In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. A. A., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1363

In the Matter of the Welfare of:
A. A. A., Child.

Filed April 26, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-JV-19-17604

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistan t County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presid ing Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After charging 15-year-old appellant A.A.A. with three counts of aiding and
abetting first-degree aggravated robbery in juvenile court, the state moved to certify these
charges to adult court. At the subsequent h earing, a forensic psychologist and a juvenile
probation officer both testified that certification would best se rve public safety. Relying

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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on that testimony, studies that each of those witnesses conducted, and other evidence, the
district court found that public safety was be st served by certifying the charges to adult
court. A.A.A. appeals. Because the record supports the district court’s findings and its
ultimate decision to certify the case was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
In October 2019, the state filed a delinquency petition ch arging A.A.A. with three
counts of aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery.1 At the time of the incident,
A.A.A. was 15 years old.
According to the petition, A.A.A. and his older juvenile brother stole three juvenile
victims’ phones. A.A.A. approached the vic tims and started talking with them at a bus
stop. Then, A.A.A.’s brother entered the bu s stop, pulled out a pistol, and demanded the
victims’ phones. When the victims refused to comply, A.A.A.’s brother hit them. A.A.A.
patted down the victims and took their phones while his brother held the gun. A.A.A. and
his brother then fled the scene.
Days after the bus stop incident, officers arrested A.A.A. for another, subsequent
armed robbery. Police executed a search warra nt at A.A.A. and hi s brother’s house and
found two of the phones th at were stolen in the bus stop incident. In a police interview,
A.A.A. admitted that he was at the bus stop but claimed that he di d not know the other
person who showed up and took the victims’ phones.

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2018).

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Shortly after the state filed the petition, the district court ordered a competency
evaluation under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01. The eval uator, forensic psychologist
Dr. Smith, opined that A.A.A. was competent to proceed but identified several potential
mental health diagnoses. A.A.A. did not dispute the evaluator’s competency opinion, and
the district court found A.A.A. to be competent.
The state filed a motion to certify the proceedings so that it could prosecute A.A.A.
as an adult. The central focus of certif ication proceedings is whether retaining the
proceeding in juvenile court serves public safety. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 2.
The state argued that retaining the matter in juvenile court wo uld not serve public safety.
A.A.A. contended that an extended juvenile jurisdiction dispositi on, which would allow
the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction until A.A.A. turned 21, was the best option to ensure
public safety.
At the certification hearing, the state called Dr. Smith and a juvenile probation
officer. Dr. Smith had, in addition to conducting the competency evaluation, completed a
study opining that certification was appropriate. The probation officer completed her own
study, also concluding that certification wa s appropriate. Broadly put, both witnesses
testified that A.A.A. had a lo ng and escalating record of de linquency adjudications that
posed a threat to public safety, that he ha d not responded well to previous programming
designed to curb his behavior, that despite various mental health diagnoses he was not
amenable to future programming, that he continued to accumulate delinquency charges as

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he was detained while this case was pending, 2 and that certificatio n would best protect
public safety.
To demonstrate that extended juvenile ju risdiction was appropriate, A.A.A. called
a corrections program lieutenant who overs ees a juvenile program at the Red Wing
correctional facility. The lieutenant testifie d about the types of services and classes
available to participants. The Red Wing program serves serious and chronic juvenile
offenders aged 10 to 21. Juveniles who have committed multiple felonies, serious felonies,
or felonies involving a firear m are eligible for th e program, so A.A.A. met the eligibility
criteria. Although the lieutenant testified that most of the Red Wing residents, like A.A.A.,
had been diagnosed with a conduct disorder, the lieutenant (who had not reviewed A.A.A.’s
records) could not testify that the program would be effective for A.A.A.
A.A.A.’s mother also testified. She stat ed that A.A.A. had been behaving better
since returning to her house on home monito ring and taking medication to address his
mental health concerns.
Following the hearing, the district court entered an order certifying the proceeding
for adult prosecution. This appeal follows.
DECISION
When a juvenile aged 14 years or older is alleged to have committed an offense that
would be a felony if committed by an adult, the state may bring a motion seeking an order

2 While placed in secure deten tion as a result of th ese charges, A.A.A. was charged with
two misdemeanors—fifth-degree assault and disorderly conduct—based on his alleged
behavior while detained.

