat ion for Ms. Van Ryswyk
having the nerve to try to protect herself and her employment
does constitute harassment, and it has had an adverse impact as
it was intended to, although not as badly affecting Ms. Van
Ryswyk as what he has hoped. So on that basis Ms. Van
Ryswyk is entitled to a continuation of her order.

The district court then detailed the harassing statements and social-media posts upon
which the order is based, including statements by husband that wife was unprofessional
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and exhibited the “dirtiest level ” of behavior, had a “complete lack of integrity or
empathy,” and exhibited qualities unbecoming a registered nurse. Husband also told wife
that he promised she would “be further disgraced” and asserted that she was “not human,
you are a disorder,” a “one night stand queen,” a “soulless, empty, pathologically damaged
person,” and a psychopath. These statements were all taken from email and text
communications submitted as evidence. The district court determined that the public posts
were made “to numerous people with intent to publicly degrade and embarrass” wife.
Finally, the district court noted that husband stole property from wife.
Husband acknowledges that he made inappropriate statements and written
communications to wife. But he argues that the statements “were made, largely, in a fit of
passion” and that inappropriate statements alone cannot support the grant of an HRO . See
Witchell, 606 N.W.2 d at 732 (reversing the grant of an HRO and concluding that
“[a]lthough husband’s statements are inappropriate and argumentative, we cannot say that
they were intrusive or that they were intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or
privacy of wife ”). He also argues that the record does not support the district court’s
determination that he stole property or that his social -media posts contained false
information meant to undermine her employment.
We conclude, however, that the district court’s findings are supported by the record.
First, with regard to the allegation of stolen property, the district court’s finding has support
in wife’s testimony that she noticed items were missing after husband came to collect some
of his items from her house and that husband later acknowledged being in possession of at
least one of the missing items. Turning to husband’s argument that the HRO was based
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only on communications between husband and wife, this is simply not the case. The district
court also grounded the HRO on other actions and communications, including social-med ia
posts made by husband to others. Moreover, even if that were not the case, an HRO can
be grounded on comments made only to the petitioner if the comments go beyond being
merely “inappropriate and argumentative” and are instead “intrusive or . . . intended to
adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy” of petitioner. See id.
With regard to husband’s social-media posts, his original post asserted that wife sent
a picture of a medical report (referring to the adverse report) to a third party and identified
wife’s employer by name. In the post, husband also stated that anyone with a copy must
destroy it to be “in compliance wi th State and Federal Law,” and that the document was
“not accurate.” At the time husband made these posts, he was aware that the adverse report
was not connected with Mayo Clinic and that wife discovered it in a box in her basement.
Nevertheless, husband’s posts strongly suggest that wife used her position at the Mayo
Clinic to obtain the adverse report , that she has access to everyone’s personal health
information and may disclose it, and that he was trying to prevent others from becoming a
“victim of her misconduct.” He opined that her conduct was illegal under state and federal
law and “a nasty thing to do from someone trusted w ith everyone in our communities’
[personal health information].” This evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s
findings that husband’s social-media posts were an attempt to degrade and embarrass wife
and threaten her employment.
Affirmed.