State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1376

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stacy Lynn Tuomi,
Appellant.

Filed August 23, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-19-1947

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County At torney, Chelsea Langton, Assistant County
Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from a conviction fo r fifth-degree drug possession, appellant
challenges the district court’s decision to deny her motion to suppress evidence. Appellant
argues that the officer did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to

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conduct an investigatory stop and that the district court erred by applying the emergency-
aid and community-caretaking exceptions to the warrant requirement. Because the officer
had reasonable, articulable suspicion of crimin al activity, we affirm the district court’s
decision.
FACTS
After an investigatory detention and warrantless vehicle search, respondent State of
Minnesota charged appellant St acy Lynn Tuomi with fifth- degree controlled-substance
possession, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.025, subdiv ision 2(1) (2018).
Tuomi moved to suppress the results of the warrantless vehicle search, arguing that the
officer who conducted the investigatory detention did not have a sufficient basis to suspect
that she was engaged in criminal activity.
Based on the evidence pres ented at the suppression hearing, the district court
determined that the state established the following facts. On the afternoon of November 3,
2019, R.M. contacted law enfo rcement to report that a woma n had taken he r grandson.
R.M. explained to law enforcement that she arranged for a ride for herself and her grandson
to an address in the area of Onigum, Minnesota. A woman known to R.M. as Stacy Borders
agreed to give R.M. and her grandson a ride to the address. 1 After R.M. placed her
grandson and some belongings in the woman’s vehicle, R.M. went to get some additional
items. When she returned, the woman was no longer there. She had removed R.M.’s
belongings from the vehicle and le ft the area with R.M.’s grandson. A note next to the

1 Stacy Borders was later identified as Stacy Tuomi.

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removed belongings said that the woman was taking R.M.’s grandson to the Onigum area.
R.M. told law enforcement th at the woman drove a “white , four-door pickup truck.”
Approximately fifteen minutes later, a law enforcement officer saw a white, four-door
pickup truck approximately one-half to one m ile from “the Onigum road.” The officer,
who had not seen any other simi lar vehicles in the area, cond ucted an investigatory stop
and identified the driver as Tuomi. The o fficer also observed R.M.’s grandson in the
vehicle. During the encounter, the officer learned Tuomi had a revo ked driver’s license,
was on probation, and had used methamphetami ne. The officer searched the vehicle and
recovered a baggie containing a crystalline substance that subsequently tested positive for
methamphetamine.
The district court denied Tuomi’s suppression motion. The district court concluded
that the officer could perform an investigatory stop based on the information provided by
R.M. The district court concluded that reasonable suspicion existed because R.M.
informed law enforcement that her grandson was “gone,” the driver left a note saying where
she was taking the grandson, and the officer located a vehicle matching R.M.’s description
in the anticipated area. The di strict court also concluded th at “the stop was justified as
either community-caretaking or emergency-aid . . . based upon [R.M.’s] report to law
enforcement.” The parties proceeded with a stipulated-evidence trial, and the district court
found Tuomi guilty. Tuomi appeals.
DECISION
Tuomi challenges the basis of the investigatory detention, asserting that the officer
lacked reasonable suspicion. We are not persuaded and affirm the district court’s decision

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to deny Tuomi’s suppression motion because th e information provided the officer with a
particularized and objective basis to suspect Tuomi of criminal activity.2
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Evidence
obtained as a result of a seizure without reasonable suspicion must be suppressed.” State
v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011). “To determine whether this constitutional
prohibition has been violated , we examine the specific police conduct at issue.” State v.
Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008). The conduct at issue here is the
investigative detention of the driver of a vehicle based on a private citizen’s tip. The
investigative detention of a driver is lawful under the Fourth Amendment when an officer
has a “particularized and objec tive basis for suspecting the pa rticular persons stopped of
criminal activity.” Berge v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690,
694-95 (1981)); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)
(stating that an investigative detention is lawful when an officer “has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot”) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30,
88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)). Eith er an officer’s own observa tions or those of a reliable
informant can support an investigative deten tion, but information given by an informant
must bear indicia of reliability to ju stify an investigatory detention. Timberlake, 744

2 Because we conclude that the officer had re asonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, we do not address Tuomi’s challenges to the district court’s use of the community-
caretaking and emergency-aid exceptions to the warrant requirement.

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N.W.2d at 393-94 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-
24 (1972)). “We presume that tips from private citizen informants are reliable,” especially
“when informants give information about their identity so th at the police can locate them
if necessary.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182-83 (Min n. 2007) (citations omitted).
This framework applies even when evaluating the reasonableness of investigative
detentions when an officer suspects that a minor law has been violated. State v. Askerooth,
681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004).
In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that “the reasonable
suspicion showing is ‘not high,’” State v. Bourke , 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006)
(quoting Richards v. Wisconsin , 520 U.S. 385, 39 4, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1422 (1997)), and
requires “a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop,” Timberlake, 744
N.W.2d at 393 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, 120 S. Ct. at 676). “Police must be
able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticular ized suspicion or ‘hunch” of
criminal activity.” Id. (quotations omitted); see also Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182 (“[T]he
officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.”
(quotation omitted)); State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (“[T]he police
need only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.”
(quotation omitted)). When determining whether a stop is justified, we consider the totality
of the circumstances based on the perspective of an objective, trained police officer. State
v. Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 2019). When facts are not in dispute, as is the
case here, we review “a pretrial order on a motion to suppress de novo and determine

6
whether the police articulated an adequate basis for the search or seizure at issue.” State v.
Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Based on the unchallenged facts in this cas e, we conclude that the officer had a
particular and objective basis for suspecting Tuomi of being engaged in criminal activity.
Pursuant to Davis, and given Tuomi’s decision not to challenge R.M.’s reliability, we
initially observe that it was reasonable for the officer to rely on th e information provided
by R.M. The officer also observed a vehicle matching R.M.’s description in the area of
Onigum. It was, therefore, r easonable for the officer to susp ect that the driver of this
vehicle was the same person reported to law en forcement. It was also reasonable for the
officer to suspect the driver of criminal activity because, at the time of the traffic stop, the
officer knew that the child had been taken without R.M.’s permission. 3 Taking the child
without permission is “somethi ng that objectively supports the [officer’s] suspicion,”
Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182 (quotation omitted), and shows that the detention was “not the
product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136 (quotation
omitted). Therefore, the office r had a specific, articulable, and objective basis to suspect
Tuomi of criminal activity when he initiated the investigative stop in this case.
Affirmed.

3 Although Tuomi argues that the record does not indicate whether R.M. is her grandson’s
legal guardian, we conclude that the offi cer reasonably suspected that Tuomi lacked
permission from the child’s legal guardian wh en Tuomi lacked permission from R.M. to
take the child anywhere by herself.