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“certifying the proceeding for action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult
criminal violations.” Minn. Stat. §§ 260B.1 41, subd. 4, 260B.125, subds. 1, 2(1) (2020);
see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.02, subd. 1. In some cases, the district court presumes
that certification is appropriate. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3 (2020) (providing that
certification is presumptive if the child is 16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense and
certain circumstances exist). But in this case, ce rtification was non-presumptive because
A.A.A. was 15 years old at the time of the offense. See id.
In non-presumptive certification proceedi ngs, the district court may only order
certification if the state proves by clear a nd convincing evidence that retaining the
proceeding in juvenile court does not serv e public safety. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125,
subd. 2(6)(ii) (2020); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.05, subd. 4(E), 18 .06, subd. 2. To
determine whether public safety is served by certifying the ma tter, the district court must
consider:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, includi ng the existence of any
aggravating factors reco gnized by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the
impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child’s participation
in planning and carrying out the offense and the
existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines;
(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child’s programming history, including the child’s
past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and

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(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4 (2020) (emphasis added); see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq.
P. 18.06, subd. 3. In considering these factor s, the court shall give greater weight to the
seriousness of the alleged offense and the child’s prior record of delin quency than to the
other listed factors. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4.3
Here, the district court found that each public-safety factor weighed in favor of
certification and that, consequently, retaining the matter in juvenile court did not serve
public safety. We evaluate the district cour t’s decision to order certification for an abuse
of discretion, and review the district cour t’s public-safety finding for clear error. In re
Welfare of J.H. , 844 N.W.2d 28, 34-35 (Minn. 2014); cf. In re Welfare of D.M.D. ,
607 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2000) (pertaining to district court’s EJJ designation decision).
We must consider the record in the light “most favorabl e” to the district court’s
public-safety finding. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35. And only when there is “no reasonable
evidence” that supports the district court’s findi ng or if we are “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has occurred” will we reverse. Id. (quotation omitted). With
these standards in mind, we address each public safety factor in turn.
The Seriousness of the Offense in Terms of Community Protection
The district court concluded that the firs t factor, the seriousne ss of the offense in
terms of community protection, weig hed in favor of certification. See Minn.
Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(1). A.A.A. conced es that this factor weighs in favor of

3 The district court may also, after a certification hearing, designate the proceedings as an
extended juvenile prosecution. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.130, subd. 1(1) (2020).

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certification. We agree—first-degree aggrav ated robbery, involving a firearm and three
victims, is a serious offense. The district court did not err in its analysis of this factor.
The Child’s Culpability in Committing the Alleged Offense
The second factor requires the district c ourt to examine the ch ild’s culpability in
committing the alleged offense. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(2). In considering the
child’s culpability, the court should “examine the alleged offenses.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at
38. Mitigating factors recognized by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines can reduce the
child’s culpability. Minn. St at. § 260B.125, subd. 4(2); see also In re Welfare of H.B. ,
956 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn. App. 2021) (holding that only mitig ating factors recognized by
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines reduce the offender’s culpability). After considering
both A.A.A.’s participation and role in the offense, and the potential mitigating factor of
A.A.A.’s mental health conditions, the district court concluded that this factor weighed
“slightly” in favor of certification.
The record supports the district court’s an alysis regarding this factor. The court
acknowledged that A.A.A. was “somewhat less culpable” because he did not brandish the
gun. Nor did he strike any of the victims. On the other hand, the district court observed
that A.A.A. collected the victims’ items wh ile the other offender held the victims at
gunpoint. And while the district court ac knowledged that A.A.A. was diagnosed with
borderline intellectual functi oning, which provides context for A.A.A.’s actions, this
condition did not “eliminate his culpability.” Dr. Smith’s test imony supports the district
court’s finding. She testified that, while she believed that A.A.A.’s lower functioning

8
impacted his decision making, it did not undermine his culpability. Thus, there is
reasonable evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings.
Still, A.A.A. argues that his mental condi tions, his less-significant role in the
offense, and the lack of “sophisticated pl anning” cause this factor to weigh against
certification. While A.A.A.’s argument has some appeal, he essentially asks us to reweigh
the evidence. That is not our role. See State v. Johnson , 568 N.W.2d 426, 435
(Minn. 1997) (observing that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence). Rather, we must
view the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s certification order. J.H.,
844 N.W.2d at 35 (indicating that an appellate court must view record in a light most
favorable to district court’s certification or der). Because there is reasonable evidence
supporting the district court’s findings and analysis of this factor, we conclude that the
district court did not err in concluding that this factor weighs slightly in favor of
certification.
The Child’s Prior Record of Delinquency
The third public-safety factor asks the district court to consider the child’s prior
record of delinquency, which includes adjudi cated violations. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125,
subd. 4(3); In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 2008). Additionally, the
district court may consider pending delinquency petitions. In re Welfare of R.D.M. ,
825 N.W.2d 394, 400 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2013).
Here, the court concluded that this factor weighed “heavily” in favor of certification
due to the “length, persiste nce, and escalating dangerousn ess of [A.A.A.’s ] delinquency
record.” There is reasonable evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings

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and analysis. A.A.A. accumulated five delinquency adjudications between May 2016 and
the date of the current offense in October 2019. Thus, the district court reasonably found
that A.A.A.’s delinquency history is long a nd persistent. And the record supports the
district court’s finding that A.A.A.’s delinquency record is escalating. Three of A.A.A.’s
prior adjudications involved vi olent behavior. And, in addition to the first-degree
aggravated robbery charges here, A.A.A. has pending first-degree robbery, disorderly
conduct, and assault charges. We conclude that the district court did not err in its findings
and analysis of this factor.
A.A.A. does not dispute his delinquency history and instead asks us, again, to view
his record in a light more favorable to his position. Relying on In re Welfare of H.S.H. ,
609 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. App. 2000), he ar gues that his delinquency history is not
significant enough to weigh in favor of ce rtification. But A.A.A.’s reliance on H.S.H. is
misplaced. In that case we observed that, although the district court found that the appellant
had an extensive delinquency record, the court failed to explain how the appellant’s record
posed a threat to public safety. H.S.H., 609 N.W.2d at 262. Noting that the appellant’s
only other felony offense occurred six years before the offense at issue, we concluded that
the appellant’s delinquency record did not sh ow “deeply ingrained, escalating criminal
behavior that presents a threat to public safety.” Id. at 262-63.
Here, in contrast, the district court explai ned its analysis and stated that A.A.A.’s
delinquency record showed a pa ttern of conduct and an “esc alating dangerousness” that
posed a threat to public safety. Dr. Smit h’s testimony supports the district court’s
finding—she testified that A.A.A.’s delinquent behavior in multiple communities showed

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an “ingrained” attitude because A.A.A.’s crim inal behavior continued even when he was
removed from his peer group.
Finally, A.A.A. also argues that when his delinquency record is viewed in context,
this factor actually weighs agai nst certification. He contends that his criminal behavior
only escalates when he is with his older brother, who was more culpable in this incident.
He also asserts that the evidence demonstrated that he does well when he is on medication
for his mental-health conditions. Thus, A. A.A. argues, his criminal behavior is
“situational, rather than an ingrained pattern.”
While there is some evidence in the record to support A.A.A.’s argument—his
mother testified that he had been doing well on home monitoring while taking medication,
and records from prior treatmen t programs show that A.A.A. had some periods when his
behavior improved—we cannot conclude that the district court erred in finding that
A.A.A.’s juvenile record supports certification. The district court considered the influence
of A.A.A.’s older brother and A.A.A.’s ment al-health condition in its consideration of
other factors. Even despite this evidence, it was reasonable to conclude, based on the length
and severity of A.A.A.’s deli nquency history alone, that this factor weighed in favor of
certification.
The Child’s Programming History
The fourth public-safety factor requires th e district court to consider the “child’s
programming history, including the child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in
available programming.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.1 25, subd. 4(4). “Programming” in this
context refers to “a specialized system of se rvices, opportunities, or projects designed to

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meet a relevant behavioral or social need of the child.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 38. The district
court may also examine the juvenile’s behavior while in detention. N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d
at 711. In examining the child’s programming history, the court may consider whether the
child failed to complete programming, was successful in programming, and will succeed
in future programming under juvenile jurisdiction. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 39; In re Welfare
of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. App. 2012); H.S.H., 609 N.W.2d at 263. The
ultimate goal of this analysis is to determine whether public safety is served by retaining
the matter in juvenile court. Thus, the district court should not place the juvenile’s potential
for rehabilitation over the interest in public safety. P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 683.
Here, the district court concluded that th is programming-history factor weighed in
favor of certification. It found that A.A.A. participated in two long-term residential
placements—Four Oaks Group Home and Clarinda Academy—for approximately fifteen
months. And the court observed that the curre nt offense occurred only five months after
leaving his most recent residential placement, Clarinda. The district court also found that,
while A.A.A. was in secure detention in relation to this case, A.A.A. accumulated
additional charges based on his alleged behavior while detained. Based on this history, the
district court reasoned that A.A.A. had “already exhaus ted nearly all programming
options.” The court concluded that additio nal programming would no t be sufficient to
protect the public against A.A.A.’s criminal behavior.
There is reasonable evidence in the record to support th e district court’s findings
and analysis. According to the certification studies and other records in evidence, A.A.A.
exhibited poor behavior at bo th Four Oaks and Clarinda. He was “aggressive” at both

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programs and had numerous behavioral incidents. Both Dr. Smith and the probation officer
testified that A.A.A. was disruptive in progr amming, often failed to participate, and still
exhibited poor behavior even after leaving the programs. Both witnesses indicated in their
reports that A.A.A. had exhausted the resources available to juvenile offenders. The record
also supports the district court’s findings a bout A.A.A.’s behavior while detained. Two
pending charges against A.A.A. (misdemea nor disorderly conduct and misdemeanor
fifth-degree assault) arose from his alleged be havior at Dakota Count y Juvenile Services
Center.4 Considering this evidence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that this factor weighed in favor of certification.
A.A.A. asserts that the district court erred because he has only “minimal prior
treatment,” given that he was only discharged from Clarinda because his family moved to
Minnesota, and that he has only recently “maintained medi cation critical to helping him
control impulses.” But again, we must view the record in a light most favorable to the
district court’s certification order. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35. Both Dr. Smith’s report and
the probation officer’s report support the district court’s finding that this factor weighs in
favor of certification.
The Adequacy of Juvenile Justice P unishment or Programming and the
Dispositional Options Available

Courts often simultaneously consider th e final two public-safety factors—the
adequacy of juvenile justice punishment or programming and the dispositional options

4 A.A.A. had to be relocated from the Dakot a County Juvenile Services Center. That
caused the probation officer particular conc ern because it was not common to have to
relocate juvenile offenders. Dr. Smith expressed similar concerns.

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available, as the district court did here. See, e.g., N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d at 711; In re Welfare
of D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998).
In addressing the adequacy of juvenile justice punishment, it is appropriate to consider the
length of potential sentences of the dispositional options and whether those sentences
“sufficiently address the seriousness of th e offense or ensure public safety.” J.H.,
844 N.W.2d at 39.
Here, the district court concluded that th e final two public-safety factors weigh in
favor of certification because A. A.A. had e xhausted nearly all res ources in the juvenile
system and was not amenable to treatment, and because certification to adult court allowed
for significantly longer sentences that would protect public safety for a longer period of
time. There is reasonable evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings and
analysis of this factor. As discussed above, Dr. Smith’s report supports the district court’s
finding that A.A.A. was not amenable to treat ment based on his prior lack of progress in
programming. Considering the district court’ s findings regarding the other factors, we
conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the inadequacy of juvenile justice
punishment and the dispositional options available weighed in favor of certification.
A.A.A. raises four arguments to attack th e district court’s findi ngs on this factor.
First, A.A.A. argues that it was “short-sighted” for the district court to certify the case to
adult court based only on the length of time remaining under extended juvenile jurisdiction
as compared to the presumptive sentence in adult court. But it is appropriate for the district
court to consider the length of potential sentences. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 39. And the district
court did not base its findings on this factor only on the length of sentences.

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Second, A.A.A. argues that the Red Wing program was an appropriate option for
rehabilitation that would protect public safety. We are also not persuaded by this argument.
While there was evidence in the record that A.A.A. was eligible for the Red Wing program,
there is no evidence in the r ecord that A.A.A. would actua lly benefit from the program.
And a district court does not err by concluding that the final two factors weigh in favor of
certification, even when a speci fic treatment facility is identif ied, if there is no evidence
that the program would actually be effective. D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d at 745.
Third, A.A.A. contends that there is reason to believe that he would be successful if
he was taking medication and engaged in appropriate programming. He asserts that even
Dr. Smith and the probation officer agreed that he had been doing well in the four months
before the certification hearing while on home monitoring. The district court recognized
this period of success but viewed it differently, concluding that A.A.A.’s success “does not
overcome the long history of failed progra mming.” The finding is consistent with
Dr. Smith’s testimony that A.A.A.’s recent success on home monitoring did not alter her
opinion that A.A.A. was not amenable to pr ogramming or treatment. Because we must
view the record in a light most favorable to the district court’s order, we conclude that the
district court’s finding was not erroneous. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35.
Finally, A.A.A. asserts that the district court erred in weighing these factors because,
in prison, A.A.A. will be exposed to influences that could negatively impact his behavior,
and therefore endanger public safety. A.A.A. made this argument to the district court, and
the district court implicitly rejected it. Thus , on appeal, A.A.A. again asks us to reweigh
the evidence to come to a different conclusion than the district court. But to do so would

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be inconsistent with our standard of review. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35 (requiring appellate
court to view the record in a light most fa vorable to the district court’s certification
decision). We decline to reweigh the evidence.
Weighing the Factors
The ultimate question here is whether the district court clearly erred by finding that
public safety was best served by certifying this case to adult court. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35.
The district court concluded that each of the six public-safety factors weighed in favor of
a finding that public safety was best serv ed by certification—including the seriousness of
the offense and A.A.A.’s prior record, the two factors to which the district court must give
the greatest weight. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. As discusse d above, the record
supports the district court’s findings and an alysis of each factor. Consequently, we
conclude that the district court did not abus e its discretion in weighing the factors and
determining that the state met its burden of showing—by clear and convincing evidence—
that retaining the proceeding in juvenile court does not serve public safety.
Affirmed